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
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












**THE HISTORY**  
**OF**  
**PHILOSOPHY.**

**VOL. II.**

*Works by the same Author.*

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BY  
GEORGE HENRY LEWES.

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## THE HISTORY.

OF

# PHILOSOPHY.

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### THE TRANSITION PERIOD.

*Philosophy struggles to emancipate itself from Theology, and at the close of the Middle Ages finally succeeds.*

**A**NCIENT PHILOSOPHY reigned for about 1000 years before its final deposition by Theology. An interval of another 1000 years may be assigned as the Transition Period between Ancient and Modern Philosophy, *i.e.* from the extinction of the Greek schools, in the sixth century, to the separation of Philosophy from Theology, by Bacon and Descartes, in the sixteenth.

The peculiarity of this Transition Period is the constant struggle of Reason to assert and justify her independence—the claim of Philosophy to exist as a function of the human mind. And this claim, under varying fortunes, was made good. The struggle, long doubtful, ended in emancipation. We have seen how Philosophy, disengaging itself from Theology, successively tried to solve all the capital problems; and how, failing everywhere, because the Method pursued was one which made failure inevitable, it once more, throughout Christendom, relapsed under the dominion of Theology. We have now to see the inevitable disquiet of Thought,



produced by the manifest incompetence of Theology to answer questions beyond its reach; we have to see Thought again seeking the aid of Philosophy, and in this search gradually becoming more and more impatient of Theology, till a final separation of the two is once more proclaimed. Thus Bacon and Descartes stand in a position somewhat analogous to that of Thales; but they have the incalculable advantage of inheriting the experience of twenty centuries, and with it the incomparable advantage of a new Method. If, in the three centuries which have since elapsed, there has been an immense progress in all departments of positive knowledge, it has been owing to this new Method. If at the same time there has been little or no progress in Metaphysics, the latest ontological systems being little distinguishable from the Alexandrian, this has been owing to the retention of the old Method, and the persistence in unverifiable speculation.

Although the Transition, commonly known as the Middle Ages, extends over nearly a thousand years, we must, as Hegel says,\* put on seven league boots to traverse it. The nature and scope of this History, no less than my own imperfect acquaintance with the writings of the period, render it necessary for my survey to be rapid. I shall distribute it into three chapters:—

1. SCHOLASTICISM.
2. ARABIAN PHILOSOPHY.
3. THE RISE OF POSITIVE SCIENCE.

Although each section would require a separate work to do it justice, it can only receive here a slight and superficial treatment, enough to carry on the story of philosophic evolution. The student will find ampler detail in the works I shall have to cite.


\* HEGEL : *Gesch. d. Phil.* iii. 99.

futility of the questions discussed, and the mode of discussing them, even more than from the arid and often frivolous poverty of the style. It is the geography of an undiscoverable country, described without splendour of imagination, and without wealth of suggestive analogy.

The work of the schools had to be done, but it is at an end. Their folios are fossils. Monstrous and lifeless shapes of a former world, having little community with the life of our own, they have for us an interest similar to that yielded by the megatherium, and the dinornis. We are no longer perplexed by their problems, but we are interested in the fact that their problems did once perplex the most eminent minds.

We must not forget that to Scholasticism we owe the emancipation of Philosophy. It was the first, and at that period the only possible, solvent of Theology. By establishing the claim of Reason—though only as a handmaid to Faith, *ancilla theologiæ*—it brought into vigorous activity the great instrument Doubt, the instrument of research. By its own failure in solving the questions it had raised, it prepared the way for the negative, but valuable solutions of Science. Men learned in reasoning freely to reason well. It was a great thing in those ages to reason on abstract subjects at all.

The universal dominion of Rome, fruitful in so many respects, was fatal to Science, then in its infancy. The disruption of the Empire, also in many respects beneficial to Humanity, was fatal to literature. Rome did her work, and left her legacy; but that legacy, so valuable as *discipline*, was less valuable as *culture*. Her dominion was succeeded by the dominion of the Church; and the Church, both by instinct and by precept, was opposed to Science and Literature. It is right that we should understand this. The great benefits which the Church conferred on Humanity can be denied only by a narrow philosophy; but her benefits were not unalloyed; and the disastrous influence she exercised on Letters and Science may be estimated by the simple fact



that, during the centuries of her undisputed dominion, not a single classic writer, not a single discoverer whose genius enlarged the intellectual horizon, not a single leader of modern thought arose to dignify her reign. The darkness of the Dark Ages was deepest when the power of the Church was least disputed: that darkness began to break when in the eleventh century the doctrines of the Church began to be called in question; the dawn was coeval with an insurrection.

Nor could it have been otherwise. The Church claimed spiritual supremacy, and aiming at the reconstruction of society on a basis of spiritual unity, was necessarily opposed to the pretensions of spiritual rivals. It held the highest truth in charge; with the highest it also claimed the lowest. Opposed as it was to this world, striving to regulate this life with a view to the life to come, its *other-worldliness*, while upholding an ideal before men's eyes, had the disadvantage of discrediting the real. Profane knowledge was, therefore, doubly despised; it was despised because it related to things of this world, and it was despised because it gave no insight into the next. It was dreaded even more than it was despised, dreaded because it claimed a share in the government of men's minds. The indignation which has so often vituperated the Church, because the Church was intolerant, would have been better directed against untutored human nature; for it is a grave error to suppose that bigotry is the monopoly of theologians, or that polemical unfairness is less conspicuous in science and philosophy than in theology. The distinguishing characteristic of theological intolerance is its belief in itself as a virtue. The conviction of finality fans into a theological flame the embers of bigotry that slumber in us all. Without rare largeness of mind, or exceptional sweetness of temper, we cannot be patient when our beliefs are opposed. Naturally we are persuaded of their truth; otherwise they would not be our beliefs; and the very love of truth, to which our opponent appeals, urges us to stand firmly by our (true) opinions. The only thing that could make us hesitate is an abiding consciousness of falli-

bility: and this is found in few minds only—those by nature sceptical and unstable, or by long training tutored into circumspection. In proportion to the importance we attach to our opinions, our irritation at doubt increases; and when our opinions have the consecration of deep feelings and large interests, it is inevitable that we should be alarmed and pained by contradiction. Hence the very word heresy, which simply means private judgment, has in all times borne an opprobrious connotation.\*

The Church was dominant; and Theology, in all respects opposed to the development of the intellect and the enlargement of knowledge, had to be dissolved by Metaphysics before Science could gain a hearing. It was Scholasticism which acted as the solvent. And here we may see an illustration of Comte's law of evolution. An abrupt transition from theological explanations of the facts of the universe to scientific explanations—omitting the intermediate stage of Metaphysics—would have been disastrous. The Church held the position of spiritual headship. Science could not have grown up under its dominion, for no sooner would their essential rivalry have become manifest than the Church would at once have suppressed the audacious innovation of rational research.

An apparent contradiction may be seen in the fact that the Arabians had no such intermediate stage, but passed over to Science almost as soon as they entered upon intellectual inquiry. The contradiction is only apparent, not real. Science was cultivated by sceptical philosophers under sceptical emirs and caliphs. But this sudden burst of a novel enthusiasm was succeeded by centuries of absolute apathy. Islamism where it had been weak grew strong.

\* 'The word heresy is Greek,' says HOBBS, 'and signifies a *taking* of anything, particularly the taking of an opinion. After the study of philosophy began in Greece, and philosophers disagreeing among themselves had started many questions not only about things natural, but also moral and civil, because every one *took* what opinion he pleased, each several opinion was called a *heresy*, which signified no more than a private opinion, without reference to truth or falsehood.'—Quoted by RICHARDSON: *English Dictionary*.

Caliphs and emirs, no less than philosophers, fell under the dominion of an energetic priesthood, and under that rule all intellectual activity withered. Theology in Europe grew weaker and weaker under the dissolving agency of Metaphysics. In Islam it grew stronger and stronger because its chief antagonist was Science, and *that* was too imperfectly matured to hold its place against Theology.

The alliance with, and subordination to, Theology, which constitute the fatal weakness of Scholasticism considered as Philosophy, constitute its great value as an agent in the evolution of thought. No wider reach was possible at that epoch. If Reason was to exercise its prerogative in a society governed by a Church, nothing but such an issue as Scholasticism could be permitted it. The dogmas were fixed. The solutions were found. Nothing remained for research, except the reconciliation of these dogmas with Reason. A new solution would have been a heresy. Philosophers were allowed to seek new routes; but they were not allowed to arrive at a new conclusion. It was something, however, to be allowed to take new routes. They thus trained themselves for travel.

'Philosophy,' said Tertullian, with perfect truth, 'is the patriarch of all the heresies.' In travelling along new roads it was inevitable that minds should arrive at new conclusions. The Church was alert. It scented a taint from afar. No sooner was danger signalled than persecution followed. This vigilance and violence greatly obstructed the free movement of thought. No questions, however seemingly remote, were long permitted to hold themselves aloof from theological direction. Plato and Aristotle could debate whether general terms were only terms or had also corresponding objects, and they debated this under no priestly dictation; but William of Champeaux and Abelard could only debate it under the ominous shadow of St. Peter's.

And yet this theological obstruction was also in one sense an aid. In those days of ignorance and incurious apathy there was an advantage in having the stimulus of dogmas

which for all men had profound interest. On subjects remote from obvious and daily needs, our imperfect intellects need the stimulus of passion before they will undergo the toil of research. In those days, far more than in our own, men would not have given their lives to the discussion of abstruse and abstract questions unless sustained by the passionate fervour of theological controversy.

Something may also be said in favour of that art of disputation against which so much eloquence has been expended. It was doubtless carried to a dangerous and ridiculous excess, and seems utterly worthless and wearisome now. Yet it was to the athletes of the Middle Ages what parliamentary debate has been to the English: a good, though by no means an unmixed good, and far from the best. We may admit that the art was ineffectual as an instrument of research, and was so far injurious that it withdrew men's energies from patient contemplation of phenomena, and employed them in the easy but illusory manipulation of formulas, thus rearing curious exotics sterile of all flowers or fruit. Nevertheless, in those days any intellectual activity which could escape on the one hand from the oppression of barbarian indifference, and on the other from theological dictation, was of value; and as the admirable historian of scholasticism remarks: 'En pressant avec trop d'énergie, dans l'ardeur de la controverse, les problèmes de l'ordre logique, on devait nécessairement en faire sortir des problèmes ontologiques, psychologiques, métaphysiques. Est-ce que l'esprit humain, une fois engagé dans la voie de la recherche, peut s'arrêter avant d'être satisfait, avant de toucher le but, ou du moins avant de croire l'avoir touché?' \*

## § II. SCOTUS ERIGENA AND ANSELM OF CANTERBURY.

So much by way of general consideration. Descending to particulars, we find Scholasticism to be not a doctrine but a movement. It began with the schools opened by Charle-

\* HAURÉAU: *De la Philosophie scolastique*, 1850, i. 419.

great subsequent influences of Arabian and Greek writers would have been powerless—the element of Doubt. Timidly as this potent weapon may have been handled, disguised as scepticism was under various subterfuges, conscious and unconscious, nevertheless its presence is unmistakable. Appearing in the shape of a feeble protest against Authority, and appealing to a higher wisdom than even that of the Fathers, it secured its footing in the domain of intelligence. The invocation of Reason, under no matter what disguise, is only the confused cry of Doubt. Faith has no need of Reason. If such aid be sought, it can only be to satisfy the unquiet intellect which cannot escape doubts. Scholasticism, as we have said, was the movement of the intellect to justify by Reason several of the dogmas of Faith. Here to excuse was to accuse.

In assigning this position to Scotus Erigena, I do not of course mean that he was the first doubter in the Christian empire, nor that he was in any way a concealed rationalist. Some modern historians probably need the correction suggested by Mr. Maurice; they may have fallen into the common error of reading modern meanings into ancient texts when they attribute to Erigena a rationalistic spirit. Nevertheless, under any interpretation of his words, there is great significance in the fact that Erigena could write thus:—

‘Thou art not ignorant,’ says the master, ‘that I think that which is first in nature is of greater dignity than that which is first in time.’ ‘This,’ says the disciple, ‘is known to almost all.’ ‘We have learnt further,’ says the master, ‘that Reason is first in nature, and Authority in time. For although nature was created together with time, Authority did not begin to exist from the beginning of nature and time. But Reason has arisen with nature and time from the beginning of things. Reason itself teaches this. For Authority no doubt hath proceeded from Reason, but Reason not by any means from Authority. And all Authority which is not approved by true Reason turns out to be weak.

affirm certain things, as if they were to be accepted on the sole strength of his presumptuous assertion. . . . Nevertheless, as we hear, this man is admired by many a one learned and versed in the wisdom of the schools, and who by his vain and pernicious eloquence so subjugates his auditors, that they no longer humbly submit themselves to the divine Scriptures, nor to the authority of the Fathers, but prefer to follow his fantastic reveries.\*

Erigena made himself the mouthpiece of those who sought a rational basis, however narrow, for their convictions. This idea once suggested could not be disregarded. The Church thundered against it; but the very echoes of that thunder only aroused a more wide-spread and prolonged attention to the idea. The pretension of Reason once asserted, was too gratifying to the intellect not to find large acceptance. Erigena might be silenced; Berengarius was silenced; but Roscellinus appeared; and after him, with greater energy and immense effect, Abelard. Even Anselm, the saintly archbishop, helped the good cause in an indirect way: he consecrated the privileges of Reason by showing the harmony between Reason and Faith.†

In the introduction to his *Monologium*, Anselm tells us that his brethren frequently requested him to set down in writing the ideas he had communicated to them in conversation. 'They begged me to borrow no important argument from Scripture, but to employ the ordinary arguments such as might be intelligible to all, to remain faithful to the rules of simple debate, seeking no other proof than such as resulted necessarily from the logical sequence of evidence.' He consented; yet he declared that in his work he has advanced nothing which is not scrupulously accordant with the writings of the Fathers, principally St. Augustin. The dread of heresy, natural to such a man, is visible throughout; and at the

\* Bishops in the ninth century seem to have been as powerful in argument as bishops in the nineteenth.

† There is a good monograph by M. CHARLES DE RÉMUSAT: *Saint Anselme de Cantorbéry*, Paris, 1853.



him, that posterity feels interested in him. M. Michelet indeed thinks that to Abelard she owes her fame: 'without his misfortunes she would have remained obscure, unheard of;' and in one sense this is true; but it is also true that, without her love, Abelard would have long ago ceased to inspire any interest: for his was essentially a shallow selfish nature. His popularity was rapid, loud, and scandalous. He was fitted for it, lived for it. But many a greater name has faded from the memories of men; many a once noisy reputation fails to awaken a single echo in posterity. Apart from the consecration of passion and misfortune, there is little in his life to excite our sympathy. Viewed in connection with Heloise he must always interest us; viewed away from her, he presents the figure of a quick, vivacious, unscrupulous, intensely vain Frenchman. But, in several respects, he represents the philosophic struggle of the twelfth century; and in this light we may consider him.

He was born in Brittany in 1079, of a noble family, named Bérenger. The name of Abelard came to him later. His master laughingly noticed his superficial manner of passing over some studies, filled as he was with others, and said, 'When a dog is well filled, he can do no more than lick the bacon.' The word *to lick*, in the corrupt Latin of that day, was *bajare*, and *Bajolardus* became the cognomen of this 'bacon-licking student' among his comrades, which he converted into *Habelardus*, 'se vantant ainsi de posséder ce qu'on l'accusait de ne pouvoir prendre.'\* In the ancient writers the name is variously spelled, as Abailardus, Abaielardus, Abaulardus, Abbajalarius, Baalaurdus, Belardus, and in French as Abeillard, Abayelard, Abalard, Abaulard, Abaalary Allebart Abulard, Beillard, Baillard, Balard, and even Esbaillard; which variations seem to imply that the

\* CHARLES DE RÉMUSAT: *Abélard*, Paris, 1845, i. 13. This valuable monograph contains the fullest biography of Abelard and the best analysis of his works yet published. Indeed, before M. COUSIN published the works of Abelard, in 1836, every account of the philosophy of this thinker was necessarily meagre and erroneous.

and, with a sophistication common to such natures, he attributes the enmities to envy at his ability, instead of to the real causes, namely his inordinate vanity and selfishness. For a time indeed the rupture with his master seemed successful. Although only two-and-twenty years of age, he established a school of philosophy at Melun, which became numerously attended, and spread his name far and wide. Emboldened by success, he removed his school still nearer to Paris—to Corbeil—in order, as he frankly tells us, that he might be more importunate to his old master. But his rival was still powerful, aged in science and respect. Intense application was necessary, and in the struggle Abelard's overtaken energies gave way. He was commanded by the physicians to shut up his school, and retire into the country for repose and fresh air.

In two years he returned to Paris, and saw with delight that his reputation had not been weakened by absence, but that on the contrary his scholars were more eager than ever. His old antagonist, William of Champeaux, had renounced the world, and retired to a cloister, where he opened the school of Saint-Victor, afterwards so celebrated. His great reputation, although suffering from Abelard's attacks, drew crowds. One day, when the audience was most numerous, he was startled by the appearance of Abelard among the students, come, as he said, to learn rhetoric. William was troubled, but continued his lecture. Abelard was silent until the question of 'Universals' was brought forward, and then suddenly changing from a disciple to an antagonist, he harassed the old man with such rapidity and unexpectedness of assault that William confessed himself defeated, and retracted his opinion. That retraction was the death of his influence. His audience rapidly dwindled. No one would listen to the minor points of Dialectics from one who confessed himself beaten on the cardinal point of all. The disciples passed over to the victor. When the combat is fierce between two lordly stags, the hinds stand quietly by, watching the issue of the contest, and if their former

lord and master, once followed and respected, is worsted, they all without hesitation pass over to the conqueror, and henceforth follow him. Abelard's school became acknowledged as pre-eminent; and, as if to give his triumph greater emphasis, the professor to whom William of Champeaux had resigned his chair was either so intimidated by Abelard's audacity, or so subjugated by his ability, that he offered his chair to Abelard, and ranged himself among the disciples.

Abelard was not content even with this victory. Although undisputed master in dialectics, he could not hear of any other teacher without envy. A certain Anselm taught Theology at Laon with immense success; and this was enough to trouble Abelard's repose; accordingly to Laon he went, ridiculed Anselm's style, laughed at the puerile admiration of the scholars, and offered to surpass the master in the explanation of Scripture. The scholars first laughed, then listened, and admired. Abelard departed, having excited anarchy in the school, and anguish in the heart of the old man.

His career, at this period, was brilliant. His reputation had risen above that of every living man. His eloquence and subtlety charmed hundreds of serious students, who thronged beneath the shadows of the cathedral in ceaseless disputation, thinking more of success in dispute than of the truths involved. M. Guizot estimates these students at not less than five thousand—of course not all at the same time. Amidst these crowds, Abelard might be seen moving with imposing haughtiness of carriage, not without the careless indolence which success had given; handsome, manly, gallant-looking, the object of incessant admiration. His songs were sung in the streets, his arguments were repeated in cloisters. The multitude reverentially made way for him as he passed; and from behind their window-curtains peeped the curious eyes of women. His name was carried to every city in Europe. The Pope sent hearers to him. He reigned, and he reigned alone.\*

\* 'Cum jam me solum in mundo supercesse philosophum aestimarem.'—*Epist.*  
i p. 9.

It was at this period that the charms and helpless position of Heloise attracted his desires. He resolved to seduce her; resolved it, as he confesses, after mature deliberation. He thought she would be an easy victim; and he who had lived in abhorrence of libertinage—*scortorum immunditiam semper abhorrebam*—felt that he had now attained such a position that he might indulge himself with impunity. We are not here attributing hypothetic scoundrelism to Abelard; we are but repeating his own statements. 'I thought, too,' he adds, 'that I should the more easily gain the girl's consent, knowing as I did to how great a degree she both possessed learning and loved it.' He tells us how he 'sought an opportunity of bringing her into familiar and daily intercourse with me, and so drawing her the more easily to consent to my wishes. With this view I made a proposal to her uncle, through certain of his friends, that he should receive me as an inmate of his house, which was very near to my school, on whatever terms of remuneration he chose; alleging as my reason that I found the care of a household an impediment to study, and its expense too burdensome.' The uncle, Fulbert, was prompted by avarice, and the prospect of gaining instruction for his niece, to consent. He committed her entirely to Abelard's charge, 'in order that whenever I should be at leisure from the school, whether by day or by night, I might take the trouble of instructing her; and should I find her negligent, use forcible compulsion. Hereupon I wondered at the man's excessive simplicity, with no less amazement than if I had beheld him entrust a lamb to the care of a famishing wolf; for in thus placing the girl in my hands for me not only to teach, but to use forcible coercion, what did he do but give full liberty to my desires, and offer the opportunity, even had it not been sought, seeing that, should enticement fail, I might use threats and stripes in order to subdue her?'

The crude brutality of this confession would induce us to

\* *Epist. i.*

suppose it was a specimen of that strange illusion which often makes reflective and analytic minds believe that their enthusiasm and passions were calculations, had we not sufficient evidence, throughout Abelard's life, of his intense selfishness and voracious vanity. History has no other such example of passionate devotion filling the mind of a woman for a dialectician. It was dialectics he taught her; since he could teach her nothing else. She was a much better scholar than he; in many respects better read. She was perfect mistress of Latin, and knew enough Greek and Hebrew to form the basis of her future proficiency. He knew nothing of Greek or Hebrew, although all his biographers, except M. Rémusat, assume that he knew them both: M. Michelet even asserting that he was the only man who did then know them.\* In the study of arid dialectics, then, must we imagine Abelard and Heloise thrown together; and, in the daily communion of their minds, passion ripened, steeped in that vague, dream-like, but intense delight, produced by the contact of great intelligences; and, as the Spanish translator of her letters says, 'buscando siempre con pretexto del estudio los parages mas retirados'—they sought in the still air and countenance of delightful studies a solitude more exquisite than any society. 'The books were open before us,' says Abelard, 'but we talked more of love than philosophy, and kisses were more frequent than sentences.'†

In spite of the prudential necessity for keeping this intrigue secret, Abelard's truly French vanity overcame his prudence. He had written love-songs to Heloise; and, with the egotism of a bad poet and indelicate lover, he was

\* He knew a few terms current in the theological literature of the day, but had he known more, his ostentatious vanity would have exhibited the knowledge on all occasions. He expressly declares, moreover, that he was forced to read Greek authors in Latin versions. See COUSIN's edition of the *Œuvres inédites*, p. 43; also *Dialectica*, p. 200, where the non-existence of Latin versions is given as the reason of his ignorance of what ARISTOTLE says in his *Physics* and *Metaphysics*.

† *Epist.* i. p. 11. He adds, with his usual crudity: 'Et sæpius ad sinus quam ad libros reducebantur manus.'

anxious for these songs to be read by other eyes besides those for whom they were composed; anxious that other men should know of his conquest. His songs were soon bandied about the streets. All Paris was in the secret of his intrigue. That which a delicate lover, out of delicacy, and a sensible lover, out of prudence, would have hidden from the world, this coxcomb suffered to be profaned by being bawled from idle and indifferent mouths.\*

At length even Fulbert became aware of what was passing under his roof. A separation took place; but the lovers continued to meet in secret. Heloise soon found herself pregnant, and Abelard arranged for her an escape to Brittany, where she resided with his sister, and gave birth to a son. When Fulbert heard of her flight, he was frantic with rage. Abelard came cringing to him, imploring pardon, recalling to him how the greatest men had been cast down by women, accused himself of treachery, and offered the reparation of marriage provided it were kept secret; because his marriage, if made known, would be an obstacle to his rising in the Church, and the mitre already glimmered before his ambitious eyes. Fulbert consented. But Heloise, with womanly self-abnegation, would not consent. She would not rob the world of its greatest luminary. 'I should hate this marriage,' she exclaimed, 'because it would be an opprobrium and a calamity.' She recalled to Abelard various passages in Scripture and ancient writers, in which wives are accursed, pointing out to him how impossible it would be for him to consecrate himself to philosophy unless he were free: how could he study amid the noises of children and domestic troubles of a household?—how much more honourable it would be for her to sacrifice herself to him! She would be his concubine. The more she humiliated herself for him the greater would be her

\* That this vanity and indelicacy are eminently French, though unhappily not exclusively French, will be admitted by all who are conversant with the life and literature of that remarkable people. This national peculiarity had not escaped the piercing gaze and healthy instincts of *MOLIÈRE*, who has an admirable passage on it: see Arnolphe's monologue, act iii. scene 3 of *L'Ecole des Femmes*.

claims upon his love; and thus she would be no obstacle to his advancement, no impediment to the free development of his genius.

‘I call God to witness,’ she wrote many years afterwards, ‘that if Augustus, the emperor of the world, had deemed me worthy of his hand, and would have given me the universe for a throne, the name of your concubine would have been more glorious to me than that of his empress: *carius mihi et dignius videretur tua dici meretrix quam illius imperatrix.*’

Gladly would Abelard have profited by this sublime passion; but he was a coward, and his heart trembled before Fulbert. He therefore endeavoured to answer her arguments; and she, finding that his resolution was fixed—a resolution which he very characteristically calls a bit of stupidity, *meam stultitiam*—burst into tears, and consented to the marriage, which was performed with all secrecy. Fulbert and his servants, however, in violation of their oath, divulged the secret. Whereupon Heloise boldly denied that she was married. The scandal became great; but she persisted in her denials, and Fulbert drove her from the house with reproaches. Abelard removed her to the nunnery of Argenteuil, where she assumed the monastic dress, though without taking the veil. Abelard furtively visited her.\* Meanwhile Fulbert’s suspicions were roused, lest this seclusion in the nunnery should be but the first step to her taking the veil, and so ridding Abelard of all impediment. Those were violent and brutal times, but the vengeance of Fulbert startled even the Paris of those days with horror. With his friends and accomplices he surprised Abelard sleeping; and there inflicted that mutilation, which Origen in a moment of religious frenzy inflicted on himself.

In shame and anguish Abelard sought the refuge of a cloister. He became a monk. But the intense selfishness of the man would not permit him to renounce the world

\* He adds, ‘Nosti . . . quid ibi tecum mea libidinis egerit intemperantia in quadam etiam parte ipsius refectorii. Nosti id impudentissime tunc actum esse in tam reverendo loco et summæ Virgini consecrato.’—*Epist.* v. p. 69.

without also forcing Heloise to renounce it. Obedient to his commands, she took the veil; thus once again sacrificing herself to him whom she had accepted as a husband with unselfish regret, and whom she abandoned in trembling, to devote herself henceforth without hope, without faith, without love, to her divine Husband.

The gates of the convent closed for ever on that noble woman whose story continues one of pure heroism to the last; but we cannot pause to narrate it here. With her disappearance, the great interest in Abelard disappears; we shall not therefore detail the various episodes of his subsequent career, taken up for the most part with quarrels—first with the monks, whose dissoluteness he reprovèd, next with theologians, whose hatred he roused by the ‘heresy’ of reasoning. He was condemned publicly to retract; he was persecuted as a heretic; he had ventured to introduce Rationalism,—or the explanation of the dogmas of faith by Reason,—and he suffered, as men always suffer for novelties of doctrine. He founded the convent of Paraclete, of which Heloise was the first abbess, and on the 21st of April, 1142, he expired, aged sixty-three. ‘Il vécut dans l’angoisse et mourut dans l’humiliation,’ says M. de Rémusat, ‘mais il eut de la gloire et il fut aimé.’

There are two points of view under which the teachings of Abelard are of interest to us. The first is his attempt to emancipate Reason; the second his attempt to disengage the doctrine of Nominalism from the heretical disgrace under which it had fallen in the hands of Roscellinus.

Carrying out more boldly and more effectively the principle started by Erigena, he brought forward Logic as an independent power in the great arena of theological debate. *Ponit in cælum os suum*, says St. Bernard, with indignation, writing to the Pope, *et scrutatur alta Dei*. It was a dangerous and damnable imprudence; and drew on him from St. Bernard this terrible accusation: *transgreditur fines quos posuerunt patres nostri*; to have passed beyond the limits set by our forefathers is, in all ages and in all nations, to have



braved the reprobation of the timid and the old. Abelard braved it.

Supported, as he thought, by thousands of partisans, Abelard assumed an attitude of offence, almost of disdain. Unconscious of his real danger, he published the substance of his Lectures in a work called *Introductio ad Theologiam*, in which he undertook to demonstrate by Reason the dogmas of Faith, and promulgated the then audacious opinion, that all dogmas should be presented under a rational form. That this was very far from being acceptable, may be read not only in his condemnation, but also in the passage of his *Dialectica*, where he says that his rivals declared it not permissible in a Christian to treat even of Dialectics, because Dialectics was not only incapable of instructing any one in the faith, but disturbed and destroyed faith by the complication of its arguments.\*

This commencement, feeble though it may have been, marks a new epoch in the development of speculation. The struggle of Reason against Authority, which was reopened by Abelard, has not yet closed. 'My disciples,' he says in his Introduction, 'asked me for arguments drawn from philosophy such as reason demanded, begging me to instruct them that they might understand and not merely repeat what was taught them; since no one can believe anything until he has first understood it; and it is ridiculous to preach to others what neither teacher nor pupil understand.'

Not content with this revolutionary principle, Abelard further 'transgressed the limits of his forefathers' by the composition of the treatise *Sic et Non*,† the object of which was to cite the passages of Scripture and the Fathers *pro* and *con.* upon every important topic: this collocation of contradictory statements given by the highest possible authorities was meant, as Abelard distinctly informs us,

\* *Dialectica*, p. 434.

† It is printed in Cousin's edition, but with omissions. The entire work was published in Germany, 1841, under this title: *Petri Abaelardi Sic et Non; primum integrum ediderunt E. L. Henke et G. S. Lindenköhl.* This is the edition I use.

to train the mind to vigorous and healthy doubt, in fulfilment of the injunction, 'Seek, and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you.' 'Dubitando enim ad inquisitionem venimus; inquirendo veritatem percipimus; juxta quod et Veritas ipsa *Quærite*, inquit, *invenietis; pulsate, et aperietur vobis.*'\* Whatever his intention may have been, the result of such a work was clearly foreseen by theological teachers, who regarded doubt as damnable, and would not tolerate it under the plausible aspects of intellectual gymnastics, or the love of seeking for truth. But theologians were unable to arrest the development of speculation. Doubt began; disputation waxed stronger; logic played like lambent flame around the most sacred subjects; Scholasticism entered every city in Europe, and filled it with subtle disputants.

During the centuries which succeeded, the question of Nominalism was constantly in debate; and beside it many others so remote, and, to modern apprehensions, so frivolous, that few historians boast of more than superficial acquaintance with mediæval philosophy, and few mention it without scorn. To name but one topic, what does the reader think of a debate *utrum Deus intelligat omnia alia a se per ideas eorum, an aliter?* What does he think of men wasting their energies in trying to convince each other of the true process by which God conceived ideas—discussing, with ardour and unmisgiving ingenuity, topics which are necessarily beyond all possible demonstration? Nevertheless, absurd as such discussions were, they have found, even in modern times, legitimate successors; and the laborious futility of the Schoolmen has been rivalled by the laborious futility of German metaphysicians.

#### § IV. THE GREAT DISPUTE.

The second point to which Abelard calls our attention, is the dispute which agitated the schools during the whole

\* Page 17 of the edition last named.

Middle Ages, the dispute as to the nature of Genera and Species, which M. de Rémusat truly says is the longest, most animated, and certainly the most abstract controversy, that has ever agitated the human mind, and the one which now seems the least likely to have interested men so deeply. The secret of this interest is the theological bearing which the question early received. It had been debated in Greece as an abstract question. It was now debated as one deeply implicating the dogmas of Faith.

M. Cousin is guilty of but a slight exaggeration, when he says that the whole Scholastic Philosophy issued out of a phrase in Porphyry, as interpreted by Boethius. This is the passage in Boethius: 'The object of Porphyry in this work, is to prepare the mind for the easy understanding of the Predicaments, by treating of the five things or words (*tractando de quinque rebus vel vocibus*), namely, genus, species, difference, property and accident; the knowledge of which leads to the knowledge of the Predicaments.' By the phrase *rebus vel vocibus*, he was understood to signify that things and words were mutually convertible, to discourse of one was to discourse of the other. But is this so? Does the word Genus, or the word Species, represent an actual something which exists objectively, or is it merely a name which designates a certain collection of individual things? Centuries had passed without any one perceiving more than a grammatical or logical importance in the alternative. 'On ne l'entrevit guère qu'au milieu du onzième siècle. Mais à peine livré à l'examen, les deux solutions contraires qu'il présentait se partagèrent les esprits; et bientôt, agité en tous sens et fécondé à la fois par la témérité et par la sagesse, il en sortit à la fin du onzième siècle, et surtout au commencement du douzième, la philosophie scolastique dans toute son originalité et sa grandeur.' \*

Roscellinus, whose name has descended to us as the first advocate and martyr of Nominalism, but of whose opinions

\* COUSIN : *Œuvres inédites d'Abélard*. Introd.

we have only the reports of adversaries, *may* have held the extreme opinion, which is attributed to him, namely, that Universals were only names; he certainly denied their objective existence, denied that there existed a thing 'colour,' apart from coloured things, a thing, 'animal,' apart from animals, and denied that there was any real existence which was not an individual. When I say that Roscellinus may have held the opinion attributed to him, I wish to be understood as speaking doubtfully, because although it seems almost inconceivable that an acute mind could believe in so crude an opinion, which implies that names are mere breath, *flatus vocis*, and not also signs of ideas; and this difficulty is heightened by the fact that we have not his words whereby to judge him, but only the language adversaries put into his mouth; nevertheless, the history of Philosophy abounds in instances of even acute minds being thoroughly subjugated by verbal distinctions, and it is quite possible that Roscellinus, in seeing the error of Realism, saw nothing more than names in general terms, and overlooked the fact that these names stood for general ideas. Unless he did overlook this, the modification of Nominalism which Abelard introduced, and which has since been known as the third opinion on the question, and named Conceptualism (a purely verbal modification), is a mere subterfuge.

Those who believed with Plato, that general terms had correspondent objective existence, might have more readily listened to the Aristotelian refutation, and more willingly acquiesced in the argument of Roscellinus, which reduced general terms to mere names, had there not been a vista of heresy in this argument. Roscellinus, with unhesitating logic, showed that the three persons of the Trinity were incompatible with the unity of real existences: either the three persons existed separately and individually, and were one only in name, having a common resemblance of nature; or else the three persons form but one God; in which case God exists alone, without distinction of persons.

That such a conclusion should startle the world, and call

against him, as we have seen, arose Abelard; not indeed to defend Roscellinus and his heretical Nominalism; on the contrary, to disavow and refute him, but to replace the two opinions by a third. He adopted so much of Nominalism that until recently he was always held (and I think justly held) to be a Nominalist. Buhle points out that Abelard is a Nominalist when combating William, and a Realist when attacking Roscellinus.\* M. Rousselot argues at great length that Abelard was in truth a Realist;† that as a logician he agreed with Roscellinus, reducing universals to general terms, but as a metaphysician he agreed with the Realists. A closer examination of the arguments, however, shows that Abelard was a Nominalist under a new name.

The peculiarity of his doctrine consists in the distinction of Matter and Form applied to genus and species. 'Every individual,' he says, in a very explicit passage of the treatise *De Generibus et Speciebus*, printed by M. Cousin, 'is composed of matter and form, i.e. Socrates from the matter of Man, and the form of Socrativity; so Plato is of the same matter, namely, that of man, but of different form, namely, that of Platonity; and so of all other individual men. And just as the Socrativity which formally constitutes Socrates is nowhere but in Socrates, so the essence of man which sustains Socrativity in Socrates, is nowhere but in Socrates. The same of all other individuals. By species, therefore, I mean, not that essence of man which alone is in Socrates, or in any other individual, but the whole collection which is formed of all the individuals of the same nature. This whole collection, although essentially multiple, by the Authorities is named one Species, one Universal, one Nature; just as a nation, although composed of many persons, is called one. Thus each particular essence of the collection called Humanity is composed of matter and form, namely, the animal is matter, the form is, however, not one, but many, i.e. rationality, morality, bipedality, and all the other sub-

\* BUHLE, *Gesch. der neuern Phil.* I. 840.

† ROUSSELOT, *Études sur la Philosophie dans le Moyen Âge*, 1840, II. 33, et seq.

Abelard to use equivocal language which has misled even M. Rousselot, is such as every Nominalist may accept. Abelard maintains that Genus and Species are not general existences, objectively real, existing integrally in various individuals whose identity admits of no other diversity than that of modes or accidents; otherwise the subject of these accidents, the substance of these modes being identical, every individual would possess the same substance. Humanity would thus only be one man; Socrates being at Athens, Humanity would be at Athens; and Plato being at Thebes, Humanity would then either not be at Athens with Socrates, or Plato would not be a man.

M. Hauréau\* seems to me correct in saying that when Abelard appears to be defending Realism against Roscellinus, it is merely on the surface; he does not think what he seems to say; nothing is more repugnant to him than that doctrine; but Nominalism having an ill name, he has to advance cautiously. All that he really advances against Roscellinus is that Genus and Species are more than words, words being signs of conceptions. How these conceptions are formed by abstraction is very explicitly stated in his treatise *De Intellectibus*.† It is true that to give an air of independence to his position, and protect himself against the accusation of Nominalism, he stoutly affirms that words are nothing, whereas Genus and Species are things, substances. But what things?—what substances? ‘Il est trop ami de l’équivoque,’ says M. Hauréau, ‘pour s’expliquer davantage à ce sujet quand rien ne l’exige.’

In spite of the equivocal, or rather in consequence of it, Conceptualism, which was Nominalism under a new name, found great favour: the more so when men discovered that if Nominalism led to heretical views of the Trinity, Realism necessarily led to Pantheism, or the identification of all substances in one substance. But the battle continued to rage

\* HAURÉAU: *De la Philos. scolastique*, I. 281.

† Printed by M. COUSIN in his *Fragmente philos.* Comp. RÉMUSAT: *Abélard*, I. 495, and HAURÉAU, I. 283.

destructively employed by Anselm's followers. And the Church applauded him. In fact, the struggles of the schools seemed about to end, as many other anarchical efforts have ended, in universal despotism. That which prevented so fatal a consummation, that which once more introduced the ferment of philosophic speculation into Europe, was the agitating influence of the Arabian commentators on Greek philosophy and science.

There never was any Arabian Science, strictly speaking. In the first place, all the Philosophy and Science of the Mohammedans was Greek, Jewish, and Persian. In the next place, it was never, or very rarely, the Arabs who devoted themselves to such studies. One authority \* has told us that what it is customary to call Arabian Philosophy forms but a small section of the Mohammedan movement, and was almost unknown even to the Mohammedans themselves. It really designates a reaction against Islamism, which arose in the distant parts of the empire, in Samarcand, Bokhara, Morocco, and Cordova. The Arabian language having become the language of the empire, this Philosophy is written in that language; but the ideas are not Arabian; the spirit is not Arabian. The real genius of that people is to be found in the Moallakat and the Koran; and is absolutely antagonistic to Grecian Philosophy. It is the genius of a Semitic race. That race has been moved to lyrical and prophetic expression, rarely to the severe abstractions of Science, or the delicate subtleties of Philosophy. None of the great names, except Al-Kendi, belong to Arabs, strictly so called. They are the names of Persians, Spaniards, and Jews. It was through the Persians, under the Abbassides, that Grecian thought was introduced into Islam. It was at Bagdad that Philosophy formed a home. The caliph, Al Mamoun, a representative of the Persian reaction, was its first great patron; Syrian Christians and the Magi were its promoters.

When the edict of Justinian drove the last of the Greek philosophers to seek a refuge in Asia, they found welcome in Persia. The Nestorians flying from Heraclius found hospitable protection under Kosroes. And thus it was, that when the Abbassides wished to illustrate their dynasty with the splendour of Letters, they found numerous Greeks, Christians, and Jews ready to aid them with Syriac and Arabian versions of the great Athenian and Alexandrian writers.†

No one doubts that the origin of Arabian Philosophy and

\* ERNEST RENAN : *Averroës et l'Averroïsme*. Paris, 1852, p. 67.

† Compare MUNK: *Mélanges de Philosophie Juive et Arabe*. Paris, 1859, p. 313.



made new translations, and corrected those already extant. Some of these, according to Munk, are executed with remarkable care and accuracy. The debt which Europe owes to the Arabs for their preservation of Greek writings, and the stimulus impressed upon European curiosity by the ardour of their veneration, without which stimulus the Renaissance might never have come to pass, has long been recognised, and perhaps exaggerated. Another and less questionable debt is due to them for the ardour with which they prosecuted mathematical, astronomical, medical, and chemical studies. Alexandria produced not simply philosophers, but also men of science; and the Arabs were brought into contact with both, learning to venerate Ptolemy and Galen as well as Aristotle. Thus, if the Arabs helped to raise Aristotle on the despot's throne, they also furnished the irresistible weapons with which that throne was one day to be destroyed.

The aspect of learning in Christian Europe during the tenth century was piteous. Yet at that very period of darkness, Andalusia, under the Mohammedans, was the centre of light. It was the market where all the treasures of the East found ready sale; works composed in Persia and Syria were often known in Spain before they had been heard of in the East. The caliph had his agents at Cairo, Bagdad, Damascus, and Alexandria, all seeking for manuscripts.

It is to be borne in mind that the Arabs, although they conquered Spain, were too weak in numbers to hold that country in subjection otherwise than by politic concessions to the opinions and customs of the people. They were in a position not unlike that of the Normans in England: superior in military organization, but inferior in actual strength, and forced to respect their subjects. Hence they permitted Jews and Christians to retain their religious rites and daily customs. So successful was this policy of conciliation, that Christians and Mohammedans not only lived together amicably, but often intermarried. And it is worthy of note, that from Spain Arabian culture slowly penetrated Europe,

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d'aujourd'hui,' says Dozy. 'Quoique musulmans de nom, ils se soucient médiocrement des préceptes de l'Islamisme. Le voyageur européen qui les a connus le mieux atteste que c'est le peuple le plus tolérant de l'Asie.'\* More than a century after Mahomet the Arabs in Egypt were ignorant of what the prophet had forbidden.† The religious fanaticism of Mohammedanism, which has aspects resembling our Puritanism, is traced by Dozy to the Berbers.

As Arabian Philosophy is nothing more than the Alexandrian interpretation of Aristotle, with occasional Oriental colouring, I shall not pause to expound the doctrines at any length; I am more desirous of indicating the kind and degree of scientific culture which was at one period so powerful in its influence on European thought. The readiest way of indicating this will be to bring forward the most eminent of the Arabian teachers.

#### § I. AL-KENDI

Our list opens with Al-Kendi, who flourished in the ninth century. He was the son of the governor of Coufa, under Haroun Al-Raschid. He studied at Bagdad and Bassora; and became famous, under the caliphs Al-Mamoun and Al-Mo'tacem, for works on philosophy, astronomy, mathematics, medicine, politics, and music. Learned in the learning of Persians, Indians, and Greeks, he was selected by the caliph as the man to translate Aristotle. Al-Kendi's commentaries on the Stagirite are rarely cited by Arab writers; and hence we may conclude they had been greatly surpassed by succeeding commentators.

In the detached notices which reach us of these Arabian thinkers, we often seem to meet with opinions greatly in advance of the culture of the time. But it would be necessary to have much more circumstantial statements before we could rely on such inferences, a verbal agreement often

\* Dozy: *Op. cit.* I. 20.

† *Ibid.* p. 37.

by Arabian writers still remain. It implied a knowledge of Plato greater than is found in other writers of that period. It contained an exposition of the various branches of philosophy and their mutual relations, an analysis of Plato's doctrine, with an indication of his works. This was followed by a more detailed account of Aristotle, with brief summaries of each of his treatises.

Al-Farabi's works on Music are said to have been greatly in advance of what had appeared before his time. One of them contained a complete theory of the art, treating of sounds, concords, intervals, rhythms, and cadence. In another he expounded the writings of the ancients, showing what progress had been made, correcting the errors of each writer, and supplying his omissions. Al-Farabi refuted the Pythagorean notion of music of the spheres. He also explained the influence of vibrations of the air upon instruments, and how the instruments ought to be constructed.\*

### § III. AVICENNA.

Far more illustrious than any who had preceded him, Avicenna—or, to give him his real title, Abou-'Ali al'Hosein ben-'Abd-Allah Ibn Sina—was born in one of the cities of Bokhara in August, 980. His family was Persian. At an early age he knew the Koran by heart, and was not a little admired for his precocity, especially in the studies of grammar and jurisprudence. To these he soon added mathematics, physics, logic, and metaphysics. Medicine followed, of course; and so marvellous was his precocity, that at the age of 17 he was appointed medical adviser to the Emir Nou'h-ben Mansour, whom he cured of a serious malady.

\* None of the important works of Al-Farabi have been translated. The little volume published at Paris in 1638—*Alpharabii, vetustissimi Aristotelis interpretis, opera omnia quæ latina lingua conscripta reperiri potuerunt*—contains only two essays, I. *De Scientiis* (a sort of programme of the sciences), II. *De intellectu et intellecto*. Two other essays in the original, with Latin versions, were published by SCHMÖLDERS: *Documenta Philosophiæ Arabum*. Bonn, 1836.

excitement, which terminated in 1037, in the fifty-seventh year of his age.

The immense productivity of the ancient philosophers is one of their most striking characteristics. Avicenna, whose brief career was also a troubled one, found time to be as voluminous as a Benedictine. Learned in all the learning of his time (which, however, was easily compassed), he composed more than a hundred works, some of which still survive.\*

In the eleventh century he was to the Mohammedans of the East what, in the twelfth century, Averroes was to the Mohammedans of the West, and what Albertus Magnus was to Europe in the thirteenth century. Indeed, it is very probable, as M. Jourdain suggests,† that Albertus borrowed the plan of his own vast labours from Avicenna, who was not so much a translator or commentator of Aristotle, as the popularizer and propagator of his ideas. Like Albertus, he composed treatises on all the subjects treated by the Stagirite, often reproducing the expressions as well as the ideas of his model, but not unfrequently deviating into new tracks, either because he had misinterpreted the original, or because his own wider knowledge and clearer thought enabled him to improve it.‡ His least questionable improvements were in psychology. It is to Avicenna that the Arabs, and after them the Schoolmen, owe the classification of the faculties into exterior (the five senses), interior, motor, and rational.

The immense and enduring success of Avicenna's *Medical Canon* is a significant fact, when we reflect that he had not advanced the science in any one direction beyond the point

\* A Latin version, published at Venice in 1495, under this title—*Avicenna, peripatetici philosophi ac medicorum facile primi, opera in lucem redacta ac nuper, quantum ars niti potuit, per canonicos emendata*—contains *Logica, Sufficientia* (or, as we should style it, *Physica*), *De Celo et Mundo*, *De Anima*, *De Animalibus*, *De Intelligentia*, *Alpharabius de Intelligentia*, and *Philosophia Prima*.

† JOURDAIN : *Recherches sur les anciennes traductions latines d'Aristote*. Paris, 1843, p. 209.

‡ 'Princeps magnus, qui semper in libris sapientie vocatur princeps Abholati, ipse iterum revocavit philosophiam in Arabico, et exposuit opera antiquorum.' ROGER BACON : *Opus Tertium*, cviii. p. 24.

authority, that even late in the sixteenth century we find Scaliger asserting that no man could be an accomplished physician who had not mastered Avicenna.

Following a chronological order, two names ought to be interposed here, Avicebron and Algazzālī; but for purposes of exposition, I withhold these to a subsequent page, Algazzālī being better understood in connection with Averroes, and Avicebron conducting us back to the scholastics.

#### § IV. AL-HAZEN.

Al-Hazen ('Abou 'Ali al'Hasan ben al-'Hazen) was really a distinguished mathematician, who flourished during the early part of the eleventh century. He is best known in Europe by his treatise on *Optics*, translated by Risner, and published at Bâle in 1572. He therein corrected the Greeks, who supposed that rays of light issue from the eye and impinge on the objects; by anatomical and geometrical arguments, he shows that the rays come from the objects and impinge on the retina. He further explained the fact, that we see objects singly, though with two eyes, because the visual images are formed on symmetrical portions of the two retinas. He explains reflection and refraction; and astonishes us with his knowledge that the atmosphere increases in density as it decreases in height, and that the path of a ray of light through it, on entering obliquely, must be curvilinear and concave to the earth. Hence, as the mind refers the position of an object to the direction in which the ray of light enters the eye, the stars must appear to us nearer the zenith than they really are. Hence we see the stars before they have arisen and after they have set.\*

#### § V. AVEMPACE.

Avempace, as the West called Abou Beer Mohammed ben Ya'hya Ibn Badja, is one of the most celebrated of the Spanish Mohammedans. He flourished early in the twelfth century.

\* It is eminently probable that KEPLER borrowed his optical views from AL-HAZEN. It is certain that he has no just title to originality as the discoverer, which is sometimes claimed for him.

himself. One likes to hear of the success of such men, and to know that his funeral was attended in person by the King Yacoub, surnamed Al-Mansour.

Abubacer was not only grateful to his predecessor, Avempace, but generous to his successor and rival, Averroes. I should be glad to believe that he was as profound as he was liberal. The evidence, however, will not warrant the conclusions of some modern admirers. I allude particularly to the claim which has been set up for him on the ground of his having, before Copernicus, rejected the Ptolemaic hypothesis. The rejection of an established error does not always imply uncommon insight. It is often due to impatient ignorance. Every year we see men ready to prove Newton's hypothesis a mistake; and if (the supposition is not very plausible) a truer hypothesis should some day replace that of Newton, these 'undevout astronomers' will clamorously assert their claims to priority. When, therefore, we are told that Abubacer rejected the Ptolemaic hypothesis, we must ask upon what grounds he rejected it, before we credit him with a deeper insight. Averroes, in his *Lesser Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics*, speaks of Abubacer's excellent views on the subject of epicycles; and Alpetragius, in his *Introduction to Astronomy*, says, 'You know that the illustrious Abubacer told us that he had found out an astronomical system and the principles of celestial motions different from those put forth by Ptolemy, and which need neither eccentrics nor epicycles; and in his system he said all movements are verified and no error results. He also promised to write on this subject.' But he did not write on it; and we are left to guess at his system, through the partial glimpses given in Averroes and Alpetragius. The basis of his objection to Ptolemy's hypothesis is that it is not in harmony with the theories of motion given by Aristotle! No man of scientific culture will be curious to hear more of a system which rests on that basis, except as a matter of historical interest; and in this direction we may notice the hypothesis proposed by Alpetragius:—'All the spheres follow the movement and the

His book was translated by Michael Scott. It was largely used by Albertus Magnus, Roger Bacon, and Vincent of Beauvais. In a treatise, written at the beginning of the fourteenth century, Isaac Israeli, a Jew of Toledo, speaks of it as the theory which agitated the whole world; although he wisely adds, it was not worked out sufficiently to render it worthy of discussion: the system of Ptolemy could not be abandoned for an hypothesis which was not based on exact calculations. Another Jew, Levi ben Gerson, thought it worth while to refute Alpetragius, and to prove in detail how preposterous were his notions. How far the wide dissemination of the hypothesis, and the controversy it provoked, may have prepared the way for Copernicus, is an interesting question.

To return to Abubacer. He is widely known in Europe through his philosophical romance, *Philosophus Autodidactus*, in which he endeavours to trace the development of an intelligence unbiassed by society and its traditions and prejudices. His hero, Hai, is born on a desert island situated beneath the equator. In lieu of human parents, his generation takes place through certain physical conditions; which did not appear so preposterous in the eyes of Abubacer's contemporaries and successors as in the eyes of moderns; spontaneous generation being an universally accepted hypothesis in those days. Hai had a gazelle for his wet-nurse. The different periods of his development are marked by the successive advances which he makes in the comprehension of things. From the simple knowledge of sensible things, he gradually arrives at a conception of the world and its physical laws. Later on he recognises the unity which underlies variety. Things, though multiple in their accidents, are one in essence. He thus arrives at the knowledge of Matter and Forms. The first Form is Species. All bodies are united by corporeity, i.e. the corporeal Form.

Contemplating Matter and Forms, he enters the spiritual world. It is obvious that inferior objects are produced by something. There must, therefore, be a Producer of Forms,

## § VII. ALGAZZĀLI.

We now turn back to the eleventh century again, to bring forward the name of an illustrious and independent thinker, Algazzāli, the 'Light of Islam,' the 'Pillar of the Mosque,' who is known under the names of Gazzali, Ghazail, Algazel, and was at one time familiar to European thinkers through the attacks of his adversary Averroes.\*

Algazzāli (Abou-'Hamed-Mo'hammed ibn Mo'hammed Al-Ghazālī) was born in the city of Tous A.D. 1058. His father was a dealer in cotton-thread (*gazzal*), from whence he drew his name. Losing his father in early life, he was confided to the care of a Soufi. The nearest approach to what is meant by a Soufi is what we mean by Mystic. The influence of this Soufi was great. No sooner had the youth finished his studies, than he was appointed professor of theology at Bagdad, where his eloquence achieved such splendid success that all the Imams became his eager partisans. So great was the admiration he inspired, that the Mussulmans sometimes said, 'If all Islam were destroyed, it would be but a slight loss, provided Algazzāli's work on the "Revivification of the Sciences of Religion" were preserved.' This work, probably owing to its originality, was never translated into Latin during the Middle Ages, and remained a closed book to all but Arabian scholars until M. Schmölders published his version. It bears so remarkable a resemblance to the *Discours sur la Méthode* of Descartes, that had any translation of it existed in the days of Descartes, every one would have cried out against the plagiarism.

Like Descartes, he begins with describing how he had in vain interrogated every sect for an answer to the mysterious problems which 'disturbed him with a sense of things unknown;' and how he finally resolved to discard all authority,

\* The most complete account of his life will be found in VON HAMMER: *O Kind! Die berühmte ethische Abhandlung Gasali's*, Vienna, 1838. MUNK: *Mélanges*, p. 366, and SCHMÖLDERS: *Essai sur les Écoles philosophiques chez les Arabes*, Paris, 1842. From my notice of this last-named work, in the *Edinburgh Review*, April 1847, I have incorporated some passages in the ensuing pages.



and detach himself from the opinions which had been instilled into him during the unsuspecting years of childhood. 'I said to myself,' he proceeds, 'My aim is simply to know the truth of things; consequently it is indispensable for me to ascertain what is *knowledge*. Now, it was evident to me that *certain knowledge* must be that which explains the object to be known in such a manner that no doubt can remain, so that in future all error and conjecture respecting it must be impossible. Not only would the understanding then need no efforts to be convinced of certitude, but security against error is in such close connection with knowledge, that even were an apparent proof of its falsehood to be brought forward it would cause no doubt, because no suspicion of error would be possible. Thus, when I have acknowledged ten to be more than three, if any one were to say, "On the contrary, three is more than ten; and to prove the truth of my assertion, I will change this rod into a serpent;" and if he *were* to change it, my conviction of his error would remain unshaken. His manoeuvre would only produce in me admiration for his ability. I should not doubt my own knowledge.

'Then was I convinced that knowledge which I did not possess in this manner, and respecting which I had not this certainty, could inspire me with neither confidence nor assurance; and no knowledge without assurance deserves the name of knowledge.

'Having examined the state of my own knowledge, I found it divested of all that could be said to have these qualities, unless perceptions of the senses and irrefragable principles were to be considered such. I then said to myself, Now having fallen into this despair, the only hope remaining of acquiring incontestable convictions is by the perception of the senses and by necessary truths. *Their* evidence seemed to me indubitable. I began however to examine the objects of sensation and speculation, to see if they could possibly admit of doubt. Then doubts crowded upon me in such numbers that my incertitude became complete. Whence results the confidence I have in sensible things? The strongest of all

our senses is sight; and yet, looking at a shadow and perceiving it to be fixed and immovable, we judge it to be deprived of movement; nevertheless experience teaches us that, when we return to the same place an hour after, the shadow is displaced; for it does not vanish suddenly, but, gradually, little by little, so as never to be at rest. If we look at the stars, they seem as small as money pieces; but mathematical proofs convince us they are larger than the earth. These and other things are judged by the senses, but rejected by reason as false. I abandoned the senses, therefore, having seen all my confidence in their truth shaken.

'Perhaps, said I, there is no assurance but in the notions of Reason: that is to say, first principles, *e.g.* ten is more than three; the same thing cannot have been created and yet have existed from all eternity; to exist and not to exist at the same time is impossible.

'Upon this the senses replied: What assurance have you that your confidence in Reason is not of the same nature as your confidence in us? When you relied on us, Reason stepped in and gave us the lie; had not Reason been there you would have continued to rely on us. Well, may there not exist some other judge superior to Reason, who, if he appeared, would refute the judgments of Reason in the same way that Reason refuted us? The non-appearance of such a judge is no proof of his non-existence.'

These sceptical arguments Algazzālī borrowed from the Grecian sceptics, and having borrowed them, he likewise borrowed from Grecian mystics, of the Alexandrian school, the means of escape from scepticism. He looked upon life as a dream.

'I strove in vain to answer the objections. And my difficulties increased when I came to reflect upon sleep. I said to myself, During sleep you give to visions a reality and consistence, and you have no suspicion of their untruth. On awakening you are made aware that they were nothing but visions. What assurance have you that all you feel and

know when awake does actually exist? It is all true as respects your condition at that moment; but it is nevertheless possible that another condition should present itself which should be to your awakened state that which your awakened state now is to your sleep; so that in respect to this higher condition your waking is but sleep.'

If such a superior condition be granted, Algazzāli asks whether we can ever attain to participation in it. He suspects that the *Ecstasy* described by the Soufis must be the very condition. But he finds himself philosophically unable to escape the consequences of scepticism: the sceptical arguments could only be refuted by demonstrations. But demonstrations themselves must be founded on first principles; if *they* are uncertain, no demonstration can be certain.

'I was thus forced to return to the admission of intellectual notions as the basis of all certitude. This however was *not by systematic reasoning and accumulation of proofs, but by a flash of light which God sent into my soul*. For whoever imagines that *truth can only be rendered evident by proofs*, places narrow limits to the wide compassion of the Creator.'

Thus we see Algazzāli eluding scepticism just as the Alexandrians eluded it, taking refuge in faith. He then cast his eyes on the various sects of the faithful, whom he ranged under four classes.

I. The *Dogmatists*: those who ground their doctrine wholly upon reason.

II. The *Bastīnīs*, or *Allegorists*: those who receive their doctrine from an Imam, and believe themselves sole possessors of truth.

III. The *Philosophers*: those who call themselves masters of Logic and Demonstration.

IV. The *Soufis*: those who claim an *immediate intuition*, by which they perceive the real manifestations of truth as ordinary men perceive material phenomena.

These schools he resolved thoroughly to question. In the writings of the Dogmatists he acknowledged that their aim was realized—but their aim was not his aim:—'Their aim,'

he says, 'is the preservation of the faith from the alterations introduced by heretics.' But his object was philosophical, not theological; so he turned from the Dogmatists to the Philosophers, studying their works with intense ardour, convinced that he could not refute them until he had thoroughly understood them. He did refute them, entirely to his satisfaction;\* and having done so, turned to the Soufis, in whose writings he found a doctrine which required the union of action with speculation, in which virtue was a guide to knowledge. The aim of the Soufis was to free the mind from earthly considerations, to purify it from all passions, to leave it only God as an object of meditation. The highest truths were not to be reached by *study*, but by *transport*—by a transformation of the soul during *ecstasy*. There is the same difference between this higher order of truth and ordinary science, as between being healthy and knowing the definition of health. To reach this state it was necessary first to purify the soul from all earthly desires, to extirpate from it all attachment to the world, and humbly direct the thoughts to our eternal home.

'Reflecting on my situation, I found myself bound to this world by a thousand ties, temptations assailing me on all sides. I then examined my actions. The best were those relating to instruction and education; and even there I saw myself given up to unimportant sciences, all useless in another world. Reflecting on the aim of my teaching, I found it was not pure in the sight of the Lord. I saw that all my efforts were directed towards the acquisition of glory to myself.'

Thus did Philosophy lead him to a speculative Asceticism, which, calamity was shortly afterwards to transform into practical Asceticism. One day, as he was about to lecture to a throng of admiring auditors, his tongue refused utterance: he was dumb. This seemed to him a visitation of

\* In the ninth volume of the works of AVERROES there is a treatise by ALGAZZALI, *Destructio Philosophorum*, which contains his refutation of the philosophical schools.

God, a rebuke to his vanity, which deeply afflicted him. He lost his appetite; he was fast sinking; physicians declared his recovery hopeless, unless he could shake off the sadness which depressed him. He sought refuge in contemplation of the Deity.

‘Having distributed my wealth, I left Bagdad and retired into Syria, where I remained two years in solitary struggle with my soul, combating my passions and exercising myself in the purification of my heart, and in preparation for the other world.’

He visited Jerusalem, and made a pilgrimage to Mecca, but at length returned to Bagdad, urged thereto by ‘private affairs’ and the requests of his children, as he says, but more probably urged thereto by his sense of failure, for he confesses not to have reached the *ecstatic* stage. Occasional glimpses were all he could attain, isolated moments of exaltation passing quickly away.

‘Nevertheless I did not despair of finally attaining this state. Every time that any accident turned me from it, I endeavoured quickly to re-enter it. In this condition I remained ten years. In my solitude there were revelations made to me which it is impossible for me to describe, or even indicate. Enough if, for the reader’s profit, I declare that the conviction was forced upon me that the Soufis indubitably walked in the true paths of salvation. Their way of life is the most beautiful, and their morals the purest that can be conceived.’

The first condition of Soufi purification is, that the novice purge his heart of all that is not God. Prayers are the means. The object is *absorption in the Deity*.

‘From the very first, Soufis have such astonishing revelations that they are enabled, while waking, to see visions of angels and the souls of the prophets; they hear their voices, and receive their favours. Afterwards a transport exalts them beyond the mere perception of forms, to a degree which exceeds all expression, and concerning which we cannot speak without employing language that would sound

blasphemous. In fact, some have gone so far as to imagine themselves to be *amalgamated with God*, others *identified with him*, and others to be *associated with him*. All these are sinful.'

Algazzālī refuses to enter more minutely into this subject; he contents himself with the assertion that whoso knows not Ecstasy knows prophetism only by name. And what is *Prophetism*? The fourth stage in intellectual development. The first, or infantile stage, is that of pure Sensation; the second, which begins at the age of seven, is that of Understanding; the third is Reason, by means of which the intellect perceives the necessary, the possible, the absolute, and all those higher objects which transcend the understanding.\* After this comes the fourth stage, when another eye is opened by which man perceives things hidden from others—perceives all that will be—perceives things that escape the perceptions of Reason, as the objects of Reason escape the Understanding, and as the objects of Understanding escape the sensitive faculty. This is Prophetism. Algazzālī undertakes to prove the existence of this faculty:

'Doubts respecting Prophetism must refer either to its possibility or its reality. To prove its possibility it is only necessary to prove that it belongs to the category of objects which cannot be regarded as the products of intelligence: such, for example, as Astronomy or Medicine. For whoso studies these sciences is aware that they cannot be comprehended except by Divine inspiration, with the assistance of God, and not by experience. Since there are astronomical indications which appear only once in a thousand years, how could they be known by experience? † From this argument it is evident that it is very possible to perceive things which the intellect cannot conceive. And this is precisely one of the properties of Prophetism which has a myriad other properties; but these are only perceptible during Ecstasy by those who had the life of the Soufis.'

\* KANT's three psychological elements, *Sinnlichkeit*, *Verstand*, *Vernunft*.

† O sancta simplicitas!

Algazzālī wrote a special treatise against the philosophers, in which he arraigns them under twenty heads, the most interesting to us being that of causality. 'En somme,' says M. Munk, 'tout le raisonnement d'Al-Gazzālī peut se ramener à ces deux propositions :—1° Lorsque deux circonstances existent toujours simultanément, rien ne prouve que l'une soit la cause de l'autre ; ainsi par exemple, un aveugle-né à qui on aurait donné la vue pendant le jour et qui n'aurait jamais entendu parler du jour ni de la nuit, s'imaginerait qu'il voit par l'action des couleurs qui se présentent à lui, et ne tiendrait pas compte de la lumière du soleil par laquelle les couleurs font impression sur ses yeux. 2° Quand même on admettrait l'action de certaines causes par une loi de la nature, il ne s'ensuit nullement que l'effet, même dans les circonstances analogues et sur des objets analogues, soit toujours le même ; ainsi le coton peut, sans cesser d'être le coton, prendre (par la volonté de Dieu) quelque qualité qui empêche l'action du feu, comme on voit des hommes, au moyen d'emplâtres faits avec une certaine herbe, se rendre incombustibles. En un mot, ce que les philosophes appellent la loi de la nature, ou le principe de causalité, est une chose qui arrive *habituellement*, parce que Dieu le veut, et nous l'admettons comme certain parce que Dieu, sachant dans sa prescience que les choses seront presque toujours ainsi, nous en a donné la conscience. Mais il n'y a pas de loi immuable de la nature qui enchaîne la volonté du Créateur.' \*

I have given these arguments against causality partly to exhibit the style of thought which was considered powerful in those days, and partly to add one more to the many illustrations of historical misapprehension which the carelessness of writers propagates. Having read what Algazzālī taught, the reader will be somewhat amazed to find M. Renan saying of it: 'Hume n'a rien dit de plus.' †

The influence of Algazzālī on Europe was null, but on the East it was immense ; as M. Munk says, it struck a blow at philosophy 'dont elle ne pût plus se relever, et ce fut en

\* MUNK : *Mélange*, p. 379.

† RENAN : *Averroës*, p. 74.

Espagne qu'elle traversa encore un siècle de gloire et trouva un ardent défenseur dans le célèbre Ibn-Roschd.' To him we now pass.

#### § VIII. AVERROES.

Averroes (Aboulwalid Mo'hammed ibn Ahmed ibn Mo'hammed ibn-Roschd) was born at Cordova about 1120.

His family belonged to the most considerable in Andalusia, high in office, high in esteem. He was greatly befriended by Abubacer, and was intimate with the family of Avenzoar, his colleague at the court of Yousouf, during whose reign he continued in high favour and was employed in various important offices, so that his works were written amid continual interruptions. This favour seems to have been increased under Yousouf's successor, Yacoub Almansour, who was fond of discussing scientific and philosophic questions with him. Indeed Averroes occasionally so far forgot etiquette as to address his sovereign thus: 'Listen, O my brother!' Such intimacy naturally excited the jealousy of those less favoured, and perhaps by their machinations, or perhaps from some imprudence on his part, he suddenly fell into disgrace. The pretext was his heterodoxy. He was banished from Cordova, and his works were condemned to the flames—an exception being made in favour of the works on medicine, arithmetic, and elementary astronomy.

Almansour issued an edict declaring that God had ordained hell-fire for those who impiously asserted truth to be given by Reason alone. From such a sovereign such a declaration must be attributed to the kind of coercion exercised by priests over all but the most self-willed rulers. At any rate, the disgrace of Averroes was only temporary. The edict was rescinded, and Averroes recalled. But the end was near. He died at Morocco in 1198.

His disgrace and the accusations of heterodoxy greatly occupied the attention of contemporaries. Arabian Philosophy, introduced under Hakem in the tenth century, and cultivated with so much zeal, now began to struggle for existence against the religious fanaticism which was finally to suppress



it. The eternal contest between Reason and Faith, between free thought and despotic ignorance, had been growing fiercer every year; even Algazzāli had thrown himself by a flank movement against philosophy. The priestly party became strong enough to enforce its views even on sceptical Emirs, especially in times of political trouble, when the support of the ignorant multitude became of consequence. In Spain, as elsewhere, the mass of men cherish an instinctive dislike to philosophers, partly because early taught to dread Inquiry as inimical to Religion, and partly because the implied equality which exists between members of a church, where all alike share the blessings and the glory of illumination, is, in the presence of philosophers, rudely set aside, and replaced by an irresistible sense of inequality. The creed of the Bishop is the creed of the grocer. But the philosophy of that grocer is in no sense the philosophy of a Professor. Therefore it is that the Bishop will be revered where the Professor will be stoned. Intellect is that which man claims as specially his own; it is the one limiting distinction; and thus the multitude, so tolerant of the claims of an aristocracy of birth or of wealth, is uneasy under the claims of an aristocracy of intelligence.

The term philosophy is used by Mohammedans of our day as synonymous with infidelity, impiety, immorality. Nay, one finds this interpretation not altogether unknown in Europe, and that, too, in circles claiming a high degree of culture. In Spain, during the twelfth century, this interpretation became general. 'A theological reaction,' says M. Renan, 'analogous to that which in the Latin Church followed the Council of Trent, undertook to recover its ground by violence. Islamism, like all religions, has gone on strengthening itself and obtaining a more absolute faith from its adepts. The greater part of Mahomet's companions hardly believed in his supernatural mission; incredulity was rife during the first six centuries; but since then there has not been a doubt, not a protest. That has come to pass in Islamism and in Catholicism in Spain which would have

come to pass all over Europe if the religious movement at the close of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth centuries had succeeded in arresting rational development.'

Aristotle became infamous in Islam; all the philosophers were proscribed, and their works destroyed. Hence it was that Averroes, who during four centuries was venerated by Jews, and highly esteemed by Christians, has left scarcely any trace on the minds of Arabs. Hence also the great rarity of his works in the original; while Hebrew and Latin versions abound in all great collections of manuscripts. The published Latin versions are very numerous. From 1480 to 1580, Renan tells us, scarcely a year elapsed without some new edition appearing. In Venice alone more than fifty editions were published, of which fourteen or fifteen are more or less complete.\*

The claims of Averroes to European admiration were as a physician and a commentator on Aristotle. In the former character he was surpassed by Avicenna. Indeed we have only to learn that he followed Aristotle's teaching in preference to that of Galen, whenever the two were at variance, to indicate the slight reliance which can be placed on his medical knowledge. As a commentator he was unrivalled; and for a considerable period Philosophy in Spain and among the schoolmen may be defined thus: 'Nature interpreted by Aristotle, Aristotle interpreted by Averroes.'

The superstitious servility with which he accepted the dicta of the Stagyrice is indicated in the declaration that 'Aristotle initiated and perfected all the sciences, no writer before him being worthy of mention, no writer after him having, in the course of fifteen centuries, added anything of importance or detected any serious error.' Yet it is unanimously affirmed by modern scholars that Averroes, and the Arabian commentators generally, are far from faithful interpreters of Aristotle. They attach themselves in preference

\* The editio princeps appeared at Padua in 1472. Towards the close of the 16th century the reprints became rarer; only a few of the medical works appeared. In the 17th century the dust began to settle on those once famous folios, from which it is never likely to be shaken.

to certain ideas obscurely indicated by the Stagyrte, and give these an undue prominence.

In three different works Averroes presented his master. 1. The *Great Commentary*, which gives each paragraph of the text, and interprets it sentence by sentence, introducing theoretical discussions as digressions. This form of commentary is peculiar to Avicenna, who borrowed it from that adopted in regard to the Koran. 2. The *Middle Commentary*, which merely cites the first words of the original paragraphs, and then weaves together text and interpretation after the manner of Avicenna—a form subsequently adopted by Albertus Magnus. 3. The *Third Commentary* is simply one of paraphrase and analysis, in which Averroes expounds the opinions of Aristotle as delivered in various treatises.

Error is long-lived. Averroes having once been named as the first who translated Aristotle from the Greek into Arabic, the statement has become stereotyped;\* but there are three reasons against it. 1. Neither Averroes, nor any other Mohammedan in Spain, could read Greek.† 2. Arabic translations of Aristotle existed three centuries before the time of Averroes. 3. The Arabic versions of Greek writers were never made direct from the Greek, but from Syriac versions.

The barbarous jargon which the European schools had to master, when they opened the Latin versions of Averroes, may be imagined when it is known that these were Latin translations from a Hebrew version of an Arabic commentary on an Arabic translation of a Syriac version of a Greek text.

Averroes, like all the schoolmen and Arabians, exerted his ingenuity in discussing Matter and Form, substance and accident, virtual and actual, intellect and agent, but he added nothing to what was known in his day, although as the last

\* MUNK and RENAN name some of the unsuspecting repeaters of this tradition : NIPHUS, PATRIZIO, MARCO ODDO, BRUYERIN, SIGONIO, TOMASINI, GASSENDI, LONGUEUR, MOREL, D'HERBELOT, CASIRI, BUELE, HARLES, ROSSI, MIDDELDORFF, TENNEMANN, DEGÉRANDO, JOURDAIN, and the *Conversations-Lexicon*.

† The ignorance of Averroes is pointedly shown by LUDOVICUS VIVES : *Opera*, i. 141. Bâle, 1555.

of the Arabs he had the reputation which often falls upon those who inherit what others invent. He exercised an important influence on the mind of Europe—especially on the development of that spirit of inquiry which Algazzālī had endeavoured successfully to discredit in the East, and which the Church was crushing in the West. The instinct of Theology early detected whither he tended; and Averroism became, as in later years Spinozism became, a synonym of infidelity. There are indeed several passages in which Averroes is explicit. I quote one given by Munk from the Hebrew version of the Commentary—a passage suppressed in the Latin version. ‘The religion peculiar to philosophers is the study of that which is; for no sublimer worship can be given to God than the knowledge of his works, which leads to the knowledge of him in his reality. That is the noblest action in his eyes; the vilest is taxing as error and vain presumption the effort of those who practise this worship, and who in this religion have the purest of religions.’ No wonder such a passage was suppressed! Here is another, which was not suppressed: ‘Among dangerous fictions we must count those which tend to regard virtue only as a means of arriving at happiness. This nullifies virtue; since the abstaining from vice is in the hope of being repaid with usury. The brave man will only seek death in order to escape a greater evil. The just man will respect the property of another only to acquire more.’ And alluding to the myths respecting a future world, he says: ‘These fables only serve to falsify the minds of the people, especially of children, without producing any real amelioration. I know men perfectly moral who reject all such fictions, and who are quite as virtuous as those who accept them.’

#### § IX. AVICEBRON.

One of the writers who exercised most influence over the Christian thinkers of the thirteenth century was the author of the *Fons Vitæ*, known by the name of Avicebron, and

believed to be one of the Arabian philosophers, but now, thanks to the researches of M. Munk, proved to have been the renowned Jew, Ibn-Gebirol. He was contemporary with Avicenna, but his philosophical work seems to have been entirely neglected both by Arabs and Jews, and to have found its public among the Christians, who studied it so eagerly that the learned Jourdain declares a true knowledge of that period to be impossible to those unacquainted with the *Fons Vita*.\* The translation and analysis of this work given by M. Munk render it accessible to all.

The part played by the Jews as physicians,† merchants, bankers, has often been appreciated. The part played by them as thinkers is less frequently mentioned. Yet it has been considerable. Not to name their great monotheistic contribution, let us only pause for a moment on the three great names of Philo, Ibn-Gebirol, and Spinoza, all three departing from the doctrines taught in the Synagogue, all three teaching a doctrine profoundly opposed to Christianity, yet all three promulgating ideas that had an irresistible fascination overpowering even the repulsion their heterodoxy excited. Confining ourselves to the more special topic now before us—the Jews must be regarded as the chief instruments whereby the Arabian philosophy was made effective on European culture. Even in Spain the Jews were the chief students of this philosophy. ‘Dans le monde musulman comme dans le monde chrétien,’ says M. Munk, ‘les Juifs, exclus de la vie publique, voués à la haine et au mépris par la religion dominante, toujours en présence des dangers dont les menaçait le fanatisme de la foule, ne trouvaient la tranquillité et le bonheur que dans un isolement complet. Ignorés de la société, les savants juifs vouaient aux sciences un culte désintéressé.’

And as translators and transmitters of the Arabian culture they had varied opportunities. Hated and persecuted though they were, the ability and perseverance of the Jews made

\* JOURDAIN : *Recherches sur les traductions latines d'Aristote*, p. 197.

† Consult CARMOLY : *Hist. des Médecins juifs, anciens et modernes*, Bruxelles, 1844.

them everywhere necessary to princes and nobles. The common people, feeling no need of culture, and having no chance of borrowing money, indulged in unrestrained religious hatred; but the great pledged their estates to Hebrew money-lenders, and submitted their bodies to Hebrew physicians, while the learned, unsuspectingly, submitted their minds to Hebrew thinkers and translators. The facility with which the Jews mastered languages made them ready interpreters between Mussulman and Christian. It was through their translations, and through their original thinkers, such as Avicbron (Ibn-Gebirol) and Moses Maimonides, that the West became leavened with Greek and Oriental thought.\*

The student who is tempted to open the *Fons Vitæ*, or to read M. Munk's analysis of it, will be struck with the 'familiar faces' of speculations which he has attributed to modern Germans, together with speculations of the Platonic and Peripatetic schools. I cannot afford the space necessary to any exposition of them.

In reviewing the labours of the Arabians we are struck with the facts that they were all men of high family, holding important positions; they were all surprisingly voluminous; they were all Aristotelians; they were all given more or less to science, especially to Medicine. Nevertheless, in spite of their advantage of position, in spite of their ardour, they left Science very much as they found it, and cannot be said to have advanced Philosophy. No germinal discoveries in Science are due to them. They improved

\* M. MUNK is guilty of a strange oversight in saying that the scholastic dispute of Nominalism and Realism sprang from Arabian Aristotelianism (*Mélanges*, p. 335), for although it is perfectly true that ALBERTUS MAGNUS and THOMAS AQUINAS studied Aristotle in Latin versions made from Hebrew versions, it is no less true—as we have seen—that the scholastic quarrel began long before Arabian commentators were heard of. M. JOURDAIN (*Recherches*, p. 210), and M. RENAN (*Averroës*, p. 175) assure us that there is no citation of any Arabian writer by the scholastics before the beginning of the 13th century. It is true that towards the middle of the 12th century GONDISALVI and others had translated certain writings, but they attracted no attention from nominalists or realists. In the 11th century the dispute had already developed all its leading characters.

instruments; they collected facts; they kept alive the sacred fire. But their labours were frustrated by their Method; and the only advantages the world received from them, were the preservation of what Grecian thought had achieved; and the scepticism which they impressed on European thought.

All the patronage of Emirs and Caliphs, all the efforts of philosophers, passed away without founding any large basis on which succeeding generations could build. In astronomy, in chemistry, in medicine, the Arabs made some subordinate improvements, largely enriching the store of observed facts, but they discovered no laws, they originated none of the germinal conceptions which act as impulses and regulators to research. The successors of the great Hipparchus had fatally neglected Observation; and the science he created languished in consequence. The Arabs, according to Delambre,\* devoted their attention chiefly to Observation; and their failure is one among the many notable examples of the impotence of Observation, when undirected by a true Method, which should teach *what* is to be observed, and *how* to observe it. They had adopted the Mathematics of the Alexandrians; but unhappily they had also adopted the Metaphysics of the Alexandrians and the Astrology of the Chaldeans. Hence it was to such problems as the influences of the stars on the destinies of men, that they applied the glorious instrument of Trigonometry which had rendered Astronomy possible as a science. Moreover their superstitious reverence for Greek theories made progress impossible.

This did not thwart their influence on Europe. There are writers who question that influence, and who affirm that the Revival of Learning would have brought the Greek thinkers into the course of European evolution disengaged from the Arabian misapprehensions. But it seems to me that the intellectual condition of Europe at the close of the

\* DELAMBRE : *Astronomie du moyen âge*, xxxix. 'Ils étaient devenus possesseurs de tous les écrits des Grecs, il était assez naturel qu'ils voulussent reconnaître par eux-mêmes l'exactitude de ces tables qui devaient servir à tous leurs calculs astronomiques et astrologiques.'

twelfth century was fast relapsing under a despotism which would have prevented the influence of Greek thought from taking effect, unless some other concurrent causes had been at work. It is quite true that the authority of Aristotle was never wholly lost, even during the darkest of the dark ages. It is true that a tradition of ancient glory survived, though the light itself was nearly extinct. But we must guard against exaggeration on this subject. It is misleading to assert, without qualification, that culture was never entirely lost, because a few monasteries preserved a few works of Greek and Latin writers which no one read. M. Jourdain says that throughout the Middle Ages Seneca's *Natural Questions*, Lucretius,\* the philosophic works of Cicero, Apuleius, Cassiodorus, and Boethius were read. What then? Do these represent ancient culture? and were even these works appreciated?† The slight tincture of ancient learning which was preserved, had no chance against the massive ignorance of the clergy.

With respect to Aristotle, the discussions as to whether his writings were, or were not, made known to Europe through the Arabs may be considered finally settled by M. Jourdain. As a logician he was known; but not until the beginning of the thirteenth century, when his metaphysical and scientific works had been introduced by the Arabs, did he become *princeps philosophorum*, and estimated more than as a logician.

Besides the introduction of Aristotle, there was an agitating scepticism stimulated by the works of the Arabs, indirectly through their instigations to positive research, directly through the suggestion that all religions have a similar basis: so far from one alone possessing a divine origin, every other being

\* I question whether LUCRETIVS was much read before the Renaissance; his opinions must have been too offensive. I cannot find any evidence of his having been read. In ALCUIN's poem (quoted by HEEREN, *Gesch. d. class. Litt.* i. 132-3), where the authors then noted are named, Lucretius does not appear. In the Bobbio Catalogue his name occurs among the classic writers; but this is the only trace I have been able to find.

† Compare EICHORN: *Allgemeine Geschichte der Cultur*, II. 54, 58; also the *Histoire littéraire de la France*, VI. 6. WHARTON: *Hist. of English Poetry*, I. Diss. 2. RÉMUSAT: *St. Anselme de Cantorbéry*, p. 90.



The introduction of Arabian writings divides the history of the Middle Ages into two markedly distinct epochs. In the first epoch Philosophy was not only servile to the Church, it was without materials, and without a Method. It lived upon the scanty remains of ancient learning, such as were contained in the compilations of Martianus Capella, Bede, and Isidore of Seville. In the second epoch a vast accession of material, in the works of Aristotle and the Alexandrians commented by the Arabians, prepared the way for the positive Method.

Before glancing at this second epoch, it will be well if we open Isidore of Seville's Encyclopædia, the *Etymologiarum libri XX.*, as an index of the culture of ages when abridgments replaced research, and when the explanation of terms was held to be knowledge. For several centuries this was the text-book; and the reader, on learning the nature of its contents, will doubtless share the surprise I felt on first becoming acquainted with it, in my eagerness to gain some definite idea of the culture of those times.

The first book is on Grammar. In thirty-nine chapters Isidore skims over this great topic, which in those days had supreme importance, and not a single observation of the slightest value escapes him. He is content to give a verbal explanation of grammatical terms without one philosophical rule. Four chapters on Fable and History succeed. As samples of his treatment of these subjects, I quote two of these chapters below.\* No amount of description will convey a better idea of the work.

sance de l'univers. . . . Quel ébranlement pour les consciences, le jour où l'on s'aperçoit qu'en dehors de la religion que l'on professe, il en est d'autres qui ne sont pas entièrement dénuées de raison !' Among literary curiosities this (imaginary) work *De tribus Impostoribus* is certainly one of the most instructive. Its authorship has been confidently assigned to various writers, including the sceptical emperor Frederick II. Its abominable doctrines have elicited eloquent refutations and indignant protests. And now the proof is overwhelming that there never was such a work at all.

\* CAP. xli. *De Historia.* Historia est narratio rei gestæ, per quam ea, quæ in præterito facta sunt, dignoscuntur. Dicta autem græce historia ἀπὸ τοῦ ἱστορεῖν, id est a *videre* vel *cognoscere*. Apud veteres enim nemo conscribebat historiam nisi is qui interfuisset, et ea, quæ conscribenda essent, vidisset. Melius enim oculis quæ fiunt deprehendimus quam quæ auditione collegimus. Quæ enim videntur

Writing materials, and the determination of Easter. The seventh of God, Angels, Prophets, and Monks. The eighth of the Jews and their sects—among which there is a piquant mention of the heretics named *Hemerobaptistæ*, who carried the notion of cleanliness being akin to godliness to the absurd length of washing their clothes and bodies daily! \* The lists of Christian heretics, which succeeds, is interesting from the minuteness of the enumeration, though nothing can be more meagre than the indication of their opinions.

The ninth book treats of Languages, the Names of nations, and of Civil and Military Titles. The tenth is an alphabetical array of etymologies, absurd enough. The eleventh treats of Man and Portents in four brief chapters, wherein we are told that *Homo* is the name given to man 'quia ex *humo* factus est;' and his body is called corpus 'quod *corruptum* perit.' Then follows an explanation of anatomical terms. The twelfth book is on Animals, without one ray of light. The thirteenth and fourteenth treat of Geography and Meteorology; the fifteenth of the origin of Kingdoms, of Public Edifices, and of Roads; the sixteenth of Mineralogy, Weights and Measures; the seventeenth of Agriculture; the eighteenth of War and Sports; the nineteenth of Ships, Architecture, and Clothes; and the final book of Food, Domestic Utensils, Carriages, and Agricultural Implements.

Any one even superficially acquainted with the Philosophy of these days, has only to combine with it such Science as this encyclopædia furnishes, to form a conception of the culture which the Arabian influences came to vivify.

\* '*Hemerobaptistæ*, eo quod quotidie vestimenta sua et corpora lavent,' *op. cit.* p. 351.

daily more conspicuously contrasted with the certainties of Science. Society ceased to be based mainly on war. Peace permitted industrial development, and industry urgently demanded peace. The army then became the servant of society, and even as a servant its importance has slowly, but inevitably, declined. In like manner the Church, which formerly represented the spiritual power, which had regulated the beliefs, and with beliefs the actions of society, lost its supremacy and gradually lost its hold on the convictions, as one by one the various domains of thought were invaded by positive knowledge. Its position has now dwindled down to that of a friendly monitor, and even as such is only maintained by a constant struggle. Its very adherents only look to it for a solemn sanction, never for scientific guidance. It once claimed to decide all questions; none are put to it now, except such as have reference to another world. The affairs of this world have long passed out of its jurisdiction.

Such has been the result of six centuries of evolution, an evolution unsuspected in the thirteenth century, nor yet generally appreciated in our own. It has moved through fierce struggles. Both the military and clerical powers have declined as the industrial and scientific powers have advanced. The separation of the temporal and spiritual is not yet completed, but the management of temporal affairs has passed from the hands of Force into the hands of Law; and the management of spiritual affairs has passed from the dominion of Faith to the dominion of Reason. A radical change has been effected in our general conception of the world; the belief in supernatural agencies has given place to an ever-widening belief in natural agencies. In other words, the theological point of view has been discarded in all questions not immediately affecting Religion. Instead of conceiving the world under the dominion of Volitions, in their very essence *variable*, we have learned to conceive it as under the dominion of Laws, in their nature *invariable*, and invariable because they are the modes of

under Law—may be summed up under two heads, theoretical and practical. The theoretical result is the limitation of our speculative activity to the problems that are verifiable—a limitation which is an intensification of power by its economy of effort and definiteness of aim. The practical result is that we, having once detected the modes of action of the immanent powers, can often foresee what will occur under given conditions, and thus either we can modify them so as to adapt them to our needs, or we can resign ourselves to them where they are seen to be inevitable.

It was in the thirteenth century that the great social and intellectual influences began the work of dissolution and reconstruction. I cannot pause here to enumerate the varied claims of this epoch, the importance of its political, religious, and social struggles, the splendour of its Architecture, the rapid development of its Commerce; my business is with its Philosophy, and especially with the new directions impressed upon the movement of Philosophy by the introduction of Greek and Arabian science. At the close of the twelfth century Scholasticism had passed into Mysticism; urged by a weary sense of its impotence, Reason was in danger of once more becoming the obedient servant of Faith. We have now to see the twofold demand for Authority and Liberty, responded to by the installation of Aristotle, and the widening reach of physical research. These may be best considered in two eminent types, Albertus Magnus and Roger Bacon: the former is the most conspicuous figure of the century, and may be regarded as the incarnation of the principle of Authority; the latter is so distinguishably the prophet of modern Inquiry, that only in modern times has his true position been understood.

## § II. ALBERTUS MAGNUS.

The 'ape of Aristotle,' as he was not unreasonably named, endeavoured to consolidate the theological conception of the

sources on which he relied,\* as to the theological bias with which he necessarily studied them. It is certain that both by nature and education he was indisposed to innovate, especially in questions which had a theological bearing. 'Whenever divine things are touched on,' he says, 'faith must predominate over reason, authority over argument;' and accordingly the decisions of Aristotle, authoritative as they are in matters of Philosophy, have nevertheless to give way to the decisions of the Church, whenever there seems to be a discrepancy: as to either of them giving way to the truth of things, the alternative is never thought of.

Nevertheless, in spite of his reverence for Authority, the fact that he was the first doctor in the Middle Ages who publicly commented on the various treatises of Aristotle sufficiently accounts for the eminence of his reputation. By spreading the knowledge of what Aristotle and the Arabians taught he enlarged the horizon of Philosophy, and stimulated men's minds to research in other directions than those in which Scholasticism hitherto had confined them. Physics, Alchemy, Natural History, Ethics, were indeed but imperfectly treated: it was a great thing for these subjects to be treated at all. Moreover Scepticism was aided in another way, unconsciously indeed, yet all the more effectively:—I allude to the plan Albertus uniformly pursues, and which was followed by all his successors, of stating the objections which can be raised against every thesis, and answering them serially. It is true that his mode of answering them is very little more than an interrogation of the authorities; but the mere habit of debate was certain to develop Scepticism.

The full development of his efforts is seen in Aquinas, the greatest of the scholastics. But I cannot pause here to sketch the portrait of the Angelic Doctor (born 1227, died 1274).† Referring the student to the special historians of

\* See this circumstantially established by JOURDAIN: *Recherches sur les traductions latines d'Aristote.*

† As the writings of AQUINAS are neither very accessible nor very inviting, the

assailing the blind servility to texts and sentences. These were Roger Bacon's teachers and friends. Towering above them all is Robert Grossetete, bishop of Lincoln, a mathematician who despaired of Aristotle, and strove to find out for himself what the obscurity of translations kept hidden, who opposed the monks, opposed the pope, and impressed his image on the popular mind, mingled with admiration and superstitious terror. A precursor of Bacon, he acquired the reputation of a sorcerer; a precursor of Wiclif, he had called the pope Antichrist.\*

Bacon early chose his career. While he regarded all the scholastics as barbarians in comparison with Aristotle and the Arabs, he was not prepared to accept even Aristotle as infallible. Experience was a surer guide; a little grammar and mathematics were preferable to all the metaphysics of the schools. He learned Greek, Arabic, Hebrew, Chaldaic—studied mathematics, alchemy, optics, and agriculture. He tells us that he had spent 2000 livres in conducting experiments. People marvelled that he could survive his excessive labours. Unhappily, the fruits of forty years of study, fruits which in his estimation would feed the hungry world, it was his bitter lot to see himself forbidden to give out. In an evil hour he had joined the order of Franciscan monks. His superiors, either jealous, or alarmed at the tendencies they discovered, forbade his writing. If he ventured to instruct some curious brother, imprisonment on bread and water was his punishment, and his book was destroyed. He was treated like a disobedient schoolboy, or else like a suspected heretic. Books were refused him. If he attempted to teach his pupils how to calculate and to observe the stars, the influence of Satan was inferred.† Nor is it only in the Middle Ages that men

\* CHARLES : *Op. cit.* p. 7.

† M. CHARLES quotes an old ecclesiastical historian, who says that 'Friar Bungay was profoundly versed in mathematics, either through the inspiration of Satan, or the teaching of Roger Bacon.' Let me add the counter-statement of ROGER BACON, that the neglect of mathematics is the work of Satan : 'Et hoc diabolus procuravit quatenus radices sapientiæ humanæ ignorarentur.' *Opus Tertium* c. xx. p. 66.

possessed of more than average skill, who could construct tables, draw diagrams, and knew something of Greek and Hebrew. Where were such men to be procured? Moreover, the pope had not ventured to interpose between Bacon and his superiors. 'You forgot,' wrote Bacon, 'to speak to my superiors in my excuse; and as I could not make known to them the secret, they threw obstacles in my way.' Nor was this the worst. 'There was another obstacle,' Bacon wrote, 'which had nearly proved subversive of the whole business; and that was want of money. For more than sixty French livres had to be expended, . . . and your messengers would not lay out a single penny, although I told them I would send you word of the amount, and that every man's debts should be paid. You know that I have no money and can have none [as a Mendicant Friar], therefore I am prevented from borrowing.'

Yet his spirit was victorious over all obstacles. In eighteen months he had composed and written out for the pope the *Opus Majus*, *Opus Minus*, and the *Opus Tertium*. 'As an instance of immense labour and application almost superhuman,' says Mr. Brewer, 'these three answers to the demand of the pope must be reckoned among the most remarkable curiosities of literature, independently of their intrinsic merits.'\* And while this poor student was thus miserably contending against external obstacles, his rivals Aquinas and Albertus Magnus were courted and aided by all temporal and clerical dignitaries. It was about this very time that 'Albert le Grand donnait à l'Empereur cette fastueuse hospitalité qui l'a rendu célèbre dans l'imagination populaire.'†

The fate of the works written under such disadvantages has been pitiable. Too much in advance of their age to be appreciated, they have only in quite modern times been rescued from the neglect and destruction too inevitably attending manuscripts. The *Opus Majus* was published by Jebb in 1733; and the *Opus Minus* and *Opus Tertium* first appeared no later than 1859. According to M. Charles, not

\* BREWER: *Op. cit.* Preface, xlv.

† CHARLES: *Op. cit.* p. 31.

resemblances in doctrine. Had there been on external grounds the shadow of a probability, there would have been on internal grounds the strongest evidence of FRANCIS BACON's plagiarism; as it is, we are forced to admit a simple coincidence; unless a more comprehensive acquaintance with the literature of the Middle Ages should prove the resemblances to be traceable to a common source. Some of these, indeed, follow naturally from the antagonism against Aristotle and the Scholastic Method, which was the leading purpose of both. Having seen the vanity of the Syllogism they could only seek refuge in Experience. Having seen the wearisome inutility of Scholasticism, they could only insist with greater emphasis on the 'fruits,' and make utility their aim. Having seen that men had all gone wrong, because all pursued a wrong Method, the suggestion of certain Idols of the mind was near at hand, and the nature of these Idols could not be very differently interpreted. Finally, having a supreme confidence in their own Method, it was natural that both should fall into the strange error of supposing that their Method would, so to speak, equalise men's minds, and render Science easily accessible to all.\* It is less on such resemblances as these, though they arrest the reader, that a charge of plagiarism could be based, than on resemblances in expression (such as the *prerogative* of Experiment) and in unimportant passages. I had drawn up a list of these, but cannot now find it; any diligent reader will notice several in the course of his study. Mr. Brewer alludes to them in his preface.†

\* FRANCIS BACON's belief in his Method was extravagant; but ROGER surpassed him, declaring not only that he could teach a willing pupil in three or six months all that he had taken forty years to learn, but that *three days* would suffice for Hebrew or Greek. *Opus Tertium*, c. xx. p. 65. While I fully concur with Mr. SPEDDING in recognising but a faint resemblance between the 'offendicula' of ROGER and the 'idols' of FRANCIS, I altogether dissent from the judgment of Mr. ELLIS, that 'the general resemblance between the spirit in which the two Bacons speak of science and its improvement is slight.' (*Bacon's Works*, i. 90.) It is precisely here that the resemblance seems to me to be striking.

† I do not reckon such resemblances as the famous epigram of FRANCIS BACON: 'Antiquitas seculi juvenus mundi,' the idea of which is clearly expressed by ROGER: 'quanto juniores tanto perspicaciores, quia juniores posteriores successione tempo-



Four great stumbling blocks to truth (*veritatis offendicula*) impede the inquirer's progress, according to Bacon, and these are: 1. The influence of fragile and unworthy authority, *fragilis et indignæ auctoritatis exemplum*. 2. Custom, *consuetudinis diuturnitas*. 3. The imperfection of undisciplined senses, *vulgi sensus imperiti*. 4. The concealment of our ignorance by ostentation of our seeming wisdom, *propriæ ignorantiae occultatio cum ostentatione sapientiæ apparentis*.

It is on the evil influence of Authority that he is most copious and effective: *nam auctoritas solum allicit, consuetudo ligat, opinio vulgi obstinatos parit et confirmat*. He shows how fallible is the authority even of the wisest philosophers, and the most illustrious fathers, 'who were wise indeed, but not wise in their opposition to truth;' and he declares it to be a feeble argument which rests only on tradition, or the wisdom of our ancestors; rather we should infer that the older and commoner a belief, the greater the chance of its being a mere prejudice. Popular opinion excites his scorn. It was the mob that abandoned Jesus after following him for two years, and shouted, 'Crucify him!' Philosophy has always been persecuted. Aristotle was calumniated, Avicenna persecuted, Averroes decried: 'whoever attempted to reform philosophy has been thwarted in every way; nevertheless truth has triumphed, and will triumph till the coming of Antichrist.' \*

But let us not be precipitate, and conclude that Bacon held the views about Authority which are held by modern insurgents. Remember that it is a friar of the thirteenth century who is denouncing the evil influence of intellectual servility, and you will understand how he could in all sincerity add, 'I do not allude to that truth and solid authority which by God's choice has been placed in the hands of the Church, or which

rum ingrediuntur labores priorum.' *Opus Majus*, c. vi. pp. 7, Venet. 1750. The same idea is met with in many writers; among others in GIORDANO BRUNO (*Opera*, i. p. 132); the felicity of the epigrammatic expression is due to FRANCIS BACON.

\* *Opus Majus*, p. 10. Comp. *Opus Tertium*, c. ix. p. 28. 'Certo multi fuerunt sancti et boni inter Judæos quando crucifixus est Dominus, et tamen omnes dimiserunt Eum.'

the saintly philosophers and infallible prophets have acquired by their own merit.' Elsewhere he places the remedy for the evils first in the study of that only perfect wisdom which is found in the Scriptures, and secondly in the study of Mathematics, and the use of Experiment. This combination of Scripture and Mathematics, so incomprehensible to us, had nothing startling to a man of that age. The infallibility of the Church was not to be shaken off in a day. The idea of Scripture not containing all wisdom is an idea which has very slowly made its way. Moreover in the state of ignorance, which was the state of the wisest in the thirteenth century, we cannot doubt Bacon's sincerity when he exclaims: 'What man knows is little and worthless in respect of that which he believes without knowing; and still less in respect of that which he does not know. Mad is he who thinks much of his wisdom; maddest he who exhibits it as something marvellous.'\*

It is to be noted that Bacon always insists on the harmony of revelation and reason, and stigmatises the distinction which was then daily growing in credit, of truth according to Scripture and truth according to Philosophy. They are vile heretics who make this distinction: 'mentiuntur tanquam vilissimi heretici;' that which is false in philosophy cannot be true elsewhere. 'Nam quicquid est contrarium sapientiæ Dei vel alienum est erroneum et inane, nec potest humano generi valere.' Therefore all wisdom is to be found in Scripture, and drawn from thence by Philosophy and the Canon Law.† Nevertheless, while Bacon thus vindicates the authority of Scripture, he is firm in asserting the integrity of Philosophy, which he regards as revealed by God, and as needed for the perfect fulfilment of Scripture. Indeed we may say that although unhesitatingly accepting the dogmas

\* 'Pauca enim sunt et vilia respectu eorum quæ non intelligit sed credit, et longe pauciora respectu eorum quæ ignorat. Et quoniam respectu eorum quæ scit homo restant infinita quæ ignorat; insanus est qui de sapientia se extollit, et maxime insanit qui ostentat et tanquam portentum suam scientiam nititur divulgare.' *Opus Majus*, p. 11.

† *Opus Tertium*, c. xxiii.-iv

of Christianity, he everywhere accepts them because they are true, and not because they claim the authority of the Fathers: against that authority he is always ready to oppose the verdicts of reason.

Dr. Whewell declares the existence of Roger Bacon's work to be a problem which has never yet been solved; \* so greatly was it in advance of the age. I think that had the historian been somewhat better acquainted with the writings then current, especially with the Arabian writings from which Bacon drew so largely, he would have seen a ready solution of this problem. I am myself but very superficially acquainted with these writings, yet I have discovered evidence enough to make the position of Roger Bacon quite explicable without in the least denying him extraordinary merit. Some of the most striking thoughts of Bacon I have found in Avicenna and Averroes, and in passages cited by Bacon himself. Nevertheless it is a point of great interest to see how this friar in the thirteenth century had assumed the positive attitude, and several of the positive principles. The luminous distinction between Abstract and Concrete Sciences had not altogether escaped him. The important principle that each order of conceptions should be independent—'in nulla facultate extranea debet dominari'—was seized by him at a time when Albertus Magnus protested against the introduction of Mathematics into Physics; and while the ignorant Fathers had discredited mathematical study, Roger Bacon made it the basis of all science—*alphabetum philosophiæ*: a conception, as Dr. Whewell remarks, in which he is superior to Francis Bacon. At a time when the Syllogistic Method was supreme, he could not only laugh at it, and disclose its incompetence, he was ready to replace it with the Scientific Method and its two handmaidens Mathematics and Experiment. 'In every science,' he said, 'we must follow the best method, and that is to study each part in its due order, placing that first which is properly at the commencement, the easy

\* WHEWELL: *Hist. of the Inductive Sciences*, 3rd ed. i. 366.

before the difficult, the general before the particular, the simple before the complex. And the exposition must be demonstration. This is impossible without experiment. We have three means of knowledge: Authority, Reasoning, and Experiment. Authority has no value unless its reason be shown; it does not teach, it only calls for assent. In Reasoning we commonly distinguish a sophism from a demonstration by verifying the conclusion through experiment.' He is constantly insisting on the necessity of Verification, and on the futility of argument.\* 'Experimental Science is the mistress of the speculative sciences, and has three great Prerogatives. First she tests and verifies the conclusions of other sciences. Secondly, she discovers in the notions which other sciences deal with magnificent results to which these sciences are incompetent. Thirdly, she investigates the secrets of nature by her own powers.' His clear insight is displayed in the recognition of an essential connection of all the sciences. Comte himself might have written this passage: 'Omnes scientiæ sunt connexæ, et mutuis se fovent auxiliis, sicut partes ejusdem totius, quarum quælibet opus suum peragit, non solum propter se, sed pro aliis.'†

We may echo Mr. Brewer's remark: 'If the world loves to contemplate the great Lord Chancellor of James I. retiring from the court or the parliament to his museum at Gray's Inn or Gorhambury, laying aside his chancellor's robe to watch the furnace or count the drops from the alembic, the example of the solitary friar with more scanty means and fewer associates justifying the value of experiment, in a darker and less favourable age, is not less interesting. So far as the prize is to be given to mere invention, Roger Bacon has superior claims to Lord Bacon.'‡

\* See especially *Opus Majus*, p. 336-7, over and above the well-known passages; and *Opus Tertium*, c. xiii.

† *Opus Tertium*, c. iv. p. 18.

‡ Mr. BREWER is less happy in his criticism of Roger Bacon when he says: 'though in his practice a keen and sagacious experimentalist, in his exposition of science he adopted the deductive in opposition to the inductive method.' In the first place, Roger Bacon never expounded a science, but only his general views of

He had a distinct idea of a science which should be a *prima philosophia*, constituted of all the fixed and universal Laws of Nature. In the study of this he repudiates as idle the search after Forms and Species, and seeks only the uniform agencies which are reducible to law. He ridicules the Method of his day on which physical questions were solved by reason, *rationaliter*. 'If you ask one of these doctors what is the cause of Combustion, he can only answer you that the cause is *causa*.'

A closer examination of Bacon's writings would demand a long chapter. Such a chapter would display the incompleteness of his conceptions, the vagueness of his Method, and the strange credulity which in those days even his independent mind could not escape.

#### § IV. OCCAM.

Roger Bacon left no school. He was too much in advance of his age; or rather he was too much in advance of the philosophical authorities to gain from them a proper recognition. The Scholasticism he opposed was still triumphant. The theologians opposed him because he inculcated Observation and discredited Authority. The philosophers were willing enough that he should attack Authority, but were not willing to listen to the same attacks upon their syllogistic method. They were not better disposed towards Observation and Experiment than the theologians were. To this day the inductive Method is distasteful to metaphysicians. Duns Scotus rose into rivalry with Aquinas, and the adverse sects of Thomists and Scotists filled Europe with their noisy disputes. Observation and Experiment instead of being practised were condemned as dangerous. In 1243 the Dominicans interdicted the study of medicine and all physical inquiry. In 1287, Chemistry was found to be dangerous.

The gradual development of Philosophy made it clear that science; and in the next place, the inductive method may be the best method of research, but the deductive is the method of exposition.

Aristotle could not be reconciled with several fundamental tenets of the Church. To save both, a distinction between the two kinds of truth was invented; and men taught the truth according to the Church and the truth according to Philosophy, as two parallel and independent lines. This could not last. Scholasticism was hastening to its end, and it received its death-blow from our brilliant and rebellious countryman William of Occam, who wrote vigorously against the temporal power of the Pope, and triumphantly against some metaphysical errors of the schools. This was in the early part of the fourteenth century.

Occam, according to M. Hauréau, is a writer of transparent candour who says what he means without equivocation. He is a freethinker, separating questions of reason from questions of faith, and not permitting the latter to embarrass the former. If the question arises as to the Divine intelligence being the first efficient cause of all that exists, he replies that as a philosopher he knows nothing about it, experience not instructing us in what way the cause of causes acts, and reason having neither the power nor the right to penetrate the divine sanctuary.

With Occam the doctrine of Realism came to an end. His advocacy of Nominalism was irresistible; and indeed it may all be said to be implied in his famous maxim about not multiplying entities. The multiplication of entities had gone on with immense fecundity in the schools. Wherever a phenomenon could be discerned an entity had to be invented to account for it—*oportet ponere aliquod agens*. But Occam showed the weakness of this recourse; and to use the language of M. Hauréau, 'Guillaume d'Ockham n'est pas seulement le chef d'une grande école; son influence sur les écoles adverses a été considérable: comme il rappelait dans les voies de la réalité les esprits fatigués de leurs vaines et laborieuses enquêtes dans les sphères du possible, son appel devait être, a été favorablement accueilli. Au treizième siècle, l'étude de la philosophie était une passion ardente, à laquelle on était prêt à faire beaucoup de sacri-

fices ; mais toutes les passions, même les plus généreuses, recherchent leur fin avec une ardeur déréglée : dès le commencement du quatorzième, on voit plus de calme dans les intelligences, et, comme elles reconnaissent la nécessité d'une méthode, elles sont disposées d'elles-mêmes à suivre le nouveau guide qui se présentera pour les conduire. Ce guide ce fut Guillaume d'Ockham.'

#### § V. THE REVIVAL OF LEARNING.

The gathering forces of the new era may be most readily indicated by an enumeration of such names as Giotto, Dante, Petrarch, Boccaccio, Chaucer, Froissart, Tauler, Wiclif—men whose greatest labours fall within this fourteenth century ; and towards its close we must add the gradual influx of Greek scholars—Barlaam, Chrysoloras, Gaza, Bessarion, and George of Trebizond, whose learning and enthusiasm gave a new direction to philosophical speculation, and opened the treasures of classic wisdom.

With the revival of learning, after the fall of Constantinople, came fresh streams of Grecian influence. The works of Plato became generally known ; under Marsilio Ficino—to whom we owe the Latin translation of Plato\*—a school of Platonists was formed, which continued to divide, with the school of Aristotle, the supremacy of Europe, under new forms, as before it had divided it under the form of Realism. The effect of this influx of Grecian influence, at a period when Philosophy was emancipating itself from the absolute authority of the Church, was to transfer the allegiance from the Church to Antiquity. To have suddenly cast off all authority would have been too violent a change ; and it may on the whole be regarded as fortunate for human development that Philosophy did so blindly accept the new authority—one altogether *human*, yet without deep roots in the life of the nation, without any external constituted

\* In many respects our best guide to Plato's meaning where he is most obscure. It is printed in Bekker's edition.

power, consequently very liable to disunion and disruption, and certain to give way before the necessary insurgence of Reason insisting on freedom.

There is something profoundly rational in the principle of Authority, when not exercised despotically, and something essentially anarchical in the principle of Liberty, when not restrained within due limits. Both Authority and Liberty are necessary principles, which only in misuse become paralyzing or destructive. It may be made perfectly clear to the rational mind that, as Comte says, there can be no such thing as 'liberty of private judgment' in Mathematics, Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, or any other science the truths of which have been established; the person ignorant of these sciences does, and must, take upon trust the statements made by those who are authorities; he cannot indulge his 'private judgment' on the matter, without forfeiting the respect of those who hear him. Does this mean that all men are bound blindly to accept what astronomers and chemists assert? No; to require such admission of the judgment, is to pass beyond the principle of Authority, and assume that of Despotism. The principle of Liberty assures entire freedom to intellectual activity, warrants the control of Authority, and incites men to control it by submitting its positions to those elementary tests by which it was itself originally constituted. If I have made a series of Experiments which have led to the disclosure of an important truth, your liberty of private judgment is mere anarchy if it assert itself in denying the truth simply out of your own pre-conceptions; but it is healthy freedom if it assert itself in denying the truth after having submitted my authority to its original tests (those experiments, namely, which gave it authority), and after detecting some error in my experimentation, or some inaccuracy in my induction. The authoritative statement of Sir Charles Bell, repeated by every other anatomist, respecting the separate functions of the anterior and posterior columns of the spinal chord, was one which permitted no liberty of private judgment, but did permit liberty of



private verification; and when M. Brown-Séquard repeated the original experiments and proved the former conclusions to be erroneous,\* his authoritative statement replaced that of previous anatomists, and will continue to replace it, until it has undergone a similar defeat through the process of verification.

If this is a correct view, it will enable us to understand the long continuance of Aristotle's authority, which coerced the minds of men as the authority of one confessedly a master in his art, and one whose positions would not easily be brought to the test of verification. Hence, as Bayle says, the method employed was first to prove every thesis by authority, and next by arguments; the proofs by authority were passages from Aristotle; the arguments went to show that these passages, rightly interpreted, meant what the thesis meant.

Other causes contributed to foster this reverence for Authority; only one cause could effectually destroy it, and that was the rise of positive Science, which, by forcing men to verify every step they took, led them into direct antagonism with the ancients, and made them choose between the new truth and the old dogma. As Campanella—one of the reforming thinkers—acutely saw, 'the reforms already made in philosophy must make us expect its complete change; and whoever denies that the Christian mind will surpass the Pagan mind, must also deny the existence of the New World, the planets and the stars, the seas, the animals, the colonies, the modern sects and the new cosmography.' † It does not come within our purpose here to trace the rise and development of Science; we therefore pass at once to the philosophical insurgents against the authority of Aristotle and the Church well typified in Giordano Bruno.

\* See *Mémoires de la Société de Biologie*. 1855.

† Quoted by M. RENOUVIER, *Manuel de Philos. moderne*, p. 7.

## § VI. GIORDANO BRUNO.

The martyrdom of Bruno has preserved his name from falling into the same neglect as his writings. Most well-read men remember his name as that of one who, whatever his errors might have been, perished a victim of intolerance. But the extreme rarity of his works, aided by some other causes into which it is needless here to enter, has, until lately, kept even the most curious from forming any acquaintance with them. The rarity of the writings made them objects of bibliopolic luxury: they were the black swans of literature. Three hundred florins were paid for the *Spaccio* in Holland, and thirty pounds in England. Jacobi's mystical friend, Hamann, searched Italy and Germany in vain for the dialogues *De la Causa* and *De l'Infinito*. But in 1830, Herr Wagner, after immense toil, brought out his valuable edition of the Italian works, and since then students have been able to form some idea of the Neapolitan thinker.\*

Giordano Bruno was born at Nola, in La Terra di Lavoro, a few miles from Naples, and midway between Vesuvius and the Mediterranean.† The date of his birth is fixed as 1548—that is to say, eight years after the death of Copernicus,—whose system he was to espouse with such ardour,—and eight years before the birth of our own illustrious Bacon. Tasso well says:

‘La terra  
Simili a sè gli abitator’ produce;’

and Bruno was a true Neapolitan child—as ardent as its volcanic soil, burning atmosphere, and dark thick wine (*mangiaguerra*)—as capricious as its varied climate. There was a restless energy which fitted him to become the preacher

\* *Opere di Giordano Bruno, Nolano, ora per la prima volta raccolte e pubblicate da Adolfo Wagner.* 2 vols. Leipzig, 1830.

† For the biographic details I am mainly indebted to the valuable work of M. CHRISTIAN BARTHOLMESS, entitled *Jordano Bruno*, 2 vols. Paris, 1848; and the extremely important *Vita di Giordano Brano*, recently published by DOMENICO BERTI. Florence, 1868.

of a new crusade—urging him to throw a haughty defiance in the face of every authority in every country,—an energy which closed his wild adventurous career at the stake. He was also distinguished by a rich fancy, a varied humour, and a chivalrous gallantry, which constantly remind us that the athlete is an Italian, and an Italian of the sixteenth century. Stern as was the struggle, he never allowed the grace of his nature to be vanquished by its vehemence. He went forth as a preacher; but it was as a preacher young, handsome, gay, and worldly—as a poet, not as a fanatic.

The first thing we hear of him is the adoption of the Dominican's frock. In spite of his ardent temperament, full of vigorous life he shuts himself up in a cloister,—allured, probably, by the very contrast which such a life offered to his own energetic character. Bruno in a cloister has but two courses open to him: either all that affluent energy will rush into some stern fanaticism, and as in Loyola, find aliment in perpetual self-combat, and in bending the wills of others to his purposes; or else his restless spirit of inquiry, stimulated by avidity for glory, will startle and irritate his superiors.

It was not long ere the course was decided. He began to doubt the mystery of transubstantiation. Nay more: he not only threw doubt upon the dogmas of the Church, he had also the audacity to attack the pillar of all faith, the great authority of the age—Aristotle himself. The natural consequences ensued—he was feared and persecuted. Unable to withstand his opponents, he fled. Casting aside the monkish robe, which clothed him in what he thought a falsehood, he fled from Italy at the very time when Montaigne, having finished the first part of his immortal Essays, entered it, to pay a visit to the unhappy Tasso, then raving in an hospital.

Bruno was now an exile, but he was free; and the delight he felt at his release may be read in several passages of his writings, especially in the sonnet prefixed to *L' Infinito*:

' Uscito di prigione angusta e nera,  
Ove tanti anni error stretto m' avvinse :  
Quà lascio la catena, che mi cinse  
La man di mia nemica invida e fera,' etc.

He was thirty years of age when he began his adventurous course through Europe—to fight single-handed against much of the falsehood, folly, and corruption of his epoch. Like his great prototype, Xenophanes, who wandered over Greece a rhapsodist of philosophy striving to awaken mankind to a recognition of the Deity whom they degraded by their dogmas, or like his own unhappy rivals, Campanella and Vanini, Bruno became the knight-errant of truth, ready to combat all comers in its cause. His life was a battle without a victory. Persecuted in one country, he fled to another—everywhere sowing the seeds of revolt, everywhere shaking the dynasty of received opinion. It was a strange time,—to every earnest man, a sad and almost hopeless time. The Church was in a pitiable condition—decaying from within, and attacked from without. In general the lower clergy were degraded by ignorance, indolence, and sensuality; the prelates, if more enlightened, were enlightened only as epicures and pedants, swearing by the Gods of Greece and Rome, and laboriously imitating the sonorous roll of Ciceronian periods. The Reformation had startled the world, especially the ecclesiastical world. The Inquisition was vigilant and cruel; but among its very members there were sceptics. Scepticism, with a polish of hypocrisy, was the general disease. It penetrated almost everywhere—from the cloister to the cardinal's palace. Scepticism, however, is only a transitory state. In all ages we see it stimulating new reforms. Reformers were not wanting in the sixteenth century. Of the Lutheran movement it is needless here to speak. The sixteenth century marks its place in history as the century of revolutions: it not only broke the chain which bound Europe to Rome, it also broke the chain which bound philosophy to Scholasticism and Aristotle. It set human reason free; it proclaimed the liberty of thought and action. In the vanguard of its army, we see Telesio, Campanella, and Bruno, men who must always excite our admiration and our gratitude for their cause and for their courage. They fell fighting for freedom of thought and utterance—the victims

of a fanaticism the more odious because it was not the rigour of belief, but of *pretended* belief. They fought in those early days of the great struggle between science and prejudice, when Galileo was a heretic, and when the implacable severity of dogmatism baptized in blood every new thought born into the world.

One spirit is common to all these reformers, however various their doctrines: the spirit of unhesitating opposition to the dominant authority. In the fifteenth century men were occupied with the newly-awakened treasures of ancient learning; it was the century of erudition; the past was worshipped at the expense of the present. In art, in philosophy, and in religion, they sought to restore the splendours of an earlier time. Brunelleschi, Michael Angelo, Raphael, disdaining the types of Gothic art, strove to recall once more the classic type. Marsilio Ficino, Mirandola, Telesio, and Bruno, discarding the subtleties and disputes of Scholasticism, endeavoured to reproduce Pythagoras, Plato, and Plotinus. In religion, Luther and Calvin, avowedly arising against Papal corruptions, laboured to restore the Church to its primitive simplicity. Thus the new era seemed retrograde. It is often so. The recurrence to an earlier time is the preparation for a future. We cannot leap far, leaping from the spot where we stand; we must step backwards a few paces to acquire momentum.

Giordano Bruno ceaselessly attacked Aristotle. In so doing he knew that he grappled with the Goliath of the Church. Aristotle was a synonym for reason. An anagram was made of his name, 'Aristoteles: *iste sol erat.*' His Logic and Physics, together with the Ptolemaic system of Astronomy, were then considered as inseparable portions of the Christian creed. In 1624—a quarter of a century after Bruno's martyrdom—the Parliament of Paris issued a decree banishing all who publicly maintained theses against Aristotle; and in 1629, at the urgent remonstrance of the Sorbonne, decreed that to contradict the principles of Aristotle was to contradict the Church! There is an anecdote recorded somewhere of a

student, who, having detected spots in the sun, communicated his discovery to a worthy priest: 'My son,' replied the priest, 'I have read Aristotle many times, and I assure you there is nothing of the kind mentioned by him. Go rest in peace; and be certain that the spots which you have seen are in your eyes, and not in the sun.' When Ramus solicited the permission of Beza to teach in Geneva, he was told, 'the Genevese have decreed once for all, that neither in logic, nor in any other branch of knowledge, will they depart from the opinions of Aristotle—*ne tantillum quidem ab Aristotelis sententiâ deflectere.*' It is well known that the Stagirite narrowly escaped being canonised as a Saint. Are you for or against Aristotle? was the question of philosophy; and the piquant aspect of this *ἀριστοτελεομαχία* is the fact that both parties were often ignorant of the real opinions of the Stagirite; attributing to him indeed doctrines the very reverse of those which a more ample knowledge of his writings has shown him to have taught.

Bruno, as we said, took his stand opposite the Aristotelians. Pythagoras, Plato, Plotinus, and Lucretius were his teachers. Something of temperament may have originated this; for Bruno undoubtedly belongs to that class of thinkers in whom Logic is but the handmaid of Imagination and Fancy. To him the Aristotle of that age was antipathetic. The Aristotelians taught that the world was finite, and the heavens incorruptible. Bruno declared the world to be infinite, and subject to an eternal and universal revolution. The Aristotelians proclaimed the immobility of the earth: Bruno proclaimed its rotation. Such open dissidence could of course only enrage the party in power. It would have been sufficiently audacious to promulgate such absurdities—*horrenda prorsus absurdissima*—as the rotation of the earth; but to defy Aristotle and ridicule his logic, could only proceed from the audacity of impiety. So Bruno had to fly.

To Geneva he first directed his steps. A colony of Italian exiles had established itself there; among them was the Marchese di Vico, who on learning the arrival of an Italian

in a monk's dress, which Bruno had resumed by the advice of friends in Padua, called on him and inquired whether he came there to profess Calvinism. 'To which,' says Bruno, 'after giving an account of myself and the reason of my having quitted my Order, I replied that I had no intention of making any such profession, not being acquainted with the nature of Calvinism, and that I was only desirous of living in freedom.' He adopted the Marchese's suggestion, however, not longer to wear the monk's costume, and entered into a printing-office as corrector of the press. For some months he continued thus earning his livelihood, often going to hear the Protestant preachers, French and Italian; but since he could not join the community, it was intimated to him that no farther assistance was to be expected. He departed, therefore, in search of more tolerant cities. After a short stay at Lyons he proceeded to Toulouse; there he raised a storm among the Aristotelians, such as compelled him to fly to Paris, the streets of which were still slippery with the blood of the eve of St. Bartholomew. It would not have been surprising had he been butchered without mercy; but, by some good fortune, he obtained the favour of Henry III., who not only permitted him to lecture at the Sorbonne, but offered to admit him as a salaried professor, if he would but attend Mass. Is it not strange that at a time when attendance at Mass was so serious a matter,—when the echoes of that lugubrious cry, *La messe ou la mort!* which had resounded through those narrow murky streets, must have been still ringing in men's ears,—Bruno, in spite of his refusal, not only continued to lecture, but became exceedingly popular? Since Abelard had captivated the students of Paris with his facile eloquence and startling novelties, no teacher had been so enthusiastically received as Bruno. Young, handsome, eloquent, and facetious, he charmed by his manner no less than by his matter. Adopting by turns every form of address—rising into the aerial altitudes of imagination, or descending into the kennel of obscenity and buffoonery—now grave, prophet-like, and impassioned—now fierce and controversial—now

fanciful and humorous—he threw aside all the monotony of professional gravity, to speak to them, as a man. He did not on this occasion venture openly to combat the prejudices and doctrines of the age; that was reserved for his second visit, after he had learned in England to speak as became a free and earnest man.

On the misty banks of our noble Thames, he was rudely initiated into the brutality of the English character; but he was amply compensated by his reception at the Court of Elizabeth, where a friendly welcome awaited all foreigners—especially Italians. Nor was his southern heart cold to the exquisite beauty and incomparable grace of our women. England was worth visiting; and he had reason to refer with pride to ‘*questo paese Britannico a cui doviamo la fedeltà ed amore ospitale.*’ It was in England he published the greater part of his Italian works. It was here perhaps that the serenest part of his life was spent. Patronised by the Queen (‘*l’ unica Diana, qual è tra voi qual che tra gli astri il sole,*’ as he calls her), he had the glory and the happiness to call Sir Philip Sidney friend.

In the high communion of noble minds, in the interchange of great thoughts and glorious aspirations, another than Bruno might have been content to leave the world and all its errors in peace; but he had that within him which would not suffer him to be at rest. He could not let the world wag on its way, content to smile at its errors. He was a soldier, and had his battles to fight. In the society of Sir Philip Sidney, Sir Fulke Greville, Dyer, Harvey, and most probably of Antonio Perez and Shakspeare’s Florio, Bruno *might* have discussed with calmness every question of philosophy, had he been of an epicurean turn—had he not been Bruno. As it was, lured by his passion for publicity no less than by his love of truth, he rushed into the arena.

It was not very long after his arrival in England (1583) that Leicester, then Chancellor of Oxford, gave that splendid *fête* in honour of the Count Palatine Albert de Lasco, of which the annals of Oxford and the works of Bruno have pre-



served some details. In those days a foreigner was 'lionised' in a more grandiose style than modern Amphitryons attempt. It was not deemed sufficient to ask the illustrious stranger to breakfast; there were no dinners given in public, or at the club. The age of tournaments had passed away; but there were still public discussions, which were a sort of passage-of-arms between the knights of intellect. And such a tourney had Leicester prepared in honour of the Pole. Oxford called upon her doughty men to brighten up their arms,—that is to say, to shake the dust from their volumes of Aristotle. All comers were challenged. Bruno stepped into the arena. Oxford chose her best men to combat for Aristotle and Ptolemy. On that cause her existence seemed to depend. Her statutes declared that the Bachelors and Masters of Arts who did not faithfully follow Aristotle were liable to a fine of five shillings for every point of divergencè, or for every fault committed against the *Organon*. Bruno wittily called Oxford the *widow* of sound learning—'la vedova di buone lettere.'

The details of this wit combat are unknown to us. Bruno declares that fifteen times did he stop the mouth of his pitiable adversary, who could only reply by abuse.\* But there is considerable *forfanterie* about the Neapolitan, and such statements must be received with caution. That he created a 'sensation' we have no doubt; his doctrines were sufficiently startling. We also find him, on the strength of that success, soliciting permission of the Oxford Senate to profess openly. With his usual arrogance he styles himself, in this address, as a 'doctor of a more perfect theology, and professor of a purer wisdom,' than was there taught. Strange

\* 'Andate in Oxonia e fatevi raccontar le cose intravenute al Nolano quando pubblicamente disputò con que' dottori in teologia in presenza del Principe Alasco Polacco, et altri de la nobilità inglese! Fatevi dire come si sapea rispondere a gli argomenti, come restò per quindici sillogismi quindici volte qual pulcino entro la stoppa quel povero dottor, che come il corifeo de l' accademia ne puosero avanti in questa grave occasione! Fatevi dire con quanta inciviltà e discortesia procedea quel porco, e con quanta pazienza et umanità quell' altro, che in fatto mostrava essere Napoletano, nato et allevato sotto più benigno cielo!'—*La Cena de le Ceneri*: Barro: *Opp. Ital.* ii. 179.

as it may appear, permission was granted ; probably because he had the patronage of Elizabeth. He lectured on cosmology, also on the immortality of the soul: a doctrine which he maintained, not upon the principles of Aristotle, but upon those of the Neo-Platonists, who regarded this life as a brief struggle, a sort of agony of death, through which the soul must pass ere it attains to the splendour of existence in the eternal and universal life: the conviction of our future existence is given in the deep unquenchable desire which is within us to unite ourselves with God, and to quit this miserable sphere for the glorious regions of Eternity. No doubt he preached this doctrine with stirring eloquence ; but it must have sounded very heterodox in the ears of that wise conclave—styled by Bruno ‘a constellation of pedants, whose ignorance, presumption, and rustic rudeness would have exhausted the patience of Job ;’ and they soon put an end to his lectures.

We have already indicated the protection which Elizabeth accorded him, and which he repaid by adulation, extravagant enough, but which was then the current style in speaking of royalty ; and it should not be forgotten that this praise of a Protestant Queen was not among the least of his crimes in the eyes of his accusers. Still, even Elizabeth could not protect a heretic ; and Bruno’s audacious eloquence roused such opposition that he was forced to quit England. He returned to Paris, once more to court the favour of the *Quartier Latin*. He obtained permission to open a public disputation on the Physics of Aristotle. For three successive days did this dispute continue, in which the great questions of nature, the universe, and the rotation of the earth were discussed. Bruno had thrown aside the veil, and presented his opinions naked to the gaze. His impetuous onslaught upon established opinions produced the natural result ; he was forced again to fly.

We next find him in Germany, carrying the spirit of innovation into its august universities. In July, 1586, he matriculated as *theologiæ doctor Romanensis* in the university of Marburg, in Hesse ; but permission to teach philosophy

was refused him *ob arduas causas*. Whereupon he insulted the Rector in his own house, created a disturbance, and insisted that his name should be struck off from the list of members of the university. He set off for Würtemberg. His reception in this centre of Lutheranism was so gratifying, that he styled Würtemberg the Athens of Germany. 'Your justice,' he writes to the Senate, 'has refused to listen to the insinuations circulated against my character and my opinions. You have with admirable impartiality permitted me to attack with vehemence that philosophy of Aristotle which you prize so highly.' For two years did he teach there with noisy popularity, yet on the whole with tolerable prudence in not speaking against the peculiar views of Lutheranism. He even undertook a defence of Satan; but whether in that spirit of pity which moved Burns, or whether in the spirit of buffoonery which delights to play with awful subjects, we have no means of ascertaining. He did not offend his audience, in whatever spirit he treated the subject.

Here, then, in Würtemberg, with admiring audiences and free scope for discussion, one might fancy he would be at rest. Why should he leave so enviable a position? Simply because he was not a man to rest in ease and quiet. He was possessed with the spirit of a reformer, and this urged him to carry his doctrines into other cities. Characteristic of his audacity is the next step he took. From Würtemberg he went to Prague; from the centre of Lutheranism to the centre of Catholicism! In this he had reckoned too much on his own powers. He met with neither sympathy nor support in Prague. He then passed on to Helmstadt, where his fame having preceded him, the Duke of Brunswick conferred upon him the honourable charge of educating the hereditary Duke. Here again, if he had consented to remain quiet, he might have been what the world calls successful; but he was troubled with convictions—things so impedimental to success!—and these drew down upon him a sentence of excommunication. He justified himself, indeed, and the sentence was removed: but he was not suffered to remain

in Helmstadt; so he passed to Frankfort, and there in quiet retirement published three of his Latin works. He there found employment in the printing-house of Weichels, and lodged in the Carmelite monastery, whose prior greatly admired his genius and learning, though somewhat dubious as to his religious opinions. One of the many visitors to the Frankfort fair was a Venetian bookseller named Ciotto, who not only learned to know Bruno, but carried back with him to Venice such a report of his wonderful genius that it inflamed the curiosity of young Mocenigo—one of the family bearing that renowned name, but having none of the qualities which created the renown. Mocenigo having conceived the idea that Bruno could impart to him mysterious and valuable secrets, which were only vaguely indicated in Lully's arts printed in his pages, invited him to be his guest at Venice. With inexplicable precipitation Bruno at once quitted Frankfort (in the spring of 1591), and took up his abode in the palace of his young admirer. The disappointment on both sides was rapid. Mocenigo, either because irritated by Bruno's ill-concealed contempt of his abilities, or because he could get none of the expected illumination, denounced him to the Inquisition as a reprobate and heretic. The whole story is set forth by Signor Berti from unquestionable documents, and is one of surprising baseness.

We have the whole of the trial before the Inquisition circumstantially reported. There seems to have been no unfairness; and Bruno answered with singular frankness, both as to his life and his opinions. He did not deny that many things in his writings were contrary to the Catholic faith, and that he may have often expressed himself so as to cause scandal; but he added—and this is thoroughly in the spirit of the time—‘these things were never spoken by me *ex professo*, to impugn the Catholic faith, but were only in reference to philosophic arguments, or in illustration of heretical opinions.’ He emphatically denied having ridiculed the Apostles, or spoken of Christ with ribaldry, but avowed that his metaphysical opinions respecting the Trinity were not in harmony

with those of the Church. 'I do not think I ever argued on the incarnation, though I have indeed privately doubted how the Word could become flesh.' A bold avowal in such a place! What is specially noticeable here is the emphatic statement on his part that his arguments had only a *meta-physical* bearing, and that for himself he not only submits to the dogmatic theology of the Church, but that he disavows, abhors, and repents of all the erroneous opinions he may have expressed, and all the doubts he may have felt.\* To a modern this appears unworthy equivocation. To a philosopher of that day it was a legitimate distinction. From the moment when Reason endeavoured in her way to solve the problems which had been already solved by the Church, such a distinction was forced upon all minds not prepared to disavow and altogether set aside the teaching of the Church. It is the same now with regard to positive Science, the conclusions of which, though flagrantly at variance with the express dogmas of the Church, are hospitably entertained in the minds of devoted servants of the Church. A striking example of the incongruity in earlier times is seen in the open profession of a disbelief in the immortality of the soul as a philosophical doctrine, on the part of public professors who nevertheless stood by the dogma of immortality.†

Bruno then, not wishing to be a victim, may have availed himself of the current equivocation without forfeiture of self-respect. He avowed his heresies, but declared his willingness to submit. It was the same with Galileo. Lovers of coincidences will find a piquant illustration in the fact that at the very moment when Bruno was thrown into prison, Galileo opened his course of mathematics at Padua.

Bruno's arrest was no sooner effected than intimation of it

\* '... detesta ed abhorre tutti li errori che ha commessi sino al presente giorno pertinenti alla vita catholica, et tutte le heresie che ha tenute et li dubbi che ha avuti intorno alla fede catholica et alle cose determinate dalla santa Chiesa.'—BERTI: *Op. cit.* p. 263.

† See this illustrated in great detail in the able and instructive work of FRANCESCO FIORENTINO, recently published: *Pietro Pomponazzi; studi storici su la scuola Bolognese e Padovana del secolo XVI.* Florence, 1868.

was sent to the Grand Inquisitor San Severino, at Rome, who ordered that the prisoner should be sent to him, under escort, on the first opportunity. Thomas Morosini presented himself before the *Savi* of Venice, and demanded, in the name of his Eminence, that Bruno should be delivered up to him. 'That man,' said he, 'is not only a heretic, but an heresiarch. He has written works in which he highly lauds the Queen of England, and other heretical princes. He has written diverse things touching religion, which are contrary to the faith.' After some hesitation the request was granted, and granted, it would seem, in conformity with Bruno's own wish. On the 16th January 1593 (not 1598, as biographers have uniformly stated) he was transferred to the Roman prison. There he remained seven years. Why he remained so long a period uncondemned is a mystery. It may have been in the hope of extorting a retraction of the one heresy which seems to have been the direst offence, namely his opinion of the plurality of worlds. He had shown in Venice a willingness to submit himself to the Church on all points of dogma—would he not here submit to the Church on this point of science? Galileo, subsequently, availed himself of the subterfuge. Bruno refused. Finding him insensible to their threats and to their logic, they brought him, on the 9th of February, to the palace of San Severino; and there, in the presence of the cardinals and most illustrious theologians, he was forced to kneel and receive the sentence of excommunication. That sentence passed, he was handed over to the secular authorities, with a recommendation of a 'punishment as merciful as possible, and without effusion of blood'—*ut quam clementissimè et citra sanguinis effusionem puniretur*,—the atrocious formula for burning alive.

Calm and dignified was the bearing of the victim during the whole of this scene. It impressed even his persecutors. On hearing his sentence, one phrase alone disturbed the unalterable serenity of his demeanour. Raising his head with haughty superiority, he said, 'I suspect you pronounce this

sentence with more fear than I receive it.'\* A delay of one week was accorded to him, in the expectation that fear might force a retractation; but the week expired, and Bruno remained immovable.

On the 17th February 1600, when the streets of Rome were crowded for the Jubilee, and no less than fifty cardinals were present, the crowd of pilgrims from many nations come to implore forgiveness of their sins, the stubborn sinner who would not disavow the horrible heresy of a plurality of worlds, which he had deduced from the Copernican hypothesis, was led to the stake erected in the Campo di Fiora, near the ancient theatre of Pompey. The fagots were lighted, while the hushed crowd looked on, many still hoping he would retract. In a little while the wind scattered the ashes of the resolute thinker, who in the martyr spirit, self-sustained and silent, welcomed death as the appointed passage to a higher life.

'Fendo i cieli e a l' infinito m' ergo.'

Bruno perished the victim of theological stupidity and self-applauding intolerance. It is impossible to read of such a punishment without strong indignation and disgust. There are, indeed, no pages in the annals of mankind which we would more willingly blot out, than those upon which fanaticism has written its bloody history. Frivolous as have often been the pretexts for shedding blood, none are more abhorrent to us than those founded upon religious differences. Surely the question of religion is awful enough in itself. Men have the deepest possible interest in ascertaining the truth of it: and if they cannot read the problem aright by the light of their own convictions, will it be made more legible by the light of an *auto-da-fé*? Tolerance is still far from being a general virtue; but what scenes of struggle, of violence, and of persecution has the world passed through,

\* 'Maggior timore provate voi nel pronunciar la sentenza contro di me, che non io nel riceverla.'

before even the present modicum of tolerance could be gained! In the sixteenth century, free thought was a crime. The wisest men were bitterly intolerant; the mildest, cruel. Campanella tells us that he was fifty times imprisoned, and seven times put to the torture, for daring to think otherwise than those in power. It was an age of persecution. That which made it so bloody was the vehemence of the struggle between the old world and the new—between thought and established dogma—between science and tradition. In every part of Europe—in Rome itself—men uprose to utter their new doctrines, and to shake off the chains which enslaved human intellect. It was the first great crisis in modern history, and we read its progress by the bonfires lighted in every town. The glare of the stake reddened a sky illumined by the fair auroral light of Science.

Did Bruno deserve to die? According to the notions of that age, he certainly did; though historians have, singularly enough, puzzled themselves in the search after an adequate motive for so severe a punishment. He had praised heretical princes; he had reasoned philosophically on matters of faith—properly the subjects of theology; he had proclaimed liberty of thought and investigation; he had refused to attend Mass; he had repeated many buffooneries then circulating, which threw contempt upon sacred things; finally, he had taught a system of Pantheism, which was altogether opposed to Christianity. He had done all this. But others before, and others afterwards, did this, yet escaped. He perished because he disputed the infallibility of the Church on points of Science, and taught that this Earth of ours on which the Saviour had been crucified, this Earth which the Church ruled, was not the pivot of the universe, was not the only world revolving in infinite space. Accordingly, the flames (as Scioppius sarcastically wrote in describing the execution to a friend) ‘carried him to those worlds which he imagined.’

‘As men die, so they walk among posterity,’ is the felicitous remark of Monckton Milnes; and Bruno, like many other men,


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is better remembered for his death than for anything he did while living. The sentence which consumed his body has embalmed his name. He knew it would be so—'La morte d'un secolo fa vivo in tutti gli altri.'

Considered as a system of philosophy, we cannot hesitate in saying that Bruno's has only an historical, not an intrinsic value. Its condemnation is written in the fact of its neglect. But taken historically, his works are very curious, and still more so when we read them with a biographical interest; for they not only illustrate the epoch, they exhibit the man,—exhibit his impetuosity, recklessness, vanity, imagination, buffoonery, his thoroughly Neapolitan character, and his sincere love of truth. Those who wish to see grave subjects treated with dignity, will object to the licence he allows himself, and will have no tolerance for the bad taste he so often displays. But we should rather look upon these works as the rapid productions of a restless athlete—as the improvisations of a full, ardent, but irregular mind, in an age when taste was less fastidious than it has since become. If Bruno mingled buffooneries and obscenities with grave and weighty topics, he therein only follows the general licence of that age; and we must extend to him the same forgiveness as to Bembo, Ariosto, Tansillo, and the rest. Plato himself is not wholly exempt from the same defect.

In adopting the form of dialogue, Bruno also followed the taste of his age. It is a form eminently suited to polemical subjects; and all his works were polemical. It enabled him to ridicule by turns the pedants, philosophers, and theologians; and to enunciate certain doctrines which even his temerity would have shrunk from, had he not been able to place them in the mouth of another. He makes his dialogues far more entertaining than works of metaphysics usually are; and this he does by digressions, by ridicule, by eloquence, and a liberal introduction of sonnets. Sometimes his very vivacity becomes wearisome. The reader is stunned and bewildered by the remorseless torrent of substantives and epithets which pours from his too prolific pen. There is nobody to



rival him, but Rabelais, in this flux of words.\* His great butts are the clergy, and the philosophers. He reproaches the former with ignorance, avarice, hypocrisy, and the desire to stifle inquiry and prolong the reign of ignorance. The philosophers he reproaches with blind adherence to authority, with stupid reverence for Aristotle and Ptolemy, and with slavish imitation of antiquity. It should be observed that he does not so much decry Aristotle, as the idolatry of Aristotle.† Against the pedantry of that pedantic age he is always hurling his thunders. 'If,' says he, in one place, characterising the pedant, 'he laughs, he calls himself Democritus; if he weeps, it is with Heraclitus; when he argues, he is Aristotle; when he combines chimeras, he is Plato; when he stutters, he is Demosthenes.' That Bruno's scorn sprang from no misology, his own varied erudition proves. But while *he* studied the ancients to extract from them such eternal truths as were buried amidst a mass of error, *they*, the pedants, only studied how to deck themselves in borrowed plumes.

Turning from manner to matter, we must assign to Bruno a place in the history of philosophy, as a successor of the Neo-Platonists, and the precursor of Spinoza, Descartes, Leibnitz, and Schelling. That Spinoza and Descartes were actually conversant with the writings of Giordano Bruno does not distinctly appear. Yet it is not to be disputed that Bruno anticipated Spinoza in his conception of the *immanence* of the Deity, in his famous *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*, and in his pantheistic theory of evolution. He also anticipated Descartes' famous criterium of truth, viz. that whatever is clear and evident to the mind, and does not

\* To give the reader a taste of this quality, we will cite a sentence from the dedicatory epistle to *Gli Eroi Furori*: 'Che spettacolo, o Dio buono! più vile e ignobile può presentarsi ad un occhio di terso sentimento, che un uomo cogitabundo, affitto, tormentato, triste, maninconioso, perdivenir or freddo, or caldo, or fervente, or tremante, or pallido, or rosso, or in mina di perplesso, or in atto di risoluto, un che spende il miglior intervallo di tempo destillando l'elixir del cervello con mettere scritto e sigillar in pubblici monumenti quelle continue torture, que' gravi tormenti, que' razionali discorsi, que' fatuosi pensieri, e quelli amarissimi studi, destinati sotto la tirannide d'una indegna imbecille stolta e sozza sporcizia!' Thus it continues for some fifty lines more!—*Opp. Ital.* ii. 299.

† Vide *Opp. Ital.* ii. 67, where this is explicitly stated.

admit of contradiction, must be true; and in his proclamation of Doubt as opposed to Authority, he thus insists upon Doubt as the starting-point: '*Chi vuol perfettamente giudicare deve saper spogliarsi de la consuetudine di credere, deve l'una e l'altra contraddittoria esistimare egualmente possibile, e dismettere a fatto quell'affezione di cui è imbibeto da natività.*'\* Leibnitz was avowedly acquainted with Bruno's works, and may have derived therefrom his theory of monads. Schelling makes no secret of his obligations.

There is another merit in Bruno which should not be overlooked, that, namely, of giving a strong impulse to the study of Nature. Occupied with syllogisms about entities and quiddities, the philosophy of the Middle Ages had missed the great truth that 'man is the minister and interpreter of Nature.' Philosophy taught that the interpretation could proceed only from *within*; that men were to look into their own minds to analyse, subdivide, and classify their own ideas, instead of looking forth into Nature, and patiently observing her processes.† Bruno was one of the first to call men out into the free air. With his poetical instinct he naturally looked on Nature as the great book for man to read. He deified Nature; and looked upon the Universe as the garment of God, as the incarnation of the divine activity. Let not this be misunderstood, however. If Bruno embraced the Copernican theory, and combated the general physics of his day, he is not on that account to be mistaken for a follower of scientific Method. He espoused the correct view of the earth's sphericity and rotation; but he did so on the faith of his metaphysical theories, not on rigorous induction.

Bruno's creed was Pantheism. In many passages he names and alludes to Avicbron, whose *Fons Vitæ* he had studied with great sympathy, and from whom he may have borrowed

\* *De l' Infinito Universo e Mondi: Opp. Ital.* ii. 84.

† It is of them TELESIO energetically says: 'Sed veluti cum Deo de sapientia contententes decertantesque, mundi ipsius principia et causas ratione inquirere ausi, et quæ non invenerant, inventa ea sibi esse existimantes, volentesque, veluti suo arbitrato, mundum affluxere.'—*De Rerum Natura*, in *Proem.*

certain pantheistic ideas. He taught that God was the Infinite Intelligence, the Cause of causes, the Principle of all life and mind; the great Activity, whose action we name the Universe. But God did not *create* the universe; he *informed* it with life—with being. He *is* the universe; but only as the cause is the effect, sustaining it, *causing* it, but not limited by it. He is self-existing, yet so essentially active as incessantly to manifest himself as a Cause. Between the Supreme Being and the inferior beings dependent upon him, there is this distinction: He is absolutely simple, without parts; he is one whole, identical and universal; whereas the others are mere individual parts, distinct from the great Whole. Above and beyond the visible universe there is an Infinite Invisible,—an immovable, unalterable Identity, which rules over all diversity. This Being of Beings, this Unity of Unities, is God: ‘Deus est monadum monas, nempe entium entitas.’

Bruno says, that although it is impossible to conceive Nature separated from God, we can conceive God separated from Nature. The Infinite Being is the essential centre and substance of the universe, but he is above the essence and substance of all things: he is *superessentialis*, *supersubstantialis*. Thus we cannot conceive a thought independent of a mind, but we can conceive a mind apart from any one thought. The universe is a thought of God’s mind—nay more, it is the infinite activity of his mind. To suppose the world finite is to limit his power. ‘Wherefore should we imagine that the Divine activity (*la divina efficacia*) is idle? Wherefore should we say that the Divine goodness, which can communicate itself *ad infinitum*, and infinitely diffuse itself, is willing to restrict itself? Why should his infinite capacity be frustrated—defrauded of its possibility to create infinite worlds? And why should we deface the excellence of the Divine image, which should rather reflect itself in an infinite mirror, as his nature is infinite and immense?’\*

Bruno admits the existence of only one intelligence, and that

\* *De l’ Infinito : Opp. Ital.* ii. 24.

is God.\* *Est Deus in nobis*. This intelligence, which is perfect in God, is less perfect in inferior spirits; still less so in man; more and more imperfect in the lower gradations of created beings. But all these differences are differences of degree, not of kind. The inferior order of beings do not understand themselves, but they have a sort of language. In the superior orders of beings, intelligence arrives at the point of self-consciousness—they understand themselves, and those below them. Man, who occupies the middle position in the hierarchy of creation, is capable of contemplating every phasis of life. He sees God above him—he sees around him traces of the divine activity. These traces, which attest the immutable order of the universe, constitute the soul of the world. To collect them, and connect them with the Being whence they issue, is the noblest function of the human mind. Bruno further teaches that, in proportion as man labours in this direction, he discovers that these traces, spread abroad in nature, do not differ from the *ideas* which exist in his own mind.† He thus arrives at the perception of the identity between the soul of the world and his own soul, both as reflections of the Divine intelligence. He is thus led to perceive the identity of Subject and Object, of Thought and Being.

Such is the faint outline of a doctrine, to preach which Bruno became a homeless wanderer and a martyr; as he loftily says, 'Con questa filosofia l'anima mi s'aggrandisce, e mi si magnifica l'intelletto.'

In five dialogues, *La Cena de le Ceneri*, he combats the

\* DE MORGAN (*Companion to the Almanack*, 1855) says: 'Among the versions of the cause of Bruno's death is *atheism*: but this word was very often used to denote rejection of revelation, not merely in the common course of dispute, but by such writers, for instance, as Brucker and Morhof. Thus Morhof says of the *De Monade, &c.*, that it exhibits no manifest signs of atheism. What he means by the word is clear enough, when he thus speaks of a work which acknowledges God in hundreds of places, and rejects opinions as blasphemous in several.'

† 'ELP.: What is the purpose of the senses?—FIL.: Solely to excite the reason; to indicate the truth, but not to judge of it. Truth is in the sensible object as in a mirror; in the reason, as a matter of argument; in the intellect, as a principle and conclusion; but in the mind it has its true and proper form.'

—*De l'Infinito*, p. 18.

hypothesis of the world's immobility; proclaims the infinity of the universe, and warns us against seeking its centre or circumference. He enlarges on the difference between appearances and reality in celestial phenomena; argues that our globe is made of the same substance as the other planets, and that everything which *is*, is living, so that the world may be likened to a huge animal.\* In this work he also answers his objectors, who bring against his system the authority of Scripture, exactly in the same way as modern geologists answer the same objection, viz. by declaring that the revelation in the Bible was a moral, not a physical revelation: it did not pretend to teach science, but, on the contrary, adopted ordinary notions, and expressed itself in the language intelligible to the vulgar.† In this work there are some digressions more than usually interesting to us, because they refer to the social condition of England during Elizabeth's reign.

The two works, *De la Causa* and *De l' Infinito*, contain the most matured and connected exposition of his philosophical opinions. As our space will not admit of an analysis, we must refer to the one given by M. Bartholmess.‡ The *Spaccio de la Bestia Trionfante* is the most celebrated of all his writings. It was translated by Toland, in 1713, who printed only a very few copies, as if wishing it to fall into the hands of only a few choice readers. The very title has been a sad puzzle to the world, and has led to the strangest suppositions. The 'Triumphant Beast,' which Bruno undertakes to expel, is none other than this: ancient astronomy disfigured the heavens with animals as constellations, and under guise of expelling these, he attacks the great beast (Superstition) whose predominance causes men to believe that

\* An idea borrowed from PLATO, who, in the *Timæus*, says, Οὕτως οὖν δὴ κατὰ λόγον τὸν εἰκότα δεῖ λέγειν τόνδε τὸν κόσμον ζῶον ἐμψύχον ἔννουν τε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ γενέσθαι πρόνοιαν.—p. 26, ed. BEKKER. Compare also *Politicus*, p. 273. BRUNO may have taken this directly from PLATO, or he might have learned it from the work of his countryman, TELESIO, *De Rerum Naturâ*.

† 'Secondo il senso volgare et ordinario modo di comprendere e parlare.' The whole of the early portion of Dialogue 4 (in which this distinction is maintained) is worth consulting.—*Opere*, i. 172 sq.

‡ BARTHOLMESS: *Jordano Bruno*, ii. 128-154.

the stars influence human affairs. In his *Cabala del Cavallo Pegaseo*, he sarcastically calls the ass 'la bestia trionfante viva,' and indites a sonnet in praise of that respectable quadruped:

'Oh sant' asinità, sant' ignoranza,  
Santa stoltizia, e pia divozione,  
Qual sola puoi far l' anime sì buone  
Ch' uman ingegno e studio non l' avanza !' &c.

The *Spaccio* is an attack upon the superstitions of the day,—a war against ignorance, and 'that orthodoxy without morality, and without belief, which is the ruin of all justice and virtue.' Bruno fancifully calls Morality 'the astronomy of the heart;' did not Bacon call it 'the *Georgics* of the mind'? The *Spaccio* is a strange medley of learning, imagination, and buffoonery; and on the whole, perhaps the most tiresome of all his writings. M. Bartholmess, whose admiration for Bruno greatly exceeds my own, says of it: 'The mythology and symbolism of the ancients are there employed with as much tact as erudition. The fiction that the modern world is still governed by Jupiter and the court of Olympus, the mixture of reminiscences of chivalry, and the marvels of the middle ages, with the tales and traditions of antiquity—all those notions which have given birth to the philosophy of mythology, of religions, and of history—the Vicos and the Creuzers—this strange medley makes the *Spaccio* so interesting. The philosopher there speaks the noble language of a moralist. As each virtue in its turn appears to replace the vices which disfigure the heavens, it learns from Jupiter all it has to do, all it has to avoid: all its attributes are enumerated and explained, and mostly personified in the allegorical vein; all the dangers and excesses it is to avoid are characterised with the same vigour. Every page reveals a rare talent for psychological observation, a profound knowledge of the heart, and of contemporary society. The passions are subtly analysed and well painted. That which still more captivates the thoughtful reader is the sustained style of this long fiction, which may be regarded as a sort of philosophic sermon. Truth and wisdom, justice and candour,

take the place in the future now occupied by error, folly, and falsehood of every species. In this last respect the *Spaccio* has sometimes the style of the Apocalypse.'

Without impugning the justice of this criticism, I must add, that the *Spaccio* taxes even a bookworm's patience, and ought to be read with a liberal license in skipping.

Perhaps, of all his writings, *Gli Eroi Furori* is that which would most interest a modern reader, not curious about the philosophical speculations of the Neapolitan. Its prodigality of sonnets, and its mystic exaltation, carry us at once into the heart of that epoch of Italian culture when poetry and Plato were the great studies of earnest men. In it Bruno, avowing himself a disciple of Petrarch, proclaims a Donna more exalted than Laura, more adorable than all earthly beauty: that Donna is the imperishable image of Divine Perfection. It is unworthy of a man, he says, to languish for a woman; to sacrifice to her all those energies and faculties of a great soul, which might be devoted to the pursuit of the Divine. Wisdom, which is truth and beauty in one, is the idol adored by the genuine hero. Love woman if you will, but remember that you are also a lover of the Infinite. Truth is the food of every heroic soul; hunting for Truth the only occupation worthy of a hero.\* The reader of Plato will trace here a favourite image; and was it not Berkeley who described Truth as 'the cry of all, but the game few run down'?

\* See, in particular, the fine passage, *Opp. Ital.* ii. 406-7.



## FIRST EPOCH.

*Philosophy again separates itself from Theology, and seeks the aid of Science.*

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### CHAPTER I.

#### BACON AND DESCARTES.

**I**N the evolution of Philosophy, as in the evolution of an organism, it is impossible to fix with any precision a period of origin, because every beginning is also a termination, and resumes the results of a whole series] of preceding evolutions. As Mr. Spedding felicitously says; our Philosophy 'was born about Bacon's time, and Bacon's name (as the brightest which presided at the time of its birth) has been inscribed upon it:

Hesperus that led  
The starry host rode brightest.

Not that Hesperus did actually *lead* the other stars; he and they were moving under a common force, and they would have moved just as fast if he had been away; but because he shone brightest, he *looked* as if he led them.\* Bacon and Descartes are generally recognised as the Fathers of Modern Philosophy, though they themselves were carried along by the rapidly-swelling current of their age, then decisively setting in the direction of Science. It is their glory to have seen visions of the coming greatness, to have expressed in

\* Bacon's Works, 1857, I. 374.

terms of splendid power the thoughts which were dimly stirring the age, and to have sanctioned the new movement by their authoritative genius. The destruction of Scholasticism was complete. They came to direct the construction of a grander temple.

There are in these two thinkers certain marked features of resemblance, and others of difference equally marked. We see their differences most strikingly in their descendants. From Bacon lineally descended Hobbes, Locke, Diderot, D'Alembert, Condillac, Cabanis, our Scotch School, and Comte. From Descartes descended Spinoza, Malebranche, Leibnitz, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. The Inductive Method predominated in the one school, the Deductive in the other. These differences we shall recognise more fully later on: at present we may fix our minds on the two great points of resemblance: 1st, the decisive separation of Philosophy from Theology; 2nd, the promulgation of a new Method.

There have been discussions respecting Bacon's orthodoxy which I do not meddle with here, since, whether his occasional declarations were sincere, or were only the lip-homage which men in those days paid the Church, nothing is more certain than that he quietly excluded Theology from his scheme, telling the King why he did so. 'If I proceed to treat of it, I shall step out of the bark of human reason, and enter into the ship of the Church; which is only able by the Divine compass to rightly direct its course. Neither will the stars of philosophy which have hitherto so nobly shone upon us, any longer supply their light, so that on this subject it will be as well to keep silence.'\* Again, 'Sacred Theology ought to be derived from the word and oracles of God, and not from the light of nature or the dictates of human reason.' And in the corresponding part of the *Advancement of Learning*, he says: 'The use of human reason in religion is of two sorts: the former in the conception and apprehension of the mysteries of God to us revealed; the other in the

\* *De Augmentis*, book ix. c. 1.

than a clearance from scholastic argumentation and Aristotelian tradition, it was a sweeping away of all Authority whatever, succeeded by the installation of Reason as supreme arbiter. Nay, he went beyond Bacon in this respect, since he wished to introduce Reason even into the domain of Theology: 'I have always thought,' he says in the dedication of his *Meditations* to the Sorbonne, 'that the two questions of the existence of God and the nature of the soul (two questions Bacon wisely left untouched) were the chief of those which ought to be demonstrated rather by philosophy than by theology; for although it is sufficient for us, the faithful, to believe in God and that the soul does not perish with the body, it certainly does not seem possible ever to persuade the infidels to any religion, nor hardly to any moral virtue, unless we first prove to them these two things by natural reason.'

While thus encroaching on the domain of Theology, he allowed no theological encroachments on Philosophy; and in promulgating his hypothesis of the vortices, he remarks that although we know for certain that God created the world at once, yet it would be of eminent interest to see how the world *might* have been evolved. Having protected himself, by this *précaution oratoire*, he proceeds with his hypothesis, and explains the world wholly without reference to God. In like manner God is assumed as the first cause of motion, but his presence is never afterwards indicated.

The separation of Philosophy from Theology is made emphatic in the rejection of Final Causes by both Bacon and Descartes. The latter says, 'Nous rejeterons entièrement de notre philosophie la recherche des causes finales; car nous ne devons pas tant présumer de nous-mêmes que de croire que Dieu nous ait voulu faire part de ses conseils;' and again: 'Tout ce genre de causes qu'on a coutume de tirer de la fin n'est d'aucun usage dans les choses physiques et naturelles.' He left them for theologians, declaring that in Physics, where every conclusion must rest on solid grounds, the appeal to final causes is inept.

But perhaps the most effective of all the novelties was the



## CHAPTER II.

*BACON.*

**I**NTO the vexed questions of Bacon's conduct both with regard to Essex and with regard to bribery, I cannot enter here ; but referring the curious to his biographers and critics, I will simply note that he was born in 1561 ; was educated at Trinity College, Cambridge, where he learned to distrust the Aristotelianism of his masters, and planned his own vast scheme of reform ; went to Paris ; sat in Parliament as member for Middlesex ; was successively appointed of the Privy Council, and Lord Chancellor ; was created Viscount Verulam ; was impeached and condemned for corruption as a judge ; and died in the spring of 1626. 'For my name and memory,' said the dying man, 'I leave it to men's charitable speeches, and to foreign nations, and the next age.'

Posterity has been generous ; the fame of Bacon is immense. Admirers have not always been unanimous as to his special claims ; but there has been no lack of enthusiasm, no questioning of his genius. He has been lauded for achievements in which he had no part, and has been adorned with titles to which he had doubtful pretensions ; while his most important services have been overlooked. But the general recognition of his greatness, and our national pride in it, have not prevented certain attacks on his reputation, which have been answered in a rather angry spirit ; and thus from one cause and another there is great difficulty in arriving at any candid and thorough appreciation of the work he did. It seems to some persons that Bacon did very little in rising against the philosophy of his day, and pointing out a new

was incapable of appreciating the real conditions of research. He saw clearly enough the great truth that the progress of research must be gradual, but he did not see what were the necessary grades, he did not see the kind of inquiries, and the order they must follow, before discoveries could be made. That he had really but vague and imperfect conceptions of Scientific Method is decisively shown by his contemptuous rejection of Copernicus, Galileo, and Gilbert, and by his own plan of an investigation into Heat. One sentence alone would suffice to show this, namely, his sneer at Copernicus as 'a man who thinks nothing of introducing fictions of any kind into nature, provided his calculations turn out well.' Bacon did not understand, what Copernicus profoundly saw, that the only value of an hypothesis was its reconciliation of calculations with observations. In his plan for an *Inquisition into the Nature of Heat*, we see a total misconception of the scientific process: not only does he set about it in a laboriously erroneous way, but he seeks that which Science proclaims inaccessible, the *nature* of heat. It is true that he arrives at an hypothesis which bears some resemblance to the hypothesis now accepted, namely, that heat is a mode of motion—'an expansive and restrained motion, modified in certain ways, and exerted in the smaller particles of the body.' But those who have been eager to credit him with an anticipation of modern views on the strength of this definition, have overlooked the fact that it is incapable of explaining a single process, includes none of the ascertained laws of phenomena, and is itself an example of the illicit generalisation which Bacon elsewhere condemns.\* It was with some justification, therefore, that Harvey, who knew what science was, and knew better than most men how discoveries were made, said of him that he wrote of science like a Lord Chancellor.

Indeed it is to mistake his position, and his greatness altogether, to attribute his influence on Philosophy, which is undeniable, to an influence on Science which is more than

\* WHEWELL: *Philos. of Discovery*, p. 137.

questionable. Bacon was a philosopher; but because with him Philosophy, separating itself from the bondage of Theology, claimed to ally itself with Science, and sought its materials in the generalities of Science, those writers who have never made a very accurate distinction between the two, but have confounded Philosophy with Metaphysics, and Science with Physics, have naturally regarded Bacon as the precursor of Newton, Laplace, Faraday, and Liebig. It is in vain that critics oppose such a claim by asserting what is undeniable, that the great discoveries in modern science were neither made on Bacon's method,\* nor under any direct guidance from him—that Copernicus, Galileo, and Kepler preceded him, that Harvey and Newton ignored him—staunch admirers have their answer ready: they know that Bacon was the herald of the new era, and they believe that it was his trumpet-call which animated the troops, and led them to victory.

Nor can any one pretend to estimate the influence of such a trumpet-call as Bacon's. He is one of the most striking illustrations of that Literature of Power, of which mention has already been made.† His distinguishing characteristic is a large opulence of mind, at once massive and florid, wide-sweeping and subtle; and the main source of his influence has been the dignity with which he invested the objective mode of looking at things, a mode liable to degenerate into a creeping prosaism and trivial love of detail, a mode wanting also in the attractions of a facile, though illusory, subjective tendency, but the only mode of reaching truth and consequently of securing the solid grandeur of permanent results. Under Bacon's eloquent teaching men began to see that they were working nobly, as well as working usefully, in limiting their researches to realities, foregoing the delusive hopes of metaphysics, proceeding

\* 'That this method is impracticable,' says Mr. ELLIS, 'cannot, I think, be denied, if we reflect not only that it never has produced any result, but also that the process by which scientific truths have been established cannot be so presented as even to appear to be in accordance with it.'—*Bacon's Works*, i. 38.

† See vol. i. p. 225.

cautiously, and checking the native impatience of the mind. Galileo, both by precept and example, had shown them a victorious method of research: but Galileo did not *dignify* that method in their eyes; he did not raise it into Philosophy. Bacon, weak in Science, was strong in the Philosophy which sought materials in Science.\* There was, and still is, an instinctive antagonism between philosophers and savans: the philosophers complaining that Science is too narrow in its scope, the savans proclaiming that Philosophy is too vague in its principles. Bacon was the first to conceive a Philosophy of the Sciences. He did this when he proclaimed that Physics was 'the mother of all the sciences.' That this was greatly in advance of his age may be gathered from the fact of its to this day remaining a heresy: the notion of ethics and politics having the same methods, and being susceptible of the same treatment as physics, is by the majority looked upon as fanciful, if not absurd.

Speaking of the causes of errors in preceding philosophers, Bacon says, 'A second cause of very great moment is that through all those ages wherein men of genius and learning principally or even moderately flourished, the smallest part of human industry has been spent upon natural philosophy, though this ought to be esteemed as the great mother of the sciences; for all the rest, if torn from this root, may perhaps be polished and formed for use, but can receive little increase. . . .

'But let none expect any great promotion of the sciences, especially in their effective part, *unless natural philosophy be drawn out to particular sciences; and, again, unless these particular sciences be brought back again to natural philosophy.* From this defect it is that astronomy, optics, music, many mechanical arts, and what seems stranger, *even moral and*

\* HALLER well says: 'Bacon's Vergleichung mit Galiläi ist höchst ungerecht; der letztere war freilich ein besserer Mathematiker und Kenner der Sterne; aber er war auf wenige Wissenschaften eingeschränkt, und Bacon übersah sie alle wie ein Wesen von einem höheren Orden, und wie noch Niemand sie vor ihm angesehen hatte.' Cited by BÖHMER: *Ueber Francis Bacon von Verulam*. Erlangen: 1864, p. 22.

*civil philosophy and logic*, rise but little above the foundations, and only skim over the varieties and surfaces of things, viz. because after these particular sciences are formed and divided off, they are no longer nourished by natural philosophy, which might give them strength and increase; and therefore no wonder if the sciences thrive not, when separated from their roots.\*

By thus bringing Science out of its laboratories into the general field of thought, and by bringing Philosophy out of its Schools into the workshops of research, Bacon really introduced the new era. Dr. Whewell well says that 'a revolution was going on, as all the greatest physical investigators of the sixteenth century were fully aware. But their writings conveyed this conviction to the public at large very slowly. Men of letters, men of rank, men of the world did not become familiar with the abstruse works in which these views were published; and above all they did not by such occasional glimpses as they took of the state of physical science become aware of the magnitude and importance of this change. But Bacon's lofty eloquence, wide learning, comprehensive views, bold pictures of the coming state of things, were fitted to make men turn a far more general and earnest gaze upon the passing change. When a man of his acquirements, of his talents, of his rank and position, of his gravity and caution, poured forth the strongest and loftiest expressions and images which his mind could supply in order to depict the "great Instauration" which he announced; in order to contrast the weakness, the blindness, the ignorance, the wretchedness under which men had laboured while they followed the long beaten track, with the light, the power, the privileges which they were to find in the paths to which he pointed; it was impossible that readers of all classes should not have their attention arrested, their minds stirred, their hopes warmed, and should not listen with wonder and pleasure to the strains of prophetic eloquence in which so great a subject was presented.'†

\* *Novum Organum*, i. Aph. 79, 80. † WHEWELL: *Philos. of Discovery*, p. 127.



It was Bacon's constant endeavour, as it has been the cause of his enduring fame, to teach men the real object of research, and the scope of their faculties, and to furnish them with a proper Method whereon these faculties might be successfully employed. He thus not only stands clearly out in history as the exponent of the long agitated antagonism to all the ancient and scholastic thinkers, but also as the exponent of the rapidly increasing tendency towards positive science. He is essentially modern. All his predecessors, even in their boldest attacks upon ancient philosophy, were themselves closely allied to the spirit of that which they opposed. But Bacon was modern in culture, in object, and in method. He attacked the ancient philosophy without having thoroughly understood it: he attacked it because he saw that a method which conducted great intelligences to such absurd conclusions as those then in vogue must necessarily be false.

'Whence can arise,' he asks, 'such vagueness and sterility in all the physical systems which have hitherto existed in the world? It is not certainly from anything in nature itself; for the steadiness and regularity of the laws by which it is governed clearly mark them out as objects of precise and certain knowledge.

'Neither can it arise from any want of ability in those who have pursued such inquiries, many of whom have been men of the highest talent and genius of the ages in which they lived; and it can therefore arise from nothing else but the perverseness and insufficiency of the methods which have been pursued. Men have sought to make a world from their own conception, and to draw from their own minds all the materials which they employed; but if, instead of doing so, they had consulted experience and observation, they would have had facts, and not opinions, to reason about, and might have ultimately arrived at the knowledge of the laws which govern the material world.

'As things are at present conducted, a sudden transition is made from sensible objects and particular facts to general propositions, which are accounted principles, and round

For the induction of which the logicians speak, which proceeds by simple enumeration, is a puerile thing; concludes at hazard, is always liable to be upset by a contradictory instance, takes into account only what is known and ordinary, and leads to no result. Now what the sciences stand in need of is a form of induction which shall analyse experience and take it to pieces, and by a due process of exclusion and rejection lead to an inevitable conclusion.' . . . 'Now my method, though hard to practise, is easy to explain; and it is this—I propose to establish progressive stages of certainty. The evidence of sense helped and guarded by a certain process of correction, I retain: but the mental operation which follows the act of sense I for the most part reject; and instead of it I open and lay out a new and certain path for the mind to proceed in, starting directly from the simple sensuous perception.'

Before expounding the rules which he proposes he enumerates the four sources of error, the idols as he terms them. He considered this enumeration as the more necessary, that the same idols were likely to return, even after the reformation of science.

These idols he divides into four classes, viz. :—

Idola Tribûs . . . .	Idols of the Tribe.
Idola Spectûs . . . .	Idols of the Den.
Idola Fori . . . .	Idols of the Forum.
Idola Theatri . . . .	Idols of the Theatre.

1. The *Idols of the Tribe* are the causes of error founded on human nature in general. 'The mind,' he observes, 'is not like a plane mirror, which reflects the images of things exactly as they are; it is like a mirror of an uneven surface, which combines its own figure with the figures of the objects it represents.'

Among the idols of this class we may reckon the propensity which there is in all men to find a greater degree of order, simplicity, and regularity than is actually indicated by observation. Thus as soon as men perceived the orbits of the planets to return into themselves, they supposed them to be perfect circles, and the motion in those circles to be

uniform; and to these hypotheses the astronomers and mathematicians of all antiquity laboured incessantly to reconcile their observations.

The propensity which Bacon has here characterised may be called the *spirit of system*.

2. The *Idols of the Den* are those which spring from the peculiar character of the individual. Besides the causes of error common to all mankind, each individual has his own dark cavern, or den, into which the light is imperfectly admitted, and in the obscurity of which a tutelary idol lurks, at whose shrine the truth is often sacrificed.

Some minds are best adapted to mark the differences of things, others to catch at the resemblances of things. Steady and profound understandings are disposed to attend carefully, to proceed slowly, and to examine the most minute differences; while those that are sublime and active are ready to lay hold of the slightest resemblances. Each of these easily runs into excess; the one by catching continually at distinctions, the other at affinities.

3. The *Idols of the Forum* are those which arise out of the intercourse of society, and those also which arise from language.

Men believe that their thoughts govern their words; but it also happens by a certain kind of reaction that their words frequently govern their thoughts. This is the more pernicious, that words, being generally the work of the multitude, divide things according to the lines most conspicuous to vulgar apprehensions. Hence, when words are examined, few instances are found in which, if at all abstract, they convey ideas tolerably precise and defined.

4. The *Idols of the Theatre* are the deceptions which have arisen from the dogmas of different schools.

As many systems as existed, so many representations of imaginary worlds had been brought upon the stage. Hence the name of *Idola Theatri*. They do not enter the mind imperceptibly like the other three; a man must labour to acquire them, and they are often the result of great learning and study.

After these preliminary discussions Bacon proceeds, in the Second Book of his *Organum*, to describe and exemplify the nature of induction.

The first object must be to prepare a history of the phenomena to be explained, *in all their modifications and varieties*. This history is to comprehend not only all such facts as spontaneously offer themselves, but all *the experiments instituted for the sake of discovery*, or for any of the purposes of the useful arts. It ought to be composed with great care; the facts accurately related and distinctly arranged; their authenticity diligently examined; those that rest on doubtful evidence, though not rejected, yet noted as uncertain, with the grounds of the judgment so formed. This last is very necessary, for facts often appear incredible only because we are ill-informed, and cease to appear marvellous when our knowledge is further extended. This record of facts is *Natural History*.

The Natural History being prepared of any class of phenomena, the next object is to discover, by a comparison of the different facts, the *cause* of these phenomena, or, as Bacon calls it, the *form*. The form of any quality in a body is something convertible with that quality; that is, where it exists the quality exists: thus, if transparency in bodies be the thing inquired after, the *form* of it is something found wherever there is transparency. Thus *form* differs from *cause* in this only: we call it form or essence when the effect is a permanent quality; we call it *cause* when the effect is a change or an event.

Two other subjects, subordinate to *forms*, but often essential to the knowledge of them, are also occasionally subjects of investigation. These are the latent process, *latens processus*; and the latent schematism, *latens schematismus*. The former is the secret and invisible progress by which sensible changes are brought about, and seems in Bacon's acceptation to involve the principle since called the *law of continuity*, according to which no change however small can be effected but in *time*. To know the relation between the time and the change effected in it would be to have a perfect

knowledge of the latent process. In the firing of a cannon, for example, the succession of events during the short interval between the application of the match and the expulsion of the ball constitutes a latent process of a very remarkable and complicated nature, which however we can now trace with some degree of accuracy.

The latent schematism is that invisible structure of bodies on which so many of their properties depend. When we inquire into the constitution of crystals, or into the internal structure of plants, etc. we are examining into the latent schematism.

In order to inquire into the form of anything by induction, having brought together all the facts, we are to begin with considering what things are thereby *excluded* from the number of possible forms. This conclusion is the first part of the process of induction. Thus, if we are inquiring into the quality which is the cause of transparency in bodies; from the fact that the diamond is transparent, we immediately exclude rarity or porosity as well as fluidity from these causes, the diamond being a very solid and dense body.

Negative instances, or those where the *form* is wanting, to be also collected. That glass when pounded is not transparent is a negative fact when the form of transparency is inquired into; also that collections of vapours have not transparency. The facts thus collected, both negative and affirmative, should, for the sake of reference, be reduced to tables.

After a great many exclusions have been made, and left but few principles common to every case, one of these is to be assumed as the cause; and by reasoning from it synthetically we are to try if it will account for the phenomena. So necessary did this exclusive process appear to Bacon that he says, 'It may perhaps be competent to angels or superior intelligences to determine the form or essence directly, by affirmations from the first consideration of the subject; but it is certainly beyond the power of man, to whom it is only given to proceed at first by negatives, and in the last place to end in *affirmatives*, after the exclusion of everything else.'

There is, however, great difference in the value of facts. Some of them show the thing sought for in the highest degree, some in the lowest, some exhibit it simple and uncombined, in others it appears confused with a variety of circumstances. Some facts are easily interpreted, others are very obscure, and are understood only in consequence of the light thrown on them by the former. This led Bacon to his consideration of *Prerogative Instances*, or the comparative value of facts as means of discovery. He enumerates twenty-seven different species; but we must content ourselves with giving only the most important.

I. *Instantiæ solitariae*: which are either examples of the same quality existing in two bodies otherwise different or of a quality differing in two bodies otherwise the same. In the first instance the bodies differ in all things but one. In the second they agree in all but one. Thus if the cause or *form* of colour be inquired into, *instantiæ solitariae* are found in crystals, prisms, drops of dew, which occasionally exhibit colour, and yet have nothing in common with the stones, flowers, and metals which possess colour permanently except the colour itself. Hence Bacon concludes that colour is nothing else than a modification of the rays of light produced in the first case by the different degrees of incidence; and in the second by the texture or constitution of the surface of bodies. He may be considered as very fortunate in fixing on these examples, for it was by means of them that Newton afterwards found out the composition of light.

II. The *instantiæ migrantes* exhibit some property of the body passing from one condition to another, either from less to greater or from greater to less; arriving nearer perfection in the first case, or verging towards extinction in the second.

Suppose the thing inquired into were the cause of whiteness in bodies: an *instantia migrans* is found in glass, which entire is colourless, but pulverised becomes white. The same is the case with water unbroken or dashed into foam.

III. The *instantiæ ostensivæ* are the facts which show

some particular property in its highest state of power and energy, when it is either freed from impediments which usually counteract it or is itself of such force as entirely to repress those impediments.

If the weight of air were inquired into, the Torricellian experiment, or the barometer, affords an *ostensive instance*, where the circumstance which conceals the weight of the atmosphere in common cases, namely the pressure of it in all directions, being entirely removed, that weight produces its full effect, and sustains the whole column of mercury in the tube.

IV. The *instances* called *analogous* or *parallel* consist of facts between which a resemblance or analogy is visible in some particulars, notwithstanding great diversity in all the rest. Such are the telescope and microscope compared to the eye. It was the experiment of the camera obscura which led to the discovery of the formation of images of external objects in the bottom of the eye by the action of the crystalline lens, and other humours of which the eye is formed.

V. *Instantiæ comitatûs*: examples of certain qualities which always accompany one another. Such are flame and heat: flame being always accompanied by heat, and the same degree of heat in a given substance being always accompanied with flame.

Hostile instances, or those of perpetual separation, are the reverse of the former. Thus transparency and malleability in solids are never combined.

VI. The *instantia crucis*. When in any investigation the understanding is placed in *æquilibrio*, as it were, between two or more causes, each of which accounts equally well for the appearances as far as they are known, nothing remains to be done, but to look out for a fact which can be explained by one of these causes and not by the other. Such facts perform the office of a cross, erected at the separation of two roads, to direct the traveller which to take: hence called *crucial instances*.

The *experimentum crucis* is of such weight in matters of

induction that in all those branches of science where it cannot be resorted to (an experiment being out of our power and incapable of being varied at pleasure) there is often a great want of conclusive evidence.\*

It is needless to criticise at any length a set of rules which the experience of two centuries has shown to be inapplicable; yet we may point to numerous passages in his works which were not only valuable in those days but continue valuable in our own. Especially noticeable is the emphasis with which he insists on a graduated and successive induction, as opposed to the hasty leaping from single facts to wide generalisations, which continues and will ever continue to be a constant source of error, and belongs to our native infirmity. There is a slight defect in his formula, which is too vague. Had he said, 'graduated Verification of inductions,' he would have hit the precise mark; for a series of inductions may be gradual and successive, yet hypothetical and erroneous; it is the Verification of each step that alone can ensure certainty. And it is worth remarking in this connection that, having imperfectly grasped the principle of Verification, he was led to misconceive the value of facts, seeming to think that quantity was of more service than quality; which every investigator knows to be wholly wrong. Thus when he blames the philosophers for theorising on a few facts, and calls their 'illicit generalisations' an anticipation of nature, he is right enough in the particular case, but vague and even wrong in principle; since a few facts of one quality are worth hundreds of another quality, and the hypothesis which he calls rash may be true, although anticipating the tardy process of proof. All depends on the validity of the facts and verification of the hypothesis. One radical defect of the method lies in its being *inductive*, and not also *deductive*. He was so deeply impressed with a sense of the insufficiency of the Deductive Method alone, which he saw his contemporaries pursuing, and which he knew to be the cause of the failure of his predecessors, that he bestowed all his attention on the Inductive Method. His

\* Abridged from PLAYFAIR's *Dissertation*.



to give sufficient indication of what happens in individual cases, where the circumstances are almost always immensely numerous. In the importance therefore which Bacon assigns, in every science, to the middle principles, it is impossible not to agree with him. But I conceive him to have been radically wrong in his doctrine respecting the mode in which these *axiomata media* should be arrived at; although there is no one proposition in his works for which he has been so extravagantly eulogised. He enunciates, as a universal rule, that induction should proceed from the lowest to the middle principles, and from those to the highest, never reversing that order, and consequently leaving no room for the discovery of new principles by way of deduction at all. It is not to be conceived that a man of Bacon's sagacity could have fallen into this mistake, if there had existed in his time, among the sciences which treat of successive phenomena, one single deductive science, such as mechanics, astronomy, optics, acoustics, etc. now are. In those sciences, it is evident that the higher and middle principles are by no means derived from the lowest, but the reverse. In some of them, the very highest generalisations were those earliest ascertained with any scientific exactness; as, for example (in mechanics), the laws of motion. Those general laws had not indeed at first the acknowledged universality which they acquired after having been successfully employed to explain many classes of phenomena to which they were not originally seen to be applicable; as when the laws of motion were employed in conjunction with other laws to explain deductively the celestial phenomena. Still the fact remains that the propositions which were afterwards recognised as the most general truths of the science were, of all its accurate generalisations, those earliest arrived at.

'Bacon's greatest merit therefore cannot consist, as we are so often told that it did, in exploding the vicious method pursued by the ancients, of flying to the highest generalisations first, and deducing the middle principles from them, since this is neither a vicious nor an exploded method, but the

universally accredited method of modern science, and that to which it owes its greatest triumphs. The error of ancient speculation did not consist in making the largest generalisations first, but in making them without the aid or warrant of rigorous inductive methods, and applying them deductively without the needful use of that important part of the deductive method termed verification.\*

We cannot entirely concur in the concluding paragraph. Although Bacon did not perhaps see the real importance of the Deductive Method, he did see the futility of the method as it was employed before his time; and he saw moreover that the cause lay in the want of 'verification'—in the want of 'the aid or warrant of rigorous inductive methods:' this we think his greatest merit, as we think his imperfect conception of the Deductive Method his greatest imperfection.

There is also another potent reason why the merely Inductive Method should not have contributed to any great discoveries; and we must borrow from the *System of Logic* the passage wherein this is exhibited:—

'It has excited the surprise of philosophers that the detailed system of inductive Logic has been turned to so little direct use by subsequent inquirers—having neither continued, except in a few of its generalities, to be recognised as a theory, nor having conducted, in practice, to any great scientific results. But this, though not unfrequently remarked, has scarcely received any plausible explanation; and some indeed have preferred to assert that all rules of induction are useless, rather than suppose that Bacon's rules are grounded upon an insufficient analysis of the inductive process. Such however will be seen to be the fact, as soon as it is considered that Bacon entirely overlooked plurality of causes. All his rules tacitly imply the assumption, so contrary to all we know of Nature, that a phenomenon cannot have more than one cause.'†

In another passage, too long for extract, the same author

\* MILL: *System of Logic*, ii. 524–6.

† *Ibid.* ii. 373.

points out a capital error in Bacon's view of the inductive philosophy, viz. his supposition that the principle of elimination—that great logical instrument which he had the immense merit of first bringing into use—was applicable in the same sense, and in the same unqualified manner, to the investigation of *co-existences*, as to that of the *successions of phenomena*.\*

In conclusion it may be said that, although his Method had not the power which he confidently assigned to it, his eloquence and far-reaching thoughts powerfully affected both his own and succeeding generations. He dignified the scientific attitude; he made men proud of investigations which otherwise they might have disdained; he kept before them the vanity of the Subjective Method, and passionately urged upon them the necessity of patient interrogation of Nature. The splendour of his style gave irresistible power to his ideas. 'Il se saisit tellement de l'imagination,' says M. de Rémusat, 'qu'il force la raison à s'incliner, et il éblouit autant qu'il éclaire.'

\* *System of Logic*, ii. 127 et seq.

## CHAPTER III.

*DESCARTES.*

## § I. LIFE OF DESCARTES.

**J**UST at the close of the sixteenth century, 1596, there was born in Touraine, of Breton parents, a feeble sickly child, named René Descartes Duperron. A few days after his birth, a disease of the lungs carried off his mother. The sickly child grew to be a sickly boy; and, till the age of twenty, his life was despaired of.

That boy was one the world could ill afford to lose. Few who saw him would have supposed that the boy, whose short dry cough and paleness seemed to announce an early grave, was shortly to become one of the leaders of men, whose works would continue, through centuries, to be studied, quoted, and criticised. His masters loved him. He was a pupil of promise; and in his eighth year had gained the title of the Young Philosopher, from his avidity to learn, and his constant questioning.

His education was confided to the Jesuits. This astonishing body has many evils laid to its door, but no one can refuse to it the praise of having been ever ready to see and apply the value of education. In the college of La Flèche the young Descartes was instructed in mathematics, physics, logic, rhetoric, and the ancient languages. He was an apt pupil; learned quickly, and was never tired of learning.

Was the food supplied by the Jesuits nutritious? M. Thomas remarks, 'There is an education for the ordinary

man; for the man of genius there is no education but what he gives himself; the second generally consists in destroying the first.' And so it was with Descartes, who, on leaving La Flèche, declared that he had derived no other benefit from his studies than that of a conviction of his utter ignorance, and a profound contempt for the systems of philosophy in vogue. The incompetence of philosophers to solve the problems they occupied themselves with—the anarchy which reigned in the scientific world, where no two thinkers could agree upon fundamental points—the extravagance of the conclusions to which some accepted premises led, determined him to seek no more to slake his thirst at their fountains.

'And that is why, as soon as my age permitted me to quit my preceptors,' he says, 'I entirely gave up the study of letters; and resolving to seek no other science than that which I could find in myself, or else in the great book of the world, I employed the remainder of my youth in travel, in seeing courts and camps, in frequenting people of diverse humours and conditions, in collecting various experiences, and above all in endeavouring to draw some profitable reflection from what I saw. For it seemed to me that I should meet with more truth in the reasonings which each man makes in his own affairs, and which, if wrong, would be speedily punished by failure, than in those reasonings which the philosopher makes in his study, upon speculations which produce no effect, and which are of no consequence to him, except perhaps that he will be more vain of them the more remote they are from common sense, because he would then have been forced to employ more ingenuity and subtlety to render them plausible.'\*

For many years he led a roving unsettled life; now serving in the army, now making a tour; now studying mathematics in solitude, now conversing with scientific men. One constant purpose gave unity to those various pursuits. He was elated—

\* *Discours de la Méthode*, p. 6, ed. JULES SIMON: Paris, 1844.

borating his answers to the questions which perplexed him; he was preparing his Method.

When only three-and-twenty, he conceived the design of a reformation in philosophy. He was at that time residing in his winter quarters at Neuburg, on the Danube. His travels soon afterwards commenced, and at the age of thirty-three he retired into Holland, there in silence and solitude to arrange his thoughts into a consistent whole. He remained there eight years; and so completely did he shut himself from the world that he concealed from his friends the very place of his residence.

When the results of this meditative solitude were given to the world in the shape of his celebrated *Discourse on Method*, and his *Meditations* (to which he invented replies), the sensation produced was immense. It was evident to all men that an original and powerful thinker had arisen; and although of course this originality could not but rouse much opposition, from the very fact of being original, yet Descartes gained the day. His name became European. His controversies were European quarrels. Charles I. of England invited him over, with the promise of a liberal appointment; and the invitation would probably have been accepted, had not the civil war broken out. He afterwards received a flattering invitation from Christina of Sweden, who had read some of his works with great satisfaction, and wished to learn from himself the principles of his philosophy. He accepted it, and arrived in Stockholm in 1649. His reception was most gratifying, and the Queen was so pleased with him as earnestly to beg him to remain with her, and give his assistance towards the establishment of an academy of sciences. But the delicate frame of Descartes was ill fitted for the severity of the climate, and a cold, caught in one of his morning visits to Christina, produced inflammation of the lungs, which carried him off. Christina wept for him, had him interred in the cemetery for foreigners, and placed a long eulogium upon his tomb. His remains were subsequently (1666) carried from Sweden into France, and buried with great ceremony in Ste. Geneviève du Mont.

Descartes was a great thinker ; but having said this we have almost exhausted the praise we can bestow upon him as a man. In disposition he was timid to servility. When promulgating his proofs of the existence of the Deity, he was in evident alarm lest the Church should see something objectionable in them. He had also written an astronomical treatise ; but hearing of the fate of Galileo, he refrained from publishing, and always used some chicane in speaking of the world's movement. He was not a brave man ; nor was he an affectionate man. But he was even-tempered, placid, and studious not to give offence.

## § II. THE METHOD OF DESCARTES.

It has already been indicated that the great work performed by Descartes was, like that of Bacon, the promulgation of a new Method. This was rendered necessary by their separation from the ancient philosophy and their exclusion of Authority. If inquiry is to be independent—if Reason is to walk alone, in what direction must she walk ? Having relinquished the aid of the Church, there were but two courses open : the one, to tread once more in the path of the ancients, and to endeavour by the ancient Methods to attain the truth ; or else to open a new path, to invent a new Method. The former was barely possible. The spirit of the age was deeply imbued with a feeling of opposition against the ancient Methods ; and Descartes himself had been painfully perplexed by the universal anarchy and uncertainty which prevailed. The second course was therefore chosen.

Uncertainty was the disease of the epoch. Scepticism was wide-spread, and even the most confident dogmatism could offer no criterion of certitude. This want of a criterion we saw leading, in Greece, to Scepticism, Epicureanism, Stoicism, the New Academy, and finally leading the Alexandrians into the province of faith, to escape from the dilemma. The question of a criterion had long been the

vital question of philosophy. Descartes could get no answer to it from the doctors of his day. Unable to find firm ground in any of the prevalent systems; distracted by doubts; mistrusting the conclusions of his own understanding; mistrusting the evidences of his senses, he determined to make a *tabula rasa*, and reconstruct his knowledge. He resolved to examine the premises of every conclusion, and to believe nothing but upon the clearest evidence of reason; evidence so convincing that he could not by any effort refuse to assent to it.

He has given us the detailed history of his doubts. He has told us how he found that he could plausibly enough doubt of everything, except of his own existence. He pushed his scepticism to the verge of self-annihilation. There he stopped: there, in Self, in his Consciousness, he found at last an irresistible Fact, an irreversible Certainty.

Firm ground was discovered. He could doubt the existence of the external world, and treat it as a phantasm; he could doubt the existence of God, and treat the belief as a superstition; but of the existence of his thinking, doubting mind no sort of doubt was possible. He, the doubter, existed, if nothing else existed. The existence that was revealed in his own Consciousness was the primary Fact, the first indubitable certainty. Hence his famous *Cogito, ergo Sum*: I think, therefore I am.

It is somewhat curious, and, as an illustration of the frivolous verbal disputes of philosophers, not a little instructive, that this celebrated *Cogito, ergo Sum*, should have been frequently attacked for its logical imperfection. It has been objected, from Gassendi downwards, that to say, 'I think, *therefore* I am,' is a begging of the question, since existence has to be *proved* identical with thought. Certainly, if Descartes had intended to prove his own existence by reasoning, he would have been guilty of the *petitio principii* Gassendi attributes to him; viz. that the major premiss, 'that which thinks exists,' is assumed, not proved. But he did not intend this. What was his object? He has told us



that it was to find a starting-point from which to reason—to find an irreversible certainty. And where did he find this? In his own Consciousness. Doubt as I may, I cannot doubt of my own existence, because my very doubt reveals to me a something which doubts. You may call this an assumption, if you will: I point out the fact as one above and beyond all logic; which logic can neither prove nor disprove; but which must always remain an irreversible certainty, and as such a fitting basis of philosophy.\*

I exist. No doubt can darken such a truth; no sophism can confute this clear principle. This is a certainty, if there be none other. This is the basis of all science. It is in vain to ask for a proof of that which is self-evident and irresistible. I exist. The *consciousness* of my existence is to me the assurance of my existence.

Had Descartes done no more than point out this fact, he would have no claim to notice here; and we are surprised to find many writers looking upon this *Cogito, ergo Sum*, as constituting the great idea in his system. Surely it is only a statement of universal experience—an epigrammatic form given to the common-sense view of the matter. Any clown would have told him that the assurance of his existence was his consciousness of it; but the clown would not have stated it so well. He would have said: I know I exist, because I *feel* that I exist.

Descartes therefore made no discovery in pointing out this fact as an irresistible certainty. The part it plays in his system is only that of a starting-point. It makes *Consciousness* the basis of all truth. There is none other possible. Interrogate Consciousness, and its clear replies will be Science. Here we have a new basis and a new philosophy introduced. It was indeed but another shape of the old formula, 'Know thyself,' so differently interpreted by Thales, Socrates, and the Alexandrians: but it gave that formula a precise signification, a thing it had before always wanted.

\* See his replies to the third and fifth series of Objections, affixed to his *Meditations*.

Of little use could it be to tell man to know himself. How is he to know himself? By looking inwards? We all do that. By examining the nature of his thoughts? That had been done without success. By examining the *process* of his thoughts? That too had been accomplished, and the logic of Aristotle was the result.

The formula needed a precise interpretation; and that interpretation Descartes gave. Consciousness, said he, is the basis of all knowledge; it is the only ground of absolute certainty. Whatever it distinctly proclaims must be true. The process, then, is simple: examine your Consciousness, and its clear replies. Hence the vital portion of his system lies in this axiom, *all clear ideas are true*: whatever is clearly and distinctly conceived is true. This axiom he calls the foundation of all science, the rule and measure of truth.\*

The next step to be taken was to determine the rules for the proper detection of these ideas; and these rules he has laid down as follows:—

I. Never to accept anything as true but what is *evidently* so; to admit nothing but what so clearly and distinctly presents itself as true that there can be no reason to doubt it.

II. To divide every question into as many separate questions as possible; that each part being more easily conceived, the whole may be more intelligible.—(Analysis.)

III. To conduct the examination with order, beginning by that of objects the most simple, and therefore the easiest to be known, and ascending little by little up to knowledge of the most complex.—(Synthesis.)

IV. To make such exact calculations, and such circum-spections, as to be confident that nothing essential has been omitted.

Consciousness being the ground of all certainty, everything of which you are clearly and distinctly conscious must be

\* 'Hâc igitur detectâ veritate simul etiam invenit omnium scientiarum fundamentum: ac etiam omnium aliarum veritatum mensuram ac regulam; scilicet, quicquid tam clarè ac distinctè percipitur quàm istud verum est.'—*Princip. Phil.* p. 4.

true; everything which you clearly and distinctly conceive exists, if the idea of it involves existence.

In the four rules, and in this view of Consciousness, we have only half of Descartes' system: the psychological half. It was owing, we believe, to the exclusive consideration of this half that Dugald Stewart was led (in controverting Condorcet's assertion that Descartes had done more than either Galileo or Bacon towards experimental philosophy) to say that Condorcet would have been nearer the truth if he had pointed him out as the Father of the Experimental Philosophy of the Mind. Perhaps the title is just; but Condorcet's praise, though exaggerated, was not without good foundation.

There is, in truth, another half of Descartes' system; equally important, or nearly so: we mean the Deductive Method. His eminence as a mathematician is universally recognised. He was the first to make the grand discovery of the application of Algebra to Geometry; and he made this at the age of twenty-three. The discovery that geometrical curves might be expressed by algebraical numbers, though highly important in the history of mathematics, only interests us here by leading us to trace his philosophical development. He was deeply engrossed in mathematics; he saw that mathematics were capable of a still further simplification, and of a far more extended application. Struck as he was with the certitude of mathematical reasoning, he began applying the principles of mathematical reasoning to the subjects of metaphysics. His great object was, amidst the scepticism and anarchy of his contemporaries, to found a system which should be solid and convincing. He first wished to find a basis of certitude: this he found in Consciousness. He next wished to find a method of certitude: this he found in mathematics.

'Those long chains of reasoning,' he tells us, 'all simple and easy, which geometers use to arrive at their most difficult demonstrations, suggested to me that all things which came within human knowledge must follow each other in a similar

chain; and that provided we abstain from admitting anything as true which is not so, and that we always preserve in them the order necessary to deduce one from the other, there can be none so remote to which we cannot finally attain, nor so obscure but that we may discover them.\* The two leading points in his system are Consciousness the only ground of certitude, and mathematics the only method of certitude.

We may say therefore that the Deductive Method was now completely constituted. The whole operation of philosophy henceforth consisted in deducing consequences. The premises had been found; the conclusions alone were wanting. This was held to be true of physics no less than of psychology. Thus, in his *Principia*, he announces his intention of giving a short account of the principal phenomena of the world, not that he may use them as reasons to prove anything; for he adds, 'we desire to *deduce effects from causes, not causes from effects*: but only in order that out of the innumerable effects which we learn to be capable of resulting from the same causes, we may determine our minds to consider some rather than others.†

Such being the Method of Descartes, our readers will hear with surprise that some French writers have declared it to be the same Method as that laid down by Bacon; and this surprise will be heightened on learning that M. Victor Cousin is one of those writers. He says, 'Let us now see what our Descartes has done. He has established in France the same Method that England has endeavoured to attribute exclusively to Bacon; and he has established it with less grandeur of imagination in style, but with the superior precision which must always characterise one who, not content with laying down rules, puts them himself in prac-

\* *Discours de la Méthode*, p. 12.

† *Principia Philos.* pars iii. p. 51. The phrase, 'cupimus enim rationes effectuum à causis, non autem à contrario causarum ab effectibus deducere,' may be said to express the nature of his method, as opposed to the method of Bacon.

tice, and gives the example with the precept.\* M. Cousin then quotes the four rules we have already given; and seeing in them Analysis and Synthesis, which he believes solely to constitute the Method of Bacon, declares that the two Methods are one. Such a statement requires no refutation; nor indeed would it have been noticed, did it not afford an illustration of the loose way in which the term Method is employed by many writers.

And here may be resumed and closed the parallel previously commenced between Bacon and Descartes, assigning to each his distinctive position. Both may be said to have instituted the Objective Method, though both in varying degrees failed to complete that attempt by an extension to all matters of inquiry, embracing both man and the world. The aberration is especially noticeable in Descartes, who, having subordinated all cosmical speculations to the Objective Method, having promulgated an hypothesis which was to explain the phenomena of the world on the properties recognised in matter without the intervention of occult qualities, entities, or volitions, and having even extended this principle to the chief physical aspects of the organism, broke suddenly away when he arrived at mental and social problems, and reintroduced the Subjective Method, which indeed he proclaimed (though he was untrue to his announcement) to be *the* Method of all philosophic research. His aberration is all the more striking because he had boldly asserted the automatism of animals. He denied that they had moral and mental faculties: they were, he said, machines. This hypothesis has been variously interpreted. It is too repugnant to common sense to gain general acceptance, and being so repugnant, it has puzzled the ingenuity of critics to explain how Descartes came to adopt it. I am not prepared with a satisfactory explanation, but note that this effort to reduce animal phenomena to a mechanism is only an extension of the effort to reduce cosmical phenomena to a mechanism

\* *Hist. de la Phil.* leçon iii. p. 91, ed. Bruxelles, 1840.

and that the denial of a soul to brutes is a rigorous consequence of the Method employed by him.\*

Thus on the one hand his antagonism to the Scholastic Philosophy, aided by his scientific knowledge, led him to the objective point of view in studying Cosmology, while on the other hand his psychological assumptions reintroduced the subjective point of view, and thus not only thwarted the perfect conception of Method but led, as it always leads, to great imperfection in the application of particular methods. A perfect employment of Method includes both the Induction of Bacon and the Deduction of Descartes, with some subsidiary processes which neither of them understood, especially the use of Hypothesis and Experiment. If it was Bacon's error to undervalue Deduction, it was no less the error of Descartes to undervalue Induction, owing to the influence of the Subjective Method, which naturally leads to the mistake of overlooking the essential requisite of Verification. The Subjective Method is always deductive, and its deductions are logically formed on the same process as those of the Objective Method; but there is a philosophical difference between the two: the *data* of the first are not verified inductions, nor are the conclusions verified by confrontation with reality; the *data* and conclusion of the second are rigorously verified.

Although Bacon failed to recognise the importance of

\* 'Quels qu'aient été les graves inconvénients réels de cette singulière théorie automatique, il importe de noter que c'est précisément pour la réfuter que les physiologistes, et surtout les naturalistes du siècle dernier, furent graduellement conduits à détruire directement la vaine séparation fondamentale que Descartes avait ainsi tenté d'établir entre l'étude de l'homme et celle des animaux.'—COMTE: *Cours de Philos. positive*, iii. 763. 'Le fameux partage opéré par Descartes n'a pu avoir d'autre efficacité essentielle que de procurer à la méthode positive la liberté nécessaire à sa formation graduelle, jusqu'à ce que sa constitution fût devenue assez complète pour lui permettre de s'emparer enfin du seul sujet qui lui eût d'abord été interdit.'—*Ibid.* p. 771. It should be added that, however absurd this hypothesis may have seemed, it was speedily reproduced by the majority even of those who made merry with it, nor is it yet finally extinct; for what is the popular notion of animals impelled by Instinct to actions which in man are the results of Reason, but a vague form of the notion that animals are mere machines without intelligent direction?

Deduction, yet he did recognise the necessity of the objective point of view, and sought the laws of phenomena in the order of the phenomena themselves. He sought an alliance with scientific research, and did his best to institute its methods. He was fully alive to the illusions of the Subjective Method. Not so Descartes. His basis was subjective. He attempted a systematic arrangement of the external phenomena according to deductions from unverified data. So far from looking out of himself for the explanation of external phenomena, it was his constant aim to discover in the orderly arrangement of ideas a key to the mystery of the world. This, indeed, Leibnitz proclaims as his chief merit.\* Although, therefore, Descartes sought alliance with scientific research, his Philosophy was essentially metaphysical; and although he made discoveries in Science, his fame is that of a great metaphysician.

While Bacon urged the necessity of proceeding from effects to causes, Descartes proceeded from causes to effects. Bacon erred as to the *nature* of the causes we should seek, as to the operation of a multiplicity of causes, and as to the methods of search. Descartes erred still more gravely in starting from data that were logical figments or subjective inspirations. Both separated Philosophy from Theology, and thus consummated the long struggle which accompanied the birth-pangs of modern culture: but Bacon, true to the objective point of view, declared the problems of Theology and Ontology to be inaccessible to reason, consequently beyond the province of Philosophy; Descartes, true to the subjective point of view, declared them to be soluble *only* by reason, and made it the primary object of Philosophy to solve them.

It is therefore with justice that modern Science looks up to Bacon as its illustrious herald, and modern Metaphysics sees its ancestry in the schools which issued directly from

\* 'On ne peut nier que Descartes n'ait apporté de belles choses; surtout il a le mérite, renouvelant l'entreprise de Platon, de détourner les esprits des considérations sensibles.'—LEIBNITZ: *Sur une Réforme de la Philos. première.*

Descartes. The metaphysical character of the Cartesian philosophy is well expressed by Fontenelle in his parallel between Descartes and Newton: 'Tous deux, géomètres excellents, ont vu la nécessité de transporter la géométrie dans la physique. . . . Mais l'un, prenant un vol hardi, a voulu se placer à la source de tout, se rendre maître des premiers principes par quelques idées claires et fondamentales, pour n'avoir plus qu'à descendre aux phénomènes de la nature comme à des conséquences nécessaires; l'autre, plus timide ou plus modeste, a commencé sa marche par s'appuyer sur les phénomènes pour remonter aux principes inconnus, résolu de les admettre, quels que les pût donner l'enchaînement des conséquences. L'un part de ce qu'il entend nettement pour trouver la cause de ce qu'il voit; l'autre part de ce qu'il voit pour en trouver la cause, soit claire, soit obscure.'

### § III. APPLICATION OF THE METHOD.

The first application of Descartes' Method was not, as some say, to prove his own existence (for that neither admitted of *logical* proof nor of disproof: it was a primary fact); but to prove the existence of God.

Interrogating his Consciousness, he found that he had the idea of God, understanding, by God, a substance infinite, eternal, immutable, independent, omniscient, omnipotent. This, to him, was as certain a truth as the truth of his own existence. I exist: not only do I exist, but exist as a miserably imperfect finite being, subject to change—greatly ignorant, and incapable of creating anything. In this, my Consciousness, I find by my finitude that I am not the All; by my imperfection, that I am not perfect. Yet an infinite and perfect being must exist, because infinity and perfection are implied, as correlatives, in my *ideas* of imperfection and finitude. God therefore exists: his existence is clearly proclaimed in my Consciousness, and can no more be a matter of doubt, when fairly considered, than my own



existence. The conception of an infinite being proves his real existence; for if there is not really such a being, *I* must have made the conception: but if I could make it, I can also unmake it, which evidently is not true; therefore there must be, externally to myself, an archetype from which the conception was derived.

‘The ambiguity in this case,’ it has been remarked,\* ‘is the pronoun *I*, by which in one place is to be understood my *will*, in another *the laws of my nature*. If the conception, existing as it does in my mind, had no original without, the conclusion would unquestionably follow that *I* had made it—that is, the laws of my nature must have spontaneously evolved it; but that my *will* made it would not follow. Now, when Descartes afterwards adds that I cannot unmake the conception, he means that I cannot get rid of it by an act of my will, which is true, but is not the proposition required. That what some of the laws of my nature have produced, other laws, or the same laws in other circumstances, might not subsequently efface, he would have found it difficult to establish.’

His second demonstration is the weakest of the three. Indeed, it is the only one not irrefragable, upon his principles. The third demonstration is peculiarly Cartesian, and may be thrown into this syllogism:—

All that we clearly and distinctly conceive as contained in anything is true of that thing.

Now we conceive, clearly and distinctly, that the existence of God is contained in the idea we have of him.

*Ergo,*

God exists.

Having demonstrated the existence of God, he had to prove the distinction between body and soul. This, to him, was easy. The fundamental attribute of Substance must be Extension, because we can abstract from Substance all the qualities except Extension. The fundamental attribute of

\* MILL: *System of Logic*, ii. 447.

Mind is Thought, because by this attribute Mind is revealed to itself. Now, according to one of his logical axioms, two substances are really distinct when their ideas are complete, and in no way imply each other. The ideas, therefore, of extension and thought being distinct, it follows that Substance and Mind are distinct in essence.

We need not pursue our analysis of his metaphysical notions further. We only stop to remark on the *nature* of his demonstrations of God and the soul. It is, and was, usual to prove the existence of God from what is called the 'evidence of design.' Descartes neither started from design nor from motion, which must have a mover: he started from the *a priori* ideas of perfection and infinity; his proof was in the clearness of his idea of God. His method was that of definition and deduction. To define the idea of God, and hence to construct the world—not to contemplate the world, and thence infer the existence of God—was the route he pursued. Is it not eminently the procedure of a mathematician? and of a mathematician who has taken Consciousness as his starting-point?

Descartes' speculations are beautiful exemplifications of his Method; and he follows that Method, even when it leads him to the wildest conclusions. His physical speculations are sometimes admirable (he made important discoveries in optics), but mostly fanciful. The famous theory of vortices deserves a mention here, as an example of his Method.

He begins by banishing the notion of a *vacuum*, not, as his contemporaries said, because Nature has a horror of vacuum, but because, the essence of Substance being Extension, wherever there is Extension there is Substance, consequently empty space is a chimera. The substance which fills all space must be assumed as divided into equal angular parts. Why must this be assumed?—Because it is the most simple, therefore the most natural, supposition. This substance being set in motion, the parts are ground into a spherical form; and the corners thus rubbed off, like filings or sawdust, form a second and more subtle kind of substance. There is,

besides, a kind of substance, coarser and less fitted for motion. The first kind makes luminous bodies, such as the sun and fixed stars; the second makes the transparent substance of the skies; the third kind is the material of opaque bodies, such as earth, planets, etc. We may also assume that the motions of these parts take the form of revolving circular currents, or *vortices*. By this means the matter will be collected to the centre of each vortex, while the second or subtle matter surrounds it, and by its centrifugal effort constitutes light. The planets are carried round the sun by the motion of this vortex, each planet being at such a distance from the sun as to be in a part of the vortex suitable to its solidity and mobility. The motions are prevented from being exactly circular and regular by various causes. For instance, a vortex may be pressed into an oval shape by contiguous vortices.\*

Descartes, in his *Physics*, adopted a method which permitted him to set aside the *qualities* and the *substantial forms* (which others were seeking), and to consider only the relations of number, figure, and motion. In a word, he saw in *Physics* only mathematical problems. This was premature. Science, in its infancy, cannot be carried on by the Deductive Method alone: such a process is reserved for its maturity. The reason is that the deduction is only valid when it is employed on the Objective Method.

But Deduction is a potent instrument, and Bacon's greatest error was in not sufficiently acknowledging it. Hence we may partly account for the curious fact that Bacon, with his Induction, made no discoveries, while Descartes with his Deduction, made important discoveries. Of course the greater physical knowledge of Descartes, and the greater attention bestowed by him upon physics, had much to do with this, by giving him an objective basis: but his Method also assisted him, precisely because his discoveries were of

\* We have followed Dr. WHEWELL's exposition of this theory, as given by him, *Hist. of Ind. Sciences*, ii. p. 134. The reader will do well, however, to turn also to DESCARTES' own exposition in the *Principia Philosophiæ*, where it is illustrated by diagrams.

a kind to which the mathematical reasoning was strictly applicable.

That Descartes had read Bacon there is no doubt. He has himself praised Bacon's works as leaving nothing to be desired on the subject of *experience*; but he perceived Bacon's deficiency, and declared that we are 'liable to collect many *superfluous* experiences of particulars, and not only superfluous but false,' if we have not ascertained the truth *before* we make these experiences. In other words, experiment should be the verification of an *a priori* conception; whereas Bacon teaches us to form our conceptions from experiment.

We have said enough to make the Method of Descartes appreciable. His position is that of founder of the Deductive Method on the basis of Consciousness. His scholars may be divided into the mathematical cultivators of Physics and the deductive cultivators of Philosophy. By the first he was speedily surpassed, and his influence on them can only be regarded as an impulsion. By the second he was *continued*: his principles were unhesitatingly accepted, and only developed in a somewhat different manner.

His philosophical Method subsists in the present day. It is the Method implicitly or explicitly adopted by most metaphysicians in their speculations upon ontological subjects. Is it a good Method? The question is of the highest importance: we will endeavour to answer it.

#### § IV. IS THE METHOD TRUE?

In the Dedicatory Epistle prefixed to his *Meditations*, Descartes declares that his demonstrations of the existence of God, etc., 'equal, or even surpass, in certitude the demonstrations of geometry.' Upon what does he found this belief? He founds it upon the very nature of certitude. Consciousness is the basis of all certitude. Whatever I am distinctly conscious of, I must be certain of; all the ideas which I find in my Consciousness, as distinctly conceived, must be true. The belief I have in my existence is derived

from the fact of my Consciousness : I *think*, therefore I *exist*. Now as soon as I conceive a truth with distinctness, I am irresistibly led to believe in it; and if that belief is so firm that I can never have any reason to doubt that which I believe, I have all the certitude that can be desired.

Further: we have *no knowledge whatever of anything external to us except through the medium of ideas*. The consequence is, says Descartes, that *whatever we find in the ideas must necessarily be in the external things*.

It is only in our minds that we can seek whether things exist, or not. There cannot be more reality in an effect than in a cause. The external thing, being the cause of the idea, must therefore possess as much reality as the idea, and *vice versa*. So that whatever we conceive as existent exists.

This is the basis on which Descartes' system is erected; if this basis be rotten, the superstructure must fall. If the root is vitiated, the tree will bear no fruit. No thinker, except Spinoza, has so clearly, so frankly, stated his criterion.

And the criterion is fallacious. The very Consciousness to which he appeals convicts him. There is this fallacy in his system: Consciousness is the ultimate ground of certitude, *for me*; if I am conscious that I exist, I cannot doubt that I exist; if I am conscious of pain, I must be in pain. This is self-evident. But what ground of certitude can my Consciousness afford respecting things which are *not me*? How does the principle of certitude apply? How far does it extend? It can only extend to things which relate to me. I am conscious of all that passes within myself; but I am not conscious of what passes in not-self: all that I can possibly know of the not-self is in its effects upon me.

Consciousness is therefore 'cabin'd, cribb'd, confined' to *me*, and to what passes within *me*; so far does the principle of certitude extend, and no farther. Any other ideas we may have, any knowledge we may have respecting *not-self*, can only be founded on inferences. Thus, I burn myself in the fire: I am conscious of the sensation; I have certain and immediate knowledge of that. But I can only be certain

that a change has taken place in my consciousness; when from that change I infer the existence of an external object (the fire), my inference *may* be correct, but I have obviously shifted my ground; Consciousness—my principle of certitude—forsakes me here: I go out of myself to infer the existence of something which is not-self. My knowledge of the sensation was *immediate*, indubitable. My knowledge of the object is *mediate*, uncertain.

Directly, therefore, we leave the ground of Consciousness for that of inference, avenues of doubt are opened. Other inferences can be brought to bear upon any one inference to illustrate or to refute it. The mathematical certainty which Descartes attributed to these inferences becomes a great uncertainty. He says we only know things through the medium of ideas. We accept the proposition as unquestionable. But then he also says that, in consequence of this, whatever we find in the ideas must necessarily be true of the things. The reason is, that as ideas are caused in us by objects, and as every effect must have as much reality as the cause—the effect being *equal* to the cause—so must ideas have the same reality as things. But this is a double fallacy. In the first place, an effect is not *equal* to its cause; it is a mere consequent of an antecedent, having no such relation as *equality* whatever. In the second place, the use of the term ‘reality’ is ambiguous. Unquestionably an effect really exists; but reality of existence does not imply similarity of modes of existence. The burn occasioned by a fire is as *real* as the fire; but it in no way *resembles* the fire.

So when Descartes says that what is true of ideas must be true of things, he assumes that the mind is a passive recipient—a mirror, in which things reflect themselves. This is altogether fallacious; the mind is an *active* co-operator in all perception—perception is a consciousness of changes operated in ourselves, not a consciousness of the objects causing those changes. In truth, so far from our being able to apprehend the nature of things external to us, there is an impenetrable screen for ever placed before our eyes, and that impenetrable

screen is the very Consciousness upon which Descartes relies. When placed in contact with external objects, they operate upon us; their operations we know, themselves we cannot know; precisely because our knowledge of them is *mediate*, and the medium is our Consciousness. Into whatever regions we wander, we carry with us this Consciousness, by means of which, indeed, we know, but all we know is—*ourselves*.

Knowledge is composed of Ideas. Ideas are the joint product of mind on the one hand and of external causes on the other; or rather we may say that Ideas are the internal movements excited by external causes. Upon what principles of inference (since we are here on the ground of inference) can you infer that the ideas excited are *copies* of the exciting causes—that the ideas excited apprehend the whole nature of the causes? The cause of the fallacy is in that very strong disposition to give objectivity to a law of the mind; in consequence of which we often hear people declare that something they are asserting is ‘involved in the idea.’

An exposition of the fallacy which misled Descartes is given by Mr. Mansel in the following admirable passage: ‘*Clearness* and *distinctness* were proposed by Descartes as criteria of the truth of ideas; but that philosopher has nowhere accurately distinguished between thought properly so called and other states of consciousness, nor between the *formal* clearness and distinctness which depend on the relation of one thought to another and the *material* clearness and distinctness which depend on the relation of a thought to its object as presented. A concept is formally clear when it can be distinguished as a whole from any other; it is formally distinct when its several constituent elements can be analysed and distinguished from each other; but this is a criterion of logical reality alone, of the mental conceivability, not of the extra-mental existence of the object. If I have a clear and distinct notion of gold and of a mountain, I have also a clear and distinct notion of a golden mountain, though the objects of the two first notions are real, and of the last imaginary. On the other hand, a concept will be materially

clear and distinct if it accurately expresses the character of the object itself, and its component elements 'as they actually exist in nature. These qualities can obviously exist only in those notions which represent real objects; and in this case the clearness and distinctness can only be ascertained by an exact comparison of the object with its notion, *i.e.* by experience.' \*

It is true that Descartes was more or less aware of the equivocal nature of his canon, since he adds to the requisite of clearness the proviso that the idea shall involve existence, which would be tantamount to Mr. Mansel's phrase 'material clearness.' But he gives no test whereby this material clearness may be ascertained; and in his speculations the material element is frequently disregarded. The experience, which he may be supposed to have silently understood in reference to some objects, could not have been implied in others. How can experience verify the material clearness of our formal idea of God? of the soul? of cause?

There is, indeed, but one mode of escape for Descartes, and all those who believe in the validity of ontological speculations: namely, to assert the existence of Innate Ideas, or—as the theory is generally stated in modern times—of Necessary Truths independent of all experience. If the idea of God, for example, be innate in us, it is no longer a matter of inference, but of Consciousness; and on such an hypothesis Descartes is correct in believing that the certainty of this idea equals the certainty of geometry.

But some maintain that he did not assert the existence of Innate Ideas, though, from its having been a doctrine maintained by his followers, it is usually attributed to him. Dugald Stewart quotes the following passage from Descartes in reply to his adversaries, who accused him of holding the tenet of Innate Ideas:—'When I said that the idea of God is innate in us, I never meant more than this, that *Nature has endowed us with a faculty by which we may know God*; but I have never either said or thought that such ideas had

\* MANSSEL: *The Limits of Demonstrative Science*, 1853, p. 10.



an actual existence, or even that they were a *species* distinct from the faculty of thinking. . . . Although the idea of God is so imprinted on our minds that every person has within himself the faculty of knowing Him, it does not follow that there may not have been various individuals who have passed through life without making this idea a distinct object of apprehension; and, in truth, they who think they have an idea of a plurality of Gods have no idea of God whatever.'

From this it would appear that he did not hold the doctrine of Innate Ideas. But we must venture to dissent from the conclusion drawn by Dugald Stewart on the strength of such a passage; against that passage we will bring another equally explicit (we could bring fifty, if necessary), which asserts the existence of Innate Ideas. 'By the word *idea*,' he says, 'I understand all that can be in our thoughts; and I distinguish three sorts of ideas:—*adventitious*, like the common idea of the sun; *framed* by the mind, such as that which astronomical reasoning gives of the sun; and *innate*, as the idea of God, mind, body, a triangle, and generally *all those which represent true immutable and eternal essences*.' \*

This last explanation is distinct; and it is all that the serious antagonists of Innate Ideas have ever combated. If Descartes, when pressed by objections, gave different explanations, we may attribute that to the want of a steady conception of the vital importance of Innate Ideas in his system. The fact remains that Innate Ideas form the necessary groundwork of the Cartesian doctrine.

Although the theory of Innate Ideas may, in its Cartesian form, be said to be exploded, it does really continue to be upheld, under a new form. A conviction of the paramount necessity of some such groundwork for metaphysical speculation has led to the modern theory of *Necessary Truths*. This plausible theory has been adopted by Dr. Whewell in his *Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences*; but his arguments have

\* *Lettres de Descartes*, liv.

been completely answered by Mr. Mill on the one hand, and by Sir John Herschel on the other.\*

The basis of all modern ontological speculations lies in the assumption that we have *ideas independent of experience*. That we have no ideas independent of experience has been clearly enough established in the best schools of psychology; but the existence of metaphysical speculation proves that the contrary opinion still finds numerous upholders.

The fundamental question then of modern Philosophy being, Have we any Ideas independent of Experience? the attempts to solve it will occupy the greater portion of our history. Before entering upon it, we must exhibit the Method of Descartes pushed to its ultimate conclusions in Spinoza.†

\* *System of Logic*, book ii. ch. v.; and *Quarterly Review*, June 1841; indeed, Dr. WHEWELL's arguments had been anticipated and refuted by LOCKE long before. See *Essay*, book iv. ch. 6, 7.

† The best modern works on Descartes, apart from regular Histories of Philosophy, are FRANCISQUE BOULLIER: *Histoire et Critique de la Révolution Cartésienne*, Paris, 1842; CH. RENOUVIER: *Manuel de la Philos. Moderne*, Paris, 1841; FEUERBACH: *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie*, Leipzig, 1847, and KUNO FISCHER: *Gesch. der neuern Philos.* Bd. i. Heidelberg, 1865. The best edition of Descartes' works is that by VICTOR CORSIN, in eleven vols. 8vo, Paris, 1826. M. JULES SIMON has also published a cheap and convenient edition, in one volume, of the *Discourse on Method*, the *Meditations*, and the *Treatise on the Passions*, Paris, 1844. Both of these have been translated into English (Edinburgh, 1853).

## SECOND EPOCH.

*The Subjective Method carried to its extreme results in  
Pantheistic Idealism.*

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## CHAPTER I.

## SPINOZA.

## § I. HIS LIFE.

GREAT among the greatest as a thinker, Spinoza is also one of the most interesting figures in the history of Philosophy—a standing lesson of the injustice of mankind to those who are honest in their opinions when the opinions happen to be unpopular. All men declare it ignoble to pretend to believe that which the mind rejects as false; yet all men are ready to make the rejection of their opinions a crime. You ought not to be a hypocrite; but you ought not to disbelieve what we assure you is the truth. Be honest by all means; only don't think differently from us. If you do, we must suspect your morals. It has always been known that Spinoza was as gentle in his life as he was steadfast in his philosophy; that he lived modest, virtuous, and independent, without blame among men, except for his incorrigible distrust in the wisdom of his elders. It has been known that if he had been an orthodox Jew, or an orthodox Christian, his career would have been held up as a model, and his character canonised; but this knowledge for several generations did not arrest almost universal execration, did not prevent his name becoming a brand of infamy; so that the accusation of Spi-

nozism was another name for atheism, and deliberate yielding of the soul to Satan.

But the temper of opinion has changed. The detested atheist is now commonly spoken of as if he were a saint; the 'devil's ambassador' is listened to as if he were a prophet. Men vie with each other in exaggeration of his merits. It is now acknowledged that he was good, wise, gentle, generous; and only polemical intolerance, or the uneasy vanity which seeks display in paradox, will now deny him these qualities. We owe the change to Lessing and Mendelssohn, whose sincerity and penetration at once discerned in the execrated writings a massive grandeur and a lucid depth, and in the man a moral elevation and serenity, which claimed all honour. Herder, Goethe, Novalis, Schleiermacher, Schelling, Hegel—each had his emphatic protest to utter against the vulgar outcry. France followed: and it would now be deemed as great a mark of ignorance to speak with reprobation of Spinoza as to shudder at the heresy of Galileo. The man whom the pious Malebranche could designate 'a wretch' (*un misérable*), the pious Schleiermacher invoked as a saint;\* the man whom the sceptic Bayle called a 'systematic atheist,' the Catholic Novalis named 'a God-intoxicated man.' And yet, although the temper has changed, we may doubt whether Spinoza will not continue to be misunderstood by the majority: 'Les âmes mâles,' says Rousseau, 'ont un idiome dont les âmes faibles n'ont pas la grammaire.'

Let us, from the story of his life and the study of his teaching, try to form some opinion of the justice of the hatred he inspired, and of the veneration now felt for him. When scorn for what is base and false is not imperatively commanded by the evidence, admiration becomes a duty. Admiration, provided it be sincere, and not a spurious noisy enthusiasm, partly echo, partly sham, is so noble a feeling, so healthy in its influence on the mind whose guest it

\* MALEBRANCHE: *Méditations Chrétiennes*, ix. 13. SCHLEIERMACHER: *Rede über die Religion*, p. 47.

becomes, that even for our own sakes we ought to give it hospitality, while on the highest grounds of justice it carries its own credentials. Blind admiration, indeed, is of no benefit; neither is blind scorn. Spinoza needs but to be known to be admired. Hence it was that his affectionate biographer, Jean Colerus, pastor at the Hague, though trembling with a vague horror at the consequences of what Spinoza taught, was so fascinated by the beauty of the life, that he devoted himself to the collection of materials which should be a lasting monument to the goodness and purity of the heretic. Nothing is more certain than that the life was one of blameless purity. Had there been any rumours to the contrary, the hatred of offended Jews and Christians would have surely preserved and magnified them. This negative evidence is stronger even than the positive details. To be famous, to be infamous, and yet give Scandal no morsel for malignant curiosity, is the rare lot of only the rarest natures.

Baruch Despinosa, or Benedictus de Spinoza,\* was born on the 24th November, 1632, in a house on a Burgwal of Amsterdam, behind the Synagogue.† His parents were descendants of Portuguese Jews who had sought refuge in Holland from the merciless Inquisition. His father was an honourable but not wealthy merchant. There were two daughters and one son. This is pretty much all we know of the family. Of Benedict himself as a child we know nothing. Early banished from the home and hearts of his relatives, there were none of those pleasant little traditions concerning the boy which are handed about with pride when the man becomes illustrious.

\* In the Royal Library at Hanover there is a letter from SPINOZA to LEIBNITZ in which he signs himself B. Despinosa. But when he published his *Abridgment of Descartes*, he wrote his name Spinoza; and this is the spelling adopted in the Excommunication. Such minor variations were little thought of in early days, and even at the present day in France we sometimes see a similar indifference.

† I tried in vain to discover the house. The Dutch, who have suffered the house where the orthodox ERASMUS was born, to become a low gin-shop, are not the people to have been very curious about the birthplace of the heterodox SPINOZA.

The first authentic glimpse we get of him is that he was destined for a theological career. His rabbinical education gave him such opportunities for the display of precocious power that he soon attracted the attention of the great Talmudist, Saul Levi Morteira, who felt in him the interest a teacher feels in a promising pupil. Unhappily for teachers, promising pupils often become troublesome : the very ardour of study and vigour of intellect which carry them beyond their schoolfellows carry them also, and with increased momentum, past those boundaries which Authority has fixed. Thus eagerness becomes dangerous, earnestness heresy, and the hopeful pupil passes into the condition of a hopeless outcast. Young Benedict asked such intelligent questions, listened so appreciatingly to the replies, showed so nimble an understanding, and so much eagerness for light, that we can sympathise with Morteira's bewilderment, half dread, half pride, when the pupil hurried on with logical impetuosity, asking questions inconvenient to answer, and pointing out slight discrepancies in the answers. He was indeed a promising pupil ; but of a promise that looked threatening. At fourteen he was a match for a rabbi in the extent and accuracy of biblical learning. At fifteen he puzzled the Synagogue with questions to which satisfactory answers were not forthcoming. Morteira, alarmed, endeavoured to check this inquiring spirit. The attempt was futile. How long the period of disquiet lasted is unknown. Spinoza had made enemies by his freedom ; and since he would not hold his tongue, he had to listen to threats mingled with sophistications. Naturally, heterodoxy grew with discussion. At last he felt that he could no longer remain a member of the Synagogue. We can easily imagine the wrath excited by his withdrawal, not only among the rabbis, but among the members of his family circle. We can picture the storming father, weeping and reproachful mother, indignant sisters, one after another and all together, threatening, sneering, expostulating, urging irrelevant arguments : Why should he not believe what his forefathers had believed ? What vanity

in him to pretend to a wisdom greater than that of the wisest rabbis! What would become of him? What could be his chance of success in life? And the feelings of his family—were they to be disregarded? It was dreadful to think of; wicked, selfish; certain to come to no good.

The arguments of Morteira having failed, we need not ask what chance there was in the 'wild and whirling words' of a family (with its 'feelings' unaccountably disregarded) making any change in his position. Threats were tried and failed. Then a bribe was tried: the suasive influence of money would surely succeed where logic failed? A pension was proposed to him of one thousand florins annually, on the condition of his appearing from time to time in the synagogue, and keeping within his own bosom certain troublesome doubts. The 'bad example' and the 'scandal' would thus be avoided. Nothing was asked of him more than is asked by all churches, when they are not strong enough to punish, and are weak enough to wish for homage where there is no belief. 'If you are not with us do at least pretend to be with us; give us your countenance, if not your heart.' To some sensitive consciences this is an appalling request. It is like an echo of the tempter's voice. Spinoza had one of these sensitive consciences. He not only would not pretend to believe what he did not believe; he was hurt at the supposition that he could be bribed into hypocrisy.

We can understand how the rage of the rabbis was intensified by this refusal, without, however, believing that they instigated the attempt at assassination which followed. I, for my part, distinctly refuse to believe that. I have never seen any evidence of Jews being morally inferior to Christians; and although fanatics of all sects have shown themselves remarkably indifferent to shedding the blood of opponents, they need, for the sake of their consciences, some form to legalise or legitimise the murder they decree. They cannot look into each other's faces, and propose what each knows will be a murder.

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Même aux yeux de l'injuste un injuste est horrible.\*

\* BOILEAU.

The action of public bodies must be public, and must be protected by at least the forms of legality or the sophisms of 'a higher law.'\* On these general grounds, therefore, I acquit the rabbis of having instigated the attempt. Far more probable is the supposition that some fanatic, hearing of the scandal about to fall upon his church, conceived that he would do the church a service if he arrested the scandal with his knife.

Be that as it may, one evening, on returning from the theatre (according to one account), or from the synagogue (according to another), or, as Mr. Froude suggests, probably coming to his home, which was behind the synagogue, a man rushed on him, and struck at him with a knife. The blow, slanting downwards, only tore his coat and grazed his skin. The fanatic escaped. The torn coat was preserved by Spinoza as a memento of religious amenity.

Shortly after this exhibition of individual fanaticism there was another and more imposing exhibition of corporate indignation in the solemn process of Excommunication. There was a large and agitated crowd in the synagogue when the tabernacle wherein were deposited the Books of the Law was opened; and the light of numerous candles of black wax streamed upon the long beards and beaded eyes of the angry faithful. Morteira, formerly the proud teacher, now the irritated priest, ordered sentence of execution to be passed. The chanter rose and chanted forth in loud lugubrious accents the words of execration and of banishment. The words ran thus:—

'According to what has been decreed in the Council of Angels, and definitely determined in the Assembly of Saints, we reject, and banish, and declare him to be cursed and excommunicated, agreeable to the will of God and the Congregation, by virtue of the Book of the Law, and of the six

\* SPINOZA has expressed this in the following passage: "Ita enim hominum naturam constitutam videmus, ut unusquisque (sive rex sive subditus sit) si quid turpe commisit factum suum talibus circumstantiis adornare studeat ut nihil contra justum et decorum commisisse credatur."—*Tractatus Theolog.-Politicus*, c. xii.



hundred and thirteen Precepts contained therein. We pronounce the same interdiction used by Joshua with respect to the city of Jericho; the same curse wherewith Elisha cursed those wanton and insolent children, as well as his servant Gehasi; the same Anathema used by Barak with respect to Meros: the same Excommunication used anciently by the members of the Great Council; and which Jehuda, the son of Ezekiel, did likewise thunder against his servant, and with all the curses, anathemas, interdictions, and excommunications which have been fulminated from the time of Moses, our master, to this present day, in the name of *Achthariel*, who is also called *Jah*, the Lord of Hosts; in the name of the great prince *Michael*; in the name of *Metateron*, whose name is like that of his master;\* in the name of *Sandalphon*, whose ordinary employment consists in presenting flowers and garlands to his master [that is, in offering the prayers of the children of Israel before the throne of God]. Lastly, in that name which contains forty-two letters—namely, in the name of Him who appeared to Moses in the bush; in that name by which Moses opened and divided the waters of the Red Sea; in the name of Him who said, *I am that I am and who shall be*; by the mysterious depths of the great Name; by His Holy Commandments engraved upon the two Tables of the Law. Lastly, in the name of the Lord of Hosts the Tetragrammaton, the God of Israel who sits enthroned upon the cherubim. In the name of the Globes, Wheels, mysterious Beasts, and his ministering Angels. In the name of all the Holy Angels who minister before the Most High. Every son of Israel or daughter of Israel who shall trespass one of the ordinances denounce solemnly. Let him be cursed by the Lord God of Hosts, who sits above the cherubim, whose holy and dreadful name was pronounced by the high-priest in the great day of atonement. Let him be cursed in heaven and earth by the very mouth of the Almighty God. Let him be cursed in the name of the

\* The letters of the word *Metateron* make up the same number with the word *Schadai*, the Almighty, namely, three hundred and fourteen.

great Prince Michael, in the name of Metatron, whose name is like that of his Master. Let him be cursed in the name of *Achthariel Jah*, the Lord of Hosts, cursed by the mouth of the Seraphim and Ofanim and those ministering angels who minister in the presence of God to serve him in all purity and holiness.

‘Was he born in *Nisan* (March), a month the direction of which is assigned to *Uriel*, and to the angels of his company, let him be cursed by the mouth of *Uriel*, and by the mouth of the angels whereof he is the head.

‘Was he born in *Ijar* (April), a month the direction of which is assigned to *Zephaniel*, and to the angels of his company, let him be cursed by the mouth of *Zephaniel*, and by the mouth of the angels whereof he is the head.

‘Was he born in *Sivan* (May), a month the direction of which belongs to *Amriel*, let him be cursed, &c.

‘Was he born in *Thammus* (June), the direction of which is assigned to *Peniel*, let him be cursed, &c.

‘Was he born in *Ab* (July), the direction of which is assigned to *Barkiel*, let him be cursed, &c.

‘Was he born in *Elul* (August), the direction of which is assigned to *Periel*, let him be cursed, &c.

‘Was he born in *Tishri* (September), the direction of which is assigned to *Zuriel*, let him be cursed, &c.

‘Was he born in *Marcheschvan* (October), the direction of which is assigned to *Zachariel*, let him be cursed, &c.

‘Was he born in *Kishlev* (November), the direction of which is assigned to *Adoniel*, let him be cursed, &c.

‘Was he born in *Tefet* (December), the direction of which is assigned to *Anael*, let him be cursed, &c.

‘Was he born in *Schevat* (January), the direction of which is assigned to *Gabriel*, let him be cursed, &c.

‘Was he born in *Adar* (February), the direction of which is assigned to *Rumiel*, and to those of his company, let him be cursed by the mouth of *Rumiel*, and by the mouth of the angels of whom he is the head.

‘Let him be cursed by the mouth of the Seven Angels

who preside over the seven days of the week, and by the mouth of all the angels who follow them and fight under their banners. Let him be cursed by the Four Angels who preside over the four seasons of the year, and by the mouth of all the angels who follow them and fight under their banners. Let him be cursed by the mouth of the seven principalities. Let him be cursed by the mouth of the princes of the Law, whose name is Crown and Seal. Let him be cursed by the mouth of the strong, powerful, and dreadful God.

‘We beseech the great God to confound such a man and to hasten the day of his destruction. O God, the God of Spirits, depress him under all flesh, extirpate, destroy, exterminate, and annihilate him. The ire of the Lord, the most contagious storms and winds fall upon the head of impious men; the exterminating angels will fall upon them. Cursed be he wherever he turn; his soul shall go out from him in terror. His death be in dire sickness; his spirit shall not pass out and away; God send the sharpest and most violent evils upon him. Let him perish by a burning fever, by a consumption, being dried up by fire within and covered with leprosy and imposthumes without. Let God pursue him till he be entirely rooted out and destroyed; until his own sword shall be pierced through his own breast; and his bow shall be broken. He will be like the straw which is scattered about by the wind. The angel of the Lord will pursue him in darkness, in slippery places, where the paths of the wicked are. His destruction will fall upon him at the time when he does not expect it; he will find himself taken in the snare which he laid in private for others. Being driven from the face of the earth, he will be driven from light into darkness. Oppression and anguish will seize him on every side. His eyes shall see his condemnation. He will drink the cup of the indignation of the Almighty God, whose curses will cover him as his garments. The strength of his skin shall be devoured. The earth will swallow him up. God will extirpate and shut him for ever out of his house. Let God never forgive him his sins. Let the wrath and indignation of

the Lord surround him and smoke for ever on his head. Let all the curses contained in the Book of the Law fall upon him. Let God blot him from under the heavens. Let God separate him to his own destruction from all the tribes of Israel, and give him for his lot all the curses contained in the Book of the Law.

‘As for you who are still living, serve the Lord your God, who blessed Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, Aaron, David, Solomon, the prophets of Israel, and so many good men everywhere dispersed among the Gentiles. May it please the Great God to shower his blessings upon this whole assembly, and upon all other holy assemblies, and the members thereof, except those that trespass over this Anathema. God keep them under his holy protection. God preserve them in his great mercy, and deliver them from all sorts of misery and oppression. God grant them all a great many years; let him bless and prosper all their undertakings. Lastly, may the great God shortly grant them that Deliverance which they with all the brethren of Israel expect: and be this His gracious Will. *Amen.*’\*

While these curses were chanted forth from one side, the thrilling sounds of a trumpet accompanied them at intervals from the other. The black candles were reversed, and made to melt drop by drop into a huge tub filled with blood. This symbol made the spectators shudder, and when the close came, and the lights were all suddenly immersed in the

\* The formula of excommunication, contained in a Ritual called ‘Kol Bo’ (reprinted in UGOLINI, tom. xxvii.), but probably never used in full, I have found nowhere in English but in the little work called *An Account of the Life and Writings of Spinoza*, published in London, 1720, which none of the later writers seem to have known. It contains an abbreviation of the Life by COLERUS, and a slight analysis of the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*. It has only ninety-six pages of large print, and was published for one shilling. The translation is loose in many places, and the Hebrew names incorrectly spelled. The version I have printed has been revised for me by the erudite Semitic scholar Mr. F. Deutsch. The form of excommunication printed by VLOTEN in the *Supplementum* is only an abridgment of that quoted in the text; whether this abridgment was made in the paper sent to Spinoza, or made by the chief Rabbi at the ceremony, is not clear.

blood, a cry of execration rose from all, and in that darkness rose shouts of 'Amen !' to the curses.

Amsterdam, at least the Jewish part of it, was in an uproar; but the young man who had been cursed thus particularly was perhaps not much troubled. Black candles melting in blood, lugubrious chantings of detailed curses with trumpet accompaniments, might terrify those who believed that God would certainly fulfil all the intentions which Rabbis attributed to him—believed in the wrath and ferocity, the merciless lust of vengeance, which they, personifying their own passions, attributed to the Creator: but such cursings were no more than fetid breath to one whose conceptions of the Creator were of a higher kind, whose faith in the goodness of God, and placid resignation to God's will, was more than a tradition, more than a profession, a deep conviction working through his life.

So much of the outward life we know; of the inward life we know nothing. Kuno Fischer is probably warranted in the assumption that it was to the influence of Descartes that Spinoza owed his emancipation from rabbinical ideas; but we have no evidence on the subject. Nor do we know how he fared when banished from the Jewish community and his family. His isolation was great. Excluded from the society of Jews, he found no refuge in that of Christians; nor had he at first a select circle of sympathising friends to whom he could turn: these came later on. There were, indeed, one or two from whom he might have received sympathy: one of these was Vanden Ende, the physician and philologist, from whom he had learned Latin and (it is conjectured) philosophy, and (as I conjecture) gained that acquaintance with anatomy and physiology which, although never obtruded, is nevertheless discernible in his writings.\* Vanden Ende had a daughter who is sometimes said to have taught Spinoza

\* There are many slight indications scattered through his works, but the best evidence is that he never commits himself by ignorant statements in these matters.

Latin, but as she was only a child of twelve at the date of the Excommunication, 1656, inexorable chronology refuses its countenance to that myth. Whether there is any truth in the story of Spinoza's having been jilted by this Clara Maria for one Kerckrinck, a Hamburgh merchant, who wooed and won her with pearl necklaces (a story which has been elevated into romance by Auerbach), it would be difficult to decide. He himself spoke of the affection he had borne her; but considering that she refused to marry Kerckrinck until he had come over to her religion, we cannot suppose that she would have listened to Spinoza, who had discarded all religious forms. And what shall we say to the suggestion of his Jewish biographer, Philippson, that it was this idea of a Jew marrying a Christian which led him to meditate on Judaism, Christianity, and Religion in the abstract, whence he rose through Love to Philosophy?

Love seems to have played but a very subordinate part in this thinker's life. He tells us himself that it was another mistress to whom he was devoted. In a fragment entitled 'On the Improvement of the Intellect,' which was his first work, there is this passage, which has biographical significance:—

'Experience having taught me that all the ordinary affairs of life are vain and futile, and that those things which I dreaded were only in themselves good or bad according as they moved my soul, I finally resolved on inquiring if there was anything truly good in itself, and capable of being communicated to man, a good which, everything else being rejected, could fill the soul entirely; whether, in short, that good existed which, if possessed, could give supreme and eternal happiness. I say, *I finally resolved*, because at first it seemed inconsiderate to renounce the good which was certain for a greater good which was uncertain. I pondered on the advantages which accrued from reputation and wealth, all of which I must renounce if I would seriously undertake the search after another object, and which, if happiness chanced to belong to these advantages, I should necessarily see escape

me; and if, on the other hand, happiness belongs to other objects, and I sought happiness where it is not to be found, then also should I miss it. I therefore resolved this in my mind: whether it were possible for me to regulate my life according to a new rule, or at any rate ascertain the existence of such a rule, without changing the actual order of my life, a thing which I have often in vain attempted. For the things which most frequently occur in life, and in which men judging from their acts, think supreme happiness consists, may be reduced to three, *riches, honours, and pleasures of the senses*.<sup>\*</sup> By these three the mind is so occupied it is scarcely able to think of any other good. Pleasures of sense, especially, so absorb the mind that it reposes in them, and thus is prevented from thinking of anything else. But after fruition follows sadness, which, if it does not absorb the mind, at least disturbs and deadens it. The search after riches and honours also occupies the mind, especially when sought for their own sake, as if they constituted happiness. Repentance does not follow riches and honours as it follows sensual pleasures; on the contrary, the more we possess of them, the greater is our pleasure, and consequently the greater our desire to increase them. Honour, or reputation, is a serious impediment, because to attain it we must direct our lives according to the wishes of others, avoiding what the vulgar avoid, seeking what men seek. When, therefore, I saw the obstacles which hindered me from following a rule of conduct different from the ordinary rule, and saw how great was the antagonism between the two, I was forced to inquire which of the two would be most useful to me; for, as I said just now, I seemed to be abandoning the certain for the uncertain. But after meditating thereupon, I found, first, that in giving up the ordinary advantages I really renounced only an uncertain good for another equally uncertain, the latter, however, being only uncertain as to the possibility of not attaining it. After assiduous meditation I found that I was

<sup>\*</sup> Spinoza's language is stronger, but to translate more literally would, perhaps mislead; he says: *Divitias, honorem, atque libidinem*.

only quitting certain evils for a certain good. For I saw I was in the greatest danger, which forced me to seek a remedy, even an uncertain one; as a man in sickness, seeing certain death before him unless something be done, will seize at any remedy, however vague, for in that is all his hope. And, indeed, all those things which the vulgar seek were not only unable to furnish me with a remedy, but were obstacles, because they are frequently the very causes of the ruin of those who possess them, and always of those who are possessed by them. Many are the examples of those who have suffered persecution, nay, death, on account of their wealth, or who, in the hope of gain, have exposed themselves to perils, and paid for their folly with their lives. Nor are there fewer examples of men who, in the pursuit of honours, or in defending them, have become most miserable. Lastly, there are innumerable examples of those who by excess of sensual pleasures have accelerated their death. Hence the evil seems to me to arise from this: that all our happiness and unhappiness depends solely on the quality of the object which we desire. For those things which are not desired arouse neither quarrels nor sorrow if they escape us, nor envy when others possess them, neither fear nor hate, in a word, no commotion of the mind; whereas all those evils belong to our attachment to perishable things, such as those just spoken of. But love of what is eternal and infinite nourishes the mind with joy only, and is never touched with sorrow, and it is *this* good so eminently desirable that all men should seek. Yet it was not without meaning that I said, *to consider the matter seriously*. For although I clearly perceived this in my mind, I could not banish all love of wealth, honours, and sensual pleasures. But I found that so long as my mind was occupied with these thoughts so long was it turned away from passions, and seriously meditated the new rule of life, which was to me a great consolation. For thus I saw that these evils were not incurable; and, although at first these serious moments were rare and brief, yet afterwards, as the *true good* became better known, they



became more frequent and more durable, especially when I saw that the acquisition of wealth, glory, and sensual pleasures was fatal so long as these were sought for their own sakes, and not as means to an end. If, indeed, they are sought as means then they have their value and do little hurt; on the contrary, they are very useful towards the proposed end.

‘Here let me say what I mean by the *true good*, and what is the *supreme good*. To understand these rightly, it must be noted that *good* and *evil* are only relative, so that one and the same thing may be called good or evil according to its different aspects; and the same of perfection and imperfection. Nothing considered in itself can be called perfect or imperfect; as we shall understand when we see how all things exist according to the external order and according to the certain laws of nature. But as human weakness cannot follow this eternal order by its own thought, and meanwhile man conceives a human nature much surpassing his own to the height of which nothing seems to prevent his arriving, he is incited to seek the means of arriving at this perfection and everything which seems to lead there is called by him the *true good*. But the *supreme good* would be for him as for others, if possible, to enjoy this higher nature. And what is this? We shall hereafter show that it is the knowledge of the union of the mind with all nature. This then is the end I must seek: to acquire this higher human nature and use every effort for others to acquire it also; that is to say, it is necessary for my happiness that many others should think with me, so that their intellects and the desires should accord with mine; for which two things are necessary: *first*, to understand Nature so as to be able to acquire this higher human nature; *next*, to form such a society as will admit of the greatest number arriving easily and securely at such perfection. Therefore our tasks are: *moral philosophy* and the *education of children*; and, as health is a not unimportant means for the end we have in view, the whole science of *medicine* must be added: and, as

the arts make many difficult things easy, and aid us by saving our labour and time, we must not omit *mechanics*. But above all must be sought a method of improving the understanding, and as far as possible to correct it from the beginning, so that, warned against error, it may know clearly.'

This passage must not be read as mere oratorical preamble, but as the serious expression of a conviction. His life testifies to its sincerity. What he said, he did; what he wrote in philosophic treatises, he tried to live in philosophic earnestness. He was very poor, and was often tempted—tempted by money, tempted by vanity, tempted by his senses; but these lures were powerless. It was not with him as it is, unhappily, with so many of us who mean to live a noble life and wish to act up to our best convictions, but who find that the allurements, which are easily vanquished while they remain at a certain distance, become our masters when they press closely on us. Spinoza was a 'God-intoxicated man' not only in the ardours of speculative activity, but in the conflict of daily life, believing in God as an ever-present reality. Amidst temptation he continued steadfast to the divinity of those aspirations which in solitude his soul had seen to be divine. Many men before and since have been poor and obscure, have despised wealth, have been careless of fame, even when they have shown no touch of vain-gloriousness in their contempt and noisy independence; but not many have been offered the opulence and glory they despised, and have continued, after the offers, to leave them disregarded and untouched. Many men have written eloquently and sincerely of quitting the perishable things of this world for Truth; but few have shown an equal earnestness in translating this eloquence into conduct. Spinoza was one of the few; and it is well that this should be known, because the deep repugnance which is felt against his speculative opinions arises less from a sense of their falsehood than from a belief that such opinions cannot enter the mind without necessarily dissolving all moral principles. I have no hesitation in avowing that many of Spinoza's conclusions

are such as must shock all Christians, and most Theists, that to him even more than to Kant should be applied the epithet of 'all shattering' (*alles zermalmende*), that logically there is but a trivial distinction between his Acosmism, which makes God the one universal being, and Atheism, which makes the cosmos the one universal existence. Observe, I say 'logically' there is but little difference; spiritually, the difference is profound. His Acosmism may denote what is scarcely distinguishable from Atheism; it connotes something utterly opposed to Atheism; and we know that he explicitly and emphatically repudiated Atheism. The horror which many feel at his opinions is entirely due to the rooted prejudice that morality is inseparable from certain special dogmas which, if rejected, leave the man a prey to all animal and ignoble passions. But no one was more rigorous than he in the subjection of all passions and all egoisms to the love of God and obedience to the Divine will. The love of God is everywhere proclaimed the highest good, the noblest aim, the only source of permanent felicity. And when Isaac Orobio accused him of getting rid of all Religion in the escape from superstition, he gravely asked, 'Is it to cast off Religion to acknowledge God as the supreme good, and to love him with singleness of soul, which love must constitute our highest felicity, our most perfect freedom? to believe that the reward of virtue is virtue, and the punishment of ignorance and impotence is ignorance? and that every one should love his neighbour and obey the laws?'\* He denied that true morality has its basis in fear of punishment. To substitute that fear for the love of God, is to show that we love something better than God.

Spinoza shocks those who regard him from an antagonistic standing point. No sooner is the mind disengaged from the trammels of old prejudice than we learn to look on his argu-

\* 'An quæso, ille omnem religionem exiit, qui Deum summum bonum agnoscendum statuit, eundemque libero animo ut talem amandum? et quod in hoc solo nostra summa felicitas summaque libertas consistit? porro quod præmium virtutis sit ipsa virtus, stultitiæ autem et impotentiae supplicium sit ipsa stultitia? et denique quod unusquisque proximum suum amare debet et mandatis summe obedire?'—*Epist.* xlix. p. 294.

ments as on the arguments of Parmenides or Algazel ; we ask whether they are true or false, whether they can be taken up into our philosophy, or rejected from it ? This is the attitude of Germany. To some extent it is the attitude of France. It will become the attitude of England. For myself I cannot accept Spinoza's system ; but I see how it was perfectly compatible with his own pure morality, and do not fear lest it should disturb the morality of any one who could conscientiously adopt it. We may reject all ontological schemes, and deny the competence of the ontological method ; but if we are to employ that method, and put our trust in its conclusions, the results of Spinozism are quite as capable of dovetailing with the needs of a noble life as any other system.

And here I may make a remark of general application, namely, that the incalculable importance of morality so presses itself upon consideration at every turn, and necessarily forms so large a part of every thinker's meditations, that no rational system can be constructed which does not conform itself to the highest prevalent conceptions of the moral law. Hence we may observe, as a rule, that in proportion as a speculative system departs from the principles currently accepted in philosophy, it seeks to gain increased support from morality, thus recovering the hold of men's minds in one direction which it has given up in the other. If this be so, it shows how misguided is the anger which assails a new thought from terror at its moral consequences. Our first question should never be, To what will this lead ? but, Is this true ?

Spinoza gained his livelihood by glass polishing. The rules of the Jewish doctors enjoin the necessity of learning some mechanical art, as well as the Law. It is not enough for a Rabbi to be a scholar, he must also have at command the means of subsistence. Spinoza, fond of optics, had learned the art of polishing lenses ; and he acquired a certain celebrity for the excellence of his workmanship, as we see in

a letter from Leibnitz. He also relaxed his mind occasionally by employing his pencil. Colerus had a portfolio of portraits by him of several distinguished men; among these was a sketch of Spinoza himself, in the dress of Masaniello.

In 1660 we find him living in Rhynsburg, near Leyden; and there among his friends we notice Henry Oldenburg, who had been the Hague consul in London, when Cromwell was Protector. He was also the intimate friend of Robert Boyle, and helped in the foundation of the Royal Society of Great Britain. The very first paper in the Transactions of that now illustrious society bears his signature. He writes from London to Spinoza in the year 1661, recalling their pleasant discussions on God, thought, extension, the union of the body and soul, and the philosophy of Descartes and Bacon.\*

Another friend is Simon de Vries, who was true to him through life, and whose veneration is prettily expressed in that passage of a letter wherein he exclaims, 'Thrice happy is the young man living in the same house with you, who can see you at breakfast and dinner, who can walk with you, and listen to you on the highest subjects.' Upon which Spinoza characteristically replies, 'You need not envy my young inmate, against whom I jealously guard myself, and to whom I earnestly beg that you and other friends will not communicate my opinions until he has grown more ripe for them. At present he is too childish and volatile, impelled rather by curiosity than love of truth. But I hope that he will put aside these faults as he grows older; nay, as far as I can judge of his disposition, I feel sure of this, and on this account I take great pains with him.† It was this young man that Spinoza instructed in the Cartesian philosophy, and for his use he began the composition of the 'Principles of Descartes geometrically demonstrated;' not for Simon de Vries, as is commonly said. This work was afterwards completed, and an appendix added, in which Spinoza indicate

\* SPINOZA : *Epist.* i.

† VLOTEN : *Supplementum*, p. 295.

his chief point of divergence from Descartes. It was published by Meyer in 1664, and produced considerable stir among the Cartesians.

He left Rhynsburg for the Hague, and there among his warm friends was the celebrated and unfortunate Grand Pensioner, Jean de Witt. 'In all Holland,' says Mr. Froude, 'there were none like these two; they had found each other now, and they loved each other as only good men love. From him Spinoza accepted a pension, not a very enormous one—some thirty-five pounds a year; the only thing of the kind he ever did accept. Perhaps because De Witt was the only person he had met who exactly understood what it was, and weighed such favours at their exact worth, neither less nor more.'

This interpretation is consistent with all we know of Spinoza. On the death of his father, his two sisters, Rebecca and Miriam, tried to keep him from his inheritance, probably thinking that an excommunicated heretic had no claim on the money of the faithful. He appealed against them in a court of law; gained his cause, and having thus satisfied his sense of justice, gave up the contested property as a free gift, thus saving his sisters from fraud, and himself from an indignity. Later in life his affectionate pupil, Simon de Vries, brought him a thousand florins, entreating him to accept it as a slight payment of the heavy debt the pupil owed the teacher. Spinoza laughingly assured him that he was in no need of money, and that such a sum would turn his head. Simon then made a will, bequeathing the whole of his property to Spinoza, who, on hearing of it, at once set off for Amsterdam to remonstrate against an act so unjust to Simon's brother. His arguments prevailed. The will was destroyed, and the brother finally inherited. Now came a struggle of generosity. The heir protested that he could not accept the property unless he were allowed to settle five hundred florins a year on the disinterested friend; and, after some debate, Spinoza agreed to accept three hundred.

In 1673 Karl Ludwig, the Elector Palatine, anxious to secure so illustrious a thinker, offered him the chair of philosophy at Heidelberg. But whatever allurements there might otherwise have been in such a proposal was destroyed by the intimation that the Elector hoped he would avoid collision with existing creeds. 'I have never had any intention of teaching in public,' replied the philosopher, 'and if I give my time to expounding the first questions of philosophy, I shall perhaps not be able to make any advances in its deeper questions as I desire. Nor do I exactly understand within what limits my philosophy *can* be made to avoid collision with established creeds. Schisms do not arise so much from a genuine love of religion as from the interests and passions, and from that love of contradiction which prompts men to falsify and anathematise even what is true.\*' And, therefore, the professorship was declined. Louis XIV. offered him a pension if he would dedicate his next work to him, but received for answer that the philosopher had no intention of dedicating anything to his majesty.

From these examples we may conclude that his acceptance of the pension from De Witt was grounded on a perfect confidence in the motives and the character of his friend. There is often as much generosity in accepting as in conferring an obligation; and as much vanity as independence in its rejection. All depends upon the nature of the existing relations, and the character of the friends.

A little incident, unnoticed by his biographers, but interesting as an indication of the state of opinion in those days, may here be related. If there is an error one might have expected the clear and penetrating intellect of Spinoza to have seen through, it is the error of the Alchemists: but this expectation is grounded on a misconception. Alchemy seems absurd to us because experience has abundantly shown that the processes of the alchemists were futile. In those

\* ' . . . Quippe schismata non tam ex ardenti religionis studio oriuntur quam ex vario hominum affectu vel contradicendi studio, quo omnia etsi recte dicta sint, depravare et damnare solent.'—*Epist.* liv. p. 304.

days it seemed plausible enough; and that which conquered the assent of eminent men was not scientific deduction, but a striking fact. J. F. Schweitzer (known in Europe by his Latinised name of Helvetius) was then physician to the Prince of Orange, and notorious as an antagonist of the alchemists. It was, therefore, their interest to convert him. On the 27th of December, 1666, he received the visit of a stranger, who declined to give his name, but who came, he said, in consequence of the dispute between Helvetius and Kenelm Digby, and was prepared with material proofs of the existence of the philosopher's stone. After a sharp discussion, the stranger handed him an extremely small portion of yellow metallic powder, having the aspect of sulphur, assuring him it would transmute an ounce and a half of lead into gold. He departed. Helvetius, in the presence of his wife, made the experiment. To his astonishment it succeeded. There was the ingot of gold, which all the goldsmiths and assayers of the Hague pronounced to be pure. He was startled into credulity. The fact mastered him, as striking facts so often master imperfect scepticism. He wrote an account of the whole adventure, and avowed his faith in the alchemy which hitherto he had derided. This made no little stir. Among the rest Spinoza was eager for precise details, and we have a letter from him dated 25th of March, 1667, in which he says, 'Your last letter of the 14th reached me safely, but various causes prevented my replying at once. I spoke to Vossius about the Helvetius affair, and he burst out laughing, wondering how I could occupy myself about such trivialities. But I, disregarding this contempt, went to the goldsmith who had assayed the gold, and whose name is Brechtett. He assured me that, in spite of Vossius, the gold during the fusion increased in weight on some silver being thrown into the crucible; hence, as he firmly believes, this gold which changes silver into gold, must contain something peculiar in itself. Not he alone, but divers other persons who were present at the time, assured me that such was the case. After this I went to Helvetius, who showed



me the gold and the crucible still having a little gold attached to its inside, and told me that he had strewn scarcely a quarter of a grain on the molten lead. He added that it was his intention to publish a brief history of the affair. This is what I have been able to learn of the matter.'

The trick which imposed upon Helvetius was adroit, and in those days the knowledge of chemistry was too imperfect, and the nature of experimental evidence too little understood, to suggest the presence of a trick. Spinoza, like the others, seems to have relied upon the purely irrelevant testimony of goldsmiths and bystanders; and on similar testimony spirit-rapping, witchcraft, and other delusions have been credited.

The next, and perhaps the most considerable, event to be recorded in Spinoza's life is the publication in 1670 of the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*. It is one of the boldest books ever written; and it was written at a time when boldness was far more perilous than it has been since; when philosophers had to use elaborate precautions in advancing even small heresies, and their skill was shown in insinuating what they could not openly avow. Spinoza had for some time resisted the entreaties of his friends; he foresaw the tumult that his opinions would arouse. Oldenburg writes to him in 1662, urging him to brave the ignorant mob and rely on the sympathy of the learned (a pretty reed to lean on!); and in 1665 he is still more pressing. 'What do you fear? Why hesitate? Begin, and you may be confident of the applause of all real philosophers. I never will believe that you would write anything against the existence and providence of God; and provided that these solid grounds of religion are respected, it is easy to excuse or defend any philosophic opinions.' Yet Oldenburg himself held very different language after publication; and proved that Spinoza's hesitation was well founded. What finally determined him is not known. Most probably a deep sense of the importance of his views at a period of widespread unrest, a period rife with sophisms. Holland was reposing on the laurels she had won in her long and desperate struggle against Spain. Having

freed herself from a foreign yoke, she might now have completed her canals, extended her commerce, and enjoyed the amenities of peace, had not theological faction disturbed it. A land of political freedom, an asylum for persecuted free-thinkers, it was torn by theological strife. The persecuted Jews might flock there from Portugal and Spain; the Protestants of France and Belgium found shelter there; but on their arrival the fugitives witnessed conflicts almost as savage as those from which they fled. Toleration was awarded to political thought; various religions were allowed to erect their churches; but within the pale of the State Church there was the old strife. What Spinoza wished to teach men was the essential nature of Religion, and the political nature of a church. He wished to see a complete separation of the temporal and spiritual powers, giving to the Church a purely political significance in outward observances, and leaving individual conscience free as to opinions. The State has a right to determine ceremonies and observances; but it violates every principle of justice if it attempts to coerce opinions or the expression of opinions. It would be impossible for men to continue to live in society unless each gave up his right of action in deference to the laws established for all. 'The right of action on his individual judgment ceases; but the right of action only, not the right of reasoning and judging.'

I shall have to speak more particularly hereafter of this book, which was everywhere condemned, interdicted, and, above all, 'refuted.' Even free-thinkers were staggered; yet it found some energetic admirers, who printed it under false titles, translated, and abridged it, thus disseminating its ideas. In England an abridgment appeared in 1720, and in 1737 a complete translation. What Spinoza thought of his 'refuters' may be gathered from a passage in one of his letters.\* 'The other day I saw the book which the Utrecht professors have been writing against me hanging in a book-

\* *Epist.* l. p. 299.

seller's window, and from the little I had time to read of it, it seemed not worth reading, much less answering. I let the book and its author alone. Mentally smiling, I thought how the men who are most ignorant are always those most audaciously ready to write.'

This *Tractate* made Spinoza's house the house of call for lion-hunters. Foreign ministers, foreign philosophers, men who admired him, men who execrated him, and men who were to 'refute him,' came to occupy his leisure with their talk. He conversed very freely with them, sketching all the while, often taking their portraits. Among these visitors we shall only here note Leibnitz, who never spoke of him but in terms unworthy of both these great intellects. This much is to be said for Leibnitz, however, that he never thoroughly understood Spinoza, and was shocked at the results of the system he so misconceived. If he never understood the simple Locke, we need not wonder that he failed to penetrate the meaning of Spinoza; that he did fail is conclusively and almost ludicrously shown in the posthumous work published by an admiring disciple,\* of which I shall take no further notice. Nevertheless, whether Leibnitz understood or misunderstood Spinoza, one would have been glad of some record of their meeting and conversation.

The murder of De Witt must have been a great shock to Spinoza. It was the only occasion on which he is known to have lost all control over his emotions; and it must have recurred to him with solemn feeling when, on a visit to the great Condé, the report arose that he was a political spy, and the populace surrounded the house where he lived. 'Fear nothing,' he said to his terrified landlord; 'it is easy for me to justify myself. There are those who know the object of my journey. But whatever may arrive, as soon as the mob assembles, I will go out and meet them, even though I share the fate of De Witt.'

Annoyed at being misunderstood on points which seemed

\* *Réfutation inédite de Spinoza. Par Leibnitz. Précédée d'un Mémoire par*  
M. FOUCHER DE CAREIL. Paris, 1854.

to him so clear, he shrank from the publication of his *Ethics*; and accordingly that work only saw the light after his death. He was timid and retiring, ill suited to the world and the world's ways, especially unsuited for conflict. A severe mysticism, like his, was not for vulgar minds. It wanted even the emotion which could commend it to mystical minds. For the peculiarity about him, that which distinguishes him from all other thinkers, is that he was a mystic whose mind moved with geometrical rigour and clearness; and his severe rigour of abstraction and deduction are as repellent to the vague emotional tendencies of the mystical mind, as the intense disinterestedness and passionlessness of his system are repellent to the ordinary mind.

Let us glance at his private life. Though very poor, from his scanty pittance he had something to spare for the necessities of others. On looking over his papers after his death, it was found that one day his expenses amounted to three halfpence, for a *soupe au lait* and a little butter, with three farthings extra for beer; another day, gruel, with butter and raisins, which cost him twopence halfpenny, sufficed for his epicurism; and as his biographer Colerus says, 'Although often invited to dinner, he preferred the scanty meal that he found at home to dining sumptuously at the expense of another.' In company with a few neighbours, he sat at the chimney corner, smoking his pipe and talking to them of what they could understand, not disturbing their creeds by any obtrusion of his own. No vanity of proselytism made him trouble the convictions of those unfitted to receive new doctrines. When his landlady, feeling, perhaps, that the assurance of so good and great a man was almost equal to the priest's, asked him whether he believed she could be saved by her religion, which she knew was not his, he replied, 'Your religion is a good one; you ought not to seek another, nor doubt that yours will procure salvation, provided you add to your piety the tranquil virtues of domestic life.' Nor was this, as some might suppose, the mere evasion of one who chose not to commit himself by

exposure of his heretical opinions; it was a part of the solemn earnestness with which he looked at life and accepted faith. Read the fourteenth chapter of the *Theological Political Treatise*, and see how he distinguishes between what is essential and what collateral in religion; how faith in God and love of God, with the consequent love of mankind, are in his eyes the sum of all religion; how, even, regarding religious dogmas, it is not essential that they should be true, so that they be truly believed; and how it by no means follows that those who can give the best reasons for their faith are truly the most faithful, but, on the contrary, those who live most according to justice and charity. He knew his hostess was not wise, but he saw that she was virtuous.

The children all loved him, and for them he would bring one of his lenses to show them the spiders magnified. It was his amusement to watch insects. The sight of spiders fighting would make the tears roll down his cheeks with laughter; a trait which Dugald Stewart thinks 'very decidedly indicates a tendency to insanity;'\* and satisfactorily accounts for the horrible doctrines of Spinozism. Hamann sees in it only the sympathy of one web-spinner for another: 'His taste betrays itself in a mode of thought which only insects can thus entangle. Spiders and their admirer Spinoza naturally take to the geometric style of building.† This is only surpassed by Hegel's interpretation of his predisposition to Consumption being in harmony with his philosophy, in which all individuality and particularity were resolved into the One Substance.‡

He had been a delicate child, and although at no time—

\* DUGALD STEWART: *Dissertation prefixed to Encyclo. Brit.* Note LL. So readily are accusations made that even this amiable writer thinks it probable that Spinoza learned his irreligious principles from the chief school of Atheism, the Synagogue of Amsterdam, 'where without any breach of charity (!) a large proportion of the more opulent class may be reasonably presumed to belong to the Sadducees.'

† HAMANN: *Schriften*, i. 406.

‡ The play on words cannot be rendered in English: 'diese Schwindsucht übereinstimmend war mit seinem Systeme, in dem auch alle Besonderheit und Einzelheit in der Einen Substanz verschwindet.'

positively an invalid, he had always been weakly. The seeds of consumption slowly but inevitably undermined his strength, and on Sunday, 22nd February, 1677, he was so feeble that his kind host and hostess left him reluctantly to attend divine service. He feared that he was sinking. But he entreated them to go to church as usual. On their return he talked with them about the sermon, and ate some broth with a good appetite. After dinner they again went to church, but left the physician by his bedside. On their return all was over. At three o'clock he had expired in the presence of the physician—who paid himself by taking a silver-handled knife and what money lay on the table, and departed.

He died in his forty-fifth year, in the maturity of his intellect, but not before he had thoroughly worked out the whole scheme of his philosophy.

## § II. HIS DOCTRINES.

Although by its geometrical form Spinoza's system stands as it were apart from every other system, a slender acquaintance with the evolution of Philosophy enables us to recognise its affiliations with those that have preceded it. In particular we are aware of this system being only one more expression of the irrepressible yearning after unity which may be recognised in all speculation; it is one more effort to place Pantheism on a demonstrable basis. Had it not been for his method, he would at once have been claimed by the mystics. But his method and his language are so unlike the method and language of mystics that his conclusions startle and repel the very natures which have really most affinity with them; and this also in some degree, because the unsparing rigour of his logic and the unhesitating sincerity with which he follows it, bring into prominence ideas which are either overlooked or suppressed by thinkers less rigorous or less sincere.

The fervour and candour of his beautiful and fearless

spirit act upon our minds with searching and beneficent effect. His sincerity challenges our own. We cannot meditate on his thoughts and remain in apathetic vagueness. We must push to a conclusion. We must accept his teaching or refute it; and to refute it we must reinvestigate the pretensions, not of his method only but of Metaphysical Method itself. It is on this ground that he merits the epithet of 'all-shattering.' A serious study of the *Ethics* may thus be a drastic purge clearing the mind of all the humours and vapours of Ontology. It was this to me. I never hoped to find terra firma in the boundless marsh of metaphysics after I had clearly seen the reasons which rejected Spinozism.

An attempt will here be made to exhibit the cardinal points of the doctrine. I cannot pretend, in reasonable limits, to anything like an exhaustive treatment, but only to furnish as it were an introduction. And before doing even this, it will be requisite to glance at the work by which Spinoza is more generally known, the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, and to indicate its relation to modern Rationalism which it has profoundly affected. While the *Ethics* must be acknowledged to have penetrated deeply into German Philosophy, the *Tractatus* may be almost considered as the parent of German Rationalism. The various schools of criticism, as is well known, bring to the interpretation of Scripture principles which greatly alter the significance of many doctrinal points. 1. The stricter interpretation of the text, initiated by Ernesti, Michaelis, and Semler, who sought by the application of *philological* canons to ascertain the meaning which the biblical writers attached to their words, and sought thus to clear away the incrustation of successive depositions of opinion which in the lapse of ages had gradually hidden the original significance. 2. The *rationalistic* interpretation of Eichhorn and Paulus, who explained the miraculous narratives as the naïve, or superstitious, investiture given by the Hebrew mind to real historical events, which were in accordance with the order of nature, and only seemed miraculous

because not understood. 3. The *moral* interpretation of the Kantists, who sought to disengage from the mixed contents of the Scriptures the moral element which approves itself to reason. 4. The acute application to the Old Testament of *historical* criticism, by which De Wette and others have endeavoured to demonstrate that the Pentateuch is a compilation of comparatively late origin, and that the subsequent historical books are unreliable. 5. The *mythical* interpretation, which is a result of modern research into the character of early national records and mythologies.

These five methods of interpretation are all more or less anticipated in the critical observations and rules of interpretation embodied in Spinoza's treatise. Wiser than the majority of critics who succeeded him, and who profited by the labours of a century of research, Spinoza saw clearly that the influences which determined so complex a result as the Hebrew Scriptures must themselves be complex, and therefore to attempt an explanation of these writings as the manifestation of a single tendency must issue in failure. In the second, third, and sixth chapters of the *Tractatus*, the rationalistic, philological, and moral methods will be recognised at once; and in the sixth chapter the general unreliability of historical documents and the mythical tendency of the human mind are clearly enunciated. There is room for doubt indeed as to the nature of Spinoza's own view of the Scriptures: two opinions seem to be expressed in different passages: one which regards the Scriptures as containing an exceptional revelation, differing not only in degree but in kind from all other revelations (he speaks of the prophets other nations have possessed), and consequently, although to be interpreted by reason, having a higher source than reason; the other opinion, which regards the Scriptures as exceptional only in so far as they contain a deeper wisdom and a higher morality, in this sense also a revelation, but one differing in degree, not in kind, from other revelations. Had Spinoza's purpose been theological, he would doubtless have avoided any such ambiguity; but his purpose was practical; he dealt



with the religion which he found established, and tried to make those who followed it follow it according to reason. The treatise was theological only in a subordinate degree; it was theologico-political—the object was political. He did not want to settle points of theological controversy, he wanted to inculcate principles of liberty and toleration. Read his exposition of the real Catholic faith, towards the close of the fourteenth chapter, and his theological position will be quite clear.

Another apparent anticipation of modern views is seen in those passages in which he speaks of Christ as a higher manifestation of the Divinity than any other member of the human race—as the actual representative of Ideal Humanity.<sup>\*</sup> I say *apparent* anticipation, for his words are susceptible of another interpretation, and it is also possible to understand them as having been uttered from a point of view lying between his actual opinion and the opinion he is controverting as an accommodation to the conviction of his readers. We have, however, in his letter to Oldenburg† an explicit statement of his meaning. Oldenburg told him that people said he concealed his real opinion about Jesus Christ, the Redeemer of the world and sole Mediator for men, as also about the incarnation; upon these points Oldenburg begs him to open his soul frankly. Spinoza replies in this language: ‘To show you undisguisedly my opinion on that point, I answer that it is not absolutely necessary to know Christ according to the flesh; but it is very different when we speak of that Son of God, that is to say that Eternal Wisdom manifested in all things, and yet more fully manifested in the human soul, and far above all in Jesus Christ. For without this no one can attain the state of beatitude, since it alone teaches us what is true and what is false, what is good and what is bad. And because this Wisdom, as I have said, was manifested in Jesus Christ in the fullest way, therefore his disciples, to whom it was revealed by him, could preach it, and they showed that they could glory in being

\* See especially chaps. i. and ii.

† *Epist.* xxi.

filled with the spirit of Christ more than other men were. For the rest, when certain churches add that God himself assumed human nature, I have expressly warned the reader that I do not understand what is said; indeed to speak freely, it seems to me as absurd as if they said that a circle had put on the nature of a square.'

This opinion is one which coincides with the cardinal position in Schleiermacher's system; and with this, and other passages before us in which a divine mission is attributed to Moses, we need not wonder if Schleiermacher and Herder in perfect sincerity claimed Spinoza as a Christian, since in their sense of the word Christianity was as compatible with the Pantheism of Spinoza as it has been with other modifications of Pantheism. The English theologian will probably deny the compatibility of Christianity with any form of Pantheism; for on a rigorous interpretation of Christian theism the two *are* irreconcilable: but in Germany this difficulty is seldom felt, and Spinoza's teaching is accepted by sincere Christians.

There is one more passage in the *Tractatus* which may arrest us for a moment. It is but three lines in the ninth chapter where he speaks of the Kabbalists, whom he designates as 'charlatans,' adding that their folly surpasses description. Spinoza, we are frequently told, 'borrowed his system from the *Kabbala*;' at other times we hear that he 'did nothing but modify the system of Descartes.' Such accusations are singularly rash, and spring as often from a secret desire to depreciate a great man as from the levity of ignorance. I am not acquainted with the doctrines of the *Kabbala*; nor indeed are the most of those who prefer the charge; but if the *Kabbala* contain Spinoza's doctrine, why have not others besides Spinoza rescued it? All Europe venerates Spinoza; who now studies the *Kabbala*? In truth, the charge of borrowing is frivolous; some resemblance there may be, must be, between ideas in the *Kabbala* and ideas in the *Ethics*; a system of philosophy does not stand alone, cut sheer off from all connection with the ideas of other systems;

the same law of organic conformity which makes the whole zoological series one, without preventing the independent individuality of each animal, holds good in the world of thought. We may inquire what resemblances exist, without seeking to break down the barriers of organic independence. Yet this is constantly attempted. First men deny that a doctrine is true, and next they deny that it is new. They seem to fancy that truth can be waved aside by exclaiming 'Ah! that is borrowed from Aristotle; or that is what Bacon has said.' If Aristotle and Bacon did say it, so much the better; the truth of which no one has had a glimmering before us will rarely be repeated after us. Spinoza profited by the wisdom of his age, and thought the thoughts which others unknown to him had also woven into systems; but if ever there was an original and independent thinker Spinoza was that thinker.

The study of the *Tractatus* requires no peculiar preparation. The book is not attractively written, but is perfectly intelligible. It is otherwise with the *Ethics*; the transparent clearness of the language and the mathematical rigour of the composition only serve to make any initial misconception more misleading. Spinoza uses words in senses which he carefully defines, but he uses words which are generally interpreted in senses removed from those he assigns to them and consequently a reader not duly warned is apt to disregard the definition, and to read Spinoza as he reads an ordinary writer. This mistake is almost inevitable on the part of those who get his doctrine at second hand. For example, they meet with the familiar word Substance, which in their service generally connotes ideas carefully separated from the idea of God; and this word they find chosen by Spinoza to designate God. In spite of definitions, in spite of etymological and philosophical justifications, in spite of an admission that the *substans*, or underlying reality and ever living existence, must indeed be God, the old connotations exercise an intolerable tyranny, and the coercion of

words over thoughts is such that most men find it impossible, and all men find it difficult, to dissociate the idea of Substance from those suggestions of transitory and ignoble phenomena which the word commonly connotes. Hence when Spinoza says that God is the only Substance, he seems to be affirming the crudest atheism. Had he used Greek instead of Latin, and called the substance *Noumenon*, this association would have been escaped. Whenever you meet with the word Substance in his teaching, substitute for it the phrase 'ground of existence,' and you will remove a diffracting medium which greatly obscures the meaning. God is existence. He alone truly exists. Whatever else may be conceived as existing exists in and through him; it is a manifestation of his being. This also is the language of St. Paul, which is chosen by Spinoza as his epigraph. 'In Him we live and move and have our being.' Is it not curious to note how slight a verbal change will dispel the common charge of atheism, and show that in denying the reality of the transitory world Spinoza affirmed the reality of God as the one fountain of all life.

A second ambiguity lies in the fourth axiom: 'the knowledge of an effect depends on, and implies, the knowledge of its cause.' Interpreted in the ordinary sense, this axiom is absurd; and Mr. Hallam so interpreting it was justified in qualifying it as grounded on a fallacy. 'The relation between cause and effect,' he said, 'is surely something perfectly different from our perfect comprehension of it, or indeed from our having any knowledge of it at all.' But the fallacy does not lie there. The axiom does not affirm that men are incapable of recognising a sequence while ignorant of an antecedent; as if a man receiving a blow in the dark could not recognise the pain (effect of the blow) until he had recognised the striker: it means that a complete and comprehensive knowledge of the effect implies a complete and comprehensive knowledge of the cause, for an effect is a cause realised; and 'things which have nothing in common cannot be understood by means of each other, *i.e.*

the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other.' Thus if an effect be different from its cause its conception does not involve the conception of the cause, but if it be the same as the cause, then the conception of the one involves that of the other, *ergo* the more complete our knowledge of the one the more complete our knowledge of the other. Spinoza is rigorously consistent. We may object, *in limine*, to his assumption that we can know anything whatever of cause, beyond the fact of an antecedent group of conditions, and of effect, beyond the fact of a consequent group of conditions; but, granting his postulate, we must accept his conclusions; and very important conclusions are drawn by him from this conception of cause.

With these indications of the necessity of carefully ascertaining the sense in which he uses terms, let us pass to the consideration of the relative position of his system among systems.

The relation of the Finite to the Infinite, the creation to the Creator, has been an eternal problem of ontological research; a problem which no man has solved; and no man can be blamed if he find it insoluble. Three answers have been given at various epochs; and only three seem possible. Every system is an acceptance of one of these answers, under modifications more or less pronounced.

*First Answer:* There are two coeternal principles: Mind and Matter.

*Second Answer:* There is but one eternal principle, the source and reality of all existence. This principle is sometimes conceived as Mind, material phenomena being thoughts—objects in representation, not objects of representation; and sometimes as Matter, mental phenomena being cerebral activities.

*Third Answer:* There is but one eternal principle, the source of all existence, but not its reality; the creator of the universe, but apart from it.

The peculiarity of this third answer is its evasion of the primal difficulty—creation—which is thus postulated as a

pure act of power working upon no material whatever. God is not conceived as fashioning the universe out of existing elements as in the old Grecian hypothesis of a prime mover. Nor, on the other hand, is he supposed to have drawn the material from himself as in the emanation hypothesis which identifies the universe with God. God is conceived as distinct from the universe both in power and in essence; and the mystery of creation is cleared up in the light of omnipotence. A fiat goes forth; the universe is realised. The creative Will condenses Nothing into Matter. The pagans said, *ex nihilo nihil*. The Christian Fathers altered it to *ex nihilo omnia*, and dismissed the difficulty with a reference to omnipotence. They were perfectly aware of the logical contradiction. They acknowledged it to be untenable by reason. It was not meant for reason. Reason was incompetent to solve such problems.

Which of these three answers satisfied Spinoza? The unprepared reader will perhaps be surprised to learn that it was the third, or Christian, answer to which he most nearly approximated, although he modified it in a way which rendered it execrable to Christian theology. He was uneasy under the logical contradiction. He was not the man to say, *credo quia absurdum*, and to flout human reason by opposing its plain requirements. Creation out of nothing was untenable, and he would not pretend to hold it. Nevertheless he saw other difficulties in the other answers. The first separated God from the universe without furnishing a plausible interpretation of the process by which two coeternal principles came into union, or indeed how one could act upon the other. The second answer was equally at fault. As Idealism it ignored the reality of Matter; as Materialism it ignored the reality of Mind: two primal realities not to be discarded. The evidence for the existence of one was the same as the evidence for the existence of the other; yet one could not be resolved into the other. To disregard either was to violate first principles. Both must be grasped in an energetic synthesis. That synthesis is God: the one principle having

Thought and Extension as two eternal and infinite attributes, constituting its essence. Thus, given the one supreme principle, Existence, we see its necessary duplicate manifestation, as Mind, under one aspect, and under the other as Matter. This is the meaning of creation. This is the explanation of the difficulty. Creation is not the calling into existence of that which had no being out of that which has no being; nor is it the refashioning of elements which have independent being; it is the outflowing of primal energy, the activity necessary to a self-caused and self-causing existence. This universe considered as a moment in the universal life is truly a creation. From God it came, and in God it exists, not in alien difference, but in vital unity. From God all flows out, and to him all returns. Everything is a form of that which ever is. God is, and is not, Nature; identical, but not the same; he is no more to be confounded with nature than the fountain with the rivulet, eternity with time. God is *natura naturans*, Nature is *natura naturata*. The one is the energy, the other the act.

A similar line of argument solves the problem of the union of Soul with Body. By one school these words are taken as representatives of two distinct essences, irreconcilable in their nature, yet mysteriously accordant in their existence. By another school the two are resolved into one, either as Idealism, denying substantive reality to Body, which is admitted only as an act of Thought; or as Materialism, denying substantive reality to Mind, which is admitted only as one of the phenomena of body. Spinoza affirms the equal reality of both, and their distinction in a higher synthesis. They are not substances at all, but the two correlated attributes which constitute the essence of substance. Man is but a mode of the Divine Existence: his mind a spark of the Divine Flame, his body a mode of the Infinite Extension.

One more remark is needful as a preparation to the study of this system. The aim of philosophy is doubtless the solution of problems, but it is also the working out of theorems: the problem, when solved, furnishes a means of

regulating life : Ontology is the introduction to *Ethica*. Life is to be so regulated that the soul may achieve the highest good ; and what is that but the love of God ? This love must be founded upon knowledge ; perfect knowledge bringing perfect love. And what is perfect knowledge ? The harmony of our thoughts with the divine order. We may indeed love God without knowing him clearly ; but it is impossible to have clear knowledge without perfect love ; and clear knowledge is only to be gained through a method which discloses the divine order. Error and doubt arise from disorder, not from native incompetence. Truth is the harmony between the order of ideas and the order of things. Let a man begin where he ought to begin, and proceed in rigorous deduction unfolding each successive consequence, never letting drop a single link in the chain which unites things, and he will never doubt, for then all his ideas will be clear and distinct, and their order will be the order of things.\* . . . *Ordo et connexio idearum idem est ac ordo et connexio rerum.*†

There are two methods of investigation : the vulgar and the scientific. The one starts from principles which have been accepted without examination, which are not therefore clearly understood. The other starts from principles clearly defined and accurately known. It is the latter only which can lead to true knowledge. Its type is mathematics. It comprehends every object because it understands the immediate cause of the object. Nothing arises except as the necessary sequence of what preceded it, and as the inevitable result of the nature of things. To understand any object, therefore, we must understand its connections. And these are displayed after the mathematical method.

Thus is the form chosen by Spinoza justified by his principles. It is a form, as I said, extremely unlike that of all other mystical philosophies, and by no means attractive to the ordinary mind. But it is eminently consistent. It

\* SPINOZA : *De intellect. Emend.* ii. 37.

† *Ethica*, ii. prop. vii.



developes the order of the universe from a few definitions and axioms. These may be given here :—

‘ DEFINITIONS.

- I. By a thing which is its own Cause I understand a thing the essence of which involves existence; or the nature of which can only be considered as existent.
- II. A thing finite is that which can be limited (*terminari potest*) by another thing of the same nature, *e.g.* body is said to be finite because it can always be conceived as larger. So thought is limited by other thoughts. But body does not limit thought, nor thought limit body.
- III. By Substance I understand that which exists in itself and is conceived *per se*: in other words, the conception of which does not require the conception of anything else antecedent to it.
- IV. By Attribute I understand that which the mind perceives as constituting the very essence of Substance.
- V. By Modes I understand the accidents (*affectiones*) of Substance; or that which is in something else through which also it is conceived.
- VI. By God I understand the Being absolutely infinite, *i.e.* the Substance consisting of infinite Attributes each of which expresses an infinite and eternal essence.  
*Explanation:* I say absolutely infinite, but not infinite *suo genere*; for to whatever is infinite only *suo genere* we can deny infinite Attributes; but that which is absolutely infinite includes in its essence everything which implies essence, and involves no negation.
- VII. That thing is said to be free which exists by the sole necessity of its nature, and by itself alone is determined to action. But that thing is necessary, or rather constrained, which owes its existence to

another, and acts according to certain and determinate causes.

VIII. By Eternity I understand Existence itself, in as far as it is conceived necessarily to follow from the sole definition of an eternal thing.

These are the Definitions; they need not long be dwelt on, although frequently referred to by him; above all, no objection ought to be raised against them, as unusual, for they are the meanings of various terms in constant use with Spinoza, and he has a right to use them as he pleases, provided he does not afterwards depart from this use, which he is careful not to do. We now come to the seven

#### AXIOMS.

- I. Everything which is is in itself, or in some other thing.
- II. That which cannot be conceived through another (*per aliud*) must be conceived through itself (*per se*).
- III. From a given determinate cause the effect necessarily follows; and *vice versâ*, if no determinate cause be given, no effect can follow.
- IV. The knowledge of an effect depends on the knowledge of the cause, and implies it.
- V. Things that have nothing in common with each other cannot be understood by means of each other, *i.e.* the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other.
- VI. A true idea must agree with its object (*idea vera debet cum suo ideato convenire*).
- VII. Whatever can be clearly conceived as non-existent, does not, in its essence, involve existence.

To these succeed the Propositions, of which only the first eight need be given here:—

PROP. I. Substance is prior in nature to its accidents.

*Demonstration.* Per Definitions 3 and 5.

PROP. II. Two Substances, having different Attributes, have nothing in common with each other.

*Demonst.* This follows from Def. 3 ; for each Substance be conceived in itself and through itself ; in other words the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other.

PROP. III. Of things which have nothing in common cannot be the cause of the other.

*Demonst.* If they have nothing in common, then (per Axiom 5) they cannot be conceived by means of each other ; *ergo* (per Axiom 4) one cannot be the cause of the other. Q. E. D.

PROP. IV. Two or more distinct things are distinguished among themselves either through the diversity of Attributes or through the diversity of their Modes.

*Demonst.* Everything which is is in itself or in some other thing (per Axiom 1), that is (per Def. 3 and 5), the thing is nothing out of ourselves (*extra intellectum*) but Substance and its Modes. There is nothing out of ourselves whereby things can be distinguished amongst themselves, except Substances, or (which is the same thing per Def. 4) their Attributes and Modes.

PROP. V. It is impossible that there should be two or more Substances of the same nature, or of the same Attribute.

*Demonst.* If there are many different Substances, they must be distinguished by the diversity of their Attributes or of their Modes (per Prop. 4). If only by the diversity of their Attributes, it is thereby conceded that there is nevertheless only one Substance of the same Attribute ; but if by the diversity of their Modes it follows that there is more than one Substance being prior in nature to its modes, it must be considered independently of them ; that is (per Axiom 3 and 6), cannot be conceived as distinguished from another ; that is (per Prop. 4), there cannot be more than one Substance, but only one Substance. Q. E. D.

PROP. VI. One Substance cannot be created by another Substance.

*Demonst.* There cannot be two Substances with the

Attributes (per Prop. 5); *i.e.* (per Prop. 2) having anything in common with each other; and therefore (per Prop. 3) one cannot be the cause of the other.

*Corollary.* Hence it follows that Substance cannot be created by anything else. For there is nothing in existence except Substance and its Modes (per Axiom 1, and Def. 3 and 5); now this Substance, not being created by another, is self-caused.

*Corollary 2.* This proposition is more easily to be demonstrated by the absurdity of its contradiction;—for if Substance can be created by anything else, the conception of it would depend on the conception of the cause (per Axiom 4), and hence (per Def. 3) it would not be Substance.

PROP. VII. It pertains to the nature of Substance to exist.

*Demonst.* Substance cannot be created by anything else (per Coroll. Prop. 6), and is therefore the cause of itself; *i.e.* (per Def. 1) its essence necessarily involves existence; or it pertains to the nature of Substance to exist. Q. E. D.

PROP. VIII. All Substance is necessarily infinite.

*Demonst.* There exists but one Substance of the same Attribute; and it must either exist as infinite or as finite. But not as finite, for (per Def. 2) as finite it must be limited by another Substance of the same nature, and in that case there would be two Substances of the same Attribute, which (per Prop. 5) is absurd. Substance therefore is infinite. Q. E. D.

*Scholium.*—I do not doubt that to all who judge confusedly of things, and are not wont to inquire into first causes, it will be difficult to understand the demonstration of Prop. 7, because they do not sufficiently distinguish between the modifications of Substance and Substance itself, and are ignorant of the manner in which things are produced. Hence it follows that, seeing natural things have a commencement, they attribute a commencement to Substances; for he who knows not the true causes of things confounds

all things, and sees no reason why trees should not talk like men; or why men should not be formed from stones as well as from seeds; or why all forms cannot be changed into all other forms. So, also, those who confound the divine nature with the human naturally attribute human affections to God, especially as they are ignorant how these affections are produced in the mind. But if men attended to the nature of Substance, they would not in the least doubt the truth of Prop. 7; nay, this proposition would be an axiom to all, and would be numbered among common notions. For by Substance they would understand that which exists in itself and is conceived through itself; *i.e.* the knowledge of which does not require the knowledge of anything antecedent to it. But by modification they would understand that which is in another thing, the conception of which is formed through the conception of the thing in which it is, or to which it belongs: we can therefore have correct ideas of non-existent modifications, because, although out of the understanding they have no reality, yet their essence is so comprehended in that of another that they can be conceived through this other. The truth of Substance (out of the understanding lies nowhere but in itself, because it is conceived *per se*. ■ therefore any one says that he has a distinct and clear idea of Substance, and yet doubts whether such a Substance exists this is as much as to say that he has a true idea, and nevertheless doubts whether it be not false (as a little attention sufficiently manifests); or, if any man affirms Substance to be created, he at the same time affirms that a true idea has become false; than which nothing can be more absurd. Hence it is necessarily confessed that the existence of Substance, as well as its essence, is an eternal truth. And hence we must conclude that there is only one Substance possessing the same Attribute; a position which requires here a fuller development. I note therefore—

1. That the correct definition of a thing includes and expresses nothing but the nature of the thing defined. From which it follows—

2. That no definition includes or expresses a distinct number of individuals, because it expresses nothing but the nature of the thing defined; *e.g.* the definition of a triangle expresses no more than the nature of a triangle, and not any fixed number of triangles.

3. There must necessarily be a distinct cause for the existence of every existing thing.

4. This cause, by reason of which anything exists, must be either contained in the nature and definition of the existing thing (*viz.* that it pertains to its nature to exist) or else must lie beyond it—must be something different from it.

From these positions it follows that, if a certain number of individuals exist, there must necessarily be a cause why that number exists, and not a larger or smaller number: *e.g.* if in the world twenty men exist (whom, for greater perspicuity, I suppose to exist at once, no more having previously existed), it will not be sufficient, in order to show the reason why twenty men exist, to point to human nature as the cause, but it will further be necessary to show why only twenty men exist, since (per note 3) there must be a cause for the existence of everything. This cause however (per notes 2 and 3) cannot be contained in human nature itself; for the true definition of man does not involve the number twenty. Hence (per note 4) the cause why twenty men exist, and why each individual exists, must lie beyond each of them; and therefore must we absolutely conclude that everything, the nature of which admits of many individuals, must necessarily have an external cause. As therefore it pertains to the nature of Substance to exist so must its definition include a necessary existence, and consequently from its sole definition we must conclude its existence. But as from its definition, as already shown in notes 2 and 3, it is not possible to conclude the existence of many Substances, *ergo* it necessarily follows that only *one* Substance of the same nature can exist.'

In this style of unimpassioned deduction he proceeds,

adding link to link in the chain of demonstration, evolving a system of Theology, Psychology, and Ethics, which alternately impresses the reader with its symmetry and sublimity, and distresses him with its pitiless destruction of long-cherished beliefs; now rousing his enthusiasm for its lofty disinterestedness, now repelling him by its disregard of his personality and his hopes. God is the ever-present reality; man but a foam-bubble reflecting the transitory gleams of a diviner light. Love and resignation are the guiding ideas; and yet they lead to conclusions which alarm the reader, who unable to see where the defect in the argument lies, is irritated at the pedantic rigour which forces his reluctant assent. No wonder if he brand Spinoza as an atheist sweeping away the only firm support of morality—a responsible personality. No wonder if he reject a system which resolves personality into a mere mode of the Infinite; which dissolves in the acid of causality every shred of organic independence; which makes liberty impossible, and, depriving even God of understanding and will, sweeps the world clear of all purpose, good or evil. This is not the conception of God, or of the world, which he finds tolerable. He rises angrily against the conception of a world of unalterable sequences, where everything is determined by *conditions*, nothing by *purposes*: a system of results, not of aims. He is impatient of the logic which proves that phenomena are not brought about by a conscious intention, but are the simple sequences of God's nature.

He is called upon to renounce his own conception of a sublime Fatherhood, an Infinite Personality—greater than man by all the incommensurable difference of infinite and finite, yet like man by all the resemblance of creator and creature—in favour of a God whose essence is impersonality, who is the one Indeterminate, the Unconditioned, to whom individuality, personality, and conditions, cannot be applied without contradiction, and consequently to whom even intellect and will cannot belong, there being no analogy between the nature of God and the nature of man. Spinoza

is explicit: Although he makes Thought one of the constituent attributes of God, he denies that intellect or will can pertain to the Infinite, if by these words we mean powers similar to those in man; in God these no more resemble what we so name in man than the dog-star resembles a dog.\*

If this be so, how can there be purposes in creation, i.e. final causes? With the disappearance of the intellect disappears the faculty of conceiving purposes: with the disappearance of the will disappears the power of acting in subordination to a purpose. God as existence and perfection is necessarily without aims. Men act with a purpose; and think they act in freedom, because they are conscious of desires, but not of the causes which determine these desires. A stone whirling through the air, and imagining itself to be flying, is an image of man acting and believing himself free.

I will here quote the famous Appendix on Final Causes which concludes the first book of the *Ethics*.

‘Men do all things for the sake of an end, namely, the good, or useful, which they desire. Hence it comes that they always seek to know only the final causes of things which have taken place, and when they have heard these, they are satisfied, not having within themselves any ground for further doubt. But if they are unable to learn these final causes from some one else, nothing remains to them but to turn in upon themselves, and to reflect on the ends by which they are themselves wont to be determined to similar actions; and thus they necessarily judge of the mind of another by their own. Further, as within themselves and out of themselves they discover many means which are highly conducive to the pursuit of their own advantage—for example, eyes to see with, teeth to masticate with, vegetables and animals for food, the sun to give them light, the sea to nourish fish, &c.—so they come to consider all natural things as means for their benefit: and because they are aware that these things have been found, and not prepared by them, they have been

\* SPINOZA: *Ethica*, i. prop. xvii. schol.



led to believe that some one else has adapted these means to their use. For after considering things in the light of *means* they could not believe these things to have made themselves but arguing from their own practice of preparing means for their use, they must conclude that there is some ruler or rulers of nature endowed with human freedom, who have provided all these things for them, and have made them all for the use of men. Moreover, since they have never heard anything of the mind of those rulers, they must necessarily judge of this mind also by their own; and hence they have argued that the gods direct all things for the advantage of man, in order that they may subdue him to themselves, and be held in the highest honour by him. Hence each has devised, according to his character, a different mode of worshipping God, in order that God might love him more than others, and might direct all nature to the advantage of his blind cupidity and insatiable avarice. Thus this prejudice has converted itself into superstition, and has struck deep root into men's minds; and this has been the cause why men in general have eagerly striven to explain the final causes of all things. But while they have sought to show that Nature does nothing in vain (*i.e.* which is not fit for the use of men), they seem to me to have shown nothing else than that Nature and the gods are as foolish as men. And observe, I pray you, to what a point this opinion has brought them. Together with the many useful things in nature, they necessarily found not a few injurious things, namely, tempests, earthquakes, diseases, &c.; these they supposed happened because the gods were angry on account of offences committed against them by men, or because of faults incurred in their worship; and although experience every day protests, and shows by infinite examples that benefits and injuries happen indifferently to pious and ungodly persons, they do not therefore renounce their inveterate prejudice. For it was easier to them to class these phenomena among other things, the cause of which was unknown to them, and thus retain their present and innate condition of ignorance,

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than to destroy all the fabric of their belief, and excogitate a new one.'

I have thus presented the two aspects of Spinoza's doctrine, neither exaggerating its mystical unction and logical rigour, nor softening its harsh angles of heterodox offence. The mysticism and logic are so little to the taste of mankind in general, and the heterodoxy is so exasperating, that it is intelligible how the majority, even of charitable readers, misconceived the spirit of the doctrine, and stood aghast at its conclusions. The wonder is that many Christian thinkers could have seen through such husks, and detected the wholesome grain within. It is not often that theological and philosophical outcries are so excusable. The tumult and the wrath excited by Spinozism were indeed unreasoning. Men's minds flew off at a tangent on the first alarm, and instead of patiently following out Spinoza's thought in his own calm spirit of research, they followed it out in their hot illogical way, first thrusting conclusions upon him which he would have repudiated, and then yelling in horror at him for teaching these conclusions. But let us be just. It was only on a patient and comprehensive study that men could learn what Spinoza really taught; and this patient study they were too angry to give. Besides, the study was laborious, and vituperation was easy. If the temper of the philosophic world has changed, and a more impartial consideration has led to a loving admiration, even where accompanied with profound dissent, this very impartiality is a result of the increased liberty which he was instrumental in developing. Whatever may be thought of his system, we must admit that from the first a strengthening and liberalising influence has rayed out from it, affecting even angry antagonists. There was something in the noble calmness and unaggressive fearlessness of his attitude which acted like a mental tonic. There was also the incidental flash of light falling on many ancient prejudices. There was the unswerving conviction in the force of truth, and in the universality of law. There was the constant exhibition of the relativity of knowledge.

Finally, there was the disinterestedness and purity of his moral views, and the quiet beauty of his own life, to answer the vulgar accusations against free thought as destructive of morality.

We find few expressions of this influence during the first years of controversy, but I do not think the influence was inoperative even then. It was, indeed, for the most part unconscious. Men thought him a monster, and said so. It was a period of theological ferment. The speculative unrest which had produced the Reformation was far from having been stilled by the Reformation. The orthodox party had indeed, proclaimed finality. It proclaimed liberty of private judgment; but it restricted that liberty within very narrow and very arbitrary limits. Every man might read the Scriptures; but no man might read in them more than the orthodox reformers read. Comprehensive liberty was denounced as anarchy. In vain. The human mind alternately longed for, and rejects, finality. In spite of ecclesiastical thunder the movement of mind could not be arrested. Anarchists were numerous, and violent because violently opposed. While orthodoxy was on the alert to scent atheism from afar and authority branded small heresies with the largest letters free-thinking works became more and more numerous and noisy. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are specially distinguished by their free-thinking literature. The question was frequently discussed whether Atheism or Superstition were the most noxious to society,\* and Atheism became the false but significant synonym of religio-eruditorum. The theological journals of the time had a special rubric under which they noticed atheistical works. But we must not too hastily conclude that many atheistical works existed; for if men denied the existence of the Devil, or even of Ghosts, they found themselves classed among the atheists.

\* PRIETIUS: *Dissertatio de Atheismo in se facto et humano genere noxio*; 1696  
 GRAPPIUS: *Dissert. an Atheismus necessario ducat ad corruptionem morum*; 1691  
 ELSWICH: *Disputatio de controversiis novis circa Atheismum*—cited in HETTINGER  
*Litteraturgeschichte des 18. Jahrhunderts*, dritter Theil, i. 42.

In a society thus alert for atheism, and the alarms of atheism, Spinoza's writings must have fallen like bombshells. But I note one remarkable fact: He has neither disciples, nor searching antagonists. There are many who adopt some of his conclusions, but no one takes up his doctrine as a system, preaching it, applying it, developing it. There are hundreds who write refutations, and thousands who denounce him with bitter and scornful contempt; but no one, not even Leibnitz himself, grapples with the system and overthrows it, or even shakes it. Fierce blows have often been aimed at it; but they have beaten the air, not touched the system. A recent Dutch antagonist, Van der Linde, has indicated several insurgent thinkers, who, in Holland, adopted the principles of the *Tractatus* with more or less fervour;\* and the pietist, Edelmann, in Germany, may be named along with these. But neither in Holland nor in Germany has there been a Spinozist, as there have been Cartesians, Kantists, and Hegelians, although German philosophy is in some sense saturated with Spinozism, and Hegel says, 'You are much of a Spinozist, or you have no standing whatever in philosophy.'†

This exceptional position has significance. It implies, I think, that the system contains within it some fundamental defect, which prevents even sympathetic students from taking it up into the framework of their daily thoughts, and adopting it as a philosophy. It also implies that the system is so rigorously constructed as only to be overturned by a lever applied to its foundations; and metaphysicians are indisposed to apply the lever *there*. This at any rate is how the case presents itself to me, read by the light of my own experience. On many grounds Spinoza attracted me. I studied him with eagerness and veneration, desirous to find a solution of all difficulties. But in vain. Conscious of a great debt to him, greater, indeed, than to any other metaphysician, I

\* VAN DER LINDE: *Spinoza, seine Lehre und deren erste Nachwirkungen in Holland*. 1862, p. 134.

† HEGEL: *Gesch. der Philos.* iii. 369. 'Du hast entweder den Spinozismus oder gar keine Philosophie.'

cannot say that I was at any period a disciple. It was a long while before I knew why.

The fundamental difficulty of Spinozism is the impossibility of Metaphysics, or to speak more precisely, of Ontology. The false Method is the fountain of error. If the Method be allowed, the system must be accepted; if Ontology is a possible science, Spinozism is the most perfect form it has yet received. This will be strenuously denied by metaphysicians; nor can I pause here to argue so large a question. They will add, perhaps, that my denial of Ontology does not wholly meet the case, since other speculators besides Spinoza have employed the same Method, and, nevertheless, have gained disciples; if these disciples have shown alacrity in setting up as masters in their turn, and disowned their allegiance, they have for a time, at least, been disciples. Why has this success been denied to Spinoza? The answer is that it has been denied to him because his doctrine did not, as theirs did, admit of endless misapprehension and equivocation. Had their foundations been exposed, their superstructures unsupported by flying buttresses, and unconcealed by moving clouds, their tottering architecture would have sheltered none whom Spinoza's visionary fabric left unhoused.

The fundamental mistake of the Metaphysical Method is that it attempts to explain the scheme of the visible from the invisible, deduces the knowable from the unknowable. In Physics we pass, by verified inductions, from the visible to the invisible, from the known to the unknown. The bulk of our facts relates to the invisible, but they are so intimately dependent on the visible, of which, indeed, they are simple deductions, that we feel the same certainty respecting them as respecting any visible fact; they are demonstrable because they are presentable to consciousness under the forms of the known. It is otherwise with Metaphysics, which proceeds on unverified deductions. The ground of knowledge there is placed beyond experience. The ideas of Noumenon, Cause, and Unconditioned Existence, are the postulates from which the scheme of phenomena is developed. The constructions

of the mind are regarded as the models after which Nature works. The external order is sought by analysis of the internal order.

Now there is one science which has a delusive resemblance to this *à priori* evolution of results from abstractions, and in which the process is thoroughly legitimate, and because legitimate effective. It is Mathematics. Spinoza, with a consistency peculiar to himself, has therefore given his system a geometrical form. If the fundamental assumption of Metaphysics be warranted, Spinoza is right. If rigorous deductions from clear ideas be all that is necessary to assure us of truth, the evolution of the concrete universe from a few definitions and axioms is as valid as the evolution of mathematical results.

But there is this objection to geometrical metaphysics. Geometry is restricted to relations of magnitude. It deals with points, lines, and surfaces, which are capable of external verification; they are also unequivocal and unalterable:—under all varieties of conditions angles preserve their angular relations and their unalterable values. Having once defined a circle or an angle we may proceed in perfect confidence to draw out all the possible relations contained within those figures. Not so in Metaphysics. We have not there to unfold definitions, but to solve problems, and reach definitions by means of our solutions. We have not simple relations of magnitude to deal with, but complex relations of causality. The data are not simple and unequivocal, but complicated and obscure. We have to analyse these into their elements, and by unfolding the order of their arrangement unfold their causal nexus. We are no longer restricted to simple unchangeable relations of quantity, but have to take in the variable relations of quality. Our reliance on deduction is no longer justifiable; our definitions and axioms cease to be comprehensively true; and thus it is that Definitions which are guides in Mathematics are will-o'-wisps in Metaphysics.\*

\* On this point, see KANT: *Untersuchungen über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze der natürlichen Theologie und der Moral.*

It is enough if the definitions of Mathematics are clear, they have then all the adequacy they claim. So manifest is this, that ingenious mathematicians have constructed a Geometry on the hypothesis of space having *four* dimensions; and this Geometry is as perfect as that of Euclid. We cannot reproach them with leaving relations of quality untouched; they only pretend to embrace relations of quantity. But the definitions of Metaphysics must not only be clear, they must be adequate, comprehensive, exhaustive, for they claim to disclose the reality in its completeness, and the world in its causality.

Are the postulates of Metaphysics clear? Two thousand years of impotence prove their obscurity. Are they adequate? They claim to be; but Spinoza has, implicitly, denied this claim by assigning infinite attributes to existence, yet of these infinite attributes recognising only two as knowable—Thought and Extension. This difficulty he nowhere resolves. Yet surely there is a manifest contradiction in first postulating an infinity of attributes as the constituents of existence, and then proceeding to give an adequate explanation of existence by means of only two out of the infinite attributes? The mathematician may not argue thus:—‘Things have a great variety of aspects which together make up the activities of their nature: I can only tell you of their quantitative aspects, but from these you may recognise all their qualitative aspects. I can measure the angles of a salt, and only the angles; from these you may at once deduce its other properties, physical, chemical, and therapeutical. I can only measure the rapidity and sweep of the oscillations of ether; but from these you can deduce the thermal, optical, and chemical effects.’ The absurdity would be glaring. The absurdity if less glaring is as great which pretends to deduce from two attributes the infinite results of infinite attributes; or—quitting Spinoza for ordinary metaphysicians—to attempt from finite, relative knowledge a construction of the infinite and absolute.

M. Damiron, in a very able essay, denies that the geo-

metrical method can be applied to Metaphysics, because our intelligence cannot form notions so clear and necessary respecting substance, cause, time, good and evil, as respecting points, lines, and surfaces; and whenever such clear notions have been attempted, it has only been by sacrificing something of the reality, by the consideration of one aspect to the exclusion of the other.\* This is perfectly true if applied to metaphysicians in general; but is not wholly true as applied to Spinoza, whose notions of substance, cause, &c., are not less clear than his notions of lines and surfaces. Meanwhile let us ask, *why* can we not form notions of cause, substance, and the rest, equalling in certainty our notions of lines and surfaces? The answer to this question dooms Metaphysics to eternal uncertainty: It is because Geometry never quits the sphere of its quantitative relations that its axioms retain their necessary clearness, and its consequences their necessary truth. It begins with lines and surfaces, with lines and surfaces it ends; it is a purely formal and deductive science. Its truths, when objectively applied, include *no other elements* than those *originally* given; when from *ideal* lines and the relations of those lines we pass to *real* lines and relations, we are still strictly within the sphere of lines and their relations; and the mightiest geometry can tell us nothing whatever of any *other* property of substance; it is powerless before any relations except those of magnitudes. Although we find, as a matter of fact, that questions of quantity underlie questions of quality, so that mathematics thus becomes an organon of discovery, these results have to be sought in other ways, and have to be verified by other means. We have found that the rapidity and swing of oscillating media determine the differences in tone and colour. But no mathematician could have deduced a tone or a colour from the velocity and sweep of a vibration. Formal Logic does remain within the sphere of its original assumptions, and it values geometry in its exactness; but when Logic passes into metaphysics, it unhappily starts from its subjective sphere,

\* DAMIRON: *Mémoire sur Spinoza*, p. 19.



and passes to the objective, pretending to *include* in its circle far more than is given in the original subjective datum, pretending indeed to disclose the *whole nature* of Substance Cause, Time, and Space, and not merely *certain relations among our ideas* of these. When, for example, Spinoza passes from his ideal distinction of cause and effect, as when he proves that God must act according to the laws of his own nature, yet without constraint, nothing determining him save his own perfection, it is evident that Spinoza believes in a purely subjective definition which he has framed expresses the whole truth of objective reality; he pretends to *know* the nature of God, and to know it through the notions he has framed of cause and effect. To select another example, the fifth proposition, on which so much of Spinoza's system depends: 'It is impossible that there should be two or more Substances of the same nature, or of the same Attributes.' This is subjectively true: as true as a proposition in Euclid that is to say, it contains no contradiction, it is perfectly coherent with the definitions of Substance and Attributes; but if we pass from *definition*, and look only at actual substances before us—say two minerals—we perceive the definition to be framed from ideas, and not founded on objective reality. The fact is that Substance, as he defines it, is altogether unknown to us; it is removed from all experience and all possible verification. The substances (existences) which we *can* know, do not accord with his proposition.

The mathematician deduces conclusions from abstraction; and these are found to correspond with objective fact nearly the whole extent of what was originally assumed, namely the relations of magnitudes, and no further. The metaphysician deduces conclusions equally abstract, and it may be that some conclusions will apply to objective fact (as when it is said 'nothing can be and not be at the same moment'), but the moment he speaks of Cause, Time, Space, and Substance his ideas are necessarily indistinct, because he cannot know these as *things*; he can only frame inferences respecting them, and these inferences at every step need *verification*.

This the metaphysician will deny. He believes in the validity of Reason. He maintains the perfect competence of human intellect to know Cause, Time, Space, and Substance ; but he has not the same clear argument Spinoza had, on which to ground this belief. And here we are face to face with the radical assumption which constitutes the initial error and logical perfection of Spinoza's system. He holds and expressly teaches that the *subjective idea* is the actual image or complete expression of the *objective fact*. 'Hoc est, id quod in intellectu objectivè continetur debet necessario in naturâ dari.' The order and connection of ideas is precisely the order and connection of things. In the Scholium to Prop. VIII. we have seen him maintaining that the correct definition of a thing expresses the nature of the thing, and nothing but its nature ; which is true in one sense ; for unless it express the nature of the thing, the definition must be incorrect ; but false in another and more important sense ; for every definition we can frame only expresses *our* conceptions of the nature of the thing : and thus we may define the nature of the inhabitants of the moon, and adhere to our definitions with the utmost logical rigour, yet all the while be utterly removed from any real knowledge of those inhabitants. The position is logically deducible from Spinoza's conception of the relation between Thought and Extension as the two Attributes of Substance ; but it is a position which is emphatically contradicted by all sound Psychology. Nevertheless without it Metaphysics has no basis. Unless clear ideas are to be accepted as the truths of things, and unless every *idea*, which is distinctly conceived by the mind, has its *ideate*, or *object*—metaphysicians are without a fulcrum.

Having thus signalled the fundamental position of Spinoza's doctrine, it is there, if anywhere, that we shall be able to show his fundamental error. On the truth or falsehood of this one assumption must Spinozism stand or fall. Those who agree with us may escape Spinozism ; but they escape it by denying the possibility of Ontology.

This consideration, that the mind is not a passive mirror

reflecting the nature of things, but the partial creator of its own forms—that in perception there is nothing but certain changes in the percipient—this consideration, we say, is the destruction of the very basis of metaphysics, for it expressly teaches that the subjective idea is *not* the correlate of the objective existence; yet only upon the belief that our ideas are the perfect and adequate images of external things can metaphysical speculation rest. Misled by the nature of geometry which draws its truths from the mind as the spider draws the web from its bosom, Descartes assumed that metaphysical truths could be attained in the same way. Spinoza has read Bacon's denouncement of this *a priori* Method, though evidently unprepared to see the truth of the protest. It is curious to read his criticism of Bacon: he looks on it as that writer's great error to have mistaken the knowledge of the first cause and origin of things. 'On the nature of mind,' he says, 'Bacon speaks very confusedly; and while he proves nothing, judges much. For in the first place he supposes that the human intellect, besides the deceptions of the senses, is subject to the deceptions of its own nature, and that it conceives everything according to the analogies of its own nature, and not according to the analogies of the universe so that it is like an unequal mirror to the rays of things, which mixes the conditions of its own nature with those of external things.' \*

Spinoza's aberration is remarkable because he had also seen that in some sense the subjective was not the absolute expression of the objective; as is proved by his celebrated argument for the destruction of final causes, wherein he showed that *order* was a thing of the imagination, and that what were also right and wrong, useful and hurtful—these being merely such in relation to *us*. Still more striking is his anticipation of Kant in this passage:—'Ex quibus clar-

\* 'Nam primò supponit quod intellectus humanus, præter fallaciam sensuum suâ solâ naturâ fallitur, omniaque fingit ex analogiâ suæ naturæ, et non ex analogiâ universi; adeò ut sit instar speculi inæqualis ad radios rerum, qui suam naturam naturæ rerum immiscet.'—*Epist. ii. Opera Posthuma*, p. 398.

videre est, mensuram, tempus, et numerum, nihil esse præter cogitandi, seu potius imaginandi modos;’ which should have led him to suspect that the same law of mental forms was also applicable to all other subjects.

Spinoza not only proceeds on the supposition that clear ideas are objective truths, but that they carry with them a supreme certainty; they are the formal essences of the objects and require no verification. Hence his conclusion that since every idea must be adequate to the formal essence of its object, being in short the obverse of it, the mind must, in order to follow Nature’s example, deduce all its ideas from that one which reproduces the origin and source of nature, so that it may be also the source of all other ideas.\*

Clear ideas are distinguished from confused ideas: the second are products of fortuitous bodily movement, the first of pure reason: ‘ex pura mente, et non ex fortuitis motibus corporis factæ sint.’ And to reduce all these clear ideas under one, we must so arrange them that our mind objectively reproduces that which is formally objective in nature.

Yet he warns us against mistaking abstractions for realities, and Bacon would have applauded what is said about guarding ourselves against confounding what is only in our own minds with what is in things: ‘et magnopere cavebimus ne misceamus ea quæ tantum sunt in intellectu cum iis quæ sunt in re.’ This is, indeed, the danger of philosophy. We avoid it by Verification, which proves the correspondence between object and idea.†

Also in respect of Definitions his warning is raised. ‘A definition should explain the intimate essence of a thing, and we must be on our guard lest we substitute a particular property for this essence. If, for example, a circle be defined as a figure in which all the lines from the centre to the circum-

\* ‘Porro ex hoc ultimo, quod diximus, scilicet quod idea omnino cum sua essentia formali debeat convenire, patet iterum, ex eo quod, ut mens nostra omnino referat naturæ exemplar, debeat omnes suas ideas producere ab ea quæ refert originem et fontem totius naturæ ut ipsa etiam sit fons ceterarum idearum.’—*De Intell. Emend.* 42.

† On this point compare our *Prolegomena*, ii. § 15.

ference are equal, every one sees that this definition in no way explains the essence of a circle but only one of its properties: and although, as I said, this matters little in reference to figures and other *entia rationis*, it is important in reference to real and physical things, because their properties cannot be understood so long as their essence is unknown. If we leave essences out of sight, the necessary concatenation of ideas which should reproduce the concatenation of objects is destroyed.\*

In arranging our perceptions systematically, he says, we must ascertain first if there is some being which is the cause of all things, and what that being is, so that its objective essence will be also the cause of our ideas, and thus our minds reproduce the order of nature, its essence and union. And this course he follows in the construction of his system. It is the purely ontological process. Had he approached from the psychological side, and first thoroughly investigated the conditions and limits of human knowledge, he would have seen the initial mistake of his Method. Indeed an extension of his own principles might have opened to him a vista of his error. He laid down the canons of truth and error. All inadequate ideas he says are erroneous, and of these. The mind has a variety of such ideas—inadequate, confused, truncated—the origin of which is vague experience, imagination, opinion, as distinguished from reason. The ideas of reason are clear and adequate. It may startle the reader to find among the inadequate confused ideas specified by Spinoza, some which are the peculiar objects of metaphysics, namely Being, Thing, Freedom, and general ideas such as Man, Animal, &c. These are nothing but abstractions arising from the infirmity of thought. We cannot at once embrace many elements of a conception. We cannot hold many particulars steadily and clearly before the mind. Drooping under their weight, and dazzled by their multiplicity, the mind slips away, carrying with it (by abstraction) some one confused general character, in which the particulars

\* *De Intell. Emend.* 95.

details are more or less merged. Imagining objects in extreme confusion we resume them under one predicate such as Being, Thing, Genus. Thus all images of particular men or particular horses are confusedly blended in the abstraction Man or Horse. Thus transcendental ideas are formed. They are *notiones universales*, and as such are necessarily obscure, inadequate, *ergo* erroneous. What wonder then that these notions have been fruitful of controversy, since each man represents the object by that sign which most interests him, and thus the variety of ideas calling themselves universal has been proportionate to the variety of interests. Freedom is an example. It is founded on the supposition of some general Will, or absolute faculty of determining this or that act, i.e. an abstraction from particular acts of volition, as Man is from individual men. The real will is desire, and every act of desire has its special cause, which it necessarily follows as effect. If we abstract from all these particular acts a naked undetermined Will, a Will that is uncaused, it is something removed from reality, '*ens imaginationis*,' having no more objective existence than the *lapidity* of stone, the *aureity* of gold, the *animality* of lions and tigers.

If we reject as abstractions, fictions of our infirm thought, such notions as those of *ens*, *aliquid*, freedom, final cause, &c., how can Spinoza ask us to accept his notions of God, Cause, and Substance, as if these also were not abstractions similarly constructed? Are they clearer? Are they more real? Yes, he replies. These are marked out as *notiones communes*, and their validity is seen in their being common to all experience. The *notio communis* is an expression of real existence, because it expresses that which is found common to every individual thing. Our knowledge of things, indeed, is partial, and in so far inadequate; but, if throughout this partial knowledge there runs one common character, we may be sure that this common character expresses a common truth.\* There are notions common to all minds; these must be true.

\* *Ethica*, ii. prop. xxxvii.-xxxviii.

The objection will certainly arise that what are called *notiones universales*—the conceptions Thing, Something, Freedom, Virtue, Animal, Man, &c.—are quite as common to all minds as the *notiones communes*, God, Substance, and Cause. Why then is the one class to be rejected as vague error, and the other accepted as irresistible truth? Spinoza's answer would be that the criterion of truth is clearness and distinctness. A geometrical fallacy. 'He who has a true idea not only knows that he has it but is unable to doubt its truth.' A psychological fallacy. Let us follow his demonstrations of it.

'A true idea in us is that which is adequate in God, in so far as he is manifested by the nature of the human mind (by coroll. prop. xi. part ii.). Let us, therefore, suppose that there is in God, so far as he is manifested by the human mind, an adequate idea A. There must be also in God the idea of this idea, which is related to God in the same way as idea A (acc. to prop. xx. the demonstration of which is universal). But the idea A is supposed to belong to God in so far as he is manifested by the human mind; therefore, also the idea of this idea must belong to God in the same way, *i.e.* the adequate idea of the idea A will be in the same mind which has the adequate idea A; and thus he who has an adequate idea or (by prop. xxxiv. part ii.) who truly knows a thing must at the same time have an adequate idea or true cognition of his cognition, *i.e.* (as is self-evident) he must at the same time have certitude: Q. E. D.

'*Schol.* In scholium prop. xxi. I have explained what is the idea of an idea. But it is to be noted that the preceding proposition is sufficiently evident by itself. For no one who has a true idea is ignorant that a true idea involves the highest certitude. To have a true idea signifies nothing else than to know a thing perfectly; nor, indeed, can any one doubt this unless he supposes an idea to be a mute image, like a picture, and not a mode of thought. And I ask who can know that he understands a thing unless he first understands it, *i.e.* who can know that he is certain of a thing unless he be first certain of it? Further, what can be clearer

and more certain than a true idea, so as to be a criterion of its truth? As light manifests both itself and darkness, so truth is the criterion of itself and of falsehood. And hereby I believe myself to have answered the following objections: namely, if a true idea is distinguished from a false idea only in so far as it is said to agree with its object, a true idea has no more reality or perfection than a false idea (since they are distinguished solely by an extrinsic mark), and consequently the man who has true ideas would have no more of reality or perfection than he who has false ideas. Further, whence comes it that men have false ideas? And lastly, whence can one certainly know that he has ideas which agree with their objects? . . . Add to this that our mind, in so far as it truly perceives things, is a part of the infinite intellect of God, and thus it is as necessary that clear and distinct ideas of mind are true as that the ideas of God are true.'

A metaphysician may be satisfied with the criterion of inward conviction, and the character of clearness. Positive philosophers may be permitted to decline such a criterion. They cannot accept subjective distinctions as equivalent to objective discrimination, logical analysis as equivalent to physical analysis, *une manière de voir* as a method of search. They deny the validity of a method which begins by assuming the conclusions at which it is to arrive. If we can ever solve the problems of the invisible and unknown, we must be led up to them through the avenues of the visible and known. Physics must form the prolegomena to Metaphysics. Psychology will teach us to relinquish all vain efforts to transcend our faculties, and no longer waste valuable time in ontological research.

I must not pursue this topic. Enough has been said, perhaps, to indicate what I consider the strength and the weakness of Spinozism. Its strength lies in its consistency. If clear thoughts are adequate and accurate representations of things, if Thought itself is the correlate of Extension, Mind the obverse of Matter, coextensive and cointensive, and human intellect a mode of God's infinite attribute;



then, indeed, all the movements of matter will be paralleled by movements of mind, the external order will be identical with the internal order, and whatever we find in the intellect may be concluded to exist in the external world; subjective logic being, as Hegel boldly affirms, identical with objective reality. That is the foundation of Spinozism. We must ask for no proof of so momentous a position. It is antecedent to all proof. To deny it is to deny philosophy. 'With Method,' Spinoza says,\* 'it is as with other instruments. Forging iron is only possible when we have a hammer; but to have the hammer we must forge it, which presupposes another instrument, and so on *ad infinitum*. It would be vain to attempt to prove by such reasoning that man had a power to forge iron. In the beginning men used the instruments furnished by nature and with them made a few imperfect things, then other things better and with more ease and thus gradually perfecting both their works and the instruments they have come to perform wonderful things with little difficulty. In the same way the human understanding in virtue of the power which is in it fashions its intellectual instruments, by means of which it acquires new forces, and so on gradually fortifying itself it advances till supreme wisdom is attained. There exists in us a true idea which resembles an instrument, and which while it is comprehended by the mind, enables us to comprehend the difference which exists between the idea itself and every other perception.'

If no proof is offered of the fundamental position, rigorous proof is offered of all that is evolved from it. Once admit that all clear and distinct ideas are necessarily adequate expressions of objects, and the mathematical deduction proceeds undisturbed. One might indeed advance another system on a similar basis, having equal validity and opposite conclusions. For example, Spinoza generates Motion out of Extension. It would be easier to generate Extension out of

\* *De Intellect. Emend.* 30.

Motion; or if not easier, the mere possibility of doing it is enough for my purpose. Again, Spinoza makes Thought the infinite attribute of Substance; thereby giving a soul both to animate and inanimate objects. But with equal or greater validity Thought may be conceived as no general attribute at all, only a special mode of the general attribute of Force. One idea is as clear as the other; which is true? It is because Metaphysics is without a criterion that systems spring up like mushrooms and like mushrooms disappear. The contest is interminable, because no conclusions are verifiable.

Finally we may point to Spinozism as the legitimate result of that Subjective Method which Descartes, in spite of his insurgence against Scholasticism, had restored to its ancient place. In vain were metaphysical entities and metaphysical theories banished; their parent, the metaphysical Method, was retained. That process of deduction which, as in Mathematics, from a few axioms constructed a whole universe, could only have been legitimised by an initial verification of the principles and a successive verification of the conclusions. This was not attempted, and could not have been effected, since the premises and the conclusions embrace objects inaccessible to human powers.

There are other points which might profitably be discussed did our limits admit of it; but enough has been said to show the main direction of Spinoza's speculations and their historical position, as the development of that Method which Descartes had systematised. The application of the Method to cosmical phenomena in the hands of Descartes and his followers, rapidly disclosed its essential unfitness for research; the application to ontological problems, in the hands of Spinoza, led to results so startling and so abhorrent to the general mind, that it called attention to the grounds upon which such conclusions could be based. As I said before, there were no Spinozists to carry on the work of their master. The followers of Descartes were quickly silenced by the followers of Newton. Only in Meta-

physics could they find a field, and there to this day Descartes is regarded as a master. In the same region Spinoza also regarded as a master : no one avowedly adopts Spinozism but German Ontology is thoroughly penetrated by it.\*

\* The works on Spinoza are abundant. The best expositions of his doctrine have seen are in KUNO FISCHER: *Gesch. der neuern Philos.*, Bd. I., and SIGWART: *Der Spinozismus historisch und philos. erläutert*. An English translation of 'Ethics' and 'Correspondence' by Dr. R. WILLIS has recently appeared. The anonymous translation of the 'Tractatus' had previously been published. There are also complete translations, in German by AUERBACH, and in French by ÉMILE SAUSSURE.

## CHAPTER II.

*THE FIRST CRISIS IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY.*

SPINOZA'S development of the germs sent forth by Descartes, produced a crisis. He startled men by the conclusions to which he showed that their philosophical premises irresistibly led; and thus forced them into the dilemma either of rejecting the premises, or rejecting the validity of Philosophy as then conceived.

If the premises are correct, if every clear, distinct idea is necessarily true, subjective logic is a key to the mystery of the objective world; the internal order is identical with the external order; and Spinozism is an acceptable creed.

If the premises are not correct, if the voice of Consciousness is not necessarily the voice of truth, the subjective not always the harmonious correlate of the objective, Metaphysical Philosophy, which has its basis in this certitude of Consciousness, is impotent.

Spinozism or Scepticism? There seemed no third alternative. Nor was there a third alternative, so long as Philosophy persisted in its ontological and absolute claims—persisted in the metaphysical Method, in the search for truths lying beyond the sphere of relativity. A new conception of Philosophy was needed to restore the shattered confidence of philosophers.

This new conception was then slowly growing into the distinctness it has of late assumed. It involved a complete change in the point of view. The relativity of all knowledge was its primary canon. With this necessarily came a complete exclusion of ontological research. The nature and limits of Knowledge became the most urgent topics. Before

deciding upon any question relating to Creation, Immortal or Cause, men saw themselves compelled to decide upon competence of human faculty to acquire any knowledge whatever of such subjects. If this inquiry should result in disclosing a native incompetence, there would be an end to all disputes on topics thus removed from rational research.

The crisis, therefore, turns upon this fundamental dispute: Can the human mind transcend the sphere of relative knowledge, and, passing from Consciousness to Causes, explain the nature of things *per se*?

The first decomposition of this great question is into a psychological question of the origin of ideas: *Have we ideas which are antecedent to, and independent of, Experience?*

The recognition of this question as the primary one, constitutes a new era in History. Several writers have remarked the enormous predominance of psychological inquiries from Spinoza to Fichte; but the reason of this turn in the direction of Philosophy has not, I think, been recognised. The fact is patent; the connection of the predominance of Psychology with the necessary decrease of Ontology requires explanation; the more so as Psychology occupied but little attention in the ancient and mediæval schools. I believe that the importance acquired by Psychology, especially its treatment of the origin and scope of human faculty, is the natural result of the same objective tendency which has given prominence to the Inductive Method. A necessity has arisen for a new course of investigation. The hopeless failures of so many generations suggested that the seekers had begun their search at the wrong end; and that before any issue could be found, a complete revision of the method of search was indispensable. The limits and conditions the inquiring mind had to be ascertained.

## THIRD EPOCH.

*Philosophy pauses to ascertain the scope and limits of  
the human mind.*



## CHAPTER I.

*HOBBS.*

PERHAPS no writer except Spinoza has ever been so uniformly depreciated as Hobbes. From his first appearance until the present day his name has been a by-word of contempt with the majority of writers; and even by those who have been liberal enough to acknowledge merit in an adversary, he has been treated as a dangerous and shallow thinker. The first person who saw his importance as a political thinker, and had the courage to proclaim it, was James Mill. As long as political and social theories continue to be judged of by their *supposed* consequences, so long will Hobbes be denied a fair hearing. He has roused the *odium theologicum*. It will be long ere that will be appeased.

Faults he had, unquestionably; short-comings, incomplete views; and—as all error is dangerous in proportion to its plausibility—we will say that he was guilty of dangerous errors. Let the faults be noted, but not overstrained; let the short-comings and incomplete views be enlarged and corrected; the errors calmly examined and refuted. We shall be gainers by it; but by inconsiderate contempt, or by vilifying, no good result can be obtained. Impartial minds will rank Hobbes amongst the greatest writers England has produced. He is profound, and he is clear; weighty, strong, and sparkling. His style, as mere style, is in its way as fine as any-

thing in English: it has the clearness as well as the solidity and brilliancy of crystal. Nor is the matter unworthy the form. It is original, in the sense of having been passed through the alembic of his own brain, even when formerly the property of others. Although little of it would now appear novel, it was novel when he produced it. Haughty, dramatic, overbearing in manner, he yet loved Truth, and never hesitated to proclaim it. 'Harm I can do none,' he says in the opening of the *Leviathan*, 'though I hear no less than they (i.e. previous writers), for I shall leave men but as they are in doubt and dispute; but intending not to take any principle upon *trust*, but only to put men in mind of what *they know already*, or may know by their experience, I hope to err less; and when I do, it must proceed from *too hasty concluding*, which I will endeavour as much as I can to avoid.'\*

He proclaimed that Psychology is a science of observation that if we would understand the conditions and operation of our minds, we must patiently look inwards and see what passes there. All the reasoning and subtle disputation in the world will not advance us one step, unless we first get a firm basis on fact. 'Man,' he says elsewhere, with his usual causticity, 'has the exclusive privilege of forming general theorems. But this privilege is alloyed by another, that is by the privilege of absurdity, to which no living creature is subject but man only. And of men those are of all most subject to it, that profess Philosophy.' And the cause of this large endowment of the privilege to philosophers we may read in another passage, where he attributes the difficulty men have in receiving Truth, to their minds being prepossessed by false opinions—they having *prejudged* the question. The passage is as follows:—'When men have once acquiesced in untrue opinions, and registered them as authenticated records in their minds, it is no less impossible to speak intelligibly to such men than to write legibly on paper already scribbled over.'

Hobbes's position in the History of Philosophy is easily

\* Works, edited by Sir W. MOLESWORTH, iv. 1.

assigned. On the question of the origin of our knowledge he takes a decided stand upon Experience: he is the precursor of modern sensationalists:—

‘Concerning the thoughts of man I will consider them first singly, and afterwards in a train or dependence upon one another. Singly they are every one a *representation* or *appearance* of some quality or other accident of a body without us, which is commonly called an *object*. Which object worketh on the eyes, ears, and other parts of a man’s body; and by diversity of working, produceth diversity of appearances.

‘The original of them all is that which we call *Sense*, for there is no conception in a man’s mind which hath not at first, totally or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of sense. The rest are derived from that original.’ \*

Here is stated, in the broadest manner, the principle of sensationalism. It is in direct antagonism to the doctrine of Descartes that there are innate ideas; in direct antagonism to the old doctrine of the spirituality of Mind. Theoretically this principle may be insignificant: historically it is important.

Hobbes’s language is plain enough, but we will still further quote from him, to obviate any doubt as to his meaning.

‘According to the two principal parts of man, I divide his faculties into two sorts—faculties of the *body*, and faculties of the *mind*.

‘Since the minute and distinct anatomy of the powers of the body is nothing necessary to the present purpose, I will only sum them up in these three heads,—power *nutritive*, power *generative*, and power *motive*.

‘Of the powers of the mind there be two sorts—*cognitive*, *imaginative*, or *conceptive* and *motive*.

‘For the understanding of what I mean by the power *cognitive*, we must remember and acknowledge that there be in our minds continually certain *images* or conceptions of the things without us. This *imagery* and *representation* of

\* *Leviathan*, ch. i. In the following exposition we shall sometimes cite from the *Leviathan*, and sometimes from the *Human Nature*.



the qualities of the things without, is that which we call *conception, imagination, ideas, notice*, or knowledge of them—and the *faculty*, or power by which we are capable of such knowledge, is that I here call *cognitive power*, or *conception*—the power of knowing or conceiving.’

The mind is thus wholly constructed out of sense. Nor must we be deceived by the words *faculty* and *power*, as if they meant any activity of the mind—as if they implied that the mind *co-operated* with sense. The last sentence of the foregoing passage is sufficient to clear up this point. He elsewhere says:—‘All the qualities called *sensible* are, in the object that causeth them, but so many several *motions* of the matter by which it presseth on our organs diversely. *Neither in us that are pressed are they anything else but divers motions; for motion produceth nothing but motion.*’

Hobbes, therefore, and not Locke, is the precursor of that school of Psychology which flourished in the eighteenth century (principally in France), and which made every operation of the mind proceed out of transformed sensations; which ended, logically enough, in saying that to *think* is to *feel*—*penser c'est sentir*.

It is to Hobbes that the merit is due of a discovery which, though so familiar to us now as to appear self-evident, was yet in truth a most important discovery, and was adopted by Descartes in his *Meditations*\*—it is that our sensations do not correspond with any external qualities; that what are called sensible qualities are nothing but modifications of the sentient being:—

‘Because the image in vision, consisting of colour and shape, is the knowledge we have of the qualities of the object of that sense; it is no hard matter for a man to fall into this opinion that the same colour and shape are the very qualities themselves; and for the same cause that sound and noise are the qualities of the bell or of the air. And this

\* DESCARTES may possibly have discovered it for himself; but the priority of publication is at any rate due to HOBBS—a fact first noticed, we believe, by Mr. HALLAM: *Literature of Europe*, iii. 271.

opinion hath been so long received that the contrary must needs appear a great paradox; and yet the introduction of *species visible* and *intelligible* (which is necessary for the maintenance of that opinion) passing to and fro from the object is worse than any paradox, as being a plain impossibility. I shall therefore endeavour to make plain these points:

'That the subject wherein colour and image are inherent, is not the object or thing seen.

'That there is nothing without us (really) which we call an image or colour.

'That the said image or colour is but an apparition unto us of the motion, agitation, or alteration, which the object worketh in the brain, or spirits, or some internal substance of the head.

'That as in vision, so also in conceptions that arise from the other senses, the subject of their inference is not the object but the sentient.'

This important principle, which Carneades among the ancients alone seems to have suspected, Hobbes has very clearly and conclusively illustrated.

Sense furnishes us with conceptions; but as there are other operations of the mind besides the conceptive, it remains to be seen how sense can also be the original of them.

And first, of *Imagination*. Mr. Hallam has noticed the acuteness and originality which often characterise Hobbes's remarks; and he instances the opening of the chapter on *Imagination* in the *Leviathan*. It is worth quoting:—'That when a thing lies still, unless some one else stir it, it will lie still for ever, is a truth no one doubts of. But that when a thing is in motion it will eternally be in motion, unless somewhat else stay it, though the reason be the same, namely that nothing can change itself, is not so easily assented to. For men measure not only other men but all other things by themselves; and because they find themselves subject after motion to pain and lassitude, think everything else grows weary of motion and seeks repose of its own accord; little considering whether it be not some

other motion wherein that desire of rest, they find in themselves, consisteth.' Imagination Hobbes defines as a 'conception remaining and by little and little decaying from an after the act of sense.' . . . 'Imagination, therefore, is but *decaying sense*.' The reader must not here understand that imagination anything more than the retaining of an *image* of the object, after the object is removed. It is the term used by Hobbes to express what James Mill happily calls *Ideation*. Sense, Sensation; ideas, Ideation. Hobbes says sense, Sensation; images, Imagination.

The materialism of Hobbes does not consist merely in his language (as is the case with some philosophers; Locke, for instance); it lies at the very root of his theory. Thus he says, we have sensations and we have images—*ideas*. Whence those images? 'When a body is once in motion it moveth, unless something hinder it, eternally; and whatsoever hindereth it, cannot in an instant, but in time and by degrees quite extinguish it; and as we see in the water though the wind cease, the waves give not over rolling for long time after: so also it happeneth in that motion which is made in the internal parts of man; then, when he awakes, dreams, &c. For after the object is removed, or the eyes shut, we still retain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it. . . . The decay of sense in men waking is not the decay of the motion made in sense but an obscuring of it, in such manner as the light of the sun obscureth the light of the stars; which stars do not lose exercise their virtue, by which they are visible, in the day than in the night. But because amongst many strokes which our eyes, ears, and other organs receive from external bodies, the predominant only is sensible; therefore the light of the sun being predominant, we are not affected with the action of the stars.' This illustration is very happy; but only serves to bring out into stronger relief the materialism. He has told us what Imagination is; let us now learn what is Memory. 'This decaying sense, when we would express the thing itself, I mean *fancy* itself, we call *imagination*, &

I have said before; but when we would express the decay, and signify that the sense is fading, old, and past, it is called *memory*. So that the imagination and memory are but one thing, which for divers considerations hath divers names.' Mr. Hallam objects to this, and says that it is very evident that imagination and memory are distinguished by something more than their names. Truly, by us; but not by Hobbes: he evidently uses the word imagination in a more generical sense than we use it: he means by it Ideation. Thus he calls dreams 'the imagination of them that sleep.' It is that state of the mind which remains when the objects which agitated it by sensations are removed: the mind is then not so agitated but neither is it calm; and he compares that state to the gentle rolling of the waves after the wind hath ceased.

Let this be distinctly borne in mind: Hobbes sees nothing in the intellect but what was previously in the sense. Sensations, and the traces which they leave (*i.e.* images), form the simple elements of all knowledge; the various commixtures of these elements form the various intellectual faculties. Open the third chapter of the *Leviathan*. In it he propounded, as something quite simple and obvious, the very important law of association of ideas.\* He states it with great clearness and thorough mastery, though he evidently was quite unaware of its extensive application.

'When a man thinketh,' he says, 'on anything whatsoever, his next thought after is not altogether so casual as it seems to be. Not every thought to every thought succeeds indifferently. But as we have no imagination whereof we have not formerly had sense in whole or in parts, so we have no transition from one imagination to another whereof we never had the like before in our senses. The reason whereof is this: all fancies (*i.e.* images) are *motions within us, relicts of those made in sense*; and those motions that immediately succeed one another in the sense continue also together after the sense; insomuch as the former coming again to take place

\* See Sir W. HAMILTON: *Dissertation* affixed to *Reid's Works*, p. 898, for a history of this law of association.

and be predominant, the latter followeth by coherence of the matter moved, in such manner as water upon a plain table drawn which way any one part of it is guided by the finger.'

The materialism here is distinct enough. He continues in excellent style:—'This train of thoughts, or mental discourse, is of two sorts. The first is unguided, without design, and inconstant, wherein there is no passionate thought to govern and direct those that follow to itself, the end and scope of some desire or other passion; in which case the thoughts are said to wander, and seem impertinent one to another as in a dream. Such are commonly the thoughts of men that are not only without company, but also without care of anything; though even then the thoughts are as busy as at other times, but without harmony as the sound which a lute out of tune would yield to an ear; or in tune, to one that could not play. And yet in this wild ranging of the mind, a man may oftentimes perceive the way of it, and the dependence of one thought upon another. For in a discourse of our present civil war, which would seem more impertinent than to ask, as one did, what was the value of a Roman penny? Yet the coherence to it was manifest enough. For the thought of the war introduced the thought of delivering up the King to his enemies; the thought of that brought in the thought of the delivering up of Christ; and that again the thought of the thirty pence, which was the price of that treason; and thence easily followed that malicious question, and all this in a moment of time; for thought is quick.'

'For thought is quick.' This is the simple pregnant comment, justly deemed sufficient. The plain direct remark with which Hobbes concludes the above passage would, in the hands of many moderns, have run somewhat thus:—'How wonderful is thought! how mighty! how mysterious! In its lightning speed it traverses all space, and makes the past present!' Hobbes, with a few simple direct words produces a greater impression than would all the swelling pomp of a passage bristling with notes of exclamation. This is the secret of his style. It is also the characteristic

of his speculations. Whatever faults they may have, they have no vagueness, no pretended profundity. As much of the truth as he has clearly seen he clearly exhibits: what he has not seen he does not pretend to see.

One important deduction from his principles he has drawn: 'Whatsoever we imagine is *finite*. Therefore there is no idea, no conception of anything we call *infinite*. No man can have in his mind an image of infinite magnitude, nor conceive infinite swiftness, infinite time, or infinite power. When we say that anything is infinite, we signify only that we are not able to conceive the ends and bounds of the thing named, having no conception of the thing, but of our own inability. And therefore the name of God is used not to make us conceive him, for he is incomprehensible, and his greatness and power are inconceivable, but that we may honour him. Also because whatsoever we conceive has been perceived first by sense, either all at once or by parts, *a man can have no thought representing anything not subject to Sense.*'

On Hobbes's principles this is irresistible. He assumes that all our *thoughts* must be *images*. So far is this from being true, that not even all our *sensations* are capable of forming images. What images are given by the sensations of heat or cold, of music, or of taste?

Every man's consciousness will assure him that thoughts are not always images. It will also assure him that he has the idea, notion, conception, figment (or whatever name he may give the thought) of Infinity. If he attempts to form an image of it, that image will of course be finite: it would not otherwise be an image. But he can think of it; he can reason of it. It is a *thought*. It is in his mind; though how it got there may be a question which he is not in a condition to answer.

We insist upon Hobbes's materialism, the better to prepare the reader for a correct appreciation of Locke. Hobbes, in the sixth chapter of his *Human Nature*, has very carefully defined what he means by knowledge. 'There is a story somewhere,' he says, 'of one that pretends to have been miraculously cured of blindness, wherewith he was born, by

St. Alban or other saints, at the town of St. Alban; and that the Duke of Gloucester being there, to be satisfied the truth of the miracle, asked the man, What colour is this who, by answering it was green, discovered himself, and was punished for a counterfeit: for though by his sight newly received he might distinguish between green and red and all other colours, as well as any that should interrogate him, yet he could not possibly know at first sight which of them was called green, or red, or by any other name.

‘By this we may understand there be *two kinds* of knowledge, whereof the one is nothing else but *sense*, or knowledge *original*, and *remembrance* of the same; the other is called *science*, or knowledge of the *truth*, of *propositions*, and how things are called, and is derived from *understanding*. Both of these sorts are but *experience*; the former being the experience of the effects of things that work upon us from *without*; and the latter experience men have from the proper use of *names* in language: and all *experience* being, as I have said, but *remembrance*, all knowledge is *remembrance*.’

The only ambiguity possible in the above passage is that which might arise from the use of the word *understanding*. This he elsewhere defines as follows:—

‘When a man upon the hearing of any speech hath those thoughts which the words of that speech in their connection were ordained and constituted to signify, then he is said to understand it; *understanding* being nothing else but *conception* formed by speech.’

We must content ourselves with merely alluding to his admirable observations on language, and with quoting, for the hundredth time, his weighty aphorism, ‘Words are wise men’s counters; they do but reckon by them; but they are the money of fools.’

No attempt is here made to do full justice to Hobbes; no notice can be taken of the speculations which made him famous. Our object has been fulfilled if we have made clear to the reader the position Hobbes occupies in modern psychological speculation.

## CHAPTER II.

## LOCKE.

## § I. LIFE OF LOCKE.

**J**OHN LOCKE, one of the wisest of Englishmen, was born at Wrington, in Somersetshire, on August 29, 1632. Little is known of his family, except that his father had served in the parliamentary wars: a fact not without significance in connection with the steady love of liberty manifested by the son.

His education began at Westminster, where he stayed till he was nineteen or twenty. He was then sent to Oxford. That University was distinguished then, as it has ever been, by its attachment to whatever is old: the Past is its model; the Past has its affection. That there is much good in this veneration for the Past, few will gainsay. Nevertheless, a University which piqued itself on being behind the age, was scarcely the fit place for an original thinker. Locke was ill at ease in a place where the Philosophy upheld was Scholasticism. On such food a mind like his could not nourish itself. Like his great predecessor Bacon, he imbibed a profound contempt for the University studies; and in after-life regretted that so much of his time should have been wasted on such profitless pursuits. So deeply convinced was he of the vicious method of college education, that he ran into the other extreme, and thought self-education the best. It is true that all great men have been mainly self-taught; all that is most valuable a man must learn for himself, must work out for himself. Locke assumes that all men *will* educate themselves if left to themselves. The fact is, the majority have to be edu-



cated by force. For those who, if left to themselves, would ne-  
educate themselves, colleges and schools are indispensable.

Locke's notion of an educated man is very characteris-  
of him. Writing to Lord Peterborough, he says, 'Your  
Lordship would have your son's tutor a thorough scholar  
and I think it not much matter whether he be any scholar  
or no; if he but understand Latin well and have a general  
scheme of the sciences, I think that enough. But I would  
have him well-bred and well-tempered.'

Disgusted with the disputes which usurped the title of  
Philosophy, Locke principally devoted himself to Medicine  
while at Oxford. His proficiency is attested by two very  
different persons, and in two very different ways. Dr.  
Sydenham, in the Dedication of his *Observations on the  
History and Cure of Acute Diseases*, boasts of the approbation  
bestowed on his Method by Mr. John Locke, 'who examined  
it to the bottom; and who, if we consider his genius and  
penetrating and exact judgment, has scarce any superior,  
and few equals now living.' The second testimony is that  
afforded by Lord Shaftesbury, when Locke first met him.  
The Earl was suffering from an abscess in the chest. No  
one could discover the nature of his disorder. Locke at  
once divined it. The Earl followed his advice, submitted to  
an operation, and was saved. A close intimacy sprang up  
between them. Locke accompanied him to London, and  
resided principally in his house.

His attention was thus turned to politics. His visits to  
Holland delighted him. 'The blessings which the people  
there enjoyed under a government peculiarly favourable to  
civil and religious liberty, amply compensated, in his view,  
for what their uninviting territory wanted in scenery and  
climate.\*' He also visited France and Germany, making  
the acquaintance of several distinguished men.

In 1670 he planned his *Essay concerning Human Under-  
standing*. This he did not complete till 1687. In 1675 the

\* DUGALD STEWART.

delicate state of his health obliged him to travel, and he repaired to the South of France, where he met Lord Pembroke. To him the *Essay* is dedicated. He returned in 1679, and resumed his studies at Oxford. But his friendship for Shaftesbury, and the liberal opinions he was known to hold, drew upon him the displeasure of the Court. He was deprived of his studentship by a very arbitrary act.\* Nor did persecution stop there. He was soon forced to quit England, and find refuge at the Hague. There also the anger of the king pursued him, and he was obliged to retreat further into Holland. It was there he published his celebrated *Letter on Toleration*.

He did not return to England till after the Revolution. Then there was security and welcome. He was pressed to accept a high diplomatic office in Germany, but the state of his health prevented him. In 1690 the first edition of his *Essay* appeared. He had indeed already (1688) published an abridgment of it in Leclerc's *Bibliothèque universelle*. The success of this *Essay* was immense; and Warburton's assertion to the contrary falls to the ground on the mere statement of the number of editions which the work rapidly went through. Six editions within fourteen years,† and in times when books sold more slowly than they sell now, is evidence enough.

The publication of his *Essay* roused great opposition. He soon got involved in the discussions with Stillingfleet, Bishop of Worcester. He was soon after engaged in the political discussions of the day, and published his *Treatise on Government*. It was about this time that he became

\* MACAULAY: *History of England*, i. 545-6.

† The writer of the article *Locke*, in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, says that the fourth edition appeared in 1700. VICTOR COUSIN repeats the statement, and adds that a fifth edition was preparing when death overtook the author; this fifth edition appearing in 1705. We know not on what authority these writers speak; but that they are in error may be seen by turning to LOCKE's *Epistle to the Reader*, the last paragraph of which announces that the edition then issued by Locke himself is the sixth.

acquainted with Sir Isaac Newton; and a portion of the very interesting correspondence has been given by Lord King in his *Life of Locke*.

Locke's health, though always delicate, had not been disturbed by any imprudences, so that he reached the age of seventy-two—a good ripe age for one who had studied and thought. He expired in the arms of his friend Lady Masham, on October 28, 1704.

## § II. ON THE SPIRIT OF LOCKE'S WRITINGS.

It has for many years been the fashion to decry Locke. Indirect sneers at his 'superficiality' abound in the writings of those who, because their thought is so muddy they cannot see its shallow bottom, fancy they are : Locke's 'materialism' is also a favourite subject of condolence with these writers, who also assert that his principles 'lead to atheism.'

Another mode of undervaluing Locke is to assert that he only borrowed and popularised the ideas originated by Hobbes. That Locke never read Hobbes may seem incredible, but has strong evidence to support it; and is one among many examples of how few were the books he had read. He never alludes to Hobbes in any way that can be interpreted into having read him. Twice only, we believe, does he allude to him, and then so distantly, and with such impropriety, as to be almost convincing with respect to his ignorance. The first time is in his *Reply to the Bishop of Worcester*, in which he absurdly classes Hobbes and Spinoza together. He says, 'I am not so well read in Hobbes and Spinoza as to be able to say what were their opinions on this matter, but possibly there be those who will think your Lordship's authority of more use than those justly-decried writers.' The form of expression, 'I am not so well read,' etc., is obviously equivalent to—I have never read those justly-decried writers. His second allusion is simply this:—'A Hobbist would probably say.'

We cannot at present lay our hands on the passage, but it refers to some moral question.

This is only negative evidence. Something like positive evidence however is the fact that Hobbes's doctrine of Association of Ideas—a principle as simple of apprehension as it is important—was completely unknown to Locke, who, in the fourth or fifth edition, added the chapter on Association as it now stands. Moreover, Locke's statement of the law is by no means so satisfactory as that by Hobbes: he had not so thoroughly mastered it; yet, had he read it in Hobbes, he would assuredly have improved on it. That he did not at first introduce it into his work is a strong presumption that he had not then read Hobbes, because the law is so simple and so evident, when stated, that it must produce instantaneous conviction.

It is strange that any man should have read Locke, and questioned his originality. There is scarcely a writer we name whose works bear such an indisputable impress of having 'raised himself above the almsbasket, and, not content to live lazily on scraps of begged opinions, set his own talents to work to find and follow truth.' It is still more strange that any man should have read Locke and questioned his power. The patient sagacity which, above all things, distinguishes a philosopher is more remarkable in Locke than almost any writer. He was also largely endowed with good sense. In these two qualities, and in his homely racy masculine style, we see the type of the English mind, when at its best. The plain directness of his manner, his earnestness without fanaticism, his hearty honest life of truth, and the depth and pertinence of his thoughts, are qualities which, though they do not dazzle the reader, yet win his love and respect. In that volume, you have the honest thoughts of a great honest Englishman. It is the product of a manly mind: clear, truthful, direct. No vague formulas, no rhetorical flights, no base flattery of base prejudices, no assumption of oracular wisdom, no word-jugglery. There are so many writers who cover their inanity with a

veil of words, who seem profound because they are obscure that a plainness like Locke's deceives the careless reader and leads him to suppose that what is there so plain must have been obvious.

Locke, though a patient cautious thinker, was anything but a timid thinker; and it does great honour to his sagacity that at a time when all scientific men were exclaiming against the danger of hypothesis, believing that the extravagant errors of Schoolmen and alchemists were owing to their use of hypotheses—a time when the great Newton himself could be led into the unphilosophical boast, *hypotheses non fingo*, or wise Locke should exactly appreciate them at their true value. He says:—

'Not that we may not, to explain any phenomena of nature make use of any probable hypothesis whatsoever. Hypotheses, if they are well made, are at least great helps to memory, and often direct us to new discoveries. But we should not take them up too hastily (which the mind that would always penetrate into the causes of things, and have principles to rest on, is very apt to do) till we have very well examined particulars, and made several experiments in the thing which we would explain by our hypothesis, and see whether it will agree to them all; whether our principle will carry us quite through, and not be as inconsistent with one phenomenon of nature as they seem to accommodate and explain another; and, at least, that we take care that the name of principles deceive us not nor impose on us, by making us receive that for an unquestionable truth which is really at best but a very doubtful conjecture: such as are most (I had almost said all) of the hypotheses in natural philosophy.'

Locke could exchange his opinions with ease when he fancied that he saw their error. He readily retracted ideas which he had published in an immature form; 'thinking himself,' as he says, 'more concerned to quit and renounce any opinion of my own than oppose that of another, where truth appears against it.' He had a just and incurable suspicion of all 'great volumes swollen with ambiguous word

He knew how much jugglery goes on with words ; some of it conscious, some of it unconscious, but all pernicious. 'Vague and insignificant forms of speech and abuse of language have for so long passed for mysteries of science ; and hard and misapplied words, with little or no meaning, have, by prescription, such a right to be mistaken for deep learning and height of speculation, that it will not be easy to persuade either those who speak or those who hear them that they are but the covers of ignorance and hindrance of true knowledge. To break in upon this sanctuary of vanity and ignorance will be, I suppose, some service to the human understanding.'

Locke had an analytical mind. He desired to understand and to explain things, not to write rhetorically about them. There were mysteries enough which he was contented to let alone ; he knew that human faculties were limited, and reverentially submitted to ignorance on all things beyond his reach. But though he bowed down before that which was essentially mysterious, he was anxious not to allow that which was essentially cognisable to be enveloped in mystery. Let that which is a mystery remain undisturbed : let that which is not necessarily a mystery be brought into the light of day. Know the limits of your understanding—*beyond* those limits it is madness to attempt to penetrate ; *within* those limits it is folly to let in darkness and mystery, to be incessantly wondering, and always assuming that matters cannot be so plain as they appear, and that something lying deeper courts our attention.

To minds otherwise constituted—to men who love to dwell in the vague regions of speculation, and are only at ease in an intellectual twilight—Locke is naturally a disagreeable teacher. He flatters none of their prejudices ; he falls in with none of their tendencies. Mistaking obscurity for depth, they accuse him of being superficial. The owls declare the eagle is blind. They prefer the twilight ; he

They sneer at his 'shallowness.' So frequent are the sneer and offhand charges against him that I, who had read him in my youth with delight, began to suspect that my admiration had been rash. The proverb says, 'Throw but mud enough some will be sure to stick.' It was so with Locke. Reiterated depreciation had somewhat defaced his image in my mind. The time came however when, for the purposes of this History, I had to read the *Essay on Human Understanding* once more, carefully, pen in hand. The image of John Locke was again revived within me; this time in more than its former splendour. His modesty, honesty, truthfulness and directness, I had never doubted; but now the vigour and originality of his mind, the raciness of his colloquial style, the patient analysis by which he has laid open to us such vast tracts of thought, and above all, the manliness of his truly practical understanding, are so strongly impressed upon me that I feel satisfied the best answer to his detractors is to say, 'Read him.' From communion with such a man as his, nothing but good can result. He suggests as much as he teaches.

### § III. LOCKE'S METHOD.

'It may be said that Locke created the science of Metaphysics,' says D'Alembert, 'in somewhat the same way as Newton created Physics. . . . To understand the soul, its ideas and its affections, he did not study books; they would have misdirected him; he was content to descend within himself, and after having, so to speak, contemplated himself a long while, he presented in his *Essay* the mirror in which he had seen himself. In one word, he reduced Metaphysics to that which it ought to be, viz. the experimental physics of the mind.' \*

This is great praise, and from high authority, but I suspect that it can only be received with some qualification.

\* 'En un mot, il réduisit la métaphysique à ce qu'elle doit être, en effet physique expérimentale de l'âme.'—*Discours prélim. de l'Encyclopédie*.

Locke made no great discovery which changed the face of science. He was not even the first to turn his glance inwards. Descartes and Hobbes had been before him.

Yet Locke had his Method; a Method peculiarly his own. Others before him had cast a hasty glance inwards, and dogmatised upon what they saw. He was the first to watch patiently the operations of his mind, that, watching, he might surprise the evanescent thoughts, and steal from them the secret of their combinations. He is the founder of modern Psychology. By him the questions of Philosophy are boldly and scientifically reduced to the primary question of the limits of human understanding. By him is begun the *history* of the development and combination of our thoughts. Others had contented themselves with the thoughts as they found them; Locke sedulously inquired into the *origin* of all our thoughts. To complete his Psychology, he should have opened an inquiry into the origin of our Faculties.

M. Victor Cousin, who, as a rhetorician, is in constant antagonism to the clear and analytical Locke, makes it an especial grievance that he and his school have considered the question respecting the origin of ideas as fundamental. 'It is from Locke,' he continues, 'that has been borrowed, the custom of referring to savages and children, upon whom observation is so difficult; for the one class we must trust to the reports of travellers, often prejudiced and ignorant of the language of the country visited; for the other class (children), we are reduced to very equivocal signs.'\*

Locke wanted to collect facts concerning the origin of ideas; and this is a practice inseparable from true scientific psychological research. Perhaps no source of error has been more abundant than the obstinacy with which men have in all times looked upon their associations as irresistible truths—as primary and universal truths. A little analysis—a little observation of minds removed from the influences which fostered those associations, would prove

\* *Histoire de la Philos.* 17<sup>e</sup> leçon.



that those associations were not universal truths, but simple associations. It is because men have analysed the cultivated mind that they have been led to false results; had they compared their analysis with that of an uncultivated mind they might have gained some insight. The objection against Locke's practice could only proceed from men who studied Psychology without previous acquaintance with Physiology—which, though they do not know it, is the same as studying functions without any knowledge of the organs. Locke was the first who systematically sought in the history of the development of the mind for answers to many of the fundamental questions of Psychology, and he has been blamed for this, in the same spirit as that which dictated the sneers of John Hunter's professional contemporaries, because the admirable anatomist sought in comparative anatomy for elucidation of many anatomical problems. Nowadays a well-informed student is ignorant of the fact that Comparative Physiology and Embryology are our surest guides in all biological questions, simply because we therein see the problems gradually removed from many of the complexities which in the higher and more completely developed organisms frustrate our research. Locke saw clearly enough that the philosophers were accustomed to consider the minds as types of the human mind; whereas their minds being filled with false notions and warped by prejudice could in no wise be taken as types; for even granting that the majority of their notions were *true*, yet these true notions were not portions of the furniture of universal mind. He sought for illustrations from such minds as had not been so warped.

His object was 'to inquire into the *original, certainty, and extent*, of human knowledge.' He was led to this by a conversation with some friends, in which, disputes growing warm, 'after we had puzzled ourselves awhile, without coming any nearer a resolution of those doubts which perplexed us, it came into my thoughts that we took a *wrong course*; and that, before we set ourselves upon inquiries

that nature, it was necessary to examine our own abilities, and *see what objects our understandings were or were not fitted to deal with.* \*

The plan he himself laid down is as follows:—

‘First, I shall inquire into the original of those ideas, notions, or whatever else you please to call them, which a man observes and is conscious to himself he has in his mind; and the ways whereby the understanding comes to be furnished with them.

‘Secondly, I shall endeavour to show what knowledge the understanding hath by those ideas; and the certainty, evidence, and extent, of it.

‘Thirdly, I shall make some inquiry into the nature and grounds of faith or opinion; whereby I mean that assent which we give to any proposition as true, of whose truth we have yet no certain knowledge; and we shall have occasion to examine the reasons and degrees of assent.’

We here see decisively settled the question so often raised respecting the importance of Locke's Inquiry into Innate Ideas. ‘For Locke and his school,’ says M. Cousin, justly, ‘the study of understanding is the study of Ideas; hence the recent celebrated name of Ideology for the designation of the science of mind.’ Indeed, as we have shown, the origin of Ideas was the most important of all questions; upon it rested the whole problem of Philosophy.

According to the origin of our Ideas may we assign validity to them. If they are of human growth and development, they will necessarily partake of human limitations. As Pascal well says, ‘Si l'homme commençoit par s'étudier lui-même, il verroit combien il est incapable de passer outre. Comment pourroit-il se faire qu'une partie connût le tout?’

Locke has given us a few indications of the state of

\* HEGEL, while admitting the plausibility of this procedure, thinks it not less absurd than to refuse to enter the water till we have learnt how to swim. Cf. *Encyklopädie*, § 10, where he argues that we must already *know* before we can examine the instruments of knowledge.

opinion respecting Innate Ideas, which it is worth while collecting. 'I have been told that a short epitome of the treatise, which was printed in 1688, was condemned by some without reading, because innate ideas were denied it, they too hastily concluding that, if innate ideas were not supposed, there would be little left either of the notion of proof of spirits.' Recapitulating the contents of the chapter devoted to the refutation of innate ideas, he says, 'I know not how absurd this may seem to the masters of demonstration, and probably it *will hardly down with anybody at first hearing.*'

Locke's inquiry was purely psychological; although he has been a student of medicine, he never indulges in any physiological speculations, such as his successors, Hartley and Darwin, delighted in. Ideas, and ideas only, solicited his analysis. Dugald Stewart has remarked that in the *Essay* there is not a single passage savouring of the anatomic theatre or of the chemical laboratory.

'If by this inquiry into the nature of the understanding can discover the powers thereof, how far they reach, to what things they are in any degree proportionate, and where they fail us, I suppose it may be of use to prevail with the human mind of man to be more cautious in meddling with the thin exceeding its comprehension, to stop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether, and sit down in a quiet ignorance of the things which upon examination are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities. We should not then perhaps be forward, out of an affectation of universal knowledge, to raise questions and perplex ourselves and others about things which our understandings are not suited, and of which we cannot frame in our minds any clear or distinct perception or whereof (as it has perhaps too often happened) we have not any notions at all. Men have reason to be well satisfied with what God has thought fit for them, since he has given them, as St. Peter says, *πάντα πρὸς ζωὴν καὶ εὐσεβείαν* whatsoever is necessary for the convenience of life and the information of virtue; and has put within the reach of the

discovery the comfortable provision for this life, and the way that leads to a better. How short soever their knowledge may be of a universal or perfect comprehension of whatever is, it yet secures their great concernments, that they have light enough to lead them to the knowledge of their Maker and the *sight of their own duties*. Men may find matter sufficient to busy their heads and employ their hands with variety, delight, and satisfaction, if they will not boldly quarrel with their own constitutions, and throw away the blessings their hands are filled with because they are not big enough to grasp everything.

'We shall not have much reason to complain of the narrowness of our minds if we will but employ them about what may be of use to us, for of that they are very capable; and it will be an unpardonable as well as childish peevishness if we undervalue the advantages of our knowledge, and neglect to improve it to the ends for which it was given us, because there are some things set out of reach of it. It will be no excuse to an idle and untoward servant who would not attend his business by candle-light, to plead that he had not broad sunshine. The candle that is set up within us shines bright enough for all our purposes.

'When we know our own strength, we shall the better know what to undertake with hopes of success;\* and when we have well surveyed the powers of our own minds, and made some estimate what we may expect from them, we shall not be inclined either to sit still, and not set our thoughts on work at all, despairing of knowing anything; or, on the other side, question everything, and disclaim all knowledge because some things are not to be understood. It is of great use to the sailor to know the length of his line, though he cannot with it fathom all the depths of the ocean. It is well he knows that it is long enough to reach the bottom at such places as are necessary to direct his voyage, and caution him against

\* 'The real cause and root of almost all the evils in science is this: that, falsely magnifying and extolling the powers of the mind, we seek not its true helps.'—BACON.

running upon any shoals that they may ruin him. . . . was that which gave the first rise to this Essay concerning the Understanding; for I thought that the first step towards satisfying several inquiries the mind of man was very a run into was to take a survey of our own understandings to see to what things they were adapted. Till that was discovered we began at the wrong end, and in vain sought satisfaction in a quiet and sure possession of truths that concerned us, whilst we let loose our thoughts into the ocean of being; as if that boundless extent were the nature and undoubted possession of our understandings, whilst there is nothing exempt from its decisions, or that escapes comprehension. Thus men extending their inquiries beyond their capacities, and letting their thoughts wander into depths where they can find no sure footing, it is no wonder that they raise questions and multiply disputes, which, not coming to any clear resolution, are proper only to confirm and increase their doubts, and to confirm them at last in perfect scepticism.'

The objective tendency of Locke's unmetaphysical led him to a clear recognition of the Scholastic error regarding Essences, *i.e.* the existence of entities corresponding in general terms. He showed that what had for centuries been regarded as essences of classes were merely the significations of their *names*: and I agree with Mr. Mill in considering this among the most valuable of the many services rendered to Philosophy.

It should be added however that Locke, when 'he repudiated the parent error, could not shake himself free from which was its fruit. He distinguished two sorts of essences: Real and Nominal. His nominal essences were the essences of classes. But he also admitted real essences, or essences of individual objects, which he supposed to be the causes of the sensible properties of those objects. We know not, he says, what these essences are (and this acknowledgment renders the fiction comparatively innocuous); but if we did, we could from them alone demonstrate the sensible properties of

object, as the properties of the triangle are demonstrated from the definition of a triangle.' \*

The decisive manner in which Locke separates himself from the ontologists is historically noteworthy, and is also noticeable as giving the tone to his subsequent speculations.

#### § IV. THE ORIGIN OF OUR IDEAS.

We have admired the Portico ; let us enter the Temple.

Hobbes had said, with Gassendi, that all our ideas are derived from sensations ; *nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu*. Locke, who is called a mere populariser of Hobbes, said that there were *two* sources, not *one* source, and these two were SENSATION and REFLECTION. Separating himself decisively from the upholders of the doctrine of innate ideas—of truths independent of experience,—he declared that all our knowledge is founded upon experience, and from experience it ultimately derives itself. Separating himself no less decisively from the Gassendists, who saw no source of ideas but Sensation, he declared that, although Sensation was one great source of our ideas, yet there was 'another fountain from which experience furnisheth the understanding with ideas ;' and this source, '*though it be not sense*, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called *internal sense* : ' this he calls Reflection.

After Dugald Stewart's ample exposure of the widespread error that Locke was the chief of the so-called Sensational School, we need spend little time inquiring whether Locke did or did not teach that all knowledge was referable to sensation. The passages which contradict the vulgar error are numerous and decisive. Dugald Stewart has selected several ; but perhaps the one we have just quoted will be considered sufficiently explicit. Reflection, he says, 'though it be not the sense,' may yet analogically be considered as

\* MILL : *Logic*, i. 126.

an internal sense. To prevent all misconception, however we will as a decisive example refer to his proof of the existence of God, which he sums up by saying, 'It is plain to me that we have a more certain knowledge of the existence of a God than of anything our senses have not immediately discovered to us. Nay, I presume I may say that we more more certainly know that there is a God than that there is anything else without us.' (Book iv. ch. x.)

Historians have not accorded due praise to Locke for the important advance he made towards a solution of the great question respecting the origin of knowledge. While Leibnitz has been lauded to the skies for having expressed this doctrine in an epigram, Locke has not only been robbed of his due, but has been sacrificed to his rival. It is commonly said, 'Locke reduced all our knowledge to Sensation: Leibnitz came and accepted the old adage of *nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu*, but he accepted it as only half the truth; and therefore added *nisi ipse intellectus*.' Now, firstly, Locke did not accept the adage as the whole truth; he said that Reflection was a second source of Ideas. Secondly, Dugald Stewart has remarked that the addition which Leibnitz made when he said there is nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the sense, *except the intellect itself*, expresses no more than the doctrine of Locke, who says, 'External objects furnish the mind with ideas of sensible qualities; and the mind furnishes the understanding with the ideas of its own operations.' Thirdly, although the phrase is epigrammatic, and thereby has had such success in the world as epigrams usually have, it will not bear scrutiny. Except as a verbal jingle, how trivial is the expression—the intellect *in* the intellect! Suppose a man to say, 'I have no money in my purse, except my purse itself,' he would scarcely be less absurd. For when the Schoolmen said, 'nothing was in the intellect which was not previously in the sense,' they did not mean that the intellect was the same as the sense; they meant that the intellect was furnished with no ideas, notions, or con-

ceptions, which had not been furnished them by sense; they meant that the senses were the inlets to the soul.

Dr. Whewell approves of the epigram; and alluding to Mr. Sharpe's objection to it, viz. that we cannot say the intellect is *in* the intellect, he says, 'This remark is obviously frivolous; for the faculties of the understanding (which are what the argument against the Sensational School requires us to reserve) may be said to be in the understanding with as much justice as we may assert that there are in it the impressions derived from sense.' We submit that the 'faculties' of the understanding are not '*all* that must be reserved for the arguments against the Sensational School' (if the Lockists be meant, and to them only did Leibnitz address himself), for the simple reason that the faculties *never* were denied.\* Opponents have attributed such a notion to Locke's school; no member of that school ever proposed it. The question never was—*Have we an Understanding, and has that Understanding certain Faculties?* The question simply was—*What is the origin of our Ideas: are they partly innate and partly acquired; or are they wholly acquired, and, if so, is Sense the sole inlet?*

To this plain question some replied plainly, 'Sense is' the origin of all our ideas.' Locke replied, 'Sense and Reflection are the sources of all our ideas.'

Leibnitz replied, 'There is nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the sense; except the intellect itself:' which latter remark is altogether *beside* the question. And yet this remark has called forth many pages of laudatory declamation: in which Locke is cast into the background, and charged with having overlooked the important fact that man has an intellect as well as senses. This notion, once started, continued its triumphant course. Men are for the most part

\* LOCKE often speaks of the operations of the mind as proceeding from powers intrinsic and proper to itself. He says also: 'Thus the first *capacity* of human intellect is that the mind is fitted to receive the impressions made on it; either through the senses by outward objects or *by its own operations when it reflects on them.*'—*Essay*, b. ii. c. i. § 24.



like sheep, who always follow the bell-wether: what ~~one~~ boldly asserts, another echoes boldly; a third transmits it a fourth, and the assertion becomes consolidated into a ~~tr~~ditional judgment. Some one more serious, or more ~~ind~~pendent than the rest, looks into the matter; sees an ~~err~~or exposes it; but tradition rolls on its unimpeded course. I ~~c~~annot expect to shake the traditional error respecting Locke. I was bound, however, to signalise it. Locke does *not* derive all our knowledge from sensation; Leibnitz has *not* made any addition by his too famous *nisi ipse intellectus*.\*

By sensation, Locke understands the simple operation of external objects through the senses. The mind is here wholly passive. The senses, therefore, may be said to furnish the mind with one portion of its *materials*. By reflection ~~h~~e understands that internal sense by means of which the mind observes its own operations. This furnishes the second and last portion of the materials out of which the mind frames knowledge. 'If it shall be demanded,' he says, 'when a man begins to have any ideas, I think the true answer is, when he first has any sensation. For since there appear not to be any ideas in the mind before the senses have conveyed any in, I conceive that ideas in the understanding are coeval with sensation.' This is making a decisive stand against the upholders of innate ideas; but it is a very rude and incomplete view.

Plato finely compares the soul to a book, of which the senses are the scribes.† But writing is only possible after a series of tentatives; the hand must practise before it can steady itself sufficiently to trace letters; so also must the senses learn by repetition to trace intelligible figures on the *tabula rasa* of the mind.

Locke continues his account of the origin of all our knowledge thus: 'In time the mind comes to reflect on its own

\* LEIBNITZ himself says, when making the distinction, 'Cela s'accorde avec avec votre auteur de l'Essai, qui cherche une bonne partie des idées dans la réflexion de l'esprit sur sa propre nature.'—*Nouveaux Essais*, ii. c. i.

† *Philebus*, p. 192, ed. BEKKER. PLATO's words are not given in the text, but the sense is.

operations about the ideas got by sensation, and thereby stores itself with a new set of ideas, which I call ideas of reflection. These are the impressions which are made on our senses by outward objects that are extrinsical to the mind, and its own operations proceeding from powers intrinsical and proper to itself; which when reflected on by itself, becoming also objects of its contemplation, are, as I have said, the original of all knowledge. Thus the first capacity of the human intellect is that the mind is fitted to receive the impressions made on it; either through the senses by outward objects or by its own operations when it reflects on them. This is the first step that a man makes towards the discovery of and the groundwork whereon to build all those notions which ever he shall have naturally in this world. All those sublime thoughts which tower above the clouds, and reach as high as heaven itself, take their rise and footing here: in all that good extent wherein the mind wanders, in those remote speculations it may seem to be elevated with, it stirs not one jot beyond those ideas which sense or reflection has offered for its contemplation.

‘When the understanding is once stored with these simple ideas, it has the power to repeat, compare, and unite them, even to an almost infinite variety, and so can make at pleasure new complex ideas. But it is not in the power of the most exalted wit, or enlarged understanding, by any quickness or variety of thought, to invent or frame one new simple idea in the mind not taken in by the ways aforementioned.’

Whoever attentively considers these passages, or consults the *Essay on the Understanding* with a view of ascertaining what precisely was the position held by Locke, will, I think, soon arrive at the conviction that, although he presupposes the existence of an active Mind (consequently of Faculties capable of being excited into activity by the operation of external objects through Sense), he was in a state of indecision and confusion respecting the faculties themselves and the psychological process; he could not

therefore fairly meet all the objections which the other school might urge.

He is distinguished from the Sensational School by the absence of any notion of evolving the Faculties from sensations. He proclaimed Sense the purveyor of food for the Mind; he did not conceive that Mind itself was developed out of Sense. As to ideas, the mind was a *tabula rasa* before experience came to write on it; but as to Faculties, the mind was—something which he had never made clear to himself.

Thus although he was strong in argument against Innate Ideas, and against all the attempts to establish a source of knowledge independent of Experience, he had but confused notions of what this Mind was, the existence of which he assumed, and of what relations of dependence existed between the Faculties and sensations. In a word, the elementary biological facts were unsuspected; and consequently there was much in his exposition which was unsatisfactory; his opponents were quick in discovering.

Opponents, however, and especially Leibnitz, committed a great oversight in charging him with not having recognised the fact on which they lay so much stress, namely, that we have ideas which have their foundation in the Mind, and which consequently have a certitude superior in its universality and necessity to any sense-knowledge. These ideas are derived from the perception of the relations which exist among our abstract ideas—as in mathematics. Thus while the origin of all simple ideas is in Sense, and our certitude can never go beyond what is thus given in experience, the relations of these ideas among each other are of universal *a priori* certitude.

#### § V. ELEMENTS OF IDEALISM AND SCEPTICISM IN LOCKE

It is certain that Locke was neither an Idealist, like Berkeley, nor a Sceptic, like Hume. Nevertheless, if we examine attentively, we shall see certain elements in his psychology which were easily developed into both these doctrines.

Can we know things as they are? Descartes and his followers suppose that we can: their criterion is the clearness and distinctness of ideas. Locke said, '*Distinct* ideas of the several sorts of bodies that fall under the examination of our senses, perhaps we may have; but *adequate* ideas I suspect we have not of any one amongst them.' Ideas, however clear, are never adequate because they are subjective. But Locke only went halfway towards the conception of knowledge as subjective. He did not think that all our ideas were images, copies of external objects; but he expressly taught that our ideas of what he calls *primary qualities* are *resemblances* of what really exists in bodies; adding, that 'the ideas produced in us by *secondary* qualities have no resemblances of them at all. There is nothing like our ideas existing in the bodies themselves. They are, in the bodies we denominate from them, only a power to produce those sensations in us.'

It is remarkable that the last sentence did not lead him to the conclusion that *all* the qualities which we perceive in bodies are the products of sensations in us; and that it is we who attribute to the object-causes of these sensations a form analogous to their subject-effects. He himself warned us 'that so we may not think (as perhaps usually is done) that they (ideas) are exactly the images and resemblances of something inherent in the subject; most of those of sensation being in the mind no more the likeness of something existing without us than the names that stand for them are likenesses of our ideas, which yet upon hearing they are apt to excite in us.' And elsewhere, 'It being no more impossible to conceive that God should annex such ideas to such motions (*i.e.* the motions of objects affecting the senses) with which they have no similitude than that He should annex the idea of pain to the motion of a piece of steel dividing our flesh, with which that idea hath no resemblance.'

From these passages it will be seen how clearly Locke understood the subjective nature of one portion of our knowledge. He did not carry out the application of his principles to primary qualities, owing perhaps to inveterate

association having too firmly established the contrary in his mind. Every one is willing to admit that colour, light, heat, perfume, taste, etc., are not qualities in the bodies, which are reproduced in us, but simply conditions of our Sensibility when placed in certain relations with certain bodies. Yet few are willing to admit—indeed only philosophers (accustomed as they are to undo their constant associations) can conceive that the primary qualities, viz. extension, solidity, motion, and number, are other than real qualities of bodies—*copies* of which are impressed upon us. And yet these qualities are no less subjective than the former. They do not belong at all to bodies, except as powers to produce in us the sensations. They are demonstrably as much the effect produced in us by objects as the secondary qualities are, and the latter every one admits to be the *effects*, and not *copies*. Wherein lies the difference? wherein the difficulty of conceiving primary qualities not to belong to bodies? In this: the primary qualities are the *invariable* conditions of sensation. The secondary qualities are the *variable* conditions. We can have no perception of a body that is not extended, that is not solid (or the reverse), that is not simple or complex (number), that is not in motion or in rest. These are invariable conditions. But a body is not necessarily of any particular colour, taste, scent, heat, or smoothness; it may be colourless, tasteless, scentless. These secondary qualities are all variable. Consequently the one set, being invariable, have occasioned indissoluble associations in our minds, so that it is not only impossible for us to imagine a body, without at the same time imagining it as endowed with these primary qualities; but also we are irresistibly led to believe that the bodies we perceive do certainly possess these qualities quite independently of us. Hence it has been said that the Creator Himself could not make a body without extension: for such a body is impossible. The phrase should be, 'such a body it is impossible for us to conceive.' But our indissoluble associations are not proofs of objective reality.

That we cannot conceive body without extension is true;

but that, because we cannot conceive it, the contrary must be false is preposterous. All our assertion in this matter can amount to is that knowledge must be subordinate to the conditions of our nature. These conditions are not conditions of things, but of our organisations. If we had been so constituted as that all bodies should affect us with a sensible degree of warmth, we should have been irresistibly led to conclude that warmth was a quality inherent in body; but because warmth varies with different bodies, some warm, others cold, there is no indissoluble association formed. And so of the other qualities.

To return to Locke: he has very well stated the nature of our knowledge of external things, though he excepts primary qualities. 'It is evident,' he says, 'that the bulk, figure and motion of several bodies about us produce in us several sensations, as of colours, sounds, tastes, smells, pleasure and pain, etc. These mechanical affections of bodies having no affinity at all with those ideas they produce in us (there being no conceivable connection between any impulse of any sort of body, and any perception of a colour or smell which we find in our minds), we can have no distinct knowledge of such operations beyond our experience, and can reason about them no otherwise than as the effects produced by an infinitely wise Agent, which perfectly surpass our comprehensions.'

He shortly after says, 'The things that, as far as our observation reaches, we constantly find to proceed regularly, we may conclude do act by a law set them; but yet by a law that we know not: whereby, though causes work steadily, and effects constantly flow from them, yet their connections and dependencies being not discoverable in our ideas, we can have but an experimental knowledge of them.'

Here we have Hume's doctrine of Causation anticipated.

To prove the subjective nature of our knowledge is but one step towards the great question. The second step, which it is vulgarly supposed was only taken by Berkeley and Hume, was also taken by Locke. Hear him. 'Since the

mind in all its thoughts and reasonings hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate, it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant about them. Knowledge, then, seems to me nothing but the perception of the connection and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy, of any one of our ideas.'

This is the great stronghold of Idealism and Scepticism Locke foresaw the use which would be made of it; and he stated the problem with remarkable precision. 'It is evident that the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of ideas it has of them. Our knowledge therefore is real only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things. *But what shall be here the criterion? How shall the mind, when it perceives nothing but its own ideas, know that they agree with the things themselves?*'

Thus has he stated the problem which was solved by Idealism on the one hand, and by Scepticism on the other. Let us see how it will solve it. There are two sorts of ideas he says, the simple and the complex; or, to use more modern language, perceptions and conceptions. The first 'must necessarily be the product of things operating on the mind in a natural way, and producing those perceptions which by the wisdom and will of our Maker they are ordained and adapted to. From whence it follows that the simple ideas are not fictions of our fancies, but the natural and regular productions of things without us really operating upon us; and so carry with them all the conformity which is intended, or which our state requires: for they represent things to us under those appearances which they are fitted to produce in us.'

This, though it cuts the Gordian knot of Scepticism, leaves the question of Idealism unanswered; indeed we shall see presently how Berkeley escaped it by affirming that ideas did not agree with things, there being in truth nothing in objects but the ideas themselves, nothing answering to ideas,

since ideas *were* objects. It is a plain and explicit avowal of the relativity of our knowledge; of the impossibility of ever transcending the sphere of our consciousness and penetrating into the essence of things. Complex ideas being made out of simple ideas, we need not examine their pretensions to infallibility. All human certainty is therefore only a relative certainty. Ideas may be true for us, without being at all true when considered absolutely. Such is Locke's position. He stands upon a ledge of rock between two yawning abysses. He will stand there, and proceed no further. Why should he move when he knows that a single step will precipitate him into some fathomless gulf? No; he is content with his ledge of rock. 'The notice we have by our senses,' he says, 'of the existence of things without us, though it be not altogether so certain as our intuitive knowledge or the deductions of our reason, employed about the clear abstract ideas of our own minds; yet it is an assurance that deserves the name of knowledge. If we persuade ourselves that our faculties act and inform us right concerning the existence of those objects that affect them, it cannot pass for an ill-grounded confidence; for I think nobody can in earnest be so sceptical as to be uncertain of the existence of those which he sees and feels. At least he that can doubt so far (whatever he may have with his own thoughts) will never have any controversy with me, since he can never be sure I say anything contrary to his own opinions. As to myself, I think God has given me assurance enough as to the existence of things without me; since by their different application I can produce in myself both pleasure and pain, which is one great concernment of my present state. We cannot act by anything but our faculties; nor talk of knowledge but by the help of those faculties which are fitted to apprehend even what knowledge is.'

Again, anticipating the objection that 'all we see, hear, feel and taste, think, and do, during our whole being, is but the series and deluding appearances of a long dream, and therefore our knowledge of anything be questioned; I must



desire him to consider that, if all be a dream, then he doth but dream that makes the question; and so it is not much matter that a waking man should answer him. But yet, if he pleases, he may dream that I make him this answer, That the *certainty* of things existing in *rerum naturâ*, when we have the testimony of our senses for it, is not only as great as our frame can attain to, but as our condition needs.' This leaves Idealism unanswered; but it pronounces Scepticism to be frivolous: 'for our faculties,' he continues, 'being not suited to the full extent of being, nor to a perfect, clear, comprehensive knowledge of things free from all doubt and scruple, but to the preservation of us, in whom they are, and accommodated to the use of life; they serve our purpose well enough, if they will but give us certain notice of those things which are convenient or inconvenient to us.'

That this is very good common-sense every one will admit. But it is no answer to Scepticism. Hume, as we shall see hereafter, proclaimed the very same opinions: but the difference between him and Locke was that he knew such opinions had no influence whatever upon the philosophical question, but simply upon the practical affairs of life; whereas Locke, contenting himself with the practical, disdained to answer the philosophical question.\*

We may sum up the contents of this section by saying that Locke distinctly enough foresaw the Idealistic and Sceptical arguments which might be drawn from his principles. He did not draw them, because he thought them frivolous. Aware that all human certitude could only be relative certitude—that human knowledge could never embrace the nature of things, but only the nature of their effects on us—he was content with that amount of truth, and 'sat down in quiet ignorance of those things which are beyond the reach of our capacities.' The grand aim of the *Essay* was to prove that all knowledge is founded on Experience. That proved,

\* REID conjectures that 'Locke had a glimpse of the system which Berkeley afterwards advanced, though he thought proper to suppress it within his own breast.' Not to suppress, but to disdain it.

he was aware that Experience never could be other than relative—it could only be *our* experience of things; and our experience could be no *absolute* standard; it could only be a standard for us.

#### § VI. LOCKE'S CRITICS.

We cannot leave the great Englishman without adverting to the tone adopted by many of his critics. This tone has been anything but considerate. That men should misrepresent Spinoza, Hobbes, or Hume, is intelligible enough; when men are frightened, in their terror they exaggerate and distort what they see. That they should misrepresent Kant, Fichte, or Hegel, is also intelligible; the abstractness of the speculations and the difficulty of the language are sufficient excuses. But that they should misrepresent Locke is wholly inexcusable. He was neither an audacious speculator nor a cloudy writer. His fault was that he spoke plainly and honestly. He endeavoured to explain the Chemistry of the Mind (if the metaphor be permissible), renouncing the vague futile dreams of Alchemy. All those men who still seek to penetrate impenetrable mysteries, and refuse to acknowledge the limits of man's intelligence, treat Locke with the same superb disdain as the ambitious alchemists treated the early chemists. The tone in which most modern Frenchmen and Germans speak of Locke is painful; the tone in which many Englishmen speak of him is inexcusable.

There is no excuse for not understanding Locke. His language may be occasionally loose and wavering, but his meaning may always be gathered from the context. He had not the lucidity of Descartes or of Hobbes; but he was anxious to make himself intelligible, and to this end he varied his expressions, and stated his meaning in a variety of forms. He must not be taken literally. No single passage is to be relied on, unless it be also borne out by the whole tenour of his speculations. Any person merely 'dipping into'

the *Essay* will find passages which seem very contradictory; any person carefully reading it through will find all clear and coherent.

The most notorious of Locke's modern critics is Victor Cousin. He has undertaken an examination and refutation of all Locke's important positions. The celebrity of his name and the popular style of his lectures have given great importance to his criticism; but his criticism is very unfair, and extremely shallow. We cannot here examine his examination: a volume would not suffice to expose all his errors. Let one example of the unfairness, and one of the shallowness, suffice:—

Speaking of the principle of reflection, he says: 'In the first place, remark that Locke here evidently confounds reflection with consciousness. Reflection, strictly speaking, is doubtless a faculty analogous to consciousness, but distinct from it, and which more particularly belongs to philosophers, whereas consciousness belongs to every man.'

We answer that, in the first place, so far from its being evident that Locke confounds reflection with consciousness, his whole *Essay* proves the contrary. In the second place, M. Cousin, using the word reflection in a peculiar sense (*viz.* as tantamount to speculation), forces that sense upon Locke, and thus makes the contradiction! If M. Cousin had interpreted Locke fairly, he could never have thus 'caught him on the hip.'

It is quite true that, in the passage quoted by M. Cousin, the faculty of reflection is limited to the operations of the mind; but, as we said, to pin Locke down to any one passage is unfair; and his whole *Essay* proves, in spite of some ill-worded definitions, that by reflection he meant very much what is usually meant by it, *viz.* the activity of the mind in combining the materials it receives through sense, and becoming thus a source of ideas.

This leads us to the second example. M. Cousin, wishing to prove, against Locke, that we have ideas from some other source besides sensation and reflection, instances the idea of

space, and examines how it was possible to obtain that idea through sensation and reflection. That the idea of pure space could not have been obtained through the senses he seems to think is satisfactorily proved by proving that the idea has nothing sensuous in it; that it could not have been obtained through reflection, because it has nothing to do with the operations of our understanding, is equally evident to him. Hence, as both sources fail, he pronounces Locke's account of the origin of our knowledge 'incomplete and vicious.'

This argument, which extends to several pages, is deemed by M. Cousin triumphant. Locke indeed says that 'we get the idea of space both by our sight and touch.' Any honest inquirer would never quibble upon this—would never suppose Locke meant to say that space is a *sensation*. He would understand that Locke meant to say, 'the idea of space is an abstraction: the primary materials are obtained through our touch and sight.' Locke did not anticipate any quibbling objection, so did not guard against it; but in his explanation of our idea of substance he has given an analogous case; although his antagonists have also frequently objected that the idea of substance never could have been obtained through sense. It has been thought an irresistible argument against Locke's theory: the very fact that we have an idea of substance is supposed to be sufficient proof of some other source of knowledge than sensation and reflection. This is an example of how carelessly Locke has been read. He expressly tells us, in more places than one, that the idea of substance (and by idea he does not here mean *image*, but a *thought*) is an inference grounded upon our experience of external things. True it is that we perceive nothing but phenomena, but our minds are so constituted that we are forced to suppose these phenomena have substances lying underneath them.

'If any one will examine himself,' he says, 'concerning his notions of pure substance in general, he will find he has no other idea of it at all, but only a supposition of he knows not what support of such qualities which are capable of

producing simple ideas in us, which qualities are commonly called accidents. If any one should be asked what is the subject wherein colour or weight inheres, he would have nothing to say but the solid extended parts; and if he were demanded what is it that solidity and extension inhere in: he would not be in a much better case than the Indian, who, saying that the world was supported by a great elephant, was asked what the elephant rested on, to which his answer was, A great tortoise; but being again pressed to know what gave support to the great broad-backed tortoise, replied, Something, he knew not what.'

The same course of argument will apply to space. M. Cousin declaims, and brings forward many arguments and illustrations, all utterly trivial, to show that the idea of space could never have been a sensation. A little more attention in reading the author he attacks would have saved him all this trouble. Locke never for an instant supposed that the idea of space could have been a sensation: on the fact that it could not, he grounds his position that the idea is vague, and is a mere supposition.

Now let us hear an Englishman, who is also an historian:— 'We need not spend much time in pointing out the inconsistencies into which Locke fell,' says Dr. Whewell, 'as all must fall into inconsistencies who recognise no source of knowledge except the senses.' Let us remark, in the first place, that it is surely a questionable procedure thus to pass over so great a man as Locke, whose influence has been general and lasting, and whose 'inconsistencies' it behoved Dr. Whewell, more than most men, to refute, inasmuch as Locke's principles refute *his* whole philosophy. Secondly, it is a misrepresentation to assert Locke's having recognised 'no source of knowledge except the senses.' Locke *did* recognise another source. 'Thus he maintains,' continues Dr. Whewell, 'that our idea of space is derived from the senses of sight and touch—our idea of solidity from the touch alone. Our notion of substance is an unknown support of unknown qualities, and is illustrated by the Indian

fable of the tortoise which supports the elephant which supports the world.'

Space we have already considered in answering M. Cousin. As to solidity, if the idea be not derived from the sensation, from whence is it derived? And as to substance, we must here again notice a misrepresentation of Locke, who does not define it as 'an unknown support of unknown qualities,' but as an unknown support of *known* qualities: from our knowledge of the qualities we infer the existence of some substratum in which they inhere. We are, with respect to substance, somewhat in the condition of a blind man, who whenever he moved in a certain direction, should receive a blow from some revolving wheel. Although unable to see the wheel, and so understand the cause of pain he received, he would not hesitate to attribute that cause to something without him. All he could ever know, unassisted, would be the fact of his being struck when he moved in a certain direction; he could have no other knowledge of the wheel, yet he would be quite certain that there was something besides his pain, and that unknown something would stand to him in a relation somewhat similar to that in which the unknown support of known accidents of bodies stands to us. This is Locke's meaning.

'Our notion of power or cause,' continues the historian, 'is in like manner got from the senses; and yet, though these ideas are thus mere fragments of our experience, Locke does not hesitate to ascribe to them necessity and universality when they occur in propositions. Thus he maintains the necessary truth of geometrical properties; he asserts that the resistance arising from solidity is absolutely insurmountable; he conceives that nothing short of Omnipotence can annihilate a particle of matter; and he has no misgivings in arguing upon the axiom that everything must have a cause. He does not perceive that, upon his own account of the origin of our knowledge, we can have no right to make any of these assertions. If our knowledge of the truths which concern the external world were wholly

derived from experience, all that we could venture to say would be that geometrical properties of figures are true *as far as we have tried them*; that we have seen *no example* of a solid body being reduced to occupy less space by pressure, or of a material substance annihilated by natural means; and that, *wherever we have examined*, we have found that every change has had a cause.'

This is only one among many instances of Dr. Whewell's want of accurate interpretation of Locke. The fallacy on which his argument rests, we shall examine at some length when we come to treat of Kant. Meanwhile let the following passage prove that Locke did not hesitate to ascribe necessity and universality to certain ideas when they 'occur in propositions,' but very clearly explained the nature of this necessity in a masterly passage: 'There is one sort of propositions concerning the existence of anything answerable to such an idea; as having the idea of an elephant, phoenix, motion, or angle, in my mind, the first and natural inquiry is whether such a thing does anywhere exist. And this knowledge is only of particulars. No existence of anything without us, except God, can certainly be known further than our senses inform us.

'There is another sort of propositions, wherein is expressed the agreement or disagreement of our abstract ideas and their dependence on one another. *Such propositions may be universal and certain.* So, having the idea of God and of myself, of fear and obedience, I cannot but be sure that God is to be feared and obeyed by me: and this proposition will be certain concerning man in general, *if I have made an abstract idea of such species whereof I am one particular.* But yet this proposition, how certain soever, that men ought to fear and obey God, proves not to me the existence of men in the world, but *will be true of all such creatures wherever they do exist*: which certainty of such general propositions depends on the agreement or disagreement to be discovered in those abstract ideas. In the former case our knowledge is the consequence of the existence of things producing ideas in

our minds by our senses; in the latter, knowledge is the consequence of the ideas (be they what they will) that are in our minds producing their general certain propositions.

'Many of these are called *æternæ veritates*; and all of them indeed are so; not from being written in the minds of all men, or that they were any of them propositions in any one's mind till he, having got the abstract ideas, joined or separated them by affirmation or negation. But wheresoever we can suppose such a creature as man is endowed with such faculties, and thereby furnished with such ideas as we have, we must conclude he must needs, when he applies his thoughts to the consideration of his ideas, know the truth of certain propositions that will arise from the agreement or disagreement which he will perceive in his own ideas. Such propositions therefore are called eternal truths, not because they are eternal propositions actually formed and antecedent to the understanding that makes them; nor because they are imprinted on the mind from any patterns that are anywhere of them out of the mind and existed before; but because being once made about abstract ideas so as to be true, they will, whenever they can be supposed to be made again at any time by a mind having those ideas, always actually be true.' \* This passage is sufficient to exonerate him from the charge of inconsistency; sufficient also, we believe, to show the error of Dr. Whewell's own conception of the necessity of certain truths.

The foregoing are samples of the style in which the great master is spoken of by his most modern critics. Let them be sufficient warning to the reader of what he is to expect from the partisans of the reaction against Locke, and his followers; and stimulate him to the careful study of that author who 'professes no more than to lay down, candidly and freely, his own conjectures concerning a subject lying somewhat in the dark, without any other design than an unbiassed inquiry after truth.'

\* *Essay*, book iv. ch. xi. §§ 13, 14.





## CHAPTER III.

## LEIBNITZ.

**L**EIBNITZ was a variously accomplished man, whose immense activity made itself conspicuous in many directions.

While Locke was doing his utmost to destroy Ontology by a psychological proof of the relativity of knowledge, his great critic endeavoured to place Ontology on a scientific basis. He constructed a scheme from logical principles, accepted *à priori*. The principle of Contradiction, the principle of Sufficient Reason, the principle of Final Cause, the principle of Agreement (*convenientiæ*), were all, so to speak, derived from the *à priori* notions of the wisdom and goodness of God. Among the infinitude of possibilities, God, being good, must have chosen that which is best. And what is best? That which presents the most perfect order and harmony. The basis of all philosophy, therefore, will be the conviction that whatever is is for the best; that everything is good, harmonious, and beautiful. 'On voit par là comment la véritable physique doit être puisée effectivement à la source des perfections divines.' Philosophy is a Theodicy.

One seems in such passages to hear the murmur of the schools of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Leibnitz indeed was a strayed scholastic; and although he investigated scientific problems, he was inspired by the metaphysical spirit. He may be regarded as the chief of the German School, and the illustrious supporter of that union between Philosophy and Theology, which it is the special effort (let us add the special glory) of modern Thought to have separated.

While from Bacon and Descartes downwards there has been the avowed aim of reconstructing a theory of the universe without the aid of Theology, and *with* the aid of Science, Leibnitz may be called the leader of those who have endeavoured to reconcile Science with Theology; modern Philosophy has risen against Scholasticism and its Method, as against a disastrous despotism, Leibnitz avowed his sympathy with Scholasticism, and his efforts to restore it under better auspices; modern Science has aimed at constructing such Metaphysics as it required from the data and conclusions of Physics, Leibnitz aimed at the construction of Physics from the data and conclusions of Metaphysics. In one word, while the *à posteriori* Method has come more and more into favour, Leibnitz remains a most vigorous and unhesitating advocate of the *à priori* Method. The two fundamental conceptions of Monads, as the unities of Matter and Form, and of Pre-established Harmony between the inner and outer worlds, are the metaphysical and theological conceptions to which his *à priori* Method led him. His starting point is that of Final Cause (Plan), which includes within it, or so to speak, engenders, Causality, *i.e.* efficient cause. Thus the physical world depends on the moral world; Physics on Metaphysics; phenomena on Order; reality on Thought. This scheme of Idealism, which may be regarded as a prefiguration of the Absolute Idealism of Hegel, we may trace either as a deduction from his conception of Final Cause (*Zweckbegriff*), or upwards from his conception of Matter and Force. The latter course will be followed here.

Let us begin with the problem of Substance.

Descartes and Spinoza had both assumed that the essence of Substance consisted in Extension. Leibnitz victoriously argued that Extension alone was incompetent to explain all the characters of Substance. If we admit that there is no body which has not Extension, this by no means carries the conclusion that bodies are nothing but Extension; whereas on the contrary from the admission of Substance as Force we conclude the existence of Extension. Bodies are not

simple magnitudes, or else geometry would be the whole of science. In the concept of Substance there is implied that of Motion, which is not deducible from magnitude. Hence it is necessary to mount to a higher metaphysical conception which will embrace all physics—the conception of Force.\*

Further, while it is impossible to conceive Substance fully and clearly except as Force, it is equally impossible to form a figurative conception of Force; which is manifested to us in its effects, not in itself. We can demonstrate its *action* by mathematical rules; but what it *is*, we cannot demonstrate by mathematics or experiment. No analysis discloses this fountain of all activity, so that we can say, Here is Force, as the mathematician says, Here is a Circle; or the physicist says, Here is a Vibration. Why is this? Because Force is not a physical, but a metaphysical notion.†

Thus is Force made to absorb Substance, and appear in its true character as Spirit. It belongs to the essence of Soul. Its cardinal qualities, by which alone we can define it, are Indivisibility, Simplicity, Originality and Immortality; which qualities though not sensible are deducible, and are thus deduced:—Force cannot be divisible, because divisibility belongs to Extension, and Extension alone is not Force. Only the extended is divisible; therefore Force, as unextended, is indivisible.‡ Force must be simple, because only that which is divisible, consisting of parts, can be complex. Force must be original, primitive, and eternal, because only that which is composite can arise, and only that which arises can pass away.

Leibnitz having thus got his metaphysical standing-point, was enabled to survey phenomena, and see in them a multiple of existent Forces, or Souls, which he called Monads. They are the true unities (*veræ unitates*), each preserving its individuality indestructible. He calls them

\* LEIBNITZ: *Opera Philosophica*, ed. ERDMANN, pp. 112-4.

† *Opera*, pp. 155-6.

‡ This argument halts. Force is conceived as variable, and is admitted to be now greater, now less; here the element of Magnitude is pre-supposed.

*metaphysical points*, to distinguish them from the physical and mathematical points: the physical having magnitude because they are extended; the mathematical having indeed no magnitude, but having no reality.\* The Monads are thus distinguishable from atoms, which indeed are only smaller corpuscles. 'Pour trouver ces unités réelles,' he says, 'je fus contraint de recourir à un atome formel, puisqu'un être matériel ne saurait être en même temps matériel et parfaitement indivisible, ou doué d'une véritable unité.'†

The derivation of a material universe from spiritual Forces is thus effected:—The monad, as a spiritual existence, is penetrable, for spirit is capable of receiving all forms within it; but as a material existence the monad is impenetrable, nay, its materiality consists in this very impenetrability; and this impenetrability, again, is only the expression of the individuality of the monad. As an individual it is *exclusive*, limited; the exclusion and limitation arise from the co-existence of independent monads, each exerting its force. One limits the other; one excludes the other. Matter is thus the necessary consequence of Force—its manifested energy. It is the *vis resistendi*—*quod penetranti resistit*. Force has two aspects, active and passive. The passive is what Kepler and his successors name *vis inertiae*, and is by Leibnitz called *materia prima*; from this Density or Mass, which he calls *materia secunda*, is derived. The active force, on the other hand, is the soul of matter—the impulse of its movement. This impulse, or inborn appetite, realises itself as extended Matter. In itself Force is not extended, nor can Matter be said to consist *in* extension, but in the *need* for extension, *extensionis exigentia*; which need is innate in Force, as the need for Representation is innate in Mental

\* 'On les pourrait appeler *points métaphysiques*: ils ont quelque chose de vital, et une espèce de perception, et les points mathématiques sont leur point de vue pour exprimer l'univers. . . . Ainsi les points physiques ne sont indivisibles qu'en apparence; les points mathématiques sont exacts, mais ce ne sont que des modalités: il n'y a que les points métaphysiques ou de substance, constitués par les formes ou *âmes*, qui soient exacts et réels.' *Système nouveau*, § 11, *Opera*, p. 126.

† *Loc. cit.* 124.

Force. 'L'étendue est la diffusion de cette qualité ou nature : par exemple, dans le lait il y a une étendue ou diffusion de la blancheur, dans le corps en général une étendue ou diffusion de l'*antitypie* ou de la matérialité.'

But the material side of the monad is only one aspect of Force. We should err as grossly in considering monads to be only dynamic bodies, as in considering them to be only forces without material limits and differences. Force is active no less than passive. Active Force is that which acts from itself, spontaneously, inalterably. It is self-moved, not moveable; self-divided, not divisible. It constitutes the Form; the Substantial Form; the Entelechy : in one word the *soul*.\*

Matter is thus the externality of Mind, the manifestation of Force, the Phenomenon of Spirit. Aware of the equivocalness of the word Spirit, especially in conjunction with Soul, Leibnitz warns us against the supposition of it as something *intelligent*; he uses the word as expressing the Form or Monad, which has by nature a kind of *striving*, or appetency, and *perception*; he distinguishes it from the superior souls, the intelligent and human, which must not be sought everywhere.† *Appetitus* is what we call *tendency*, *agendi conatus*. *Perceptio* is the *representative* faculty, *representatio variationis externæ in interna*, the expression of the many in the one.‡ But these powers only rise to intelligence and consciousness in Man. Nature is an unconscious Soul.

Evolving Matter from Force, he got rid of the old Dualism of Matter and Mind as two independent existences; and with it the insoluble difficulty of how Matter could act upon Mind; how two things separated by the whole diameter of being, could come into union yet remain distinct.

Malebranche § tried to solve it by the once famous hypo-

\* 'Et tale principium appellamus substantiale, item vim primitivam, *ἐντελέχειαν τῆς πρώτης*, uno nomine *animam*, quod activum cum passivo conjunctum *substantiam completam* constituit.' *Opera*, p. 463.

† *De ipsa Natura*, § 12, *Opera*, p. 158.

‡ *Opera*, pp. 438, 464.

§ MALEBRANCHE: *Recherche de la Vérité*, lib. vi. ch. 3. Comp. DESCARTES: *Princip. phil.* ii. § 36.

thesis of 'occasional causes':—We see all things in God; and it is God who produces sensations in us coincident with the movements of bodies; or *vice versâ* produces movements in bodies coincident with our volitions.

Leibnitz also saw the difficulty, but objected to the explanation of 'occasional causes,' because it involved a perpetual miracle. Why a perpetual miracle should be rejected, he did not make clear; still less did he show wherein his favourite hypothesis of a Pre-established Harmony surpasses the philosophic value of Occasional Causes: the two only differ as a constant and a constantly-renewed action of the deity; what in the one conception is the fluent motion of God's agency, is in the other conception crystallised into preordained Plan.


Impressions on the body were supposed to create sensations in the mind; but how? Leibnitz\* denied the fact; declared that sensations came *from* within, and were only in harmony with external objects; declared that body and mind were so adjusted that they were like two unconnected clocks, so constructed that the instant one strikes the hour, the other strikes it.† 'I cannot help coming to this notion,' he says, 'that God created the soul in such a manner at first that it should *represent* within itself all the simultaneous changes in the body; and that He has made the body also in such a manner as that it must of itself do what the soul wills: so that the laws which make the thoughts of the soul follow each other in regular succession *must* produce *images* which shall be coincident with the impressions made by external objects upon our organs of sense; while the laws by which the motions of the body follow each other are likewise so coincident with the thoughts of the soul as to give to our *volitions* and *actions* the very same appearance as if the latter were really the natural and the necessary consequence of the former.'

\* *Théodicée*, i. 65.

† Dr. WILLIS in his *Life of Spinoza* (1870), p. 139, declares the passage in the text to be inexact, adding that Leibnitz speaks of one clock not two. If my critic will turn to *Opera*, pp. 130, 134, and 430, he may satisfy himself that Leibnitz very distinctly says: 'Figurez-vous deux horloges ou deux montres,' &c.

The Pre-established Harmony hypothesis has carried the name of Leibnitz far and wide (on the breath of Laughter mostly), and made him known to thousands who would never otherwise have heard of him. Kuno Fischer is, I believe, the first writer who has seen this hypothesis in its true light, namely, as a presentation of Leibnitz's metaphysical conception of the world in a popularly intelligible aspect. The two clocks figured the two aspects of the one existence, which Philosophy, no less than Common Opinion, held to be not one, but two disparate existences. Matter and Mind were conceived as two, even by Spinoza, though he regarded them only as Attributes of the one Substance. Leibnitz had to show how these opposites could unite; and taking his stand on the common ground, regarding them *as* opposites, he said their agreement or union could only be conceived as resulting from influx, assistance, or pre-established harmony. These three conceptions he illustrated by supposing two independent clocks which should perfectly accord: 1st. Because, as in the experiment of Huygens, the vibrations of the one influenced those of the other. 2nd. Because an attendant vigilantly rectified any deviation which might occur, and so kept the two in agreement. 3rd. Because the clocks were from the first so constructed that the action of each would exactly correspond with the action of the other. The first supposition was untenable, because for an *influxus physicus*, it would be necessary that the particles should pass from one to another. The second was untenable because it required a perpetual interference—a perpetual miracle. Only the third supposition therefore remained, namely, that 'Dieu a fait dès le commencement chacune de ces deux substances de telle nature qu'en ne suivant que ses propres loix qu'elle a reçues avec son être, elle s'accorde pourtant avec l'autre, tout comme s'il y avoit une influence mutuelle, ou comme si Dieu y mettoit toujours la main au-delà de son concours général.'

The attentive reader will remark that the hypothesis of mutual influence by no means requires that the material



particles of the one should pass over to the other, as Leibnitz assumes; it only requires that the motions of the particles should be rhythmic and communicable. But Leibnitz had in his eye the old hypothesis of sensible species, images, eidola, detaching themselves from objects, and entering the mind. He denied that the atoms could penetrate each other; figuratively declaring that they had 'no windows through which an entrance could be made.' The limits of individuality were opposed to all physical influx. It should be observed that Leibnitz, who denied—and I think rightly denied—the generally accepted idea of the *communication* of Motion from without, may have denied the explanation of Huygens that the vibrations of one clock were communicated to the other, each clock having only its own motions. On this ground he would have opposed the influence of Motion as he opposed the influx of particles. 'Accidents cannot detach themselves and walk out of substances, as the scholastics formerly imagined.' But unless he had also denied that motions could be *compounded*, as atoms could be aggregated, he would have had no solid reason for the denial of mutual influence.

The reader will further observe another difficulty. If, as Leibnitz maintains, the monad is at once *both* soul and body, force and matter, there needs neither 'influence' nor 'plan' to account for their harmony. The movements of Matter are but the objective side of the movements of Mind. There is no harmony, for there are not two existences to harmonise. Here Kuno Fischer's suggestion that the 'Pre-established' hypothesis was only a pedagogic illustration, and that the relation between Soul and Body was by him treated as an anthropological not as a metaphysical question, finds its strongest support. Nevertheless we have still to reconcile the many passages in which the existence of *two* disconnected spheres, that of Mind and that of Body, harmonised in their movements, is expressly maintained: 'que cette correspondance sert à expliquer la communication des substances et l'union de l'âme avec le corps par les loix de la nature.' In



reply to Foucher's objection that the harmony renders Matter superfluous, he says: God has willed that there should be many substances, and 'il a trouvé bon que les modifications de l'âme répondissent à *quelque chose* de dehors.'\* And he confesses that his illustration of the two disconnected clocks, was to prove the communication between '*deux substances aussi différentes que l'âme et le corps.*'† The harmony results because the movement of external things following their own special laws, coincides with the movement of the soul, which has equally its special laws. 'The first difficulty consists in this question, are the two substances which accord made for each other? I answer, yes, since if they accord, God has made them so.'‡

The discrepancy is reconciled if we adopt Fischer's suggestion, that in these, and all other passages, in which Leibnitz speaks of Matter and Mind as two Substances, or as two disconnected spheres, he is only accommodating himself to popular language. Although I do not remember any express indication of such a compliance, in this particular case, there are several places in which he says that in spite of Copernicus we still speak of the 'sun rising and setting;' and there can be no sort of doubt that he refused to regard either Matter or Mind as substances at all: their supposed opposition vanishes under the light of the Principle of Continuity, which dissolves all difference.

Every monad is at once body and soul, a besouled body, a living machine, a complex of active and passive Forces. The active Force is living, spontaneous, planning; the passive is moveable, mechanical, efficient. The relation of soul to body is the relation of an aim to its execution—of a plan to the movements which realise it. Leibnitz thus, as Fischer remarks, reproduces Aristotle, Plato, and Pythagoras: after Aristotle he makes the soul the final cause or Entelechy of the body; after Plato its Form or Idea; after Pythagoras its harmony. We must not therefore say there is harmony

\* *Opera*, pp. 131, 132.† *Ibid.* p. 133.‡ *Ibid.* p. 458.

between soul and body, as if these were two, but the soul is the harmony of the body.\*

We must now consider the fundamental conception which may be said to animate the whole of this philosophy, that of Final Cause. In our *Prolegomena*, § 50, and vol. I. p. 317, we have discussed this conception of Plan, which, instead of regarding a resultant as a resultant, regards it as a directing guide. The end which we see *achieved*, is detached from its historic moments and erected into a pre-existent *aim*. The idea we thus form of an event is supposed to have engendered the event. Referring the reader to this discussion, we will ask him on returning from it to consider the arguments by which Leibnitz upholds the Final Causes so energetically denounced by Bacon, Descartes, and Spinoza.

He does not, as less subtle advocates of this cause often do, fall into the absurdity of making the Plan something external, as it is in Art. The Final Cause is not independent of the means, but includes and engenders them. Art can only execute its Plan by bringing together foreign materials, Nature incarnates her Plan in the material. Thus the sculptor realises his idea of Hercules in marble, but it is a dead Hercules. Nature realises her idea in the living Hercules—the soul incorporates itself. The soul is thus the Plan of the body in a double sense, namely, as a condition and a perfection, as a possibility and an actuality. It first exists as a simple *disposition*—the possibility of being. This disposition includes,—and including engenders,—the individual. Every monad is an individual that evolves itself. The evolution is conformable to plan, because the efficient or mechanical causes are under the inspiration and guidance of spiritual spontaneous activity. The body acts as corporeal, that is, as mechanical, but its motive is teleological.

Thus efficient causes are related to final causes, as Machinery to Life, as passive to active forces. Soul and body are not two different essences, but the two primitive

\* KUNO FISCHER: *Geschichte der neuen Philosophie*, 1867, ii. 391.

forces constituting every monad. And just as the soul and body form an Individual, so the spiritual and corporeal worlds are not different worlds but an Universe or Cosmos.\*

It is on these grounds that Leibnitz places the conception of Plan in the supreme position, using it 'not only as of advantage to Morality and Religion, but also as an organon of physical discovery.'†

Thus armed, Leibnitz maintains the embryological doctrine (which Aristotle had satisfactorily refuted‡) of Preformation, or Pre-existence; a doctrine which sets forth that the oak is contained in the acorn, the man in the ovum, 'et que sa génération apparente n'est que développement, et une espèce d'augmentation.' 'Les expériences de notre temps nous portent à croire que les âmes et même les animaux ont toujours existé, quoiqu'en petit volume.'§ It is unnecessary now-a-days to refute this hypothesis; our interest in it is its necessary position in his scheme, and the sort of countenance it gave to his conception of Plan as the *supreme condition*: for this is the true description of Plan; efficient causes are the material conditions of an effect, but over and above these there is the supreme (spiritual) condition, which is Plan.

Two points deserve notice here: 1st, that Leibnitz has succeeded where Hegel failed, namely, in finding a First Principle which contained within itself the necessity of development; 2nd, that the resolution of this Principle into an Idea was also effected without breach of continuity, so that Idealism may be said to have its metaphysical germ in the definition of Force.

I. *Development*.—The monad is a self-developing force; were it merely passive, it would have material extension, but

\* KUNO FISCHER, here (p. 399), notices and refutes the idea that the Pre-established Harmony is borrowed from SPINOZA; he shows the radical opposition of the two thinkers.

† 'Non tantum prodesse ad virtutem et pietatem in Ethica et Theologia naturali sed etiam in ipsa Physica ad inveniendum et detegendum abditas veritates.' *Opera*, p. 155.

‡ Conf. my *Aristotle: a chapter from the history of Science*, pp. 352-9.

§ *Opera*, 125, 179; conf. *De Anima Brutorum*, § xi.

no change; being, however, active, no less than passive, it has within it the principle of change.\* Moreover, the activity is implied in the passivity, as an inseparable correlate: 'tout ce qui pâtit doit agir réciproquement, et tout ce qui agit doit pâtir quelque réaction.'† The activity is internal, since no external cause can influence or penetrate it.‡ All these changes, issuing from within, form a series which was *virtually* pre-existent, and might have been foreseen by superior intelligence.§ For we must not suppose that the individual is the *sum* of these changes, their product, it is rather their metaphysical *unity*, or subject. Herein we have the explanation of that obscure passage respecting specification which runs thus: 'Mais il faut aussi qu'outre le principe du changement [active force] il y ait *un détail de ce qui change*, qui fasse pour ainsi dire la spécification et la variété des substances simples.'|| What is this 'détail de ce qui change?' It is, as Kuno Fischer says, the subject of change, the special peculiarity of the monad. 'Ce détail,' adds Leibnitz, 'doit envelopper une multitude dans l'unité, car tout changement naturel se faisant par degrés, *quelque chose change et quelque chose reste*, et par conséquent il faut que dans la substance simple il y ait une pluralité d'affections et de rapports, quoiqu'il n'y en ait point de parties.'

II. *The Idea*.—The passage just cited, which has puzzled many students, will explain for us that resolution of the

\* 'Differt enim vis activa a potentia nuda vulgo scholis cognita, quod potentia activa scholasticorum, seu facultas, nihil aliud est quam propinqua agendi possibilitas, quæ tamen aliena excitatione, et velut stimulo indiget, ut in actum transferatur. Sed vis activa actum quendam sive *ἐντελέχειαν* continet, atque inter facultatem agendi actionemque ipsam media est et conatum involvit; atque ita per se ipsam in operationem fertur; nec auxiliis indiget, sed sola sublatione impeditenti.' *De primæ philosophiæ emendatione. Opera*, p. 122.

† *Sur l'essence du corps. Opera*, p. 113.

‡ *Monadologie*, § 11.

§ 'Que chacune de ces substances contient dans sa nature *legem continuationis series suarum operationum*, et tout ce qui lui est arrivé et arrivera.' *Lettre à Arnauld: Op.* 107. 'Et comme tout présent état d'une substance simple est naturellement une suite de son état précédent, tellement que le présent est gros de l'avenir.' *Monadologie*, § 22: *Op.* 706.

" *Monadologie*, § 12.

monad itself into an Idea which has also been regarded as unintelligible. First note that the active Subject—the *détail de ce qui change*—comprises multiplicity in unity. Next note that Perception is defined the ‘expression of multiplicity in unity.’ Then add that the multiple changes which exist performed in the monad, exist ideally, not materially, and that the soul has a *prevision* of the future rather than actual *comprehension* of it. Crown all by the definition of the *vis representativa*, as the power of making present, and you have the whole scheme before you: the *entelechie* or active force is a representative force—‘habet variationem internam secundum quam etiam variantur actiones externæ; sed perceptio nihil aliud est quam illa ipsa representatio variationis externæ in interna.’\* The representative nature is elsewhere declared to be the power possessed by the monad of expressing the relations of external objects to it, which power was bestowed on it at its creation, and constitutes its individuality; each represents exactly the whole universe from its own point of view; and the perceptions or expressions of external objects arising in the soul in virtue of her own laws, as if in a world apart.†

Thus the existence of Motion implies an antecedent Active Force. This, in turn, implies an Aim or Plan, since the action must have a direction. Plan, in turn, implies Intelligence. Thus the primitive conception of Force is resolved into Representation—and Things are representative representations.

In this ‘evolution of the Idea’ we must, however, distinguish the grades, and not confound the unconscious perception of inferior monads with the conscious perception of higher monads; animals, plants, and minerals are all incessantly guided by the immanent Plan, the active final cause; they all represent the objects in relation to them; but they are not conscious of their aim, they do not *know* the representations. Man alone (unless there be higher beings, which

\* *De Anima Brutorum*, § viii. *Opera*, 464.

† *Système nouveau*, § 14. *Opera*, p. 127.

Leibnitz thinks (a necessary deduction from the Law of Continuity) has true knowledge. This assumption of a special endowment for Man, while it gets rid of the objectionable anthropomorphism which seemed to identify cosmical phenomena with human phenomena, and made the mineral *intelligent*, though intelligent at a lower power, is open to the twofold objection that it is a breach in the Law of Continuity, and that it is opposed to the very Law of Analogy which Leibnitz invokes as its basis. If man has a representative power which is analogous to that of animals, plants, and minerals, his intellect may be higher than theirs, but must be of the same nature, differing solely in degree. And this is the opinion held by Leibnitz when treating of the Cosmos. He forsakes it when treating specially of Psychology, and notably in his polemic against Locke.\*

Unless we identify the Active Force in Things with Representations, we cannot adopt his ideal hypothesis; and if we identify them, we must pursue the analogy, and declare that minerals as well as men have not only perceptions and desires, but conceptions, ratiocinations, terrors, pains, and pleasures. The latter conclusion is absurd, and is repudiated in advance by him; but his important distinction of Perception and Apperception—Unconscious and Conscious states will not save the fundamental position. For of two things, one: either the Law of Continuity is absolute, and there can only be variations of degree; or the Law is relative, and variations of degree, at certain stages, suddenly start into variations of kind. The first supposition anthropomorphizes the Cosmos. The second supposition admits the special character of Humanity, the exclusive nature of the human soul, but withdraws from the Cosmos that immanent Intelligence which it was the purpose of Leibnitz to prove.

\* 'On pourroit se servir d'un mot plus général que celui de *pensée*, savoir de celui de *perception*, en n'attribuant la pensée qu'aux esprits, au lieu que la perception appartient à toutes les Entéléchies. Mais je ne veux pourtant contester à personne la liberté de prendre le terme de pensée dans la même généralité.'—*Nouveaux Essais*: *Opera*, p. 268.

Here as throughout he is misguided by the principle of *virtual* existence.

The fact is Leibnitz was placed in the unpleasant dilemma of assimilating Man to animals, and through these to plants, and through these again to minerals, or else of relinquishing his fundamental positions. He endeavoured to escape by assigning *sensible* representation to animals, denying them *thought*. Their perceptive power enables them to feel, but not to know; their representations remain impressions, do not become objects. Their judgments are memories, never notions; memories combining sensible experiences, not *causal* intuitions. The dog remembers the pain inflicted by the stick; he does not dread the stick because he knows from causality that it *must* pain him if it strike him; he dreads it because it *has* pained him.\* Man alone has the power of ratiocination. The *a priori* principles by which his reason is guided are innate. They form the primitive nature of Mind. The origin of knowledge therefore must not be sought in Experience, but in these preformed, pre-existent Ideas which constitute the Mind—not, indeed, according to the vulgar hypothesis which Locke opposed, pre-existent as *actual*, but as *virtual—potential*—called into actuality through Experience. They form the *unconscious* groundwork of the Mind; and Locke confounds *innate* with *known*, when he argues against them. In so arguing Locke suppresses the important distinction between potential and actual, and implies that Force does not exist where it is not manifested.

All thus turns upon the Aristotelian distinction of virtual and actual. But even this will not give us the necessary deduction of Mind as a special endowment of Man. The distinction between Man and Animal is asserted, not deduced. Leibnitz consents to class souls apart, as monads that have memory added to perception and appetency; and on similar grounds he classes minds apart, as monads that add to memory 'the knowledge of necessary and eternal truths.†

\* *De Anima Brutorum. Monadologie. Principes de la Nature et de la Grdee.*

† *Monadologie*, § 29. *Principes de la Nature*, § 5.

But this addition he assumes. It is a consequence of a kind of 'election,' through which the animal soul is raised to the prerogative of rational souls. The animal soul mirrors the universe and its creatures, but the rational soul mirrors Divinity itself, the author of nature, and is 'not only capable of knowing the universe, but in some sort of creating one for itself, each mind being a small deity in its own department.'\* If we accept his assertion that in animals and plants the perceptions are unconscious, whereas in man they are conscious—perception being 'the internal state of the monad, representing external things,' and conscience, or apperception, being 'the reflective knowledge of that internal state,'† we may thereby save the Law of Continuity from any breach. But obviously this assertion is wholly destitute of proof; and if the Law of Analogy obliges us to regard the activity of animals, plants, and minerals as perceptions, and intelligently guided, we require some stringent proof before admitting that the activity of Man, or any special group of his activities, has the supreme prerogative of judgment by Causality, the supreme prerogative of Innate Ideas. The *central monad*, which in Man is Mind, and in the Animal or Plant is only Soul, must differ only in degree, not in kind, if the Law of Continuity holds good. Leibnitz indeed says that 'there is an infinity of degrees among monads, some of them more or less dominant over the others.'‡ And if God is the *monas monadum*, so in a smaller sphere may the Mind be a *monas monadum*.

Modern Biology presents us with an illustration of the Monadology, in its conception of the Organism as constituted by an infinite number of cells, each cell having an independent life of its own,—origin, development, and death. The compound result of all these separate lives is the Life of the Organism. There is a school of biologists which holds that the Life of the Organism is not the sum of these cells, but that over and above these cells and their lives, there is a

\* *Monadologie*, § 82.† *Principes de la Nature*, § 4.‡ *Loc. cit.*



Vital Principle which guides their forces in accordance with its nature. For this Vital Principle a Leibnitzian might substitute a Central Cell, primitively distinguished from all subordinate cells by forces of a higher reach, yet in all other essential respects analogous to the subordinate cells.

I must not dwell longer on these metaphysical hypotheses; and I have dwelt so long on them, mainly as a preparation for the understanding of German Philosophy, which they in a great measure inspired. As a help to the student the following remark may be added. The whole speculations of Leibnitz may be regarded as *illustrations of the conception of Plan (Final Cause) evolving itself through the Law of Continuity, by means of an immanent Polarity*. The polarities, or necessary correlates, are Active and Passive, Aim and Means, Force and Extension, Spontaneity and Causality, Living Mechanism and Causal Mechanism, Form and Matter, Soul and Body, Ideal and Actual, Conscious and Unconscious. In this list the first of each couple corresponds with all the other firsts, and the second with all the other seconds.

Quitting this region of Metaphysics we must now pass to that of Psychology, at least in relation to the criticism of Locke which forms one of his three capital works. The *Nouveaux Essais* were not published till many years after his death, and are not included in the edition by M. Dutens. The work was unknown to Dugald Stewart; and this fact will explain a passage in his *Dissertation*, where he says that Leibnitz always speaks coldly of Locke's *Essay*. This is inexact. In the brief *Réflexions sur l'Essai*,\* he speaks with evident admiration, and marks his dissent firmly yet without acrimony or superciliousness; admitting that Locke had good reason for opposing the prejudices current respecting innate ideas. And in the *Nouveaux Essais* he treats his great adversary with due respect, in the preface speaking of him with eulogy. 'The *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, written by an

\* *Opera*, p. 136.

illustrious Englishman, being one of the finest and most esteemed works of our time, I have resolved to make some comments on it. . . . Thus I shall procure a favourable introduction for my thoughts by placing them in such good company. . . . It is true that I am often of a different opinion; but so far from detracting on that account from the merit of this celebrated writer, I do him justice in making known in what and wherefore I differ from him, when I judge it necessary to prevent his authority from prevailing over reason on some important points. In fact, although the author of the *Essay* says a thousand things which I must applaud, yet our systems greatly differ. His has greater affinity to that of Aristotle,—mine, to that of Plato.' This is the spirit in which the Homeric heroes regard their adversaries; an interchange of admiration for each other's prowess does not deaden one of their blows, but it makes the combat more dignified.

Leibnitz, as we said, was an avowed upholder of Scholasticism, but under an improved form. 'In my opinion true philosophy consists in combining Plato with Aristotle and Democritus.'\* He was deeply read in Suarez, the last of the Scholastics; borrowed largely from Giordano Bruno; was influenced greatly by Descartes and Spinoza, though always at war with them; and did his utmost to combine Greek Philosophy with Christian Philosophy.

To a mind thus furnished, the doctrines of Locke must needs have been unwelcome; indeed they could not be expected to gain admission. Moreover, as F. Schlegel observed, every man is born either a Platonist or an Aristotelian.† Leibnitz and Locke were examples of this antagonism: 'Our differences,' says Leibnitz, 'are important. The question between us is whether the soul in itself is entirely empty, like tablets upon which nothing has been written (*tabula rasa*), according to Aristotle and the author of the *Essay*;

\* *Opera*, p. 446.

† COLERIDGE used to pass off this aphorism as his own. It is to be found, however, in SCHLEGEL: *Geschichte der Literatur*.

and whether all that is there traced comes wholly from the senses and experience ; or whether the soul originally contains the principles of several notions and doctrines, which the external objects only awaken on occasions, as I believe with Plato.'

The nature of the problem is well stated here ; and Leibnitz sides with Plato in his solution of it. The main arguments by which he supports his view are those so often since repeated of the Universality and Necessity of certain truths, and of the incapacity of Experience to furnish us with anything beyond a knowledge of individual cases. 'For if any event can be foreseen before it has been tried, it is manifest that *we* contribute something for our own parts.' *Ergo*, mere experience, it is argued, does *not* constitute all our knowledge. 'The senses, although *necessary* for all actual knowledge, are not sufficient to *give* us all of it ; since the senses never can give anything but examples, that is to say, particular or individual truths. But all the examples which confirm a general truth, however numerous, do not suffice to establish the universal necessity of that truth ; for it does not follow that that which has once occurred will always occur in the same way.'

Leibnitz continues : 'Whence it appears that necessary truths, such as we find in mathematics, and particularly in arithmetic and geometry, must have principles of which the proof does not depend upon examples, nor consequently upon the senses, although without the senses one would never have thought of them. So also logic, metaphysics, and morals are full of such truths, and consequently their proofs can only come from those internal principles which are called *innate*.'

Locke would perfectly have agreed with these premises, but the conclusion he would have rejected. That the senses alone could not furnish us with any general truth, he taught as expressly as Leibnitz did ; but this in no way affects his system, for he did not build his system upon the senses alone.

Leibnitz, however, seems to have been misled by Locke's

language in the first definition of Reflection; for he says, 'Perhaps the opinions of our able author are not so far from mine as they appear to be. For, after having employed the whole of his first book against innate knowledge taken in a certain sense, he acknowledges in the beginning of the second that there are ideas which do not originate from the senses, but arise from Reflection. Now reflection is nothing but attention to that which passes within us; and *the senses do not convey to us what we already possess within ourselves*. Can it then be denied that there is much innate in the mind?'

The passage in italics is a curious instance of how the mind, preoccupied with its own opinions, sees them reflected in the expressions of others. Leibnitz here assumes the very point at issue; assumes that the mind has innate ideas which the senses cannot convey to it; and this assumption he supposes to be contained in Locke's words. Locke taught precisely the contrary. 'The mind is itself innate,' continues Leibnitz—(to which we reiterate our objection: innate in *what*? In itself? or in us? To say that it is innate in itself is a quibble; that it is innate in *us*, is a displacement of the question: no one in those days doubted that the mind of man was born in man—born with man; the question was, Are there any ideas born *with* the mind, or are all ideas acquired *by* the mind?) 'The mind is itself innate, and there are included in it substance, duration, change, action, perception, pleasure, and a thousand other objects of our intellectual ideas. . . . I have used the comparison of a block of marble which has certain veins in it, rather than a plain piece of marble such as the philosophers call *tabula rasa*; because, if the soul resembled tablets unwritten on, truths would be in us like the figure of Hercules is in the block of marble, when that marble may receive indifferently one figure or another. But if there are veins in the marble which mark the figure of Hercules rather than any other figure, that marble would be more determinate, and the figure of Hercules would in some way be innate, although

labour would be necessary to discover the veins, and to free them from their envelopment of marble. Thus are ideas and truths innate in us.'

This is an ingenious statement of the theory: unfortunately for it, the very existence of these veins in the marble is an assumption, and an assumption not made for the facilitating of inquiry, but simply for the proof of the theory assumed: it is an hypothesis framed for the sake of explaining—what?—the hypothesis itself! Ideas are first assumed to be innate; to prove this assumption, another assumption—the existence of innate ideas—is made; and the theory is complete.

The real force of Leibnitz's theory lies in his distinction between contingent and necessary truths, and in his position that Experience alone could never furnish us with necessary truths: a position we shall have to examine closely when we come to Kant, who gave it its most authoritative form. The weakness of the theory, as propounded by Leibnitz, is that it makes no consistent distinction between empirical and *a priori* knowledge. Locke had shaken, if he had not shattered, the old assumption of Innate Ideas, by showing that the ideas were deducible from Experience. Leibnitz attempted to meet this by assuming that all knowledge was in truth innate, and that what Locke supposed to be *given in* Experience was simply *evolved by* Experience.\* Herein the distinction between necessary and contingent disappears; if all knowledge is innate, all is developed, all stands on equal footing of certainty. Kant perceived the contradiction; but no one before Kant saw how it could be rectified.

One passage will suffice to exhibit the contrast between Locke and Leibnitz (*Philalèthe* stands for Locke):—

'*Philalèthe*.—L'entendement ne ressemble pas mal à un cabinet entièrement obscur, qui n'aurait que quelques petites

\* 'Lorsque vous direz que les idées nous viennent de l'une ou l'autre de ces causes (observation and reflection), je l'entends de leur perception actuelle, car je crois d'avoir montré qu'elles sont en nous avant qu'on s'en aperçoive.'—*Nouveaux Essais*, liv. ii. ch. i. Comp. liv. i.

ouvertures pour laisser entrer par dehors les images extérieures et visibles, de sorte que si ces images, venant à se peindre dans ce cabinet obscur, pouvaient y rester et y être placées en ordre, en sorte qu'on pouvait les retrouver dans l'occasion, il y aurait une grande ressemblance entre ce cabinet et l'entendement humain.

*'Théophile.*—Pour rendre la ressemblance plus grande, il faudrait supposer que dans la chambre obscure il y eût une toile pour recevoir les espèces, qui ne fût pas unie, mais diversifiée par des plis représentant les connaissances innées; que de plus cette toile étant tendue eût une manière de ressort ou force d'agir, et même une action ou réaction accommodée tant aux plis passés qu'aux nouveaux venus des impressions des espèces.'\*

A dispassionate review of the controversy, as conducted by the Sensationalists on the one hand, and the Animists on the other, discloses the incompleteness of both. Locke had but a vague and vacillating conception of the nature of the Understanding upon which the Senses traced images; or of the processes by which sensation and ideation were effected. He was forced to admit innate faculties, but had no precise conception of what they were, nor of how they operated. Leibnitz properly objected that these naked faculties, 'les facultés sans quelque acte, en un mot, les pures puissances de l'école, ne sont que des fictions que la nature ne connaît point et qu'on obtient en faisant des abstractions.'

But Leibnitz himself, though vindicating the necessary co-operation of the Mind (the co-operation of subject with object, in Kant's phrase), had no precise conception, and was reduced to mere assumption. Because we are born with certain dispositions, and because Thought has certain recognisable conditions, he assumed that we are born with all dispositions, and that all knowledge is simply the awakening of slumbering ideas.

As a corrective to what was precipitate in Locke's psycho-

\* *Nouveaux Essais*, liv. ii. ch. xii.

logy, as an energetic protest against what may be called sensuous experience (which disregards the 'organised experience' of the race, and thereby isolates the individual from Humanity), the criticism of Leibnitz was of signal service. In itself it was not of value. The false method on which he proceeded rendered psychological discovery hopeless.\* Nevertheless, there are certain incidental passages displaying extraordinary acuteness; and there is one contribution to Psychology which I consider of immense value, namely, the distinction between perception and apperception, or, as I have named them, Sense-Consciousness and Thought-Consciousness.† A thorough discussion of this subject ought to find a place in the prolegomena to every system of Psychology.

The problems relating to the origin and scope of Knowledge henceforth occupy the most prominent position in speculation. The solutions offered by Locke were widely accepted. In England and in France, they may be said to have constituted the principia of all theorising. But, as was noted in a previous chapter, they contained within them seeds of Idealism and Scepticism; and these we are now to contemplate in their developed forms.

\* 'Son principe de la raison suffisante, très-beau et très-vrai en lui-même,' says D'ALEMBERT with pleasantry, 'ne paraît pas devoir être fort utile à des êtres aussi peu éclairés que nous le sommes sur les raisons premières de toutes choses.'—*Discours préliminaire de l'Encyclopédie*.

† *Nouveaux Essais*, liv. ii. ch. i. §§ 14–19. Compare *Physiology of Common Life*, ii. 74.

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ERDMANN'S edition of the Philosophical Works (Berlin, 1840) is the best and completest up to this date. There is a handy edition of the chief writings in the *Œuvres de Leibnitz*, par M. A. JACQUES, in 2 vols., Paris, 1842. A good exposition will be found in BÜHLE: *Gesch. der neuern Philos.* iv. 129–238. BAUMANN: *Die Lehren von Raum, Zeit und Mathematik in der neuern Philosophie*, 1870, ii. pp. 1–347. HARMS: *Einleitung in die Physik (Karsten's Allgemeine Encyclopädie der Physik)*, 1869, pp. 129, 237–43. CASPARI: *Leibnitz' Philosophie beleuchtet vom Gesichtspunkt der Grundbegriffe von Kraft und Stoff*, 1870. But far surpassing all other works, both in exhaustiveness and acuteness, is the volume devoted to Leibnitz by KUNO FISCHER, *Gesch. d. neuern Philos.* 1867, Bd. ii.

## FOURTH EPOCH.

*The problem of an external world discussed on psychological data.*

## CHAPTER I.

BERKELEY.

## § I. LIFE OF BERKELEY.

THERE are few men of whom England has better reason to be proud than of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne. To extraordinary merits as a writer and thinker, he united the most exquisite purity and generosity of character; and it is still a moot point whether he was greater in head or heart.

He was born on the 12th of March, 1684, at Kilcrin, in the county of Kilkenny; and educated at Trinity College, Dublin, where, in 1707, he was admitted as a Fellow. In 1709, he published his *New Theory of Vision*, which made an epoch in Science;\* and the year after, his *Principles of Human Knowledge*, which made an epoch in Metaphysics. After this he came to London, where he was received with open arms. 'Ancient learning, exact science, polished society, modern literature, and the fine arts, contributed to

\* It contains one of the most germinal discoveries yet made in Psychology. It is substantially adopted by HELMHOLTZ in his marvellous *Handbuch der physiologischen Optik*, 1867. The late SAMUEL BAILEY some years ago attempted a refutation of it, but his attempt was victoriously defeated by STUART MILL and Prof. FERRIER. Compare BAUMANN: *Die Lehren von Raum, Zeit und Mathematik*, ii. 348-72.



adorn and enrich the mind of this accomplished man. All his contemporaries agreed with the Satirist in ascribing

To Berkeley every virtue under heaven.

Adverse factions and hostile wits concurred only in loving, admiring, and contributing to advance him. The severe sense of Swift endured his visions; the modest Addison endeavoured to reconcile Clarke to his ambitious speculations. His character converted the satire of Pope into fervid praise. Even the discerning, fastidious, and turbulent Atterbury said, after an interview with him, "So much learning, so much knowledge, so much innocence, and such humility, I did not think had been the portion of any but angels, till I saw this gentleman."\* •

His acquaintance with the wits led to his contributing to the *Guardian*. He became chaplain and afterwards secretary to the Earl of Peterborough, whom he accompanied on his embassy to Sicily. He subsequently made the tour of Europe with Mr. Ashe; and at Paris met Malebranche, with whom he had an animated discussion on the ideal theory. In 1724, he was made Dean of Derry. This was worth eleven hundred pounds a year to him; but he resigned it in order to dedicate his life to the conversion of the North American savages, stipulating only with the Government for a salary of one hundred pounds a year. On this romantic and generous expedition he was accompanied by his young wife. He set sail for Rhode Island, carrying with him a valuable library of books, and the bulk of his property. But, to the shame of the Government be it said, the promises made him were not fulfilled, and after seven years of single-handed endeavour, he was forced to return to England, having spent the greater part of his fortune in vain.

In 1732 he published a tractate in vindication of his

\* Sir J. MACKINTOSH.

*Theory of Vision*.\* He was made Bishop of Cloyne in 1734. When he wished to resign, the King would not permit him; and being keenly alive to the evils of non-residence, he made an arrangement before leaving Cloyne, whereby he settled 200*l.* a year, during his absence, on the poor. In 1752, he removed to Oxford, where, in 1753, he was suddenly seized, while reading, with palsy of the heart, and died almost instantaneously.

Of his numerous writings we cannot here speak; two only belong to our subject: the *Principles of Knowledge*, and the *Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous*. We hope to remove some of the errors and prejudices with which his name is incrustated. We hope to show that, even in what are called his wildest moods, Berkeley was a plain, sincere, deep-thinking man, not a sophist, playing with paradoxes to display his skill.

## § II. BERKELEY AND COMMON SENSE.

All the world has heard of Berkeley's Idealism; and innumerable 'coxcombs' have vanquished it 'with a grin.'† Ridicule has not been sparing. Argument has not been wanting. Idealism has been laughed at, written at, talked at. It is ludicrous to notice the constant iteration of trivial objections which, trivial as they are, Berkeley had already anticipated. In fact, the critics misunderstood him, and then reproached him for inconsistency—inconsistency, not with *his* principles, but with *theirs*. They forced a meaning upon his words which he had expressly rejected; and then triumphed over him because he did not pursue their principles to the extravagances which would have resulted from them.

\* *The Theory of Vision, or Visual Language, shewing the Immediate Presence and Providence of a Deity, vindicated and explained.* This tract, so little known as to have been omitted in his collected works, was reprinted and edited by Mr. H. V. H. COWELL in 1860 (Macmillan & Co.).

† 'And coxcombs vanquish Berkeley with a grin.'—BROWN: *Essay on Satire*. This verse has so much of the well-known ring of POPE that it is almost universally attributed to him.

When Berkeley denied the existence of matter, he meant by 'matter' that unknown *substratum* the existence of which Locke had declared to be a necessary *inference* from our knowledge of qualities, but the nature of which must ever be altogether hidden from us. Philosophers had assumed the existence of Substance, i.e. of a *noumenon* lying underneath all *phenomena*—a substratum supporting all qualities—a *something* in which all accidents *inhere*. This unknown Substance, Berkeley rejects and replaces by a known Cause, a *spiritual* substance. The substratum, confessedly unknown, is a mere abstraction, he says. If it is unknown, unknowable, it is a figment, and I will none of it; for it is a figment worse than useless; it is pernicious, as the basis of all atheism. If by matter you understand *that* which is seen, felt, tasted, and touched, then I say matter exists: I am as firm a believer in its existence as any one can be, and *herein I agree with the vulgar*. If, on the contrary, you understand by matter that occult *substratum* which is *not* seen, *not* felt, *not* tasted, and *not* touched—that of which the senses do not, cannot, inform you—then I say I believe not in the existence of matter, and *herein I differ from the philosophers and agree with the vulgar*.

'I am not for changing things into ideas,' he says, 'but rather ideas into things; since those *immediate objects of perception* which, according to you (Berkeley might have said, according to all philosophers), are only *appearances of things*, I take to be the real things themselves.

'*Hylas*. Things! you may pretend what you please: but it is certain you leave us nothing but the empty forms of things, the *outside of which only strikes the senses*.

'*Philonous*. What you call the empty forms and outside of things seem to *me* the very things themselves. . . . We both therefore agree in this, that we perceive only sensible forms; but herein we differ: you will have them to be empty appearances; I, real beings. In short, *you do not trust your senses; I do*.'

Berkeley is always accused of having propounded a theory

which contradicts the evidence of the senses. That a man who thus disregards the senses must be out of his own, was a ready answer; ridicule was not slow in retort; declamation gave itself elbow-room, and exhibited itself in a triumphant attitude. It was easy to declare that 'the man who seriously entertains this belief, though in other respects he may be a very good man, as a man may be who believes he is made of glass; yet surely he hath a soft place in his understanding, and hath been hurt by much thinking.'\*

Unfortunately for the critics, Berkeley did *not* contradict the evidence of the senses; in denying a *substratum*, he did *not* propound a theory at variance with the ordinary belief of mankind. His peculiarity is that herein he confined himself exclusively to the evidence of the senses. What the senses informed him of, that, and *that only*, would he accept. He held fast to the facts of consciousness; he placed himself resolutely in the centre of the instinctive belief of mankind: there he took his stand, leaving to philosophers the region of supposition, inference, and of occult substances.

The reproach made to him is really the reproach he made to philosophers, namely, that they would not trust to the evidence of their senses; that over and above what the senses told them, they imagined an occult something of which the senses gave no indication. 'Now it was against this metaphysical phantom of the brain,' says an acute critic, 'this crotchet-world of philosophers, and against it alone, that all the attacks of Berkeley were directed. The doctrine that the realities of things were not made for man, and that he must rest satisfied with mere appearances, was regarded, and rightly, by him, as the parent of scepticism with all her desolating train. He saw that philosophy, in giving up the reality immediately within her grasp, in favour of a reality supposed to be less delusive, which lay beyond the limits of experience, resembled the dog in the fable, who, carrying a piece of meat across a river, let the substance slip from his

\* REID: *Inquiry*.

jaws, while with foolish greed he snatched at the shadow in the stream. The dog lost his dinner, and philosophy let go her secure hold upon truth. He therefore sided with the vulgar who recognise no distinction between the reality and the appearance of objects, and, repudiating the baseless hypothesis of a world existing unknown and unperceived, he resolutely maintained that what are called the sensible shows of things are in truth the very things themselves.\*

True it is that, owing to the ambiguities of language, Berkeley's theory does seem to run counter to the ordinary belief of mankind, because by Matter, men commonly understand the Seen, the Tasted, the Touched, etc.; therefore when the existence of Matter is denied, people naturally suppose that the existence of the Seen, the Tasted, and the Touched is denied; never suspecting that Matter, in its philosophical sense, is the *not* seen, *not* tasted, *not* touched. Berkeley, it must be confessed, has insufficiently guarded against all ambiguity. Thus he says in one of the opening sections of his *Principles of Human Knowledge*, that 'It is indeed *an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men* that houses, mountains, rivers, and, in a word, all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding.' This is striking a false key-note. It rouses the reader to oppose a coming paradox. Yet Berkeley foresaw and answered the objections which Wimpey, Beattie, Reid, and others brought forward. He was not giving utterance to a caprice; he was not spinning an ingenious theory, knowing all the while that it was no more than an ingenuity. He was an earnest thinker, patient in the search after truth. Anxious, therefore, that his speculations should not be regarded as mere dialectical displays, he endeavoured on various occasions to guard himself from misapprehension.

'I do not argue against the existence of any one thing

\* *Blackwood's Mag.* June 1842, p. 814, art. 'Berkeley and Idealism;' by Professor FERRIER: since reprinted in his *Lectures on Greek Philosophy, and other Philosophical Remains*, edited by GRANT and LUSHINGTON, 1866, vol. ii. p. 291.

that we can apprehend either by sensation or reflection. *That the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose existence I deny is that which philosophers call Matter, or corporeal substance.* And in doing this there is no damage done to the rest of mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss it. . . .

'If any man thinks we detract from the reality or existence of things, he is very far from understanding what has been premised in the plainest terms I could think of. . . . It will be urged that thus much at least is true, viz. that we take away all corporeal substances. To this my answer is that, if the word *substance* be taken in the vulgar sense, for a combination of sensible qualities, such as extension, solidity, weight, etc., this we cannot be accused of taking away.\* But if it be taken in the philosophic sense, for the support of accidents or qualities without the mind; then, indeed, I acknowledge that we take it away, if one may be said to take away that which never had any existence, not even in the imagination.† But say what we can, some perhaps may be apt to reply, he will still believe his senses, and never suffer any arguments, however plausible, to prevail over the certainty of them. Be it so: assert the evidence of sense as high as you please, *we are willing to do the same.* That what I see, hear, and feel, doth exist, *i.e.* is perceived by me, I no more doubt than I do of my own being; *but I do not see how the testimony of sense can be alleged as a proof of anything which is not perceived by sense.*‡

After reading these passages (and more of a similar cast might be quoted), in what terms shall we speak of the works written to refute Idealism? Where was the acuteness of the

\* An answer to Dr. JOHNSON's peremptory refutation of BERKELEY, viz. kicking a stone: as if Berkeley ever denied that what we called stones existed!

† This is not well said. That substance was *imagined* to exist (as a support of accidents), Berkeley's argument supposes: it is against such an imaginary existence he directs his attacks. Perhaps he means that no *image* of substance could be formed in the mind: which no one disputes.

‡ *Principles of Human Knowledge*, §§ 35-37, 40.

Reids and Beatties, when they tauntingly asked why Berkeley did not run his head against a post, did not walk over precipices, etc., as, in accordance with his theory, no pain, no broken limbs, could result? \* Where was philosophical acumen, when writers could imagine they refuted Berkeley by an appeal to common sense—when they contrasted the instinctive beliefs of mankind with the speculative paradoxes of a philosopher, who expressly took his stand beside common sense against philosophers?

Men trained in metaphysical speculations may find it difficult to conceive the non-existence of an invisible unknowable substratum; but that the bulk of mankind find it almost impossible to conceive any such substratum is a fact which the slightest inquiry will verify.

Berkeley, therefore, in denying the existence of Matter, sided with common sense. He thought, with the vulgar, that Matter was *that* of which his senses informed him; not an occult something of which he could have no information. The table he saw before him certainly existed: it was hard, polished, coloured, of a certain figure, and cost some guineas. But there was no *phantom table* lying underneath the *apparent table*—there was no invisible substance supporting that table. What he perceived was a table, and nothing more; what he perceived it to be, he would believe it to be, and nothing more. His starting-point was thus what the plain dictates of his senses, and the senses of all men furnished.

### § III. IDEALISM.

The first step which a philosopher takes in any inquiry is a departure from Common Sense. Reflecting upon what his

\* 'But what is the consequence? I resolve not to believe my senses! I break my head against a post that comes in my way: I step into a dirty kennel; and after twenty such wise and rational actions I am taken up and clapt into a madhouse. Now I confess I had rather make one of those credulous fools whom nature imposes upon than of those wise and rational philosophers who resolve to withhold assent at all this expense.'—REID: *Inquiry*, ch. iv. § 20. This one passage is as good as a hundred.

senses convey to him, he seeks an explanation of phenomena: and it is in proportion to the care with which he analyses the facts to be explained that he is usually supposed to be free from the mere extravagances of speculation. And yet Berkeley's analysis of the facts of Consciousness (as Consciousness is commonly understood by philosophers) has obtained for him the reputation of being one of the most extravagant of speculators.

This is the problem: our senses inform us of certain sensible qualities, such as extension, colour, solidity, etc. But Logic declares that these qualities must be qualities of something: they cannot exist as mere extension, colour, etc.: there must be something extended, coloured, etc. What is that something? The solution given by the philosophers was uniformly this: *what* that substance is, we can never know, because it lies beyond our apprehension; but we are forced to admit it, as a support to the qualities which we do apprehend, as a substance in which sensible qualities inhere. So that, deeply considered, the only reason for inferring the existence of Matter is *the necessity for some synthesis of attributes*.

Now, what did Berkeley? With very subtle perception of the difficulties of the problem, he boldly solved it by *making the synthesis a mental one*. Thus was Matter, the substratum, wholly got rid of.

The nature of human knowledge is the first object of his inquiry. 'It is said that the faculties we have are few, and those designed by Nature for the support and pleasure of life, and not to penetrate into the inward essence and constitution of things. Besides, the mind of man, being finite, when it treats of things which partake of infinity, it is not to be wondered at if it run into absurdities and contradictions, out of which it is impossible it should ever extricate itself, it being of the nature of infinite not to be comprehended by that which is finite.'

This is plainly enough launched at Locke; but the worthy Bishop has no such disposition 'to sit down in quiet



ignorance.' He suspects that 'we may be too partial in placing the fault originally in our faculties, and not rather in the wrong use we make of them.' He believes that God is too bountiful not to have placed knowledge within our reach of which He has given us the desire. (Berkeley here disregards the lesson man was taught in Paradise, where the Tree of Knowledge was placed within his reach, but the fruits thereof forbidden him.) 'Upon the whole,' continues Berkeley, 'I am inclined to think that the far greater part, if not all, the difficulties which have hitherto amused philosophers, and blocked up the way to knowledge, are entirely owing to themselves. That we have first raised a dust, and then complain we cannot see.'

The pretension on which all Ontology is founded is here openly proclaimed. The consequences of Locke's doctrine are rejected; the premises are retained. Berkeley's account of the origin of knowledge is the same as Locke's, only somewhat more explicitly defined. But the student must be warned against the common mistake of supposing that Locke ignored the part played by what have been called *a priori* notions. Among these notions are Substance and Cause; it is on these Berkeley relies. 'The mind, her acts, and faculties,' he says,\* 'furnish a *new and distinct class of objects*, from the contemplation whereof arise certain other notions, principles, and varieties, so remote from and even so repugnant to the first prejudices which surprise the sense of mankind, that they may well be excluded from vulgar speech and books, as abstract from sensible matter, and more fit for the speculation of truth, the labour and aim of a few, than for the practice of the world.' In an earlier paragraph he speaks of the objects of sense as what the mind first regards as realities; but no sooner does intellect dawn upon the shadowy scene, 'than we perceive the true principle of unity, identity, and existence. Those things which before seemed to constitute the whole of being, upon taking an in-

\* BERKELEY: *Sermons*, § 297.

tellectual view of things [*i.e.* viewing them as conceptions] prove to be but fleeting phantoms.'

In presence of such declarations, Professor Frazer declares that Berkeley 'not only was not a sensualist of the school of Condillac, not only not an empiricist of the school of Hume, but he was a transcendentalist of the highest and purest school of Kant. With Kant he held the intellectual origin of certain concepts. With Kant he held the dependence of these concepts for their development on sense. With Kant he even discriminated the peculiar functions of sense and intellect; the one as the source of intuition, and the other as the source of thought. Nay, with Kant he held that space had no objective reality, but was "a child of the imagination grafted upon sense;" and he expresses the same opinion with respect to the objective reality of time.'\*

The student of Berkeley will remark that the *objects* of knowledge are said to be *ideas*. This has a paradoxical air to those unaccustomed to metaphysics, yet it is the simple expression of the facts of consciousness. All that the mind can be conversant about is its ideas: we are conscious of nothing but the changes that take place in our minds. Whether these ideas are the *copies* or *representatives* of any *things*—whether changes in our state are to be attributed to any external *cause*: this is a question of Philosophy—a question which Common Sense makes no scruple of begging. You see before you a flower, and you assume that an external thing resembling that flower exists, and that your sensation is produced by it, as a reflection in a mirror is produced by an object out of the mirror. But dive deeper into consciousness, interrogate yourself, and you will find that the comparison of the mirror is an assumption made only to explain the facts of consciousness, not given *in* those facts. Moreover, granting the assumption, you will then

\* *Berkeley's Idealism*, in the *North British Review*, lxviii. p. 475; on the whole, the most luminous essay on Berkeley which has come under my notice. What is said, however, respecting the agreement with Kant's views on Space and Time must be accepted with a reservation. Berkeley held all objective reality to be subjective, but he did not hold Space and Time to be special forms of Intuition.

make the mind immediately conversant with its ideas *only*; for assuming that objects reflect themselves in the mirror, the mirror itself knows only the reflections: these it knows immediately; the objects it knows mediately, i.e. through the reflections. Thus is Berkeley keeping rigorously to the facts of consciousness when he says that the 'objects of knowledge are ideas.'

Were not the history of Philosophy crowded with similar examples, we might feel surprised at the strange misconception of Berkeley, which has become traditional, through Reid, Stewart, Brown, nay, even Hamilton and Mansel, and which Professor Frazer was, I believe, the first to point out—namely, the misconception of Berkeley's theory of ideas. These writers suppose him to have held that ideas are intermediate entities, distinct from the human intellect no less than from the divine, mediating between the two. The same mistake has been even more widely prevalent respecting Aquinas.\* 'The entity-idea was invented as a mediator between mind and matter. What occasion, therefore, could there be for a mediator when the existence of matter was denied?' The source of the misconception is, no doubt, the employment of the word *idea* to signify the *object* of consciousness; though a glance at Arnauld would have revealed that 'objective' in those days meant the mental presence of a thought, as distinguished from the local presence of a thing; and a glance at one of Berkeley's precursors now seldom read—John Serjeant†—would have revealed that the word *object* signified thing meant—'Now the Meanings of Words, or (which is the same, taking that word *objectively*, what's meant by those words).' Thus in calling ideas 'objects' Berkeley was following in the track of his predecessors and contemporaries. 'We know that not only can we perceive,' says Professor Frazer, 'but that we can make our perception an object of ulterior thought; and hence, though philosophers while concentrating their attention on the act have called it a *perception*, yet when regard-

\* Comp. HAURÉAU, *Hist. de la Phil. scholastique*, ii. 177, and ROUSSELOT, *Études sur le Moyen Âge*, ii. 250.

† *Solid Philosophy asserted against the Fancies of the Idealists*, 1697.

ing it as an object they have named it an *idea*'—a point overlooked by Reid. 'Berkeley, it is true, describes our ideas as "real beings," as "objects of knowledge," as "things which exist whether we think on them or not." But he distinctly repudiates the monstrosity attributed to him by Reid, Stewart, Brown, Hamilton, and Mansel. What, in fact, is the fundamental principle of his philosophy? It is that "the *esse* of every idea is *percipi*;" that "it is not possible to separate, even in thought, any of our ideas from *perception*." As, when speaking of those ideas as inert, fleeting, and dependent beings, he tells us that they "subsist not by themselves, but are supported by, or exist in, minds or spiritual substances," so, when speaking of them as "real things," he states that "their being consists in being perceived."

While on this topic, I may observe that one great purpose of Berkeley was to bring prominently forward those notions, concepts, which Locke had left too much in the background. In doing this he had to reject the ideal theory which he is popularly supposed to have embraced, and to deny, not only that ideas were entities, mediates, but also that they were copies of or resemblances of things.\*

From this digression let us pass to remark on Berkeley's use of the word *idea*, which stands both for sensation and idea. We cannot but regard this confusion of language as the cause of no little misapprehension of his doctrines. 'That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor the ideas formed by our imagination, exist without the mind is what everybody will allow; and to me it is no less evident that the various sensations or ideas imprinted on the sense, however blended or combined together (*that is, whatever objects they compose*), cannot exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them. . . . The table I write on, I say, exists, *i.e.* I see it, and feel it, and if I were out of my study, I should say it existed; meaning thereby that, if I was in my study, I might

\* On this point I would gladly quote the remarks of Serjeant, *Solid Philosophy* (Preface), but cannot afford the requisite space.

perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it. As to what is said about the existence of unthinking things, without any relation to their being perceived, that is to me perfectly unintelligible. Their *esse* is *percipi*; nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them.'

It is in this last paragraph that the kernel of his system lies. He had identified objects with ideas: having done so, it was easy to prove that objects could not exist without a perceiving mind *in* which to exist as ideas. 'For what are the objects but the things which we perceive by sense?' Realism assents: objects are what we perceive. 'And *what*, I pray you,' continues Berkeley, 'do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations?' Realism hesitates; certainly the mirror has nothing immediately present to it besides the reflections. 'And is it not plainly repugnant,' triumphantly continues Idealism, 'that any one of these ideas, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived?' Realism has no answer to offer. It is in a dilemma from which there is apparently no escape.

The supposition of the existence of Matter is founded on the doctrine of abstract ideas (against which Berkeley wages war). 'For can there be a nicer strain of abstraction than to distinguish the existence of sensible objects from their being perceived, so as to conceive them existing unperceived? Light and colours, heat and cold, extension and figures—in a word, *the things we see and feel*—what are they but so many sensations, notions, ideas, or impressions on the sense; *and is it not impossible to separate, even in thought, any of these from perception?* For my part, I might as easily divide a thing from itself. I may indeed divide in my thoughts, or conceive apart from each other, those things which perhaps I never perceived by sense so divided. Thus I imagine the trunk of the human body without the limbs, or conceive the smell of a rose without thinking of the rose itself. So far I will not deny that I can abstract, if that be properly called abstraction which extends only to the conceiving separately such

objects as it is possible may really exist, or be actually perceived asunder; but my conceiving or imagining power does not extend beyond the possibility of real existence or perception. Hence, as it is impossible for me to see or feel anything without an actual sensation of that thing, so it is impossible for me to conceive in my thoughts any sensible thing or object distinct from the sensation or perception of it. In truth, the object and the sensation are the same thing, and cannot therefore be abstracted from one another. . . .

‘In a word, all the choir of heaven and furniture of earth—all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world—have not any subsistence without a mind: their *esse* is to be perceived or known; and consequently, so long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind, or that of any other created spirit, they must either have no existence at all, or else subsist *in the mind of some eternal spirit*. . . .

‘Though we hold indeed the objects of sense to be nothing else but ideas which cannot exist unperceived, yet we may not hence conclude they have no existence except only while they are perceived by us, since there may be some other spirit that perceives them, though we do not. Whenever bodies are said to have no existence without the mind, *I would not be understood to mean this or that particular mind, but all minds whatsoever*. It does not therefore follow that bodies are annihilated and created every moment, or exist not at all during the intervals between our perception of them. . . .

‘I am content to put the whole upon this issue: if you can but conceive it possible for one extended movable substance, or in general for any one idea, or anything like an idea, to exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it, I shall readily give up the cause; I shall grant you its existence, though you cannot either give me a reason why you believe it exists, or assign any use to it when it is supposed to exist. I say the bare possibility of your opinion being true shall pass for an argument that it is so.

‘But say you, surely there is nothing easier than for me to

imagine trees in a park, or books in a closet, and nobody by to perceive them. I answer, you may so: there is no difficulty in it. But what is all this, I beseech you, more than *framing in your mind certain ideas* which you call books and trees, and at the same time *omitting to frame the idea of any one perceiving them?*

'But do not *you yourself perceive or think of them all the while?* This therefore is nothing to the purpose: it only shows you have the power of imagining or framing ideas in your mind, but it does not show that you can conceive it possible the objects of your thought may exist without the mind. To make out this, it is necessary that you conceive them existing unperceived or unthought of, which is a manifest repugnancy. When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies, we are *all the while only contemplating our own ideas.*'\*

The last very remarkable passage must have been overlooked by the critic before mentioned, otherwise he would not have said that the 'knot which Berkeley loosened, but which he certainly did not explicitly untie,' was to be resolved, for the first time, by the arguments he there brings forward. Berkeley had untied the knot, explicitly, satisfactorily; and that too in the same way as his critic.†

The distinction between *primary* and *secondary* qualities Berkeley easily refutes, and shows that the same arguments which make the secondary qualities to be only affections of the mind may be applied to the primary qualities.

Having battered down almost every objection, trivial or serious, that could be offered, Idealism iterates its fundamental principle:—All our knowledge of objects is a knowledge of ideas; objects and ideas are the same. *Ergo*, nothing exists but what is perceived.‡

\* The foregoing passages are all taken from the *Principles of Human Knowledge*, §§ 5, 6, 8, 22, and 23.

† See the article in *Blackwood*, already cited, p. 817, *et seq.*; *Lectures*, ii. p. 308.

‡ Nothing can be more inaccurate than to class BERKELEY among those who maintain ideas to be representative of things; ideas, he says, are things. Yet HAMILTON commits this inaccuracy.

Realism espies a loophole. These ideas, with which we admit the mind to be solely conversant, are but the ideas (images) of certain things: these things exist independently of being perceived, though their ideas cannot. Berkeley foresaw this also. 'But, say you, though the ideas themselves do not exist without the mind, yet there may be things like them whereof they are copies or resemblances, which things exist without the mind in an unthinking substance. I answer, *an idea can be like nothing but an idea*; a colour or figure can be like nothing but another colour or figure. Again, I ask whether those supposed originals or external things, of which our ideas are the pictures or representations, be themselves perceivable or no? If they are, then they are ideas, and we have gained our point; but if you say they are not, I appeal to any one whether it be sense to assert a colour is like something which is invisible; hard or soft, like something which is intangible?' (Sect. 8.)

As far as the metaphysical conception of Consciousness extends, the analysis given by Berkeley is unimpeachable, unless we deny that Consciousness is immediately affected by sensations, and assert that it is immediately affected by external objects; but no metaphysician will take up this position, for it would lead him to maintain that Consciousness is nothing but these very sensations, which are produced in the organism by the action of external influences; and this would be getting rid of the substratum Mind, in order to rescue the substratum Matter. No metaphysician therefore ever could, logically, object to Berkeley's fundamental position; but only tried to elude it, or make it open into other issues.

The question whether Consciousness is anything over and above its acts, whether in Sensation and Ideation there is feeling *and* consciousness of feeling, thinking *and* consciousness of thinking, or whether the two phrases express but one fact, has been considered settled by modern psychologists, since Brown. Yet the whole notion of a duplicate consciousness, attendant upon each act of consciousness (a



feeling of feeling, to translate it into precise language), still crops up, even in modern speculations.

The real battlefield is, therefore, that of Dualism. Are there two distinct existences, Mind, on the one hand, and Matter, on the other; Mind in no respect allied with Matter, yet acted on by it, and representing it? The Idealist says: There is but one existence, Mind. Analyse the concept Matter, and you will discover that it is nothing but a synthesis of qualities; the qualities are sensations, the synthesis is mental.

The Realist, if consequent, will say, There is but one existence, Matter. Analyse your concept of Mind, and you will discover that it is nothing but a synthesis of qualities (states of consciousness); the qualities are activities of the vital organism; the synthesis is the organism.

The Sceptic agrees with both, and disagrees with both, and says: Your Matter is but a fleeting succession of phenomena, your Mind is but a fleeting succession of ideas.

The Dualist says: There is but Mind and Matter; the two are in essence distinct, and never can be brought into union; but the Mind has the capability of being acted on by Matter, the result of which is a representation within it of that which is without it; and it has, moreover, a power of acting on Matter, the result of which is—I don't exactly know what, but, at any rate, it is indicated by certain motions of Matter. If you ask me, How two existences thus essentially distinct, having no quality in common, can nevertheless act on each other? I answer: It is a mystery.

A mystery, no doubt. But Philosophy cannot be satisfied with phrases. It wants precise data. The dualistic hypothesis has the disadvantage of introducing two factors, without in the least assisting us. Idealism taking firm hold of one of these factors, Mind, explains phenomena quite as lucidly as Dualism with its two factors. Realism does the same with its one factor, Matter. Philosophy has to decide between them.

Berkeley has far better reasons for his opinion than his

critics generally imagine. He could not see the force of the argument which made Matter the substratum a necessary postulate. That we *could* have sensations and ideas without the presence of external objects is manifest from the fact that we *do* often have them, as in dreams and frenzies. If therefore Matter is not always necessary for the production of ideas—if ideas can be sometimes produced without the presence of external objects—the pretended necessity, which alone forms the argument for the existence of Matter, is done away with.

‘But though,’ he says, ‘we might possibly have all our sensations without bodies, yet perhaps it may be thought easier to conceive and explain the manner of their production by supposing external bodies in their likeness rather than otherwise, and so it might at least be probable there are such things as bodies that excite ideas in our minds. But neither can this be said, for though we give the Materialists their external bodies, they, by their own confession, are never nearer the knowing how our ideas are produced, since they own themselves unable to comprehend in *what manner body can act upon spirit*, or how it is possible it should imprint an idea in the mind.’

We have here the difficulty stated, which most Dualists (those who maintain the existence of spirit and matter, as distinct substances) have not been sufficiently alive to; it is that which gave rise to Leibnitz's theory of pre-established harmony, and to Malebranche's theory of our seeing all things in God. This difficulty is indeed insuperable. It is easy to talk of the spirit being a mirror in which the universe reflects itself. Try for an instant to imagine a substance reflecting itself in, or acting upon, another substance having no one property in common with it. You cannot. Nor is this all: you cannot even imagine two substances so distinct as Matter and Spirit are defined to be: Spirit always presents itself to imagination as an attenuated Matter.

Berkeley then is right in triumphing over Realism and

Dualism. Right in saying that, if he were to accord them the existence of Matter, they could make no use of it. The subject would remain as dark as before: Matter throws no light on it. He maintains that our ideas are produced in us conformably with the laws of Nature. These laws have been ordained by God. To suppose that Matter is the mere occasional cause—*the vehicle through which the laws of Nature operate*—is gratuitous. The existence of Matter cannot be established either by intuition or by inference; the notion is full of contradictions. Whereas the existence of Spirit is known directly; and Spirit is God. The agency of the Creator is therefore more simple and direct. He had no need of creating first laws, and afterwards Matter, through which these laws should come into effect. He thought, and his thought reflected itself in us directly, without the superfluous aid of Matter as a mere go-between.

Mr. Herbert Spencer has argued that Berkeley's hypothesis is a logical suicide; that the Universal Postulate, or the fundamental assumption which is itself the ultimate test of every speculation, namely, the inconceivability of the negative, is violated by Idealism. But an Idealist might reply: All that your Postulate implies is that Something external to my consciousness exists; Something which is not me, but affects me. I admit this. I admit the existence of Ideas, but I admit the existence of nothing answering to the Ideas—nothing *behind* them. They are all the reality which God excites in me; and they are only that.

What, then, is granted? That Something, a Non-ego, exists. I cannot know this Something otherwise than under the subjective conditions of knowledge; it is to me what I know it; where the Ego ends, the Non begins. I am quite at liberty to suppose this Something to be only the Mode in which, and through which, the Deity affects me. You would also be at liberty to suppose it to be self-existent Matter; only that supposition leads to atheism, and is therefore convicted of error.

Now, as an inference—as an hypothesis—few thoroughly

acquainted with the question, and with the data on which it was founded, can, we think, deny that this of Berkeley is many degrees superior to the hypothesis of Dualism. While most philosophers teach that there are two distinct eternal substances, which they name Spirit and Matter, Berkeley teaches that there is only *one* substance, viz. Spirit. With this one substance he can construct the world. According therefore to the fundamental rule in philosophy, that 'Entities or existences are not to be multiplied unless upon necessity' (*entia non sunt multiplicanda præter necessitatem*), the introduction of a second substance, Matter, is superfluous, or worse. Of its existence we have no proof whatever: it is a mere inference; it is inferred in order to explain the phenomena: and what phenomena? those of perception—i.e. the phenomena of the thinking substance.

If, then, Berkeley is more rigorous in his analysis of facts, and more ingenious and plausible in his hypothesis, than his antagonists suppose, shall we pronounce his Idealism satisfactory and true?

Hume said of it that it admitted of no answer, but produced no conviction. And there has been no final refutation of it. Yet, inasmuch as the irresistible belief of mankind is that objects are not dependent for their existence either upon our perception of them nor upon the perception of any other mind—that objects exist *per se*, and would continue to exist if all minds were annihilated—Berkeley's theory never can produce conviction. Reid was right in standing by this universal and irresistible belief. He was egregiously wrong, however, in supposing that he answered Berkeley by an appeal to this irresistible belief. This appeal, so loudly proclaimed by the Scotch school,\* is

\* Especially by Dr. BROWN, who says that the 'sceptical argument for the non-existence of an external world, as a mere play of reasoning, admits of no reply.' The only reply he makes is that the belief was irresistible. HUME had already admitted that the belief was irresistible; the whole scope of his philosophy was to prove it both irresistible and *false*. How absurd then to appeal to the belief! KANT truly observes, in the preface to his *Kritik*, 'Admitting Idealism to be as dangerous as it really is, it would still remain a shame to philosophy and reason to

rejected by several thinkers. The belief that the sun revolved round the earth was for many centuries irresistible, and false. Why may not Berkeley have been a metaphysical Copernicus, who, by rigorous demonstration, proved the belief of mankind in the existence of Matter to be irresistible and false? Reid has no answer to give. He can merely say, 'I side with the vulgar;' but he might have given the same answer to Copernicus. Many illustrious men (Bacon among them) ridiculed the Copernican theory: but all the dogmatism, ridicule, and common sense in the world could not affect that theory. Why, we repeat, may not Berkeley have been a metaphysical Copernicus?

To prove that he was not, you must prove his reasoning defective; to prove this, you must show wherein his error lies, and not wherein his theory is at variance with your belief. All that your irresistible belief amounts to is that of a strong, a very strong, presumption against the truth of that which opposes it. Reid, in accepting this presumption as a proof, was in the right so long as Berkeley's reasoning was not strong enough to overcome it: but singularly wrong in supposing that the presumption was a refutation.

Berkeley's main position is that the *objects of knowledge are ideas, and nothing but ideas*. The position is incontrovertible. The conclusion therefore: *all human knowledge can only be the knowledge of ideas, and of nothing but ideas*, is equally incontestable. Not less so the second conclusion: *objects being identified with ideas, and we having no idea of an object but as it is perceived, the ESSE of objects to us is PERCIPI*.

In admitting all this, what do we admit? Simply that human knowledge is not the 'measure of all things.' Objects *to us* can never be more than ideas; but are *we* the final measure of all existence? Because we can only *know* objects as ideas, is it a proper conclusion that objects only *exist* as ideas? Objects subtend certain angles to our consciousness: because we can only see them under these angles, is it logical

be forced to ground the existence of an external world on the (mere) evidence of belief? The more so as the fact of belief had never been questioned. The question was, Is the belief well grounded?

to conclude that they are only these angles? For this conclusion to be rigorous, we must have some proof of our knowledge being the absolute standard of *things existent*, not simply of *things known*.

The Idealist will say: 'If you cannot *know* anything beyond your ideas, why do you infer that there *is* anything?'—A question not easily answered. He will, moreover, say: 'I defy you to conceive anything existing unperceived. Attempt to imagine the existence of matter when mind is absent. You cannot, for in the very act of imagining it, you include an *ideal percipient*. The trees and mountains you imagine to exist without any perceiving mind, what are they but the very ideas of *your* mind, which you transport to some place where you are not? In fact, to separate existence from perception is radically impossible. It is God's synthesis, and man cannot undo it.'\*

To this one may answer, It is very true that, inasmuch as our knowledge of objects is identical with our ideas, we can never, by any freak of thought, imagine an object *apart from the conditions under which we know it*. We are forced by the laws of our nature to invest objects with the forms in which we perceive them.† We cannot therefore conceive anything which has not been subject to the laws of our nature, because in the very act of conception those laws come into play. But is it not a very different proposition to say, 'I cannot conceive things otherwise than according to the laws of my nature,' and to say, 'I cannot conceive things otherwise, *consequently* they cannot exist otherwise?' The Idealist here assumes that knowledge is absolute, not relative—that man is the measure of and comprehends all things; which may

\* See this argued in a masterly manner by the critic in *Blackwood*, before quoted.

† 'When in perception,' says SCHELLING, 'I represent an object, *object and representation are one and the same*. And simply in this our inability to discriminate the object from the representation during the act lies the conviction which the common sense of mankind has of the reality of external things, although these become known to it only through the representations.'—*Ideen zu einer Philos. der Natur*, Einleitung, p. xix. (quoted by Sir W. HAMILTON). This is indisputable, but it is only saying that our knowledge of things is subject to the conditions of knowledge. Because *we* cannot discriminate between the object and the representation, it is no proof that there is no distinction between them.

be likened to the assertion that no raw material exists, only manufactured goods.

Psychology declares that Perception is the *identity* of the ego and the non-ego—the relation of two terms, the *tertium quid* of two united factors; as water is the identity of oxygen and hydrogen. The ego can never have any knowledge of the non-ego in which it (the ego) is not indissolubly bound up; as oxygen can never unite with hydrogen to form water without merging itself and the hydrogen in a *tertium quid*. Let us suppose the oxygen to be a process of consciousness, *i.e.* a feeling of changes. It would attribute the change *not* to hydrogen, which is necessarily hidden from it, *but to water*, the only form under which hydrogen is known to it. In its consciousness it would find the state named water, which would be very unlike its previous state; and it would suppose that this state, so unlike the previous one, was a representation of that which caused it. We say then that, although the hydrogen can only exist for the oxygen (in the above case) in the identity of both as water, this is no proof that hydrogen does not exist under some other relations to *other* gases. There are hydrocarbons and hydrochlorates as well as oxides of hydrogen. In like manner, although the non-ego cannot exist in relation to Mind otherwise than in the identity of the two (perception), this is no proof that it does not exist in relation to other Existences under quite different conditions.

In conclusion, we admit, with the Idealists, that all our *knowledge* of objects consists in our ideas. But we cannot admit that all existence is comprehended by our knowledge merely on the ground that, when we would conceive anything existing, we are forced to conceive it in accordance with the laws of human faculties. We admit, with the Idealists, that our knowledge is *subjective*. But we do not admit that what is true subjectively is true comprehensively of all existence. We believe in the existence of an external quite independent of any percipient; the arguments by which Idealism would controvert it are vitiated by the assumption of knowledge being a criterion of existence. Idealism agrees with Realism

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in placing reliance on the evidence of consciousness ; it argues however that, inasmuch as our *knowledge* is confined to ideas we have no right to assume anything beyond ideas. Yet it also is forced to assume something as the cause of ideas : this cause it calls the Action of the Creator ; and this is an assumption. In Berkeley's *Vindication of the Theory of Vision*, there occur these explicit passages : 'The objects of sense, being things immediately perceived, are otherwise called *ideas*. The cause of these ideas, or the *power of producing them*, is not the object of sense, not being itself *perceived but only inferred* by reason from its effects, to wit, those objects or ideas which are perceived by sense. From our ideas of sense the inference of reason is good to Power, Cause, Agent. But we may not, therefore, infer that our ideas are like unto this Power, Cause, or active being. On the contrary, it seems evident that an idea can only be like another idea, and that in our ideas or immediate objects of sense, there is nothing of Power, Causality, or Agency included. Hence it follows that the Power or Cause of ideas is not an object of Sense but of Reason. Our knowledge of the Cause is measured by the Effect ; of the Power by our Idea. To the absolute nature, therefore, of outward Causes or Powers, we have nothing to say ; they are no objects of our sense or perception. Whenever, therefore, the appellation of sensible *object* is used in a determined intelligible sense, it is not applied to signify the *absolutely existing outward Cause* or Power, but the ideas themselves produced in us. Ideas which are observed to be connected together are vulgarly considered under the relation of cause and effect ; whereas, in strict philosophic truth, they are only related as the sign to the thing signified. For we know our Ideas ; and therefore know that one Idea cannot be the cause of another. We know that our ideas of sense are not the cause of themselves. We know also that we do not cause them. Hence we know that they must have some other efficient cause, distinct from them and us.' \*

Again : 'The real objects of sight we see, and what we see we know. And these true objects of sense and knowledge,

\* *The Theory of Vision Vindicated*, pp. 20-28.



to wit, our own ideas, are to be considered, compared, distinguished, in order to understand the "True Theory of Vision" as to the outward cause of these ideas: whether it be one and the same, or various and manifold; whether it be thinking or unthinking, spirit or body, or whatever else we conceive about it, the visible appearances do not alter their nature, our ideas are still the same. Though I may have an erroneous notion of the cause, or though I may be utterly ignorant of its nature, yet this does not hinder my making true and certain judgments about my ideas; my knowing which are the same and which different; which are connected together, and wherein this connection consists; whether it be founded in a likeness of nature, in a geometrical necessity, or merely in experience and custom.\*

It thus clearly appears that Berkeley, in common with philosophers and ordinary men, admitted the existence of an external something as the cause of sensations, *which sensations constitute the objects to us*. Thus the question remaining open is: Which is the most plausible hypothesis, the one that interprets this something as an *unknown substance*, the one that interprets this something as the *very object of sensation*, or the one that interprets this something as the *direct action of the Divine Agency*? The second hypothesis being wholly excluded by the psychology of the schools (a mistaken psychology, I conceive), there only remains a choice between the first and the third.

'What is the *cause* of our ideas?' asks Professor Frazer. 'Impelled by the quasi-externality of our perceptions, we naturally regard them as determined from without; urged by the primary instinct of reality, we naturally regard them as determined from without by matter. The first hypothesis that was excogitated to explain our sensible perceptions therefore was the *Theory of Physical Influence or Afflux*. The material films of the atomists, the matterless forms of the schoolmen, the material properties and powers of modern materialists, were so many modifications of the same hypothesis.' To

\* *The Theory of Vision Vindicated*, p. 40.

this succeeded the *Theory of Hyperphysical Influence* in the Cartesian school, especially in Malebranche and Leibnitz. Herein God replaced Matter. 'Our sensations were produced by His power, but our ideas were participations in His intelligence; and thus the knowledge of the world of matter was a *vision of the world in God*. It was in this position that philosophy was found by Berkeley, and it determined the evolution of his system. . . . He held with his predecessors that mind has an objective knowledge of a world of matter. He held with them that in this respect the mind is conscious of nothing but ideas. He held with them that these ideas must have a cause. He held with them that these ideas were not generated from within but were determined from without. With them he held that the external cause of our ideas could not be matter; and with them he held that the external cause was God. But if God were the cause of our ideas, why gratuitously suppose the existence of an unknown world of matter?''\*

The whole dispute then resolves itself into the question of the cause. Our ideas, which are the objects, have a cause which is not ourselves—a Non-Ego. This cause, says Berkeley, cannot be material, because Matter is unknown; the cause must therefore be spiritual, because Mind is known. Existence comprehends but two kinds, entirely distinct, namely Spirits and Ideas: 'the former are active indivisible substances; the latter are inert, fleeting, and dependent beings which subsist not in themselves but are supported by or exist in, minds or spiritual substances'—a conception which may be thus restated: There are but two existences, namely permanent Organs, and transitory Acts; permanent Minds, and their fleeting States. Ideas are not less real because they are transitory; the vibration of a sonorous body is not unreal because it quickly subsides, to be reproduced, the same (though not numerically the same) whenever the body be again struck. Now the *appulse*, or idea, which is

\* *North British Review*, No. lxviii. pp. 457-9.

supposed by mankind in general, and by most philosophers to come from an *impulse* of Matter, is by Berkeley affirmed to be the impulse of God. God is the cause whereon ideas depend, by whom they are 'imprinted,' 'suggested,' 'excited.'\*

To those who hold that God is known, and the only Existence that is known, Berkeley's position is assuredly a strong one. But those who demur to such a proposition, and who say that we have no evidence to warrant the assumption that God who made man did not *also* make a world in which man lives; and who affirm that this world is the non-ego which *directly* excites the changes in the ego, however *indirectly* the excitation may come from God—those, and they are the vast majority, will say that since our irresistible belief affirms the existence of an external world, Philosophy has to decide which assumption is more consonant with our irresistible belief—the assumption of external existences independent of our sensations; or the assumption of a providential scheme in which our sensations are the effects of the operation of Divine laws, and in which objective existences play no part. The answer cannot be dubious. The former assumption, as more consonant with universal belief, must be accepted.

Berkeley, we believe, failed as a metaphysical Copernicus, because the assumption which he opposed to the universal belief was less consonant with that belief than the assumption it was meant to replace. Had Copernicus not started an hypothesis which, however contradictory to the senses, nevertheless afforded a much better explanation of celestial phenomena than was possible on the old hypothesis, he would not have been listened to. Berkeley's assumption, if conceded, carries him no deeper than the old assumption. Idealism explains nothing. To accept it would be to renounce a universal belief for a mere hypothesis.

While Idealism may thus be answered on the general

\* Prof. FRAZER, *loc. cit.*, corrects the very common mistake that Berkeley discarded Substance, in discarding Matter; he simply replaced the material Substance by a spiritual Substance—i.e. the unknown by the known Cause.

ground, Berkeley's Idealism may be shown to involve a special contradiction and a special difficulty. Its foundation is the proposition that objects are ideas, their *esse*, or total existence, being *percipi*. If things are only perceptions, the conclusion is obvious: whatever is not perceived does not exist. Now it is equally obvious that many things exist which are altogether beyond the reach of human perception; and if we deny the existence of whatever cannot be perceived, we must deny the motion of the earth, for instance. To escape such a dilemma Berkeley must enlarge his formula, and say, 'Objects are ideas; their *esse* is either *percipi* or *concupi*'—what cannot be directly perceived by the senses may be conceived by the reason. Let this be accepted; we may then ask, 'Why deny the existence of Matter, yet affirm the existence of the earth's motion? Both of these are conceptions, neither are perceptions. If we are forced to infer the existence of the earth's motion to explain the perceived phenomena, are we less stringently forced to infer the existence of an external substance to explain the objects of perception?'

Nor can he escape this dilemma by declaring that although the motion of the earth is not capable of being perceived by us, it would be perceptible were our faculties enlarged, and is perceptible to the higher minds; it may therefore be declared potentially perceptible. No doubt, if Motion exists, it is conceivably perceptible; but is not substance conceivably perceptible? Since the existence of both is admitted only on the grounds of inference, and not on the ground of perception, we are thrown back upon the previous question, Which inference has the greater probability, the existence of objects independent of ideas, or the existence only of ideas?

The whole question of Idealism is too vast to be argued here, even in outline; I have only to present it as it appears in Berkeley's scheme, adding by way of conclusion that those who have followed the course of this History with attention will not fail to observe how Berkeley's Idealism is at bottom the much-decried system of Spinoza, who taught that there was but one essence in the universe, and that one Substance.

Berkeley also taught that there was but one, and that one Thought. Now call this One what you will, the result is the same: speculatively or practically. There may be certain degrading associations attached to the idea of substance; or certain exalted associations attached to that of spirit. But what difference can our associations make with respect to the real nature of things?

One great result of Berkeley's labours was the lesson he taught of the vanity of ontological speculations. He paved the way to that Scepticism which is the terminal morass of all consistent Metaphysics.

## FIFTH EPOCH.

*The arguments of Idealism carried out into Scepticism.*

## CHAPTER I.

HUME.

## § I. LIFE OF HUME.

MR. BURTON'S ample and excellent biography\* would furnish materials for a pleasant memoir, could we here afford the requisite space; but we must content ourselves with referring the reader to that work, merely recording the principal dates and events of an uneventful life.

David Hume was born at Edinburgh, April 26, 1711; the youngest child of a poor laird of good blood. He became an orphan before his education was completed. His guardians first thought of the profession of law, but, owing to his repugnance, he was absolved from that career, and was placed in a Bristol counting-house, where he did not remain long. On coming of age, he found himself in possession of a small property, too small for honourable subsistence in England, but large enough for France; and he went to Rheims; from thence to La Flèche, where the Jesuits' college and library were great attractions to the studious youth; there he passed several years in solitary study.

A great ambition moved him: he was to accomplish for

\* JOHN HILL BURTON: *The Life and Correspondence of David Hume, from the Papers bequeathed to the Royal Society of Edinburgh*, 2 vols.

moral science a revolution analogous to that which Bacon had effected in physical science. His *Treatise on Human Nature*, which appeared in 1737, was announced as an attempt to introduce the Experimental Method into reasonings on moral science. It is needless to point out the profound misconception of the Experimental Method here implied; nor is it necessary to show at any length that there was no novelty whatever in Hume's attempt to test Psychology by experience.

In 1741 appeared the first part of his immortal *Essays*; and in 1747 he accompanied General St. Clair, as secretary, in the embassy to Vienna and Turin. In 1752 he published his *Political Discourses* and the *Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*. The appointment of Librarian to the Faculty of Advocates in Edinburgh—the salary of which he generously gave to the poor poet Blacklock—placed at his disposal a fine collection of books; and this suggested the undertaking which has long been held his greatest title to fame—the *History of England*, the first volume of which appeared in 1754.

For the literary historian there are two piquant episodes in the life of Hume. The first is the ovation given to the philosopher in Paris, whither he had accompanied the Marquis of Hertford; the second is his friendship and quarrel with Rousseau. Both are copiously narrated by Mr. Burton.

Hume died in the spring of 1776, leaving a name imperishable in our literature, although it is a name attached to opinions which have roused, and will continue to rouse, vehement opposition. In considering this it should never be forgotten that so wise and good a man as Adam Smith could publicly write of him, 'Upon the whole, I have always considered him, both during his lifetime and since his death, as approaching as nearly to the idea of a perfectly wise and virtuous man as perhaps the nature of human frailty will permit.'

## § II. HUME'S SCEPTICISM.

The marvellous acuteness and subtlety of Hume have never been denied. His influence upon speculation has been aided as much by the alarm his doctrines excited as by the ingenuity with which they were upheld. If Berkeley met with no refuters, Hume could meet with none. Antagonists have generally been compelled to admit that the sceptical reasoning was unanswerable.

Locke had shown that all our knowledge was dependent upon experience. Berkeley had argued that we have *no* experience of an external world independent of perception; nor could we have any such experience. He pronounced Matter to be an abstraction; which is true, but it is formed from concretes, of which we have experience. Hume took up the line where Berkeley had cast it, and flung it once more into the deep sea, endeavouring to fathom the mysteries of Being. Probing deeper in the direction Berkeley had taken, he found that not only was Matter an abstraction, Mind was an abstraction also. If the occult substratum, which men had inferred to explain material phenomena, could be denied, because not founded on experience; so also, said Hume, must we deny the occult substratum (Mind) which men have inferred to explain mental phenomena. All that we have any experience of is impressions and ideas. The substance *of* which these are supposed to be impressions is occult—is a mere inference; the substance *in* which these impressions are supposed to be is equally occult—is a mere inference. Matter is but a collection of impressions. Mind is but a succession of impressions and ideas.\*

Thus was Berkeley's dogmatic Idealism converted into Scepticism. Hume, speaking of Berkeley, says, 'Most of the writings of that very ingenious philosopher form the best

\* LOCKE had already argued that we are as ignorant of spirit as of substance. We know mind only in its *manifestation*; we cannot know it as a *substratum*. HUME's argument, therefore, had a firm foundation in the current philosophy. He only concluded from admitted premises.



lessons of scepticism which are to be found either among the ancient or modern philosophers, Bayle not excepted. He professes, however, in his title-page (and undoubtedly with great truth), to have composed his book against the Sceptics, as well as against the Atheists and Free-thinkers. But that all his arguments, though otherwise intended, are in reality merely sceptical appears from this, that they admit of no answer, and produce no conviction.'

Remark also that Hume's scepticism, though it reduces Ontology to a singular dilemma,—namely, that of either refuting the sceptical arguments, or of declaring itself and its pretensions to be vain and baseless,—nevertheless affects in no other way the ordinary judgments or actions of mankind. Much stupid ridicule and frivolous objection have been, and probably will continue to be, brought against Hume. Reid, from whom one might have expected something better, is surprised at Hume's pretending to construct a science upon human nature, 'when the intention of the whole work is to show that there is neither human nature nor science in the world. It may perhaps be unreasonable to complain of this conduct in an author who neither believes his own existence nor that of his reader; and therefore could not mean to disappoint him, or laugh at his credulity. Yet I cannot imagine that the author of the *Treatise on Human Nature* is so sceptical as to plead this apology. He believed, against his principles, that he should be read, and that he should retain his personal identity, till he reaped the honour and reputation justly due to his metaphysical acumen.' He continues further in this strain, dragging in the old error about Pyrrho having inconsistently been roused to anger by his cook, 'who probably had not roasted his dinner to his mind,' and compares this forgetfulness to Hume's every 'now and then relapsing into the faith of the vulgar.'\*

If this was meant for banter, it is very poor banter; if for argument, it is pitiable. But since such arguments

\* *Inquiry*, introd § 5.

appeared valid to a thinker of Reid's reputation, it is reasonable to suppose that inferior men may also receive them as conclusive. Hume shall therefore be allowed to speak for himself; and he shall speak in the language of that very *Treatise on Human Nature* to which Reid alludes:—

‘Should it be here asked me whether I sincerely assent to this argument which I seem to take such pains to inculcate, and whether I be really one of those sceptics who hold that all is uncertain, and that our judgment is not in *any* thing possessed of *any* measures of truth and falsehood, I should reply that this question is entirely superfluous, and that neither I nor any other person was ever sincerely and constantly of that opinion. Nature, by an absolute and uncontrollable necessity, has determined us to judge as well as to breathe and feel; nor can we any more forbear viewing certain objects in a stronger and fuller light upon account of their customary connection with a present impression than we can hinder ourselves from thinking as long as we are awake, or seeing the surrounding bodies when we turn our eyes towards them in broad sunshine. Whoever has taken the pains to refute the cavils of this *total* scepticism has really disputed without an antagonist, and endeavoured by arguments to establish a faculty which *Nature has antecedently implanted in the mind, and rendered unavoidable.*

‘My intention then in displaying so carefully the arguments of that fantastic sect is only to make the reader sensible of the truth of my hypothesis that all our reasonings concerning causes and effects are derived from nothing but custom; and that belief is more properly an act of the sensitive than of the cogitative part of our natures. . . . If belief were a simple act of the thought without any peculiar manner of conception, or the addition of force and vivacity, it must infallibly destroy itself, and in every case terminate in a total suspense of judgment. But as experience will sufficiently convince any one that, although he finds no error in my arguments, yet he still continues to believe and think

and reason as usual, he may safely conclude that his reasoning and belief is some sensation or peculiar manner of conception, which 'tis impossible for mere ideas and reflections to destroy.\*

It is an illustration of the want of candour displayed by Hume's opponents that they never quoted this very significant and explicit passage; indeed I never remember to have seen the passage quoted by any one. Let us ask, what does the foregoing declaration amount to, if not to the boasted 'common-sense view' that our belief in the existence of matter is instinctive, fundamental? Does not Dr. Brown's admission that the sceptical argument is unanswerable as a mere play of reasoning concede all that Hume requires? Does not Dr. Brown's conclusion that we are thrown upon 'irresistible belief' as our only refuge against scepticism equally accord with Hume's explicit declaration that we *do* believe, and cannot help believing, though we can give no reason for the belief?

'Thus the sceptic,' Hume adds a little further on, 'still continues to reason and believe, even though he asserts that he cannot defend his reason by reason; and by the same rule he must assent to the principle concerning the existence of body, though he cannot pretend by any arguments of philosophy to maintain its veracity. *Nature has not left this to his choice*, and has doubtless esteemed it an affair of too great importance to be trusted to our uncertain reasonings and speculations. We may well ask, *what causes induce us to believe in the existence of body?* but 'tis in vain to ask *whether there be body or not?* that is a point which we must take for granted in all our reasonings.'

After this, let no more be said about Hume's practical consequences. Locke before him had clearly enough seen and signalised the impotence of the attempt to penetrate beyond phenomena, and had, with his usual calm wisdom, counselled men to 'sit down in quiet ignorance.' He knew

\* *Human Nature*, part iv. § i. p. 250.

the task was hopeless ; he knew also that it was trivial. We have the means of knowing all that directly concerns us with a certainty which suffices for our wants. With that, reasonable men will be content. If they seek more, they seek the impossible ; if they push their speculations deeper, they end in scepticism. It was the philosophical *mission* of Hume (to adopt a phrase in vogue) to show how inevitably all such speculations, if consistent, ended in scepticism.

'Men,' he says, 'are carried by a natural instinct or prepossession to repose faith in their senses. When they follow this blind and powerful instinct of nature, they always suppose the *very images* presented to the senses *to be* the external objects, and *never entertain any suspicion that the one are nothing but representatives of the other*. But this universal and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy, which teaches us that nothing can ever be present to the mind but *an image or perception*. So far then we are necessitated by *reasoning to contradict the primary instincts of Nature*, and to embrace a new system with regard to the evidence of our senses. But here philosophy finds herself extremely embarrassed, when she would obviate the cavils and objections of the sceptics. She can no longer plead the infallible and irresistible instinct of nature, for that led us to quite a different system, which is acknowledged fallible, and even erroneous ; and to justify this pretended philosophical system by a chain of clear and convincing argument, or even any appearance of argument, exceeds the power of all human capacity.

'Do you follow the instincts and propensities of nature in assenting to the veracity of the senses ? But these lead you to believe that the *very perception or sensible image is the external object*—(Idealism).

'Do you disclaim this principle in order to embrace a more rational opinion, that the perceptions are only *representations* of something external ? You here depart from your natural propensities and more obvious sentiments ; and yet are not

able to satisfy your reason, which can never find any convincing argument from experience to prove that the perceptions are connected with external objects'—(Scepticism).

This is the dilemma to which Ontology is reduced : out of it there is no escape ; and Hume deserves the gratitude of mankind for having brought Philosophy to this pass. Mankind, however, has paid him with reprobation. As the whole course of our History has been occupied in tracing the inevitable result of all Ontology to be precisely this, our readers will be prepared for a different appreciation of Hume. Let us therefore endeavour to define the nature of this scepticism, which has caused such great alarm. Scepticism, meaning doubt, and being frequently used to signify religious doubt, has alarming associations attached to it. To call a man a sceptic is to call him a heretic. And, unfortunately for Hume's philosophical reputation, he was a sceptic in Theology as well as in Philosophy, and mankind have consequently identified the former with the latter.

Now, philosophical scepticism means a doubt as to the validity of Philosophy ;—in other words, a doubt only on one particular subject. If I accept the consequences to which the doctrine of Hume leads me, am I forced to suspend my judgment, and to pronounce *all* subjects uncertain ? or am I only to pronounce *some* subjects uncertain ? The latter is clearly the only opinion I can entertain. *What* then are the questions on which I must be content to remain in darkness ? Locke, no less than Hume, has told us : All which relate to Ontology—which pretend to discuss the nature and essences of things considered as removed from all relation to us.

This scepticism, the reader must acknowledge, has nothing very alarming in it,—except to Philosophy. It is maintained by the vast majority of thinking men—some from conviction, others from a vague sense of the futility of ontological speculation. Only the bad passions roused in discussion could pretend to confound it with a religious heresy. Scepticism indicates the boundaries of inquiry. It leads us from

impossible attempts to fly, and instructs us how securely we may run. It destroys Metaphysical Philosophy only to direct all our energies towards Positive Philosophy. In the words of Goethe, 'Let us not attempt to demonstrate what cannot be demonstrated! Otherwise we shall make our miserable deficiencies more glaring to posterity by our so-called works of knowledge.'

Hume was a sceptic; and, consequently, early in life ceased devoting his marvellous acuteness to any of the questions agitated in the schools. His *Essays* and his *History* were excellent products of this change of direction; and although he did devote a portion of the *Essays* to Philosophy, yet it was but a portion, and one which gave a more popular and elegant exposition of the principles of his first work.

### §. III. HUME'S PSYCHOLOGY.

It was clearly seen by Hume that the failure of Philosophy to compass its ambitious aim was owing to a false conception of the scope of human intellect. 'The only method,' he says, 'of freeing learning at once from these abstruse questions is to inquire seriously into the nature of human understanding, and show from an exact analysis of its powers and capacity that it is by no means fitted for such remote and abstruse subjects.'\* The sceptical issue from his analysis could only be escaped by proving some flaw in the analysis.

All our mental furniture being reduced to Impressions (even ideas being simply the feeble copies of the livelier Impressions), the philosopher may 'banish all that jargon which has so long taken possession of metaphysical reasonings, and drawn such disgrace upon them. All ideas, especially abstract ones, are naturally faint and obscure. The mind has a slender hold of them: they are apt to be confounded with other resembling ideas; and when we have often employed any term, though without a distinct meaning, we are apt to imagine that it has a determinate idea annexed

\* *Essays*, sect. i.

to it. On the contrary, all impressions, that is, all sensations, either outward or inward, are strong and sensible; the limits between them are more exactly determined; nor is it easy to fall into any error or mistake regarding them. When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent), we need but inquire, *from what impression is that idea derived?* And if it be impossible to assign any, this will serve to confirm our suspicion.\*

In other words, a conception which we are unable to reduce to sensible elements can have no objective reality. If it is a *relation*, we must exhibit the related *terms*. If it is a *symbol*, we must exhibit the facts which are converted into signs. Hume used the word Impressions in this wide sense: 'all our more lively perceptions when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will;' a somewhat unfortunate ambiguity, and one that was not cleared up by his distinction of Ideas as the same Impressions in a less vivid form. Nevertheless, although there was deficient precision in his views, he was, I think, on the track of true psychological discovery. That he had not clearly thought out the distinctions between faculties and sensations, or between sensations and ideas, is obvious enough. Thus in treating of the question of Innate Ideas, he says: 'If innate be equivalent to natural, then all the perceptions and ideas of the mind must be allowed to be innate or natural. . . . If by innate be meant contemporary to our birth the dispute seems to be frivolous; nor is it worth while to inquire at what time thinking begins, whether before, at, or after, our birth.' [What a complete misapprehension of the reach of the dispute!] 'Again, the word *idea* seems to be commonly taken in a very loose sense, even by Locke himself, as standing for any of our perceptions, our sensations, and passions, as well as thoughts. Now, in this sense, I should desire to know what can be meant by asserting that self-love, or resent-

\* *Essays*, sect. ii.

ment of injuries, or the passion between the sexes, is not innate? But admitting these terms, *impressions* and *ideas*, in the sense above explained, and understanding by *innate* what is original or copied from no precedent perception, then may we assert that all our impressions are innate, and our ideas are not innate.' In so acute a thinker, such confusion is remarkable.

Hume perceived the difficulty of recognising Mind as an Entity; but his imperfect acquaintance with Biology prevented him from recognising the other alternative, that Mind might be a Function. In denying a mental *substratum* analogous to the *substratum* imagined to underlie the qualities of matter, he was left in a state of absolute scepticism. He gave a logical unity to consciousness, and supposed that this logical unity was all that men meant when they spoke of vital unity. A metaphysician might reasonably object that the reality of Mind was implied in the fact of impressions: an implied something which is impressed, a something which feels and ideates: that something being the mental substratum. A biologist would make a somewhat similar reply. Hume says, 'An impression first strikes upon the senses; . . . of this impression there is a copy taken by the mind, which remains after the impression ceases; and this we call an idea.' This is preposterous and vague: it introduces an hypothetical Mind (whose existence he denies) acting like a copying machine; and when we come to learn what this Mind is, we find it is 'nothing but a *heap or collection* of different perceptions united together by certain relations, and supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with perfect simplicity and identity.'\* What should we say to a philosopher who asserted that a locomotive was *nothing but a succession of spaces passed through*, and denied that there was any motor, any real object, passing through the described spaces?

If mind is a series of impressions, or, as modern psycho-

\* *Treatise on Human Nature.*



logists say, a succession of states of Consciousness, what is their connecting link? Between any two states there must be an interval, however brief, in which no object occupies Consciousness. During this interval does Consciousness vanish, to reappear with the next state? Is there no continuity? The metaphysician answers: Yes, the Mind itself continues and connects in one synthesis all its manifestations. In the intervals between two acts, it is in the static condition; in the several manifestations, it is in the dynamic condition.

The biologist answers: Consciousness, being a vital process, not an Entity, has its synthesis in the continuity of the vital conditions. Just as a muscle continues to exist, as muscle, in the interval between two contractions, so does the nervous mechanism, of which Consciousness is a function, continue to exist in the interval between two acts of Consciousness; but neither Contractility nor Sensibility exist independently of their tissues; nor can they be manifested when the vital properties are exhausted.

The metaphysician would assuredly reject aid of *this* kind, even against Hume. He would assert that the reality of the mental entity is testified by Consciousness, and is proved by the fact that we say My body—an assurance that my body is not *me*. Here the biologist would remark that the testimony of Consciousness needs sifting by analysis. If we say, My body, not less undeniably do we say, My mind.

Hume's assertion that the mind is nothing but a series of impressions, was less the result of psychological investigation than of logical deduction. The arguments by which Berkeley had destroyed the notion of a substantive Matter were turned with equal force against the notion of a substantive Mind. But, nevertheless, this sceptical suggestion, once thrown out, could not fail to act like a ferment. It was a step towards the biological solution; a step which could not be carried far until Biology had from its side also approached the subject.

## § IV. HUME'S THEORY OF CAUSATION.

It is customary in speaking of Hume's theory of Causation, to bestow no inconsiderable acrimony upon him. But, in the first place, the theory is not peculiarly his; in the second place, his application of it to the question of Miracles, which has excited so much vehement controversy, reduces itself to 'this very plain and harmless proposition, that whatever is contradictory to a complete induction is incredible. That such a maxim as this should be either accounted a dangerous heresy or mistaken for a recondite truth, speaks ill for the state of philosophical speculation on such subjects.' \*

The theory may be thus briefly stated. All our *experience* of causation is simply that of a constant succession. An antecedent followed by a sequent—one event followed by another: this is all that we experience. We attribute indeed to the antecedent a *power* of producing or causing the sequent; but we can have no experience of such a power. If we believe that the fire which has burned us will burn us again, we believe this from habit or custom; not from having perceived any *power* in the fire. We believe the future will resemble the past, because custom has taught us to rely upon such a resemblance. 'When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operation of causes, we are never able in a single instance to discover any power or necessary connection—any quality which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence to the other. We only find that the one does actually in fact follow the other. The impulse of one billiard-ball is attended with motion in the second. This is the whole that appears to the outward senses. The mind feels no sentiment or inward impression from this succession of objects; consequently there is not, in any single instance of cause and effect, anything which can suggest the idea of power or

\* MILL: *System of Logic*, vol. ii. p. 183.

necessary connection.\* This is the whole of his theory. His explanation of our belief in power, or necessary connection, is that it is a matter of habit.

I know not whether Hume ever read Glanvill's *Scepsis Scientifica*. The title was one to attract him. At any rate, Glanvill had clearly enough stated Hume's theory, *e.g.* 'All knowledge of causes is deductive; for we know of none by simple intuition, but through the mediation of their effects. So that we cannot conclude anything to be the cause of another *but from its continually accompanying it*; for the *causality* itself is *insensible*.' Malebranche had also anticipated him; and so had Hobbes. The language, indeed, of the latter is so similar to the language employed by Hume, that I agree with Dugald Stewart in suspecting Hume to have borrowed it from Hobbes. 'What we call experience,' says Hobbes, 'is nothing else but remembrance of what antecedents have been followed by what consequents. . . . No man can have in his mind a conception of the future, for the future is not yet; but of our conceptions of the past we make a future, or rather call past future relatively. Thus, after a man has been accustomed to see like antecedents followed by like consequents, whensoever he seeth the like come to pass to anything he had seen before, he looks there shall follow it the same that followed then.'

This theory of Causation has been hotly debated, partly because of the 'consequences' which some have seen, with alarm, to be deducible from it (for opinions are judged of more by their supposed consequences than by their reasoned truth); partly also because Hume has not stated it with the clearness which prevents misunderstanding. It is only to the latter point we can here attend.

When Hume asserts that experience gives no intimation of any *connection* between two events, but only of their invariable *conjunction*—when he says that the mind cannot perceive a causal nexus, but only an invariableness of ante-

\* *Essays*, sect. vii.

cedence and sequence, he is, or seems to be, contradicted by the consciousness of his readers. They declare that, over and above the fact of sequence, there is always an intimation of *power* given in every causation, and this it is which distinguishes causal from casual sequence,—connection from mere conjunction. The fire burns paper because there is some power in the fire to effect this change. Mere antecedence, even if invariable, cannot be sufficient, or else day would be the cause of night, the flash of lightning would be the cause of the thunder-peal. In every case of causation there must be an element of power—a capacity of producing the observed change—a nexus of some kind, over and above the mere juxtaposition of bodies. If diamond will cut glass, it has a power to do so; the sharpest knife is without this power.

So reason Hume's antagonists. Nor do I think they are finally answered by resolving the idea of power into mere invariableness of antecedent and sequent; for they may reply that the 'invariableness' itself, which can never be a matter of direct experience, is deduced from the idea of power: we believe the fire will invariably burn the paper because it has the power to do so, because there is a real nexus between fire and the combustion of paper; only on such a belief can our expectation of the future resembling the past be securely founded.

The ordinary belief of mankind in the existence of something more than mere antecedence and consequence is therefore a fact. This fact Hume and others admit. Because they cannot perceive the power, they declare that we have no right to believe in it. Hume insists upon the impossibility of our perceiving power—of our perceiving any necessary connection between two events. But, say those who oppose this theory, 'Although we cannot *perceive* the power, we are forced to *believe* in it; and this belief is not a matter of custom, but is given in the very facts of consciousness. We perceive that *some power* is at work producing effects; the *precise nature* of this power, indeed, we cannot perceive,

because we never can know things *per se*. When a spark ignites gunpowder, we perceive a power in the spark to ignite gunpowder: *what* that power is, we know not: we only know its effects. But our ignorance is equally great of the gunpowder: *what* it is, we know not; we only know its appearances to us. It might as well be said that we believe in the gunpowder from custom (since we really know nothing of it *per se*) as that we believe in the power of the spark to ignite gunpowder from custom, since we really know nothing of powder *per se*. We know nothing *per se*.'

I have marshalled the arguments, with as much force as I could muster, into so small a field, in order to bring into appreciable distinctness the source of the opposition to Hume's theory on the part of many who have no doctrinal distrust towards it. Before attempting an elucidation of the difficulty, it will be needful to consider the grounds of our belief in causation. As it is a fact that all men believe in some power involved in every causal act, we have to ask, Is that belief well founded?

Two schools at once present themselves. The one (that of Hume) declares that the belief has no good grounds; it is a matter of custom. If I believe the sun will rise to-morrow, it is because it has always risen. If I believe that fire will burn in future, it is because it has always burned. From habit I expect the future will resemble the past: I have no proof of it.

The other school declares that this belief in causation 'is an intuitive conviction that the future will resemble the past.' This is the language of Reid and Stewart. Dr. Whewell would have us admit the belief as a fundamental idea—a necessary truth independent of and superior to all experience.

Both explanations are questionable. Custom or habit can essentially have nothing whatever to do with it, because our belief is as strong from a single instance as from a thousand. 'When many uniform instances appear,' says Hume, 'and the same object is always followed by the same event, *we then*

*begin to entertain* the notion of cause and connection. We then feel a new sentiment, to wit, *a customary connection* in the thought between one object and its usual attendant; and this sentiment is the original of that idea which we seek for.' This is manifestly wrong. A single instance of one billiard-ball moving another suffices to originate the 'sentiment,' without further repetition. Nor is there more truth in the assertion that the belief depends on 'conviction of the future resembling the past;' this explanation assumes that the general idea precedes the particular idea. When we believe that similar effects will follow whenever the same causes are in operation—when we believe that fire will burn, or that the sun will rise to-morrow—the belief is simply *following our experience*, and nothing more. We cannot help believing in our experience: that is irresistible; but in this belief, the idea of either past or future does not enter. I do not believe that fire will burn because I believe that the future will resemble the past; but simply because my experience of fire is that it burns—that it has the power to burn. Take a simple illustration, trivial, if you will, but illustrative:—A child is presented with a bit of sugar: the sugar is white, of a certain shape, and is solid; his experience of the sugar is confined to these properties: he puts it in his mouth; it is sweet, pleasant: his experience is extended; the sugar he now believes (knows) to be sweet and pleasant, as well as white and solid.\* Thus far experience is not transcended. Some days later, another piece of sugar is given him. Is it now necessary for him to have any 'intuitive conviction that the future will resemble the past'—any fundamental idea independent of experience—to make him believe that if he puts the sugar in his mouth it will taste sweet? Not in the least:

\* It will perhaps seem strange that we should select sweetness as an example of causation. We selected it for its simplicity. No one will deny that the taste of sweetness is as much an effect caused by the sugar as pain is an effect caused by fire. But people are apt to overlook that causation is the properties of one body acting upon the properties of another. They would call sweetness a quality in sugar; but the motion of a billiard-ball they say is *caused* by another ball.

he believes it is sweet because his experience of sugar is that it is sweet. By no effort could he divest himself of the idea of its sweetness, because sweetness forms an integral part of his idea of the sugar. So we may say of the sun's rising: it is part and parcel of our idea of the sun. So of one billiard-ball putting a second in motion: our experience of billiard-balls is that they put each other in motion.

Custom has primarily nothing to do with the belief. If we had only one experience of fire—if we saw it only once applied to a combustible substance—we should believe that it would burn, because part of our idea of fire would be that of a thing which burns. Custom has however, secondarily, some influence in correcting the tendency to attribute properties to things. Thus, a child sees a friend who gives him an apple. The next time the friend comes he is asked for an apple, because with the image of this friend is combined the image of a man who, amongst other properties, has that of giving apples. No apple is given, and this idea is disturbed. Similarly, when all our experience of things is confirmatory of our *first* experience, we may say that habit or custom induces us to attribute certain effects to certain causes. When our subsequent experience contradicts our first experience, we cease to attribute those effects to those causes which we first experienced; this is only saying that our subsequent experience has destroyed or altered the idea we formed at first.

Remark how much confusion is spread over this subject by the inconsiderate introduction of the word belief. It is misleading to say that a man *believes* that fire will burn him if he puts his finger in it; he *knows* it. He will believe that it has burned some one else—he will believe in a *proposition* you make about fire, belief being the assent to propositions: but to talk of his believing that sugar will be sweet when he cannot think of it otherwise than as sweet; or that fire will burn when he knows it burns, is as misleading as to say that he *believes* himself cold when he feels cold.

Only from this misleading use of the word belief could the

theory of fundamental ideas, or of 'an intuitive conviction that the future will resemble the past,' have stood its ground for a moment. If the proposition 'Fire will burn paper' were put to any one, he would unquestionably believe it, because his knowledge of the fire is of its burning properties. The proposition is as evident to him as that two and two make four. Although, therefore, he may be said to believe in the proposition 'Fire will burn paper,' he cannot properly be said to act upon belief when he attempts to light paper: he acts upon his knowledge. Metaphysicians argue as if the belief in the immediate result of an action were a belief in some *implied proposition* about the course of nature. It is really a reliance upon experience; nothing more.

We must distinguish between belief in existence and belief in propositions. It is inaccurate to say that a man *believes* in his own existence, as if that were a belief in a proposition. But though a man cannot believe in his own existence, simply because it is impossible for him to conceive himself as non-existent, he may believe that he will exist eternally, because that is a proposition, the converse of which is conceivable and maintainable.

The primordial act of all thinking whatever, is, as I have explained in the Prolegomena to this History, the making *present* to the mind of what is *absent* from the sense; and this, which connects all intellectual phenomena into one class, renders the accurate demarcation of them sometimes impossible, so insensibly does the one pass into the other. Thus when I say, 'I see it has rained,' because the wet streets make me infer that the wetness was caused by rain, my assertion is grounded on a mental re-presentation of the absent occurrence, precisely analogous to that which takes place when I *infer* the sweetness of the sugar before me, or *perceive* that the flower in my sister's hair is a rose, or *believe* that the paper she holds close to the candle will infallibly ignite if paper and flame come in contact. In each case the inference, perception, or belief, is the re-presentation of facts formerly present in my experience of rain, sugar, roses,



and candles. Whenever I forget any of the attendant facts, *i.e.* fail to make them present, I can only form an incomplete conception of the thing about which I reason, or infer. Bad logic is imperfect re-presentation. In proportion to the complexity of a proposition will be the liability to error, because of the liability to suffer some of the attendant facts to drop out of sight. Thus the proposition 'Fire will burn paper' is so simple, and accordant with daily experience, that assent to it is instantaneous; but the proposition 'Human life may extend over two centuries' is one implying so many facts which cannot be made present to the mind, because not lying within familiar experience, that instead of assent it produces denial, or at least doubt, which is suspension of belief, which again is the confessed inability to make all the facts present to the mind. That 'two and two make four' is the immediate and irresistible conclusion of the educated man; nevertheless, this very man would pause before assenting to the proposition 'Eight times three hundred and ninety-six, make three thousand one hundred and sixty-eight,' because he would have to make present to his mind the successive steps of the calculation, and this would demand an effort, great in proportion to his want of familiarity with calculations.

In spite of this identity of belief and perception, it is necessary for the perspicuity of discussion to discriminate the two, and I propose therefore to restrict the term belief to the assent to propositions, and demarcate it from those direct inferences which are made in the presence of objects and have reference to them. I would say, we believe in the proposition 'Fire burns,' but know that the paper about to be thrust into flame will ignite. Such a discrimination of terms will be found useful in discussing causation. We shall thus see in what respect assent to a proposition, complex in its elements, differs from the 'practical belief' of mankind in particular facts—we shall separate the belief of the philosopher in the proposition 'Every effect must have a cause,' from the belief of the child that the fire, which yesterday

burned paper, will burn it to-day. Both beliefs are grounded on and limited by experience; but the experience of the philosopher is distinguished from that of the child by its greater accumulation of analogous facts. The 'necessity' and 'universality' which, according to Kant, distinguish the philosophical concept, and raise it above experience, will be considered hereafter. For the present it is enough if we have reduced belief in causation (or in power) to experience of a direct kind, *not* separable from any other intellectual act, but allied to all other acts in being the mental representation of phenomena formerly present in experience. And this will help us, perhaps, to reconcile the combatants who quarrel over the idea of 'power' in causation.

Thus while it will be admitted by the one party that between two events, named respectively cause and effect, no *nexus* is perceived by us, over and above the mere fact of antecedence and sequence; and that therefore Hume is right in saying—'we only perceive this antecedence, and do not perceive the causal link;' on the other hand it must be maintained, that between those two events there is a specific *relation*, a something which makes the one succeed the other, causing this particular effect rather than another; and this subtle link it is which is the *nexus* contended for; this relation it is which distinguishes a causal act from one of accidental sequence. There must be a peculiar relation existing between oxygen and metals, otherwise metals never could be oxidised. The oxidation of iron is an effect like the ignition of paper; but it is an effect producible only through a specific relation or cause. If cause is a Relation, the reason of our inability to perceive it as an isolated existence, is the inability to isolate a relation from its related terms. It is not an object that can be presented to consciousness. Our phenomenal knowledge must ever be limited to the mere recognition of related terms. But although the relation is not an object of perception, it is an object of induction, and if it exist we may discover it.

All things necessarily stand related to all other things:

sometimes these relations are obtruded on our notice, because they pass from relations of coexistence into relations of succession, and we name them causes and effects; at other times they remain in the background of unremarked coexistence, and our unsolicited attention overlooks them; we do not then name them cause and effect. The carbonate of lime, which I see before me as marble, suggests to me, in its inaction, no conception of power, or causation, because my attention is not solicited by any *successive* relations; yet, if I had witnessed the action of the carbonic acid on the lime, and perceived the motions which originally *caused* the two substances to unite and form marble, the passage from one state to another would have suggested the idea of some power at work. It is clear that there must be relations existing between the carbonic acid and the lime, which *cause* the two to remain united, as we see them in marble. We do not see these relations—we do not therefore see the cause—but we know the cause must be in operation all the while, although, in consequence of no changes taking place, we are not solicited to observe the operation. Hence it is that only successive phenomena are named causal; and hence is it that Hume was right in saying that, in a last analysis, invariableness of antecedence and sequence is all that experience tells us of causation; although he did not, I think, state this position clearly, nor discern its real basis.

This conception of Causation, as the direct Relation between any two phenomena, whether coexistent or successive, accords with the conception that what is called the effect is itself but the union of concurrent causes—the oxygen and the metal co-operate to form an oxide; the group of facts which we designate as the antecedent, combines with the group of facts called the sequent; as when we say that ‘Henry I. died of eating lampreys;’ by which we mean, that in a certain condition of his organism the introduction of lampreys was the antecedent to a whole series of sequences terminating in death; although we are perfectly aware that the

lamprey was not the 'cause,' but only one integer in the sum of causes. The difficulty in fixing upon a true cause is this very complexity of relations: only when we can be said to know all the elements of a group, can we isolate one to estimate its influence.

I have endeavoured to reconcile the two contending parties on this perplexing question, and for all further discussion must refer to Mr. Mill's chapter in his *System of Logic*, where however there is a passage which seems to me quite contrary to the doctrine he upholds. I allude to his strictures on the dogma *cessante causâ cessat et effectus*. 'A *coup de soleil* gives a man a brain-fever: will the fever go off as soon as he is moved out of the sunshine? A sword is run through his body: must the sword remain in his body in order that he may continue dead?'\* Surely this argument is tenable only by those who identify a cause with the whole group of conditions which precede, and the effect with the whole group of conditions which succeed; and is not tenable by those who hold cause and effect to be simply antecedent and sequent. The solar rays striking on the man's head produce a disturbance in the circulation, which in its turn becomes the antecedent to a congestion of the blood-vessels in the brain, which becomes a brain-fever; instead of one succession of cause and effect, we have here a series of such successions; and if we could analyse the various stages of the sunstroke, we should find that each effect did cease on the cessation of the cause; indeed, if an effect be nothing but the sequent of an antecedent—and not the product of some creative power in the cause—it must depend for its existence on the presence of the antecedent.

Hume's Theory of Causation set Kant speculating on the constituent elements of cognition; but before we follow out the development of Philosophy in that direction, it will be necessary to trace the further development of Locke's influence in other directions.

\* Vol. i. p. 413, first ed.

## SIXTH EPOCH.

*Attempts to discover the mechanism of psychological action :  
the Sensational School.*



## CHAPTER I.

## CONDILLAC.

## § I. LIFE OF CONDILLAC.

**E**TIENNE BONNOT, who became Abbé de Condillac, was born at Grenoble, in 1715. His life was passed mainly in study, and was not varied by any of those incidents which give interest and romance to biography. He published his first work, *Essai sur l'Origine des Connoissances humaines*, in 1746; three years after, his *Traité des Systèmes*. His other works followed rapidly; and established for him such a reputation that he was appointed tutor to the Prince of Parma, for whose instruction he wrote the *Cours d'Études*. In 1768 the capricious doors of the Académie Française were opened to him; but once elected a member, he never after attended any of its sittings. He published his *Logique* in 1780, a few months before his death; and he left behind him his *Langue des Calculs*, published in 1798.

There is one biographical detail of interest, though I do not remember to have seen it alluded to by any one except Mr. Maurice,\* and it receives fresh interest from the point of resemblance it suggests in the lives of two other philosophers.

\* MAURICE: *Modern Philosophy*.

The influence of a woman's mind in determining the later speculations of Auguste Comte, and those of another eminent thinker, still living, is avowed by them; a similar influence is avowed with equal candour and almost equal enthusiasm by Condillac in the case of Madlle. Ferrand, to whom 'he owed the illumination which dispelled his prejudices.' He regrets her loss, and the imperfect state of his work thus deprived of her revision. The merit, if there be merit, he ascribes to her. 'Les vues les plus fines qu'il renferme sont dues à la justesse de son esprit et à la vivacité de son imagination. Elle sentit la nécessité de considérer séparément nos sens, de distinguer avec précision les idées que nous devons à chacun d'eux, et d'observer avec quel progrès ils s'instruisent, et comment ils se prêtent des secours mutuels.' \*

## § II. CONDILLAC'S SYSTEM.

We have seen how Idealism and Scepticism grew out of the doctrines respecting the origin of knowledge. We have now to see the growth of the Sensational School.

The success which Locke met with in France is well known. For a whole century the countrymen of Descartes extolled the English philosopher, little suspecting how that philosopher would have disclaimed their homage, could he have witnessed it. Condillac is the acknowledged representative of Locke in France. When his first work, entitled *Essai sur l'Origine des Connoissances humaines*, appeared he had no notion of simplifying Locke by reducing all Knowledge to Sensation. He was a modest disciple, and laid down as the fundamental principle that 'sensations and the operations of the mind are the materials of all our knowledge—materials which reflection sets in action by seeking their combinations and relations.' (Chap. i. § 5.)

In 1754 appeared his celebrated work, the *Traité des Sensations*. In it he quits Locke for Gassendi and Hobbes. 'The chief object of this work,' he says, 'is to show how all

\* *Traité des Sensations*, pp. 48-55.

our knowledge *and all our faculties* are derived from the senses, or, to speak more accurately, from sensations.' The inclusion of 'our faculties,' as well as our ideas, in this sensuous origin is however due entirely to Condillac. Hobbes never thought of such a simplification. The divergence from Locke is obvious: instead of the two sources of ideas, recognised in the *Essay on Human Understanding*, it assumes one source only—Sensation; instead of Mind, with certain elementary faculties, it assumes one elementary faculty—that of Sensibility—out of which all the faculties are evolved by the action of external objects on the senses. Nor was this a mere phrase of Condillac: the principle is radical; it constitutes the peculiarity of his system. Speaking of various philosophers, and quoting, with praise, the maxim attributed to Aristotle, that 'Nothing is in the intellect which was not previously in the Senses,' he adds, 'Immediately after Aristotle comes Locke; for the other philosophers who have written on this subject are not worthy of mention. The Englishman has certainly thrown great light on the subject, but he has left some obscurity. . . . All the faculties of the soul appeared to him to be innate qualities, and he never suspected they might be derived from sensation itself.

'Locke is the first,' he says, 'who remarked that the inquietude caused by the privation of an object is the principle of our actions. But he makes the inquietude born of desire, and it is precisely the contrary. . . . It remained therefore to show that this inquietude is the first principle given to us by the habits of touching, seeing, hearing, tasting, comparing, judging, reflecting, desiring, loving, hating, fearing, hoping, willing; that, in a word, it is from this arise all the habits of the soul and body.

'Locke distinguishes two sources of ideas, sense and reflection. It would be more exact to recognise but one; first, because reflection is in its principle nothing but sensation itself; secondly, because it is less a source of ideas than a canal through which they flow from sense.

'This inexactitude, slight as it may seem, has thrown much obscurity over his system. He contents himself with recognising that the soul perceives, thinks, doubts, believes, reasons, wills, reflects; that we are convinced of the existence of these operations, because we find them in ourselves, and they contribute to the progress of our knowledge; but he did not perceive the necessity of discovering their origin, and the principle of their generation,—he did not suspect that they might only be acquired habits; he seems to have regarded them as innate, and he says only that they may be perfected by exercise.' \*

This is far enough from Locke, who would have been amazed to hear that 'judgment, reflection, the passions—in a word, all the faculties of the mind—are nothing but *sensation which transforms itself differently* (*qui se transforme différemment*).'

Those who are curious to see how sensation transforms itself into these faculties may read Condillac's account. 'If a multitude of sensations operate at the same time with the same degree of vivacity, or nearly so, man is then only an animal that feels; experience suffices to convince us that then the multitude of impressions takes away all activity from the mind. But let only one sensation subsist, or without entirely dismissing the others, let us only diminish their force; the mind is at once occupied more particularly with the sensation which preserves its vivacity, *and that sensation becomes attention*, without its being necessary for us to suppose *anything else in the mind*. If a new sensation acquire greater vivacity than the former, it will become in its turn attention. But the greater the force which the former had, the deeper the impression made on us, and the longer it is preserved. Experience proves this. Our capacity of sensation is therefore divided into the sensation we have had and the sensation which we now have; we perceive them both at

\* *Extrait raisonne du Traité des Sensations: Œuvres de Condillac* (1803), iv. 13. Compare: *Essai sur l'Origine des Connoissances*, p. 26; and *Logique*, pp. 25, 49, 83.



once, but we perceive them differently: the one seems as past, the other as present. The name of *sensation* designates the impression actually made upon our senses; and it takes that of *memory* when it presents itself to us as a sensation which has formerly been felt. Memory is only the transformed sensation. When there is double attention there is comparison; for to be attentive to two ideas, and to compare them, is the same thing. But we cannot compare them without perceiving some difference or some resemblance between them: to perceive such relations is *to judge*. The acts of comparing and judging are therefore only attention; it is thus that sensation becomes successively attention, comparison, judgment.'

If ever the epigram of Leibnitz, *nisi ipse intellectus*, could be used as an argument, it would be against this system. Although Condillac's plausibility captivated Europe for a time, there was a speedy reaction, springing from the conviction that, however Condillac might identify the phenomena, a real distinction existed in fact. He was quite consistent. He considered that judging, comparing, numbering, imagining, wondering, having abstract ideas, having ideas of time and number, knowing general and particular truths, are only different ways of attending; all our passions are different ways of desiring; and as attention and desire are modes of feeling, it is clear that sensation 'enveloppe toutes les facultés de l'âme.'

Now the first objection which must be raised against this system, though it is one which I do not remember to have seen raised, is that it presupposes the existence of the very Mind which it proceeds to deny. Condillac is called a materialist, because careless readers or uncandid antagonists have overlooked his plain and repeated statements of his belief that there is a soul in the body, and that the sensations are only the occasional causes of mental operations.\*

\* 'Je dis la *cause occasionnelle*, parce que les sensations sont les modifications propres de l'âme, et que les organes n'en peuvent être que l'occasion.'—*Traité des Sensations*, p. 51.

Hence he recognises the power of the mind to acquire ideas even independently of sense; which will be the case in a future life. Nor is this hypothesis of *l'dme*, as an existing entity, a mere make-believe phrase. The activity of the soul, in sensation itself, is always presupposed by him. Thus, in his famous statue, each sensation calls forth judgment, comparison, desire; and yet Condillac pretends that these faculties thus called forth are only the sensation itself transformed; but, however he may name the process, the process itself in no respect differs from that described by Locke, who also taught that the mind exercised its faculties on materials furnished by sense.

Thus, while he pretends to evolve all knowledge and all the faculties out of sensation and the transformations of sensation (which is to be his advance on Locke), we cannot but observe that in his evolution the presence is tacitly admitted of those very faculties which are said to be evolved. In fact, he confounds the faculties with the operations of the faculties. Nor was there any alternative for him. In the absence of the faculties which elaborate sensations into perceptions, judgments, reasonings, the senses would never have raised his statue above the condition of idiocy. A man reduced to mere sensations would be like the pigeon whose cerebrum is removed, sensitive indeed, but incapable of memory, judgment, thought. Condillac was therefore forced to presuppose the existence of the mental faculties—the transforming power. To say that sensations themselves were the faculties, was equivalent to saying that exercise is the faculty of running. The child cannot run until he has learnt to use his limbs, but the exercise, in which this is learned, does not give him the limbs. Condillac was perfectly right in saying that we are not born with our mental faculties ready developed, any more than we are born capable of running at once; and when he divined this truth he was on the threshold of an important investigation, namely, How are the faculties developed? but he was unable to pursue the investigation, not having a right Method. Instead of biological, he pur-

sued verbal analysis. A verbal analysis of the phenomena was approximately made, and this was accepted as a substitute for the analysis of organ and function.

The second objection is, that if the mind is a *tabula rasa* as to knowledge, and is not even pre-existent as faculty (according to the metaphysicians) or as organism (according to the biologists), if, in a word, sensations and combinations of sensations create both knowledge and the knowing faculties, how can we explain the phenomena of idiocy? How is it that brutes with senses resembling our own have minds so markedly distinguished from our own? The sensations of the idiot are as vivid and varied as those of a rational man; the differences arise in the *cerebrations* of the two. Condillac felt the force of the objection respecting brutes, and attempted to elude it, first by asserting that brutes had less perfect sensations of touch, 'et par conséquent il ne sauroit être pour elles la cause occasionnelle de toutes les opérations qui se remarquent en nous;' and secondly, by assuming that the 'soul of brutes was of an essentially different order from that of man.'\* To the first we reply, that idiots and apes have the perfect sense of touch, without the perfection of mind assumed as following from it; to the second, that it is a mere evasion of the difficulty.

Finally, if Sensation is the origin and end of all mental faculty, how is it that men of vivid sensuous activity are not also the men of powerful intellect, which they notoriously are not; how can such a case as that of Laura Bridgman be explained?—a girl born deaf, dumb, and blind, yet manifesting unusual and varied intellectual activity. The biologist sees no difficulty here; nor does the ordinary psychologist. The one sees a cerebral organism, with its inherited aptitudes, ready for its work; the other sees a Mind, with its constituent faculties. But the sensationalist has no such refuge. Unless, indeed, he belongs to that biological school which traces the development of Sensibility throughout the animal series, and notes the derivation of the faculties from

\* Loc. cit.

developments, so that what was simple sensation at last gradually becomes identified with the form of Sensibility or to cerebration. It was no such idea as this, however, which guided Condillac. He saw that sensation was the origin of all mental phenomena; and not seeing how the intellect could be identical with sensation, he really preceded their existence while proclaiming them to be only formations.

He did that verbal analysis was accepted in lieu of a logical analysis. This points to a peculiarity in Condillac's system. It was his merit to have seen, and clearly expressed, the immense influence exercised by language on thought. It was his mistake to have exaggerated its influence, and to have drawn the conclusion that a perfect science is only a perfect language.\* There can be no doubt that when a science is perfect its language will be perfect also; but Condillac reverses this, and says that we form science forming itself as its language is formed; and in trying to perfect language we render the science more facile. He forgets his own remark, 'Parce que nous donnons des noms à des choses dont nous avons une idée, on suppose que nous avons une idée de toutes celles auxquelles nous donnons des noms.' †

Words are the signs of ideas, and language is a means by which reasoning is carried on, not the reasoning itself. Condillac affirms that without names we should have no distinct ideas; but the reverse is true: without the power of distinction we should never need the names which are only of the abstracts. 'Si nous ne raisonnons,' he says, 'sans le secours de ces dénominations, c'est une nouvelle science que nous ne raisonnons bien ou mal que parce que la langue est bien ou mal faite.' So completely did he identify the real process that he declared the art of reasoning reduced to a well-constructed language, 'because the

\* 'une science bien traitée n'est qu'une langue bien faite.'—*Langue des Calculs*, 2<sup>e</sup> édit. comp. pp. 142, 163.  
 † *ibid.*, p. 50.

order in our ideas is itself only the subordination existing in the names given to genera and species.'

Starting on the false supposition that a verbal analysis could lead to anything more than verbal analysis, it seemed to him that metaphysics was capable of the same precision as geometry, if only the expressions were as accurately determined;\* and his analysis of the mind is a remarkable illustration of the facility with which a man may seem to say a good deal merely by naming things in a new way. Let any one examine Condillac's genesis of the faculties, and he will find that it is solely a process of naming.

I will begin at the beginning, and show that under the one name of Sensation he includes two really different things, that is to say, two phenomena having different characters, and although allied by a community which unites all the phenomena of Sensibility, nevertheless as rigidly to be demarcated, in virtue of their specific differences, as any other two phenomena. Sensation and Ideation are two distinct functions. They have two distinct organs. To speak of Cerebration or Ideation as the same phenomenon exhibited by the organs of Sense—to call an idea a 'transformed sensation'—is equivalent to calling a muscular motion a transformed sensation. In the one case, as in the other, a sensation is the starting-point; in the one case, as in the other, the starting-point is not the sequence. A sensation stimulates a muscle into action; a sensation stimulates the Cerebrum into action. The Neurility of an ingoing nerve is transformed into (awakens) Sensibility in the Centre, and is retransformed into (awakens) Neurility in the outgoing nerve, which again is transformed into (awakens) Contractility in the muscle. This is the sequence, as I have elsewhere endeavoured to prove; and the sequence is alike whether the final phenomenon be a thought or an action; the only difference being that in the one case the Sensibility of a Centre is reflected on the Cerebrum, in the other it is reflected on a muscle.†

\* *Essai sur l'Origine des Connoissances*, p. 2.

† *Physiology of Common Life*, ii.

By Sensation therefore must be understood that form of Sensibility which belongs to the organs of Sense—including, of course, those important, but generally neglected, sensibilities which arise from the viscera and from muscular actions. The Centres of these are the various sensory ganglia at the base of the cerebrum and in the medulla oblongata, with the ganglia imbedded in the spinal cord.

Is Ideation the same thing? It also is a form of Sensibility \*—the peculiar property of ganglionic tissue—but it is a *special* form, the action of a special organ. It cannot be separated from sensation, any more than movement can be separated from sensation; but that it is the action of a special organ, and subject to special laws, suffices to demarcate it from the activity of the senses.

The point in dispute is so important, and is so intimately bound up with the whole doctrine of the Sensational School, forming indeed the battle-ground of all psychological doctrine, that we must consider it with more than a passing attention. The confusion of Sensation with Ideation, is Condillac's systematic error; but it is an error from which few, if any writers, even of the spiritualist schools, have been free. Explicitly, or implicitly, these two phenomena have been regarded as two aspects of the same thing. The rigorous demarcation of Sensation as one process, from Cerebration as another process—each dependent on its separate nervous centre—will be found in no psychological treatise. Nevertheless Comparative Anatomy has succeeded in demonstrating the independence of the organs of Sense and the Brain; although no one has yet succeeded in detecting the true relations which connect these independent centres, and make them act together. We know that the Brain is as much an *addition* to the organs of Sense as these organs are additions to the nervous system of the

\* 'Les idées sont, comme les sensations, des manières d'être de l'âme.' CONDILLAC: *Logique*, p. 83. True enough; but not the same *manières d'être*. Motion and secretion are modes of vital activity, but no one supposes them to be the same.

simpler animals. Low down in the animal scale we can detect no trace at all of a nervous system; ascending a few steps, we detect a simple ganglion with its prolongations; ascending higher, we detect a more complex arrangement of ganglia, and rudimentary organs of Sense; ascending still higher and higher, we detect more complex organs of Sense, and a rudimentary Brain; till at last we arrive at man, with his complex organs and his complex Brain. But so independent is the Brain, that even in the human species cases occur of 'anencephalous monsters,' that is to say, children born without any Brain whatever; and these children breathe, suck, cry, and struggle, like other children.

Granting this, we grant that the functions, Sensation and Ideation, are as independent as the organs of which they are the functions; and although Ideation is organically connected with Sensation, yet it is not more so than Muscular Motion is connected with Sensation.

It is customary to speak of the organs of Sense as if they were simple organs: we must not innovate in this matter, although we find it needful to remind the reader that each special sense is really the function of a complex apparatus of organs. The apparatus of Sight, for example, may be separated into at least three parts;—1st, for the reception of impressions of light; 2nd, for the transmission of those impressions (*i.e.* the nerve with its Neurility); 3rd, for the sensation (*i.e.* the ganglion with its Sensibility). Of these the last only need here be especially considered, and may be called the *Sensational Centre*. In this centre the external stimulus becomes a sensation; from this centre the sensation is generally (not always) propagated to the Cerebrum, which in turn may propagate the influence to the muscles or glands.

Every sense, whether it be one of the five special senses, or of the so-called 'organic senses' (such as those of the alimentary canal and of muscular activity), has its own special centre, or *sensorium*: but there seems to be no ground for assuming, with Unzer and Prochaska, the exist-

ence of any one general *sensorium*, to which these all converge; and I shall speak therefore of the *Sensational Centres* as the seats of sensations derived from the stimuli which act on the organs of sense. Considered as Sensational Centres, they are perfectly independent of the Brain; they may and do act without implicating the Brain, for they will act when the Brain is absent; an animal deprived of its cerebrum manifests unequivocal symptoms of being sensitive to light, sound, &c. But in the normal state of the organism these centres are intimately connected with the Brain; and the stimuli which affect them directly, indirectly affect the Brain. Light, impinging on the retina, determines a change in the optic Sensational Centre; this change is usually propagated to the Cerebrum; and as the first change was a sensation, so is the second an idea; this idea may excite other ideas, or it may be so faint in its influence as to be almost immediately absorbed, and then we are said to be 'scarcely conscious' of the sensation—meaning that we thought very little about it: an example of which is the little attention we pay to the clock striking when we are engaged in study, if the fact is indifferent to us; we hear it, but do not think of it the next moment; if on the other hand the striking of the clock is not indifferent to us, the various thoughts which it awakens make us eminently 'conscious of the sensation.' In the heat of battle, a sword passes through a man's arm, and nevertheless the wound is followed by no pain or 'consciousness;' the stimulus which under ordinary circumstances would have been propagated from a Sensational Centre, and thence radiating to the Cerebrum, would have roused up manifold ideas, namely, of consequences, what was necessary to be done, &c., is prevented from so radiating, and is not carried beyond the Sensational Centre.

Not only can we have sensations without being conscious of them—*i.e.* without thinking about them; we can also think with perfect freedom when all the Sensational Centres (except those of organic life) are unaffected by any external stimulus, *i.e.* when we have no special sensations. We do so



when awake in bed during the stillness of night : the senses are in repose, the Brain is active.

Thus the independence of Ideation and Sensation psychologically and anatomically destroys the basis of Condillac's doctrine. But even on other grounds we may reject his theory of the origin of knowledge. It rests on two positions;—the first is the identification of all knowledge with sensation; the second is the dogma of our faculties not being innate. The first is the doctrine of Gassendi and Hobbes. It is thus stated by Diderot, one of Condillac's most celebrated pupils:—'Every idea must necessarily, when brought to its state of ultimate decomposition, resolve itself into *a sensible* representation or picture; and since everything *in* our understanding has been introduced there by the channel of sensation, whatever proceeds *out* of the understanding is either chimerical or must be able, in returning by the same road, to re-establish itself according to its sensible archetype. Hence an important rule in philosophy, That every expression which cannot find an external and sensible object to which it can thus establish its affinity, is destitute of signification.' \*

This is true enough, and has already been insisted on; but although ideas have their origin in sensations, they are not themselves sensations; they are formed from sensations, but are not sensible pictures. The least experience is sufficient to convince us that we have many ideas which cannot be reduced to any *sensible picture* whatever; or, to prevent any of the ambiguity which belongs to the word 'idea,' let us rather say we have many thoughts which cannot be reduced to pure sensations. If the elements are given by Sense, they are combined in new ways by Thought. We can think of virtue or goodness, or patriotism or scoundrelism, without being able to form mental pictures of these ideas, although each element in these composite wholes is reducible to a sensation.

Now for the second point: Condillac, as already hinted,

.. \* Quoted by DUGALD STEWART, *Philosophical Essays*, p. 166.

was the first to catch a glimpse of the important truth that our *faculties* are not innate—are not even connate; but he bungled in attempting to trace the genesis of these faculties. That men are not born with the powers of reasoning, remembering, imagining, is a proposition which will meet with very little credit at first. A little experience and reflection, however, show us that as the baby certainly cannot reason, remember, or imagine, these being faculties subsequently and slowly developed, we must conclude that the mental faculties are only *potentially* in the new-born child (which is saying that they are not there at all. See *Prolegomena* IV. § 52). The baby can no more reason than he can talk. He *learns* to do both; and, before he can learn them, the powers of his cerebrum no less than the muscles of his vocal organs, must grow, be developed, and strengthened by exercise. Man is no more born with reason than an acorn is born an oak. The infant and the acorn, though they contain that within them which, under fitting circumstances, will be developed into reason in the one, and foliage in the other, cannot be said to have as yet either reason or foliage.

This important distinction is obtruded upon our experience in our daily observation of children. Condillac has the merit of having seen it first; but he saw it very imperfectly, and failed altogether to make any good use of it. As an example: He who told us that our faculties were not innate, but were 'acquired habits,' tells us, when he comes to the genesis of those faculties, that they spring into existence at once—are born full-grown—the acorn suddenly leaps into an oak. Thus his famous statue has Memory, Judgment, Desire, &c., as soon as it has Sensations. This is enough to show that if Condillac discovered an important fact, he only stumbled over it, and knew not its significance.\* Let us hope that, if England is to produce any new system of Psychology, this most important point will not be over-

\* The only person who, to our knowledge, has made any use of this fact is Dr. BENEKE, who has made it the basis of his whole philosophy. See his *Neue Psychologie*, also the *Lehrbuch der Psychologie* (Berlin, 1845).

looked: the growth and development of our faculties is as much a part of Psychology, as the growth and development of our organs is a part of Biology.\*

But although Condillac must be pronounced wrong in his identification of Thought with Sensation, the attempt itself was a legitimate hypothesis, and had the effect of all hypotheses, in giving a precise direction to research. It was an attempt to discover the mechanism of the mind: it could not succeed because it was an attempt to discover a mechanism by a verbal analysis of the phenomena. We shall see presently, in Hartley and Darwin, a nearer approach to the objective study of the mechanism; but before doing so, it may be well to glance at the exceptional merits of Condillac, which secured for him an European renown.

Above all praise is the transparent clearness of his language, and the painstaking effort to condense metaphysical mists into tangible water. It was an unfortunate day for French Philosophy when—in blind reaction against doctrines which were misconceived, and therefore shuddered at—men relinquished the clear language of the 18th century for the vaporous eloquence, and the mystical jargon, which dreads clearness as a ghost dreads daylight. The descent from Condillac to Maine de Biran and Victor Cousin is immense; and a deterioration of French Philosophy has accompanied this fall.

Many excellent remarks and acute analyses will be found in Condillac's very readable volumes. I would direct attention to his explanation of what Leibnitz and Hamilton have emphasised respecting the unconscious modifications of the mind;† and to the ingenious account of Memory as the tendency of the fibres of the brain to vibrate in the way they have formerly vibrated: 'on a des idées dans la mémoire comme on a dans les doigts des pièces de clavecin: c'est

\* Since this was written (1846) Mr. HERBERT SPENCER has expounded the development of the faculties in his very remarkable *Principles of Psychology* (1855).

† *Essai sur l'Origine des Connoissances*, pp. 43 sq.

à dire que le cerveau a, comme tous les autres sens, la facilité de se mouvoir suivant les déterminations dont il s'est fait une habitude.' \*

Although Condillac assuredly was not a Materialist in the strict sense of that term, yet, according to the lax interpretations of antagonists, his system being one which 'led to' Materialism by its identification of Thought and Feeling, and both with movements of the nerve fibres, the world has discredited his belief in the spirituality of the soul. Indeed, just as Descartes practically set aside all reference to the Creator, by expounding a system of the universe in which only matter and motion were factors; so did Condillac practically set aside all reference to a spiritual entity, by expounding a system of Psychology in which only sensation and its transformation were factors. The elimination in each case was certain to be made by successors.† And although, what is called Materialism I hold to be as entirely beside the true science of positive Psychology, as the doctrine of 'vortices' is beside the positive science of Cosmology, yet, in both cases, I regard the fundamental hypothesis in the light of an immense advance. Condillac destroyed, at any rate for a time, the metaphysical superstitions respecting mental operations. He set aside the unknowable entity, and attached himself to the knowable phenomena. Had it not been for the supposed moral and political consequences deducible from his mode of looking at phenomena, Psychology would now have been in a far more matured condition; but terror at the consequences produced a reaction against his point of view, and thus prevented a rectification of his errors, and a development of his method.

Two great schools of Psychology have divided the attention of Europe; that of Descartes, starting from pure Thought, and employing the Deductive Method; and that of Locke, starting from Sensation, and employing the Inductive Method. The main defect of the first has been the

\* *Logique*, ch. ix. pp. 82 sq.

† See the chapter on DESTUTT DE TRACY, farther on.

predominance of the Subjective Method, which has led to the disregard of the conditions of Thought, and all its manifold relations to the external medium. The main defect of the second has also been a too great reliance on this Method, and an imperfect appreciation of the objective relations. Occupied with the spirituality of the mind, the Cartesians have attempted to deduce conclusions from their conceptions of a spiritual substance. The rival school, taking an opposite point of departure, has been too exclusively occupied with the senses, and has confounded Sensation with Thought. The Scotch School of Psychologists attempted a compromise; but having failed to see that Psychology was a branch of Biology, continued to employ the old Subjective Method—with what results we shall see.

The doctrine of transformed sensations was a step in advance, if only because it fixed the attention of psychologists upon the verifiable processes, and withdrew them from interminable and profitless discussions respecting the nature of the soul—its qualities as a spiritual substance, its modes of action as a spirit. But the doctrine was in no other sense an advance. It explained nothing; it only named anew processes already known. The traveller whom we have seen attempting to explain the phenomena of the clock (*Prolegomena*, § 19), after having rejected the hypothesis of the clock being an animal, arrived at the conclusion that the pendulum is the primary cause. Now, suppose him to have been a disciple of Condillac, he would, ingeniously enough, argue that the ticking, the striking, and the movements of the hands, were all ‘transformed pendulum-motions;’ which indeed they are; but what is learned by learning this, unless at the same time the mechanism of transformation be displayed? Would our traveller have known more of the clock, by knowing that its phenomena were transformed pendulum-motions? Would he have been able to regulate the clock’s action, or, when some accident had disturbed its mechanism, would he have been able to repair it? Brought thus to apply his knowledge, he would have discovered its

infertility; the necessity for a real analysis would have taught him the vanity of his verbal analysis.

This, then, may be said to be the significance of Condillac: he helped to withdraw men from the contemplation of a metaphysical entity, but he could not guide them in objective research. Let us see how it fared with his successors.

## CHAPTER II.

## HARTLEY.

## § I. LIFE OF HARTLEY.

DAVID HARTLEY, the son of a Yorkshire clergyman, was born on the 30th of August, 1705. He went to Cambridge at fifteen, and became a Fellow of Jesus College. Originally destined for the Church, he had scruples about signing the Thirty-nine Articles, and gave up the Church for Medicine, which he subsequently practised with great success.

When only twenty-five years of age, he conceived the design and commenced the execution of his celebrated *Observations on Man, his Frame, his Duty, and his Expectations*, led thereto, as he tells us in the Preface, by hearing that 'the Rev. Mr. Gay had asserted the possibility of deducing all our intellectual pleasures and pains from association.' Mr. Gay published his views in a dissertation prefixed to Law's translation of King *On the Origin of Evil*; but, although Hartley acknowledges having derived the suggestion from Gay, it is clear to all readers of his work that he had thoroughly mastered, and made his own, the principle of Association as the primary law of intellectual combination. Hartley did not publish his *Observations* till 1748, eighteen years after the scheme was first laid. The year before, according to Dr. Parr, he published a small treatise as a precursor to this work. 'You will be astonished to hear,' Dr. Parr writes to Dugald Stewart,\* 'that in this book, instead of the Doctrine of Necessity, Hartley openly declares for the indifference of the will, as maintained by Archbishop King.' And the reader

\* STEWART'S *Dissertation*, part ii. p. 355 of HAMILTON'S edition.

will be astonished to hear that Hartley does no such thing! Dugald Stewart, who had not seen the work referred to, remarks that 'it is curious that in the course of a year, Hartley's opinions on so very essential a point should have undergone a complete change;' still more curious, however, that Dr. Parr should have read the work and discovered in it such a mare's nest. The tract in question is reprinted in the volume of *Metaphysical Tracts by English Philosophers of the Eighteenth Century. Prepared for the Press by the late Rev. Samuel Parr, D.D., London, 1837*—a volume precious to metaphysical students, because it contains Collier's *Clavis Universalis* and *Specimen of True Philosophy*. If the reader will turn to the third of these tracts, *Conjecturæ quædam de Sensu, Motu, et Idearum Generatione*, without date, he will find that it is nothing more nor less than an abstract, in Latin, of the first part of Hartley's *Observations*; and that the question of Free-will is nowhere opened in it. I can only suppose that Dr. Parr, unacquainted with physiological speculations, was misled by the admirable discussion of automatic and voluntary actions (pp. 31-35), into the notion that Hartley there espoused the doctrine of Free-will; but I am surprised that Sir W. Hamilton should have allowed the error to pass uncorrected in his edition of Stewart's Dissertation.

Hartley died on August 25, 1757, aged fifty-two, and left a name so distinguished for piety and goodness, that it in a great measure shielded his doctrines from the reprobation they have often incurred when promulgated by others.

## § II. HARTLEY'S SYSTEM.

Combining a suggestion thrown out by Newton at the end of his *Principia*, and in the questions annexed to his *Optics*, respecting vibrations of an ether as the cause of sensation, with the doctrine of Locke respecting Association of Ideas. Hartley produced a system of Psychology, which is historically curious as the first attempt to explain the physiological mechanism of psychological phenomena. If not



worth much as a contribution to Philosophy, it is very noticeable as an effort to connect intellectual with physical phenomena; and, however subsequent writers may have ridiculed, not without excuse, the vibrations and vibratiuncles which Hartley substituted for the old metaphysical conceptions, it is certain that his attempt to explain the phenomena physiologically has very much influenced the thoughts of succeeding speculators.

'Man,' he says, 'consists of two parts, body and mind.' Does he mean by this to proclaim the existence of a distinct immaterial entity superadded to the body? According to the terms of his definition, on the first page of his work this seems to be his intention; for he defines it as 'that substance, agent, principle, &c., to which we refer the sensations, ideas, pleasures, pains, and voluntary motions.' Yet the whole system of vibrations seems to imply the contrary; and, at the close of the first part of his work, he declares that he holds himself aloof from the question altogether. He will not deny the immateriality of mind: 'On the contrary, I see clearly, and acknowledge readily, that matter and motion, however subtly divided, yield nothing more than matter and motion still. But then neither would I affirm that this consideration affords a proof of the soul's immateriality.' He thinks, with Locke, that it is quite possible the Creator should have endowed matter with sensation; but he will not undertake to affirm it as a truth. 'It is sufficient for me that there is a certain connection of one kind or other between the sensations of the soul, and the motions excited in the medullary substance of the brain.'\* A more rigorous logic would have forced him into a more decided opinion; for this question of the soul's immateriality is one vitally affecting the system of vibrations; and his

\* Compare also Scholium to Prop. 5 (vol. i. p. 33): 'I do not by thus ascribing the performance of sensation to vibrations excited in the medullary substance, in the least presume to assert that matter can be endued with the power of sensation. It is common to all systems to suppose some motions attendant upon sensation, since corporeal objects must by their actions impress some motion upon our bodies;' and *Conjecturæ quædam de Sensu*, &c., p. 41.

adversaries have had little difficulty in showing the insufficiency of 'vibrations' to explain the phenomena of an immaterial mind. Between the immaterial principle and these material vibrations, they saw an impassable gulf: let the ether vibrate never so rhythmically, it always remains 'vibrating ether,' it cannot become 'sensation,' or 'thought;' nor does Hartley bridge over the gulf by the assumption of an 'infinitesimal elementary body intermediate between the soul and the gross body,' to which, and from which, the vibrations of the nerves are communicated; the radical difficulty remains.

It may be objected, perhaps, that those who point out the defect in Hartley's hypothesis are themselves open to a similar charge, since they assume an immaterial principle to be affected by a material change, and assume the mind to be in connection with the body, following its alterations. But there is this difference between them and Hartley: they do not pretend to explain how mind is affected by body, he does. They accept, as an ultimate fact, what he attempts to elucidate: and it is his elucidation which they refuse to acknowledge.

His first proposition is, that, 'The white medullary substance of the brain, spinal marrow, and the nerves proceeding from them, is the immediate instrument of sensation and motion.' Modern physiologists maintain precisely the reverse of this, declaring the *grey* matter to be the seat of sensation and motion. I may say, in passing, that both these positions seem to be erroneous in their exclusiveness; and that the white as well as the grey substance must be present, just as the zinc and copper plates must both be present in the galvanic battery.

Hartley continues: 'External objects impressed upon the senses occasion, first, in the nerves on which they are impressed, and then in the brain, Vibrations of the small—or, as one may say, infinitesimal—medullary particles. These Vibrations are motions backwards and forwards, of the same

kind as the oscillation of pendulums, and the tremblings of the particles of sounding bodies. They must be conceived to be exceedingly short and small, so as not to have the least efficacy to disturb or move the whole bodies of the nerves or brain. For that the nerves should vibrate like musical strings is highly absurd.'

The proof that external objects impress vibratory motions on the nerves is seen in the continuation of a sensation, 'since no motion besides a vibratory one can reside in any part for the least moment of time.' The vibrations are propagated by the ether which penetrates the pores of the nerves, and the vibrations of the ether 'agitate the small particles of the medullary substance of the sensory nerves with synchronous vibrations, in the same manner as the vibrations of the air in sounds agitate many regular bodies with corresponding tremblings.' 'One may conjecture, indeed, that the rays of light excite vibrations in the small particles of the optic nerve by a direct and immediate action. And it may also be that sapid and odoriferous particles are agitated with specific vibrations, and they communicate these directly to the small particles of the gustatory and olfactory nerves as well as to the interjacent ether.'


He uses vibrations as synonymous with sensations. 'The quantity of matter in bodies is always found to be proportional to their gravity: we may therefore either make the quantity of matter the exponent of the gravity, or the gravity the exponent of it, *according as either may be ascertained*. . . . And by a parity of reasoning, if that species of motion which we term vibrations can be shown by probable arguments to attend upon all sensations, ideas, and motions, and to be proportional to them, then we are at liberty either to make vibrations the exponents of sensations, ideas and motions, or these the exponents of vibrations, as best suits the inquiry; however impossible it may be to discover in what way vibrations cause sensations and ideas, *i.e.* though vibrations be of a corporeal and sensations and ideas of a mental nature.'

The passage in italics ought to have arrested him. A

little reflection would have disclosed that while gravity and mass may severally be taken as exponents of each other, because sometimes one, and sometimes the other, may more easily be measured; vibrations and sensations do not stand on a similar footing. The sensation must always be more easily ascertained than the vibration—the latter indeed being hypothetical. Since Hartley wrote, the advance of science in this direction has been such as to give a high degree of probability to the general doctrine of vibrations; but even now our knowledge of sensations is much more certain, and much more easily ascertainable, than that of the vibrations actually involved. We could not use the one as exponent of the other, with the freedom of a physicist choosing between gravity and mass.

Let me here point out the radical insufficiency of Hartley's doctrine of vibrations. It is an hypothetical machinery substituted for that of Condillac, which adds nothing to our knowledge of psychical processes. To call them vibrations and vibratiuncles, or to call them sensations and transformed sensations, enlarges not our horizon. What we want is to trace the mechanism of thought; the doctrine of vibrations might help us, if from the known laws of vibratory bodies we could deduce explanations of mental phenomena hitherto unexplained—such, for instance, as the phenomena of polarisation and interference, in the case of Light. And I believe such deductions can be made; but not upon Hartley's vague theory; nor did he attempt to make any. Indeed, so entirely aloof is the hypothesis of vibrations from any psychological process, as explained by Hartley, that when Priestley abridged the work he omitted the hypothesis altogether, and it was never missed.

To say that vibrations produce sensations throws little light. What is the specific velocity and sweep of each vibration? *That* would be valuable knowledge. The researches of modern physicists have measured with surprising accuracy the *kind* of vibration which determines each specific sound



and each specific colour, and which determines the sensation of heat; but they have not yet measured the vibrations which determine touch, tickling, taste or smell. Hartley never thought of descending from the generalities to such specialities. He contented himself with calling sensations vibrations, as his predecessors had called them motions of animal spirits. In no respect can I detect an advance upon the doctrine so well expounded by the Cartesian, De la Forge.\* The only effect of the hypothesis is to make his work repulsive and slightly ridiculous in the eyes of some readers, and needlessly wearisome to others.

Moreover, note how entirely the biological method was disregarded even by a physician who had so far escaped from the metaphysical trammels as to reduce intellectual phenomena to vibrations. The clock was not 'taken to pieces' even by Hartley. Subjective analysis still furnished the datum which objective analysis would speedily have disclosed to be false, namely, that ideas were faint sensations, and that both sensations and ideas had one seat.

But although, like Condillac, Hartley failed to throw any light upon the physiological process, he carried still further than Condillac the fertile suggestion that psychological processes were in truth physiological, and must be sought in the organic mechanism; and he has the immense superiority over Condillac, that having clearly seen the significance of the fundamental Law of Association, he was enabled to give that Law an extent of application no one had previously suspected. Nay, more; he applied it to those physiological phenomena which still interest and perplex philosophers, namely, the voluntary and involuntary actions. His twenty-first proposition, and the elucidations which follow, deserve to be read even at the present day.†

The Law of Association, by which most if not all our intellectual processes are regulated, has been copiously illustrated

\* DE LA FORGE: *Remarques sur l'Homme de René Descartes*. Paris, 1729, pp. 190-7.

† The student may also compare the passage in the *Conjecturæ*, p. 34.

by Scotch and English psychologists, though scarcely used by the German and French; and whoever sees the importance of the Law will be grateful to Hartley for his services in establishing it; the more so because the vibrations and vibratiuncles have long since passed into the limbo of abortive efforts, and Hartley's name is seldom cited.

## CHAPTER III.

## DARWIN.

ALTHOUGH even more neglected than Hartley by the present generation, Darwin, once so celebrated, deserves mention here as one of the psychologists who aimed at establishing the physiological basis of mental phenomena.

Erasmus Darwin was born at Elton, near Newark, on the 12th of December, 1731. After studying at St. John's College, Cambridge, and taking his degree of Doctor of Medicine at Edinburgh, he established himself as a physician in Lichfield, married twice, had three sons, and died in the seventieth year of his age, on the 18th of April, 1802. As a poet, his *Botanic Garden* (1781) by its tawdry splendour gained him a tawdry reputation; as a philosopher, his *Zoonomia; or Laws of Organic Life* (2 vols. 4to, 1794-6) gained him a reputation equally noisy and fleeting.

Although couched in different language, Darwin's theory is substantially the same as Hartley's: for 'vibrations' he substitutes 'sensorial motions.' By the sensorium Darwin means 'not only the medullary part of the brain, spinal marrow, nerves, organs of sense, and of the muscles; but also at the same time that living principle, or spirit of animation, which resides throughout the body without being cognisable to our senses, except by its effects.' The changes which occasionally take place in the sensorium, as during the exertions of volition, or the sensations of pleasure or pain, are termed *sensorial motions*.\*

The medullary substance, he thinks, passes along the

\* *Zoonomia*, vol. i. p. 10.

nerves and mingles with the muscular fibres. The 'organs of sense consist in like manner of moving fibres enveloped in the medullary substance.' The word *idea* has various meanings, he says, and to give it precision he defines it as 'a contraction or motion, or configuration of the fibres which constitute the immediate organ of sense. Synonymous with the word *idea* we shall sometimes use the words *sensual motion*, in contradistinction to *muscular motion*.'

He then undertakes to prove the existence of these sensual motions, and deduces from this proof the fact that as we advance in life all the parts of our bodies become rigid, and are consequently less susceptible of new habits of motion, though they retain those already established. Hence only the young can learn; hence the aged forget the events of yesterday and remember those of infancy.\*

'If our recollection, or imagination, be not a repetition of animal movements, I ask, in my turn, What is it? You tell me it consists of images or pictures of things. Where is this extensive canvas hung up?—or where the numerous receptacles in which these are deposited?—or to what else in the animal system have they any similitude? That pleasing picture of objects, represented in miniature on the retina of the eye, seems to have given rise to this illusive oratory! It was forgot that this representation *belongs rather to the laws of light than to those of life*; and may with equal elegance be seen in the camera obscura as in the eye; and that the picture vanishes for ever when the object is withdrawn.†

Had Darwin left us only the passage just cited, we should have credited him with a profounder insight into Psychology than any of his contemporaries, and the majority of his successors, exhibit; and although the perusal of *Zoonomia* must convince every one that Darwin's system is built up of untenable hypotheses, Darwin deserves a place in history for

\* *Zoonomia*, vol. i. p. 27.

† *Ibid.* p. 29. In BAIN'S *Senses and the Intellect*, p. 60 sq., the reader will find the old theory of a *sensorium*, or chamber of images, which DARWIN here pushes aside, satisfactorily refuted from the physiological point of view.



that one admirable conception of Psychology as subordinate to the laws of life. So little has this conception been appreciated, that not only are systems of Psychology constructed in serene indifference to Physiology, but many of the questions agitated in mental Physiology are hopelessly entangled because men will not, or cannot, discriminate between problems of Physics and problems of Physiology; between phenomena regulated by laws of inorganic matter, and phenomena regulated by laws of organic matter. Thus the questions, Why with two eyes do we see objects *single*? and, Why do we not see objects *inverted*, since their images are inverted on the retina? have puzzled thousands; and not one of the attempted solutions has recognised the important fact that the problems are *psychological*, not optical nor anatomical, consequently cannot be settled by optics and anatomy; angles of incidence, and decussation of optic nerves, have nothing to do with the phenomena the moment after the Sensational Centre has been affected. We might as well attempt to deduce the assimilation of sugar from the angles of its crystals, or from the sand-like disposition of its grains, as to deduce the perception of an object from the laws of optics: the crystals and grains of sugar must first be *destroyed*, and the sugar made soluble, before it can be assimilated; the retinal images must, in like manner, first be transformed in the Sensational Centre before they can, through that Centre, affect the Cerebrum.

That this is no gratuitous hypothesis, but expresses the actual process of perception, in as far as that process has been ascertained, may perhaps be made clear from the following considerations: When I say that the perception of a visual object is a psychological act, not in any way explicable by the laws of optics, or by any investigation of the anatomical structure of the optic apparatus, I ground that assertion on certain authoritative facts; for example, I take up the vexed question of our perceiving an object as single, although two images are formed on the two retinas; and instead of endeavouring to explain it by delicate anatomy of

the retina, or the decussating fibres of the optic nerves, I at once remove it from that circle of discussion by classing it with phenomena precisely analogous. We see objects single with two eyes; but we also hear sounds as single with two ears; we smell odours as single with two nostrils; we feel objects as single with five fingers. How is it that no physiologist has reflected on the bearing of these facts? If the ordinary explanations of optical perception are correct, why do not auditory and olfactory nerves decussate, and so the whole mystery be cleared up? No sooner is attention called to the fact of single hearing and single smelling, with two auditory and two olfactory nerves, than we at once cease to regard single vision with two optic nerves as anything special, and we try if a psychological explanation will not avail. I believe the explanation to be very simple. *We cannot have two precisely similar sensations at precisely the same instant; the simultaneousness of the two sensations renders them indistinguishable.* Two sounds of precisely the same pitch and intensity, succeeding each other by an *appreciable* interval, will be heard as two sounds; but if they succeed each other so rapidly that the interval is inappreciable, no distinction will be felt, and the two will be heard as one, because heard simultaneously.

The fact of our being able to see an image reflected on the retina of an animal, and of our being able to explain on optical principles the formation of that image, has very much misled physiologists in their efforts to comprehend the sensation; they have naturally imagined that in vision we see the retinal image; whereas, unless I am altogether mistaken, we see nothing of the kind—we are affected *by* that retinal image, as in hearing we are affected by a wave of air, but do not perceive the wave; or as in smelling we are affected by the action of volatile substances on the olfactory nerve, but do not perceive the substances. We only perceive the changes effected in us by these agents.

The various Sensational Centres are *variously* affected by the *same* external stimuli: electricity giving to the gustatory

nerve the stimulus of savorous bodies, to the auditory nerve the stimulus of sonorous vibrations, to the optic nerve the stimulus of luminous bodies, to the tactile nerves the stimulus of touch. Pressure on the eye causes luminous spots to be seen; we seem to see fire-flies. The pressure of over-distended blood-vessels produces spectral illusions, and we *see* daggers in the air as vividly as any at our sides. Unhappy students well know the 'singing in the ears' produced by over-study. Nor is this all: narcotics introduced into the blood excite in each Sensational Centre the specific sensation normally excited by its external stimuli: giving the appearance of luminous spots to the eyes, of singing in the ears to the auditory nerves, and of 'creeping sensations' to the nerves of touch.

The reason of this is that each Sensational Centre has its specific manner of reacting, no matter what the nature of the thing affecting it. While only certain things affect it sensationally, all those which *do* affect it, do so in a specific manner. Light, for instance, affects the optic centre, but produces no appreciable effect on the auditory, gustatory, or tactile centres; nevertheless the optic centre may be affected by pressure, by narcotics, or by electricity, precisely in the same way as by light. The vibrations of a tuning-fork which affect the auditory centre as sound, affect the tactile centre as 'tickling,' not 'sound.'

From these indubitable facts it is not difficult to elicit a conclusion, namely, that the character of a sensation depends on the Sensational Centre and not on the external stimulus; that stimulus being only the cause of the sensational change. Whether the retina be directly affected by rays of light issuing from an object, or the optic centre be affected by the pressure of congested blood-vessels, in each case we *see*, in each case the optic centre is affected in that specific manner in which alone it is capable of being affected. Consequently inasmuch as the visual sensation depends on the optic centre being affected, and does *not* depend on the formation of an image on the retina, we have no alternative but to admit that

the *retinal affection is transformed by the Sensational Centre*, and there the *impression* first becomes a *sensation*.

It may be added as confirmation of the foregoing doctrine respecting the centre as the seat of sensation, that Müller has cited examples of luminous spectra being excited by internal causes after the complete destruction of the retina, and 'Luicke relates the case of a patient who after the extirpation of the eye for fungoid disease perceived all kinds of luminous appearances independently of external objects.'\*

When therefore it is asked, Why do we see objects *erect*, when they throw *inverted* images on the retina? the answer is, Because we do not see the retinal image at all; we see, or are affected by, the object; and our perception of the erectness of that object does not depend on vision, but on our conceptions of space and the relations of space—which are not given in the visual sensation, but are ideal conceptions: conceptions which are acquired in a complicated series of inferences, according to most philosophers; which are 'forms of intuition,' according to Kant; but which are by no school held to be immediate elements of optical sensation.

We thus return to the position that in every act of consciousness the impression on the nerve becomes transformed into a sensation only in the Sensational Centre; and the old theories of 'eidola,' 'images,' 'impressions,' are seen to be untenable. Just as the crystals of sugar have to be decomposed, and the sugar transformed into glucose, the glucose transformed into lactic acid, before sugar can be assimilable in the organism, so have the retinal images to be decomposed in the optic centre before a visual *sensation* can be produced. Attempt a more direct process, and failure is inevitable: cane-sugar injected into the veins is expelled in the urine as a foreign substance, not assimilable; and, in like manner, the most dexterous adjustment of rays of light falling *immediately* on the optic ganglion, not transmitted thereto by the optic nerve, would produce no visual sensation.

\* MÜLLER: *Physiology*, Eng. Trans. i. 1072.

To call sensations and ideas by the vague name of motions, is to violate the conditions of philosophic language, and to mislead those who accept it into the belief that an explanation has been given in the change of term. That Darwin was by it misled into absurdity will be apparent in the following attempt to explain perception:—

‘No one will deny,’ he says, ‘that the medulla of the brain and nerves has a certain figure; which, as it is diffused through nearly the whole of the body, must have nearly the figure of that body. Now it follows that the spirit of animation, or living principle, as it occupies this medulla and no other part, has also the same figure as the medulla . . . which is nearly the figure of the body. When the idea of solidity is excited, a part of the extensive organ of touch is compressed by some external body, and this part of the sensorium so compressed exactly resembles *in figure* the figure of the body that compressed it. Hence when we acquire the idea of solidity we acquire at the same time the idea of *figure*; and this idea of figure, or motion of a *part* of the organ of touch, exactly resembles *in its figure* the figure of the body that occasions it; and thus exactly acquaints us with this property of the external world.’\*

He is thus brought back to the old conception of the mind being ‘impressed’ by the exact forms of objects, as wax is impressed by a seal. As he proceeds he gets more and more absurd. Thus he says, although ‘there may exist beings in the universe that have not the property of solidity; that is, which can possess any part of space at the same time that it is occupied by other bodies; yet there may be other beings that *can assume this property of solidity or disrobe themselves of it occasionally*, as we are taught of spirits and of angels; and it would seem that the *spirit of animation* must be endued with this property, *otherwise how could it occasionally give motion to the limbs of animals?*—or be itself stimulated into motion by the obtrusions of surrounding bodies, as of light or odour?’† He is led to this by the Spinozistic

\* *Zoonomia*, pp. 111–12.

† *Ibid.* p. 114.

axiom, that 'no two things can influence or affect each other which have not some property common to both of them,' which axiom destroys the possibility of spirit acting on body. Hartley, as we saw, tried to get over this difficulty by assuming the existence of a substance intermediate between body and spirit. Darwin finds it easy to assume that the spirit has the power of putting on or putting off the properties of matter just as it pleases. 'Hence the spirit of animation at the time it communicates or receives motion from solid bodies must itself possess some property of solidity. And at the time it receives other kinds of motion from light, it must possess that property which light possesses to communicate that motion named Visibility. In like manner it possesses Saporosity, Odorosity, Tangibility, and Audibility.'\*

This is enough to show how little Darwin understood the real value of his luminous idea respecting Psychology based on the laws of life; enough also to make every one understand how philosophers rebelled against such 'materialism' as issued from the explanation of mental phenomena by 'sensory motions.' Before finally quitting the *Zoonomia* we must pause a moment over the explanation of our feeling for Beauty. He describes the sensations of the babe when 'soon after it is born into this cold world it is applied to its mother's warm bosom,' and the agreeable influences which thus grow up in the mind associated with the form of the bosom, 'which the infant embraces with its hands, presses with its lips, and watches with its eyes; and thus acquires more accurate ideas of the form than of the odour, and flavour, or warmth, which it perceives by its other senses. And hence in our maturer years, when any object of vision is presented to us, which by its waving or spiral lines, bears any similitude to the form of the female bosom,—whether it be found in a landscape with soft gradations of rising and descending surface, or in the form of some antique vases, or

\* *Zoonomia*, i. 115.

in the works of the pencil or chisel—we feel a general glow of delight which seems to influence all our senses; and if the object be not too large, we experience an attraction to embrace it with our arms, and to salute it with our lips, as we did in our early infancy the bosom of our mother.\* One of the happiest illustrations of the generally false saying, that ridicule is a test of truth, is the reply of Sheridan to this theory of Beauty. ‘I suppose,’ said he, ‘that the child brought up by hand would feel all these emotions at the sight of a wooden spoon!’

\* *Zoonomia*, i. 145.

## CHAPTER IV.

*DESTUTT DE TRACY.*

THE germinal error of Descartes was developed by Spinoza into a system from which Philosophy shrank back appalled. The germinal error of Locke was developed by Berkeley and Hume into systems equally repugnant to common sense. The germinal error of Condillac was developed into the Sensational School, and received its logical expression in Destutt de Tracy: and Philosophy in alarm once again threw herself into the arms of the theological party, turning upon Metaphysics and Rhetoric for aid in her distress. Condillac, as we have seen, admitted the existence of a substantial entity, over and above the faculties and their acts (which he identified with sensations). But in his system this entity was a superfluous existence. It was altogether inoperative; being neither the seat of the mind's actions, nor the originating cause of them. The faculties, which Locke had supposed to be presupposed as existent in every mind, Condillac held to be evolved in the act of sensation. Now De Tracy sought to suppress Condillac's inoperative entity. Laplace and Napoleon that the simple reason why, in his exposition of the system of the world, he had not mentioned the Creator, was because 'he had no need of that hypothesis.' In the same way De Tracy had no need of the hypothesis of a substantial entity, in expounding the system of mental phe-

Louis Claude Destutt de Tracy was born July 20, 1754. His family was of Scotch extraction. The clan Stutton sent four of its sons to join the Douglas in his resistance to Charles VII. against the English, these young men later serving in the *Garde écossaise* of Charles and



Louis XI., were endowed with lands in the Berri; and from one of them, married to a De Tracy of Nivernais, descended the philosopher.

After serving a brilliant career as a soldier, De Tracy joined the revolutionary party and sat in the Constituent Assembly by the side of Lafayette. Becoming *suspect*, like so many other patriots, he was imprisoned, and would assuredly have perished on the 11th Thermidor—the day fixed for his trial—had not the memorable events of the 9th Thermidor suddenly put an end to the Reign of Terror. It was during his imprisonment, indeed only four days before the 9th Thermidor that he conceived the design of the system he was afterwards to develop. Having previously prepared himself for scientific investigation by assiduously following in the footsteps of Fourcroy and Lavoisier, he resolved on analysing Thought as these great investigators analysed Matter.

Condillac was his guide. From him was borrowed the principle that sensation was not simply the primitive element of all intelligence, but the sole element. All the faculties, all the acts of the mind, were reduced to sensation. 'On voit que je réunis et confonds dans la faculté générale de sentir, ce que l'on a coutume de distinguer en *affections* et *connaissances*, et ce qu'on appelle souvent, en termes métaphoriques — et peu exacts, l'esprit et le cœur. Effectivement, je crois que = cette division n'est pas fondée.\* There were four fundamental acts: perception, which was the sensation of objects = memory, the sensation of remembrances; judgment, the sensation of relations; and will, the sensation of desires.

The three first faculties are our means of acquiring know-—ledge. The fourth is our means of action. That all four are due to the senses is evident. The external object produces an impression on our nerves, and the nerves, by movement peculiar to them, transmit this impression to the brain. The brain, which is endowed with a peculiar force [not defined or otherwise described], receives the impression, and

\* *Idéologie*, Paris, 1825, iii. p. 102. *Logique*, chap. ii.

converts it into (1) a perception, if the object be present; into (2) a remembrance, if the object be absent; into (3) a relation, if several objects at once bring the image of their resemblances or their differences; into (4) a ratiocination, if there are several relations; and, finally, if the object rouses desire, it provokes another movement to satisfy it; and this produces *action*, as the previous movement produced *knowledge*. Thus knowing and willing are the resultants of two organic operations, one dependent on the other.

It is needless, after what has already been said, to point out the defects of this system. All we have to note here is its logical development of Condillac's germinal error. As in Condillac, we find in De Tracy much admirable analysis, and some suggestions which Psychology may profit by. One luminous principle he had conceived, namely, that Psychology is a part of Biology; *L'idéologie est une partie de la zoologie*. It was this principle which Cabanis asserted still more effectively.

## CHAPTER V.

## CABANIS.

PIERRE JEAN GEORGES CABANIS was born on the 5th of June, 1757, at Conac near Brives. The dear friend of De Tracy, he was both prized as a thinker by Turgot, D'Holbach, Franklin, Condorcet, Mirabeau, Diderot, and D'Alembert, and prized as a physician by numerous patients. He died on the 6th of May, 1808.

We have traced the course of psychological investigation in its attempts to detect the mechanism of mind up to the point it had attained in the system of De Tracy. The announcement that ideology was a part of zoology, is but the systematic expression of a tendency dimly discernible even in Locke, who, as Victor Cousin complains, is fond of drawing facts from savages, children, and animals. Condillac in his *Traité des Animaux* had boldly claimed the validity of inferences deducible from animals; but a thorough application of the Comparative Method was not practicable at that period.

The prejudices of that age forbade it. The ignorance of that age made it impossible. Comparative Physiology is little older than Goethe, and Comparative Psychology is only now glimmering in the minds of men as a possibility. If men formerly thought they could understand man's body by dissecting it, and did not need the light thrown thereon by the dissection of animals; they were still less likely to seek psychical illustrations in animals, denying, as they did, that animals had minds.

The school of Locke, therefore, although regarding Mind as a property of matter, consequently directing attention to

the human organism, trying to understand the mechanism of sensation, and thus dealing with tangible realities instead of with impalpable and ever-shifting entities, was really incompetent to solve the problems it had set itself, because its Method was imperfect, and its knowledge incomplete. The good effect of its labours was positive; the evil, negative. Following out this positive tendency, we saw Hartley and Darwin advancing still nearer to a true Method;—by a bold hypothesis, making the phenomena dependent on vibrations in the nerves; thus leading to a still more precise and *definite* consideration of the organism.

These were, however, tentatives guided by no distinct conception of the necessary relation between organ and function; and the commencement of the biological Method, truly so called, must be sought in the work of Cabanis: *Rapports du Physique et du Moral de l'Homme*.\*

A disciple of Condillac, he nevertheless saw, more distinctly than any man before him, one radical vice of Condillac's system, namely, the limitation of mental phenomena to sensations, and the non-recognition of connate instincts. If sensation were the admitted source of all mental phenomena (and Cabanis rightly made these phenomena include more than 'ideas'), it became the duty of philosophers to examine the nature of sensation itself. 'No one,' he says, 'had clearly explained in what the act of sensibility consists. Does it always presuppose consciousness and distinct perception? And must we refer to some other property of the living body all those unperceived impressions and movements in which volition has no part?' To put this question was to inaugurate a new study. It became necessary to examine whether all mental phenomena were not reducible to the fundamental laws of Sensibility. 'All the while that the Intellect is judging and the Will is desiring or rejecting,

\* This work originally appeared as a series of *Mémoires* read before the Institute (1798-99). It was published as a separate book in 1802, under the title *Traité du Physique et du Moral de l'Homme*; which title is also borne by the second edition of 1805. Not until 1815, and after the death of Cabanis, was the word *Rapports* substituted for *Traité*.

many other functions are going on, all more or less necessary to the preservation of life. Have these diverse operations any influence, the one on the other? And is it possible from the consideration of different physical and moral states, which are observed simultaneously, to seize the relations which connect the most striking phenomena, with such precision as to be certain that in the other less obvious cases, if the connection is less easily detected, it is so simply because the indications are too fugitive?'

This conception of a possible Psychology is in itself enough to mark for ever the place of Cabanis in the History of Philosophy. It establishes Psychology as one branch of the great science of Life. It connects the operations of intelligence and volition with the origin of all vital movements. It makes Life and Mind correlatives. This was a revival of the great truth clearly recognised by Aristotle, from whom it descended to the Schoolmen. 'Impossibile est,' says Aquinas, very emphatically, 'in uno homine esse plures animas per essentiam differentes, sed una tantum est anima intellectiva, quæ vegetativæ et sensitivæ et intellectivæ officiis fungitur.' The division of Life and Mind as two distinct entities was introduced by the Italians of the Renaissance, adopted by Descartes and Bacon, and once more rejected by Stahl, who returned to the Aristotelian conception. With the fall of Stahl's doctrine, the separation of Mind from Life again became the dictum of the schools, until Cabanis; no one since Cabanis seems to have been thoroughly impressed with the unity of the two till Mr. Herbert Spencer presented it as the basis of psychological induction.\* The consequences were immediate: if Mind was to be studied as one aspect of Life, it could only be efficiently studied on that inductive and experimental Method which had reached the certain truths of positive science: 'Les principes fondamentaux seraient également solides; elles se formeraient également par l'étude sévère et par la composition des faits; elles s'étendraient par

\* SPENCER: *Principles of Psychology*, 1855.

les mêmes méthodes de raisonnement.' Cabanis warns his readers that they will find nothing of what is called Metaphysics in his book; they will only find physiological researches, '*mais dirigées vers l'étude particulière d'un ordre de fonctions.*'

In the purely physiological direction, indeed, Cabanis had many predecessors, from Willis in the middle of the seventeenth century, to Prochaska, who preceded Cabanis by one year only.\* The nervous system had of course been studied by physiologists, and this study led them to form psychological theories; but although we may find elsewhere, especially in Unzer and Prochaska, sounder views of the physiology of the nervous system, we find nowhere so clear and large a conception of physiological Psychology as in Cabanis.

'Subject to the action of external bodies,' he says, 'man finds in the impressions these bodies make on his organs at once his knowledge and the causes of his continued existence; for to live is to feel; and in that admirable chain of phenomena which constitute his existence, every *want* depends on the development of some *faculty*; every *faculty* by its very development satisfies some want, and the faculties grow by exercise as the wants extend with the facility of satisfying them. By the continual action of external bodies on the senses of man, results the most remarkable part of his existence. But is it true that the nervous centres only receive and combine the impressions which reach them from these bodies? Is it true that no image or idea is formed in the brain, and that no determination of the sensitive organ takes place, other than by virtue of these same impressions on the *senses* strictly so called?'†

This question cuts away the very root of Condillac's

\* *Lehrsätze aus der Physiologie des Menschen*, 1797. Curiously enough, the second and third editions of this work were exactly contemporaneous with the second and third editions of CABANIS, 1802 and 1805 (counting the publication in the *Mémoires de l'Institut* as one edition). It is not to be supposed that CABANIS knew of PROCHASKA's existence; nor is there more than a general resemblance in their physiological conclusions.

† *Deuxième Mémoire*, § ii.

system. Cabanis had no difficulty in showing that Condillac's limitation of our mental phenomena to the action of the special senses was a contradiction of familiar experience, *e.g.* the manifold influence exercised by the age, sex, temperament, and the visceral sensations generally. A survey of the human organism, compared with that of animals, conducted him to the following conclusions:—

‘The faculty of feeling and of spontaneous movement forms the character of animal nature.

‘The faculty of feeling consists in the property possessed by the nervous system of being warned by the impressions produced on its different parts, and notably on its extremities. These impressions are internal or external.

‘External impressions, when perception is distinct, are called *sensations*.

‘Internal impressions are very often vague and confused, and the animal is then only warned by their effects, and does not clearly distinguish their connection with the causes.

‘The former result from the application of external objects to the organs of sense; and on them *ideas* depend.

‘The latter result from the development of the regular functions, or from the maladies to which each organ is subject; and from these issue those determinations which bear the name of *instincts*.

‘Feeling and movement are linked together. Every movement is determined by an impression, and the nerves, as the organs of feeling, animate and direct the motor organs.

‘In feeling, the nervous organ reacts on itself. In movement it reacts on other parts to which it communicates the contractile faculty, the simple and fecund principle of all animal movement.

‘Finally, the vital functions can exercise themselves by the influence of some nervous ramifications, isolated from the system: the instinctive faculties can develop themselves, even when the brain is almost wholly destroyed, and when it seems wholly inactive.

‘But for the formation of thoughts it is necessary that the

brain should exist, and be in a healthy condition: it is the special organ of thought.'\*

He justly repudiates any attempt to explain Sensibility: it must be accepted as a general property of organised beings, in the same way that attraction is accepted as a general property of bodies. No general property admits of explanation. It can only be subordinated to some other property, and be explained by it, on the supposition that it is *not* general. Accepting Sensibility therefore as an ultimate fact in the organic world, Cabanis detects its phenomena running through all those called vital and all those called mental.

'It is something,' he says, 'to have established that all ideas and all moral phenomena are the results of impressions received by the different organs; and I think a still wider step is taken when we have shown that these impressions have appreciable differences, and that we can distinguish them by their seat and the character of their products, although they all act and react on each other, on account of the rapid and continual communications with the sensitive organ.'† The object of his treatise is to examine the relations existing between the moral and physical conditions, how the sensations are modified by modifications in the organs, how ideas, instincts, passions are developed and modified by the influences of age, sex, temperament, maladies, &c. It is not therefore a treatise on Psychology, but contributions towards a science of Psychology, and as such may still be read with advantage, although the science of the present day rejects many of its physiological details. He foresaw that this would be so, 'Le lecteur s'apercevra bientôt que nous entrons ici dans une carrière toute nouvelle. Je n'ai pas la prétention de l'avoir parcouru jusqu'au bout; mais des hommes plus habiles et plus heureux achèveront ce que trop souvent je n'ai pu que tenter.'

As a specimen of inductive Psychology, we must not pass over in silence his experimental proof of instinct being developed by certain organic conditions. He takes one of

\* *Deuxième Mémoire*, § viii.

† *Ibid.* § v.



the most marvellous of instincts, that of maternal love, and having analysed its physiological conditions, he says, 'In my province, and some of the neighbouring provinces, when there is a deficiency of sitting hens, a singular practice is customary. We take a capon, pluck off the feathers from the abdomen, rub it with nettles and vinegar, and in this state of local irritation place the capon on the eggs. At first he remains there to soothe the pain; soon there is established within him a series of unaccustomed but agreeable impressions, which attaches him to these eggs during the whole period of incubation; and the effect is to produce in him a sort of factitious maternal love, which endures, like that of the hen, as long as the chickens have need of aid and protection. The cock is not thus to be modified; he has an instinct which carries him elsewhere.'

The novelty of the conception which Cabanis put forth, and the interest attached to many of his illustrations, made his work very popular; but its influence was only indirect. The ignorance which almost all psychologists continued to display, not only of Physiology, but of the necessity of a physiological Method, together with the alarm excited by the accusation of 'materialism,' aided as it was by the reaction mainly political, but soon extending itself to philosophical questions, which condemned the labours of the eighteenth century, left Cabanis with few adherents and no continuers. In elaborate works the brain was still designated as the 'organ of the Mind,' but the Mind was passionately declared *not* to be the function of the brain; the profounder views of Cabanis, which regarded Mind as one aspect of Life, were replaced by the old metaphysical conception of *le Moi*,—the Ego,—the immaterial Entity *playing upon* the brain as a musician plays upon an instrument.\* Instinct was no longer regarded as determined by the organism, changing with its

\* One living writer, of authority, has gravely declared that mental fatigue is the consciousness which the *mind* has of the *brain's* weariness! In our confessed inability to understand what matter *is*, why will men persist in dogmatising on what it *is not*?

changes, rendered abortive by mutilations, and rendered active by stimulation; but as a 'mysterious principle implanted' in the organism: a 'something' which, although essentially mysterious and unknowable, appeared to be perfectly well known to the metaphysicians.

By an unfortunate phrase, Cabanis gave his antagonists an advantage, and impeded the progress of his own views. He was understood to say that the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile. He said nothing of the kind; but his language lent itself easily to the misconception; and the ridicule and disgust which assailed it seriously damaged the dignity of the physiological method. This is what he did say: 'Pour se faire une idée juste des opérations dont résulte la pensée, il faut considérer le cerveau comme un organe particulier destiné spécialement à la produire (had he stopped here, few would have seen anything to cavil at; but he added), de même que l'estomac et les intestins à opérer la digestion, le foie à filtrer la bile.'\* This is really saying no more than that thought is the function of the brain; and the difference between that, and the ordinary conception of the brain as 'the organ of the mind,' is simply the difference between precise and lax language. But the unlucky words 'digestion,' and the 'secretion of bile,' made many readers suppose that Cabanis held thought to be a secretion.

It is true that the language of Cabanis is ambiguous, and leads to the interpretation that thought is a secretion, although he really means that thought is a function. Such ambiguity is deplorable. But that it was merely a verbal laxity may be seen in the following passage. 'We see the aliments fall into the stomach; we see them pass out with new qualities, and we conclude that it has impressed on them a real alteration. We also see the impressions reaching the brain by the channels of the nerves; they are then isolated and without coherence. The organ (*viscère*) reacts upon them, and soon metamorphoses them into ideas, which

\* CABANIS: *Rapports*, ii. *Mémoire*, § vii.

speech and gesture manifest externally. We conclude with the same certitude that the brain digests, so to speak, the impressions,—*qu'il fait organiquement la sécrétion de la pensée.*' When a man permits himself to say that we *see* impressions reaching the brain through the nerves, and see the brain metamorphose these impressions into ideas, he may permit himself to say that thought is a secretion; but that this was not really his opinion will appear on an attentive study of his work. Like most psychologists and biologists, he had but hazy conceptions of function; and like most of the writers of his school, he had but an imperfect sense of the value of accuracy of expression. But I do not think that he meant what he is supposed by antagonists to have meant. I think he meant simply to indicate that thought was a function of the brain, as digestion was a function of the intestinal canal.

Certainly, if he did regard thought as a secretion, the error was monstrous, and the outcry against him was justifiable. I shall have to recur to this subject in speaking of the materialism of certain writers of our own day in Germany.

## CHAPTER VI.

*SUMMARY OF THE SIXTH EPOCH.*

CONSIDERED as a contribution to Philosophy, the labours of the Sensational School have mainly an indirect value. They found Philosophy reduced to a question of Psychology, and found Psychology itself in so imperfect a condition as to be unable to give any reliable guidance. The question of the origin of knowledge necessarily involved the whole subject of mental operations. To determine whether we had any ideas independent of Experience, it became necessary to ascertain what Experience was—what were its conditions and limitations. To determine this, it was necessary to ascertain the relations of the mind to the body. If once it could be settled that the phenomena of mind were simply phenomena of the organism, a positive science of Psychology would become possible, and its results would have the same validity as those of the physical sciences. From the earliest times Philosophy had admitted that the Mind only manifested itself through the organs of the Body, and that these manifestations were all subject more or less to material conditions. But from the time of Descartes there had been a strong repugnance against every suggestion which seemed to rob the Intellect of its entity, by identifying mental with vital phenomena. The independence of the Mind as an entity was regarded as a first truth, required by Metaphysics no less than by Theology. To doubt this truth was to 'overthrow all morality, to reduce man to the level of the brute, to make Religion a mockery.' To doubt this truth was, in fact, to incur the most incriminating of charges—Materialism.

Nevertheless, good and pious men were forced to doubt

this first truth, in spite of the odium which they knew would fall on them. And although partly from terror, and partly from the effect of old metaphysical prejudice, most of the Sensational School clung to some vague admission of a spiritual entity, whose active interference was, however, quietly ignored, nevertheless the inevitable tendency of their teaching was clearly seen by antagonists, and finally avowed by their successors.

A decision became indispensable. If the Intellect were admitted as an independent existence, having powers not gathered from organic conditions, there could be no *scientific* exposition of the conditions and limitations of human knowledge. It was always open to assume the existence of innate ideas, of truths transcending those gained through experience, and of criteria not amenable to the canons of experience. But if (the existence being admitted) all the operations of the mind were limited by organic conditions, then indeed a science became possible, but the preliminary hypothesis became superfluous.

To this dilemma the Sensational School had successfully brought Philosophy. It had presented the alternative of considering Psychology as a branch of Biology, and Mind as only one aspect of the equally mysterious Life; or of once more falling back upon Metaphysics which modern Science gloried in having escaped from for ever.

The first issue was too repulsive for the majority of philosophers. It was repulsive because it disturbed the sacred associations of awe which surrounded the mystery of Mind, and because it was said by antagonists to lead to degrading and immoral conclusions; which it did *not*, and which it could not lead to, if true; though antagonists chose to affirm that it was not true, because they assumed that it led to the immoral conclusions. While thus repulsive in its first aspect, it had the great disadvantage of not being sufficiently precise in its indications, or coercive in its arguments, to carry conviction to the unwilling mind. No great depth or subtlety was required to see that Hartley and Darwin, De Tracy and

Cabanis, were far from accounting satisfactorily for the phenomena; yet only by the force of demonstration could their disagreeable conclusions get acceptance.

There was, therefore, a general revolt. The second issue was eagerly chosen. The reaction in favour of Metaphysics triumphed for a time over what was called the Eighteenth Century Philosophy, though its real struggle was with the Sensational School. We shall trace that reaction in Scotland, Germany, and France.



## SEVENTH EPOCH.

*Second Crisis: Idealism, Scepticism, and Sensationalism  
producing the reaction of Common Sense.*



## CHAPTER I.

REID.

DUGALD STEWART opens his *Account of the Life and Writings of Thomas Reid* with remarking that the life was 'uncommonly barren of those incidents which furnish materials for biography;' and as our space is scanty, we will content ourselves with a bare enumeration of such facts as may be useful for reference. Thomas Reid was born in 1710, at Strachan, in Kincardineshire. He was educated at Marischal College, Aberdeen. In 1752 he occupied the chair of Moral Philosophy in Aberdeen. In 1764 appeared his *Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense*. 'In 1763 \* the *Inquiry* received a still more substantial testimony of approbation from the University of Glasgow,' in the offer of the chair of Moral Philosophy, vacant by the resignation of Adam Smith. In 1780 Reid resigned his office, and passed the remaining years of his life in retirement and study. In 1785 appeared his *Essays on the Intellectual Powers*. He died in Glasgow in 1796, having survived four of his children.

Reid's Philosophy made a great stir at first, but has for

\* STEWART: but there must be some error here. If the *Inquiry* was not published till 1764, REID could not in 1763 have been offered the chair at Glasgow as a 'testimony of approbation.'

some years past been sinking into merited neglect. The appeal to Common Sense as arbiter in Philosophy is now pretty well understood to be on a par with Dr. Johnson's kicking a stone as a refutation of Berkeley. Indeed Dugald Stewart himself was fully alive to the inconsequence of such an argument, and endeavoured to shield his master by saying that the phrases 'Common Sense' and 'Instinct' were unhappily chosen. Unfortunately they were not mere phrases with Reid; they were principles. It is impossible to read the *Inquiry* and not see that Reid took his stand upon Common Sense; \* and Beattie and Oswald, his immediate disciples, are still more open to the charge.

It would carry us to great lengths if we were to examine all the questionable tenets contained in the philosophy of Common Sense. We cannot, however, pass the supposed triumph over Locke, who said that personal identity consists in Consciousness; 'that is,' continues Reid, 'if you are conscious you did such a thing a twelvemonth ago, this consciousness of what is past can signify nothing else but the remembrance that I did it; so Locke's principle must be, that Identity consists in remembrance; and, consequently, a man must lose his personal identity with regard to everything he forgets.' Here Locke is altogether misstated. Consciousness does not resolve itself into any single act of memory, as Reid would here have us believe, nor can personal identity be limited to any one act. I have the consciousness of a certain mental state, wherewith is connected the remembrance of a certain anterior state, which was also connected with an anterior state, and so on. The rope is made up of many strands, and although some of these may be out of sight, not one is broken. I am connected with my boyhood by a regular series of transmitted acts of consciousness. I may have forgotten a thousand things, but I have not forgotten myself: if *one* act performed yesterday is forgotten to-day, *all* are not forgotten; and to

\* 'I despise Philosophy, and renounce its guidance: let my soul dwell with Common Sense.' (*Inquiry*, ch. i. § 3.) Let it be observed, in passing, that by REID's disciples the *Inquiry* is regarded as his best work.



remember one, however indistinctly, is sufficient to keep up the continuity of consciousness. Let those who fancy the sentiment of personal identity does not consist in the consciousness of personal identity, show us in what it does consist.

We come now to Reid's great achievement, that upon which he declared his philosophical fame to rest: the refutation of Berkeley and Hume by the refutation of the Ideal theory, which, as we have seen, he radically mistook. This he considered as his contribution to Philosophy; this has been made the monument of his glory. It appears to us, after a long acquaintance with his writings, and a careful perusal of what his critics and admirers have advanced, that his sole merit in this respect is that of having called attention to some abuses of language, and to some examples of metaphors mistaken for facts. How much confusion the word 'idea' has always created need scarcely be alluded to; and any attempt to destroy the acceptation of the word as tantamount to *image*, must be welcomed as salutary. So far let us be grateful to Reid. But whatever abuses may have crept in with the use of the word 'idea,' it seems quite clear that Berkeley and Hume are not to be refuted by refuting the hypothesis of ideas, as Reid and his school suppose; had they even held that theory as he understands it.

Let us, to avoid useless discussion, take it for granted that philosophers did adopt the theory of ideas which Reid combats; let us also grant that Reid has overturned that theory. What advance is made towards a solution of the problem? Not one step. The dilemma into which Hume threw Philosophy remains the same as ever. Since I cannot transcend the sphere of my Consciousness, I can never know things except as they act upon me—as they affect my Consciousness. In other words, a knowledge of an external world is impossible, otherwise than as it appears to my Sense, which transforms and distorts it.

This proposition may be said to form the ground of Scep-

ticism. Now, we ask, how is that proposition affected by overthrowing the ideal theory? What does it signify whether the 'affections of my consciousness' be regarded as 'images' or not? They do not remain less purely *subjective* whichever way we regard them. They are changes *in me*. The main position of Scepticism is precisely this subjectivity of knowledge. Because we cannot transcend Consciousness we can never know things *per se*. Reid acknowledges that we cannot know things *per se*; but he says that we must believe in them, because in what we do know their existence is *suggested*. This is exactly the opinion of Locke; nay more, it is the doctrine of Hume: for he says that we believe in an external world, though we have no good reason for believing it. Sir J. Mackintosh relates that he once observed to Dr. Thomas Brown that he thought Reid and Hume differed more in words than opinions; Brown answered, 'Yes, Reid bawled out we must believe in an outward world; but added, in a whisper, we can give no reason for our belief. Hume cries out we can give no reason for such a notion; and whispers, I own we cannot get rid of it.'

Reid ought to have seen that his refutation of the ideal theory left Idealism and Scepticism untouched: \* for either doctrine it matters little *how* the knowledge be acquired, so long as its reach is only subjective. The argument brought forward by Dugald Stewart—that the belief in the existence of an external world is one of the Fundamental Laws of Human Belief—is more philosophical; but when he says that Berkeley's Idealism was owing to the unhappy and unphilosophical attempt of Descartes to prove the existence of the world, he forgets that Idealism was known in the ancient schools long before any one thought of proving the existence of matter. Moreover, although Stewart's formula is not open to the same objections as Reid's, yet it leaves the vital question untouched.

No one doubts that we believe in the existence of an

\* In fact MALEBRANCHE's Idealism, which is very similar to BERKELEY's, is founded on a theory of Perception almost identical with REID's.

external world. Idealism never questions the fact. The only doubt is, whether that belief be objectively as well as subjectively valid. To say that the belief in objective existence is a Fundamental Law, is simply saying that *we are so constituted* that we are forced to attribute external reality to our sensations. As well say we are so constituted that fire applied to our bodies will give us pain. We *are* so constituted. What then? Does this advance us one step? Not one. We have still to seek some proof of the *laws of our constitution* being the measure of the *laws of other existences*—still to seek how what is true of the subjective must necessarily be true of the objective.

Thus, granting to Stewart all he claims, we see that he does not attain to the heart of the question; and, strictly speaking, he does not touch Berkeley at all; he only touches Hume. For what answer can it be to Berkeley, to say that our Belief in matter is a Fundamental Law, not to be questioned? Berkeley would reply: 'Exactly; I said as much. I said that men believed their senses, and believed that what they saw was *out* of them. This is the law of human nature: God has so ordained it. But that which men do *not* believe, is the existence of an occult substance, an imaginary world lying underneath all appearances. You do not mean to assert that the belief in this substance is a Fundamental Law? If you do, you must be mad.' Stewart's answer is thus shown to be quite *beside* the mark.

Reid constantly declares that no reason can be given for our belief; it must be referred to an original instinctive principle of our constitution implanted in us for that express purpose. If this be so, we ask upon what pretence does Reid claim the merit of having refuted Idealism and Scepticism by refuting the ideal hypothesis? If *instinct* and not *reason* is to settle the question, then has the *ideal hypothesis* nothing to do with it; if the refutation of the ideal hypothesis sufficed, then has instinct nothing to do with it. 'To talk of Dr. Reid,' said the *Quarterly*, in its review of Stewart's Second Dissertation, 'as if his writings had opposed a

barrier to the prevalence of sceptical philosophy, is an evident mistake. Dr. Reid successfully refuted the principles by which Berkeley and Hume endeavoured to establish their conclusions; but the conclusions themselves he himself adopted as the very premises from which he reasons. The impossibility of proving the existence of a material world from "reason, or experience, or instruction, or habit, or any other principle hitherto known to philosophers," is the argument and the *only* argument by which he endeavours to force upon us his theory of instinctive principles.'

It appears, then, that inasmuch as Reid declares *instinct* to be the *only* principle upon which we can found our belief in an external world, his argument against Berkeley is trebly vicious. First, because the *belief* was never questioned; secondly, because although we must *act* according to our instincts, such a necessity is no proof that our *beliefs are true*; thirdly, because if instinct, and not reason, is to be the arbiter, the attack on the ideal hypothesis is utterly beside the question.

Thus we see that, granting to Reid the glory he claims of having destroyed the ideal hypothesis, he has only destroyed an outpost, fancying it to be the fortress. A few words on his own theory of perception may not be out of place here.

He justly enough declared the ideal hypothesis to be gratuitous. We have no reason for supposing that the mind perceives images of things instead of the things themselves. But he denies that we perceive things *mediately*; he says we perceive them *immediately*. His explanations are contradictory and confused, but he repeats the assertion so often, that there can be no doubt he meant to say we perceive things immediately; the mind stands face to face with the thing, and perceives it immediately, without any medium of ideas, images, eidola, or the like. Reid constantly contradicts himself on the point.

'When I attend,' he says, 'as carefully as I can to what passes in my mind, it appears evident that the *very thing* I

saw yesterday, and the fragrance I smelled, are now the *immediate objects* of my mind when I remember it. . . . Upon the strictest attention, memory appears to me to have the things that are past, *and not present ideas*, for its objects.'

This is his position against the ideal hypothesis which assumes that nothing is perceived but what is in the mind which perceives it; that we do not really perceive things which are external, but only certain images and pictures of them imprinted on the mind. The position is untenable. The very thing, the rose, of which he thinks, is not an immediate object at all: *it* is elsewhere. The fragrance cannot even be recalled; that is to say, cannot be *felt* again, but only *thought*. All we can remember is the fact of having been affected by the rose in a certain manner: that affection we call fragrance; we cannot recall the affection. Reid could hardly therefore have meant what his words literally express. Perhaps he meant, that when we think of the rose and the fragrance, the object of which we think is the rose, not an idea of the rose. But what a truism! He says, that 'in memory the *things* that are past, and not *present ideas*, are the objects of the mind.' This is either a needless truism or a falsism. Let us alter the sentence thus—'In memory the *things thought* of are not themselves present to the mind, but the *thoughts* only are present to it.' Reid would not dispute this—could not dispute it: yet it is only a more guarded statement of the ideal hypothesis; it substitutes 'thoughts' for 'ideas.' He was misled by the ambiguity of the word 'object,' which he uses as if meaning simply what the mind is thinking of; and of course the mind thinks of the thing, and not of the idea. But the ideal hypothesis takes 'object' to be that which is immediately present to—face to face—with the mind, viz., an idea, or thought; and of course the mind thinks *by* its thoughts: it may think about the thing, but it is through the medium of thought.

The difference is this:—The Idealist says, that when things affect us, our sensations are what we perceive, and

not the things producing those sensations. Reid says, we feel our sensations, but therewith also we perceive the things. The Idealist further says, that when we think of things, the immediate object face to face with the mind is not a thing but an idea (thought). Reid says the object is the very thing: which is either an absurdity, or else does not differ from the ideal hypothesis.

We are quite ready to admit that the pretended separation of thoughts from thinking, and the making thoughts 'objects,' is vicious; and therefore Reid's language is perhaps less objectionable. But we must confess that we see no other advantage he gains over his adversaries. He does not pretend that our sensations are at all *like* their causes; nay, he fancies that he destroys the ideal hypothesis by insisting on the want of resemblance between matter and our sensations. He says, over and over again, that the external world is in no respect like our sensations of it. 'Indeed, no man can conceive any sensation to resemble any known quality of bodies. Nor can any man show, by any good argument, that all our sensations might not have been as they are, though no body, nor quality of body, had ever existed.'\* This granted, the question arises, How do you know anything of the external world? Reid answers, 'It is owing to an original instinct implanted in us for that purpose.' Push the question further, drive him into a corner, and bid him tell you what that instinct enables you to know of matter, and he will answer, 'In sensation there is suggested to us a cause of that sensation in the quality of a body capable of producing it.' This is Locke's view.

The great point in Reid's theory is, that with our sensations are joined perceptions. 'The senses have a double province,' he says; 'they furnish us with a variety of sensations, some pleasant, others painful, and others indifferently; at the same time they give us a conception, and an invincible belief of the existence of external objects. This

\* *Inquiry*, ch. v. § 2.

conception and belief, which Nature produces by means of the senses, we call *perception*.\* This, upon which so much stress is laid that philosophers are said to have been always in error because they overlooked it, we regard as a remarkable instance of Reid's want of subtlety. Neither Berkeley nor Hume denied the fact of our belief in the externality of the causes of sensations: Berkeley denied that these causes had an occult substratum; Hume denied that any reason could be given for our belief in their externality. What force then has 'perception'? It is nothing more than that 'belief,' according to Reid; though to call perception a belief is, to say the least, somewhat unusual. But grant all he wishes, and you grant that with our sensations there is an accompanying belief in the existence of an external cause of those sensations. Berkeley would answer, 'Very true; but that cause is not unthinking matter.' Hume would answer, 'Very true; but we can give no reason for our belief; we can know nothing of the cause.' Reid can only retort, 'Perception is belief:' a retort which has been deemed satisfactory by his school; which really is only an abuse of language; and which moreover has the further disadvantage of being available only as an argument against Hume; for against Berkeley it is powerless. If perception is belief, and we perceive an external world, Hume may be answered when he says we have no grounds for our belief. But Berkeley is not answered. He says that we *do* believe in an external world; but that world is not a world of unthinking matter—it is a world of divine agency. Reid would not pretend that in sensation or perception we can distinguish the nature of the causes which affect us; he constantly tells us that we cannot know *what* those causes are, but only *that* there are causes. As long as the noumenal world is removed from our inspection, so long must Berkeley remain unrefuted by any theory of perception.

Reid says, that if we grant Berkeley's premise—viz. 'we can have no conception of any material thing which is not

\* *Essays on Intellectual Powers*, ii. ch. xvii.

like some sensation in our minds'—then are the conclusions of Idealism and Scepticism unanswerable. This premise therefore he disputes. Now attend to his challenge:— 'This I would therefore humbly propose, as an *experimentum crucis*, by which the ideal system must stand or fall; and it brings the matter to a short issue: Extension, figure, and motion may, any one or all of them, be taken for the subject of this experiment. Either they are ideas of sensation, or they are not. If any one of them can be shown to be an idea of sensation, or to have the least resemblance to any sensation, I lay my hand upon my mouth and give up all pretence to reconcile reason to common sense in this matter, and must suffer the ideal scepticism to triumph.\* It was not till after repeated perusals that we caught the significance of this passage; and are not quite positive that we have understood it now. To admit it to have any force at all, we must understand 'ideas of sensation' as '*images* of sensation.' Certainly, extension is no copy of any one sensation. But if Reid means to say that the idea of extension is not the result of complex sensations which a body excites in us—if he means to say that the idea of extension is not an abstract idea by which we express a certain property of bodies, a property known to us only through sensation—then must we cease all dispute, and leave him in possession of his discovery.

Reid's theory of perception may be thus stated:—External objects occasion certain sensations in us; with these sensations we perceive the existence of certain qualities capable of producing them: these he distinguishes into primary and secondary. The primary, he says, we perceive *immediately*; the second, *mediately*.

And this is the theory, by which, with the aid of an 'original instinct,' he is supposed to have refuted Idealism. Any one may see that Berkeley might readily have accepted Reid's hypothesis with perfect security for Idealism. The 'unknown causes,' which Reid calls 'qualities,' Berkeley calls 'divine laws.' The difference is merely nominal.

\* *Inquiry*, ch. v. § 7.



Thus much with respect to Idealism. With respect to Hume, the theory is almost as harmless. Hume would say, 'All that is given in sensation is sensation; your "perception" (which you call belief) of qualities amounts to nothing more than a *supposition*—a necessary one, I admit; but I have always said that our belief in external causes of sensation was an *irresistible prejudice*; and my argument is, that we have nothing but the prejudice as a proof—reason, we have none.'

Finally, with respect to Locke, it will in the first place be seen that Reid's solution is neither more nor less than that given by Locke; in the second place, the boasted refutation of the ideal hypothesis is always supposed by Reid's school to be a refutation of Locke's view of the origin of knowledge; and this is a very great mistake. Because Berkeley and Hume pushed Locke's system to conclusions from which he wisely shrank, it has been generally supposed that his account of the origin of our knowledge is indissolubly bound up with the ideal hypothesis, by it to stand or fall. This probably is the meaning of the vulgar error that Locke's view of knowledge leads to atheism. It led to Hume.

In disproof of Reid's supposition we answer, firstly, Idealism is not indissolubly bound up with the ideal hypothesis; and that Berkeley did not adopt that hypothesis; secondly, Locke's system is altogether independent of the hypothesis, and in his Review of the doctrines of Malebranche he very distinctly and emphatically denies it. The force of this observation will better be appreciated when it is remembered that although Locke's language is notoriously unguarded and wavering, all his reasonings are founded on the use of the word 'ideas' as synonymous with 'notions' or 'thoughts.' \*

\* Since the first edition of this work, Sir W. HAMILTON has published an edition of REID, illustrated and enriched by notes and dissertations of remarkable erudition and acuteness. Respecting the interpretation Sir WILLIAM gives to REID's doctrines, I will only say that he has shown what a subtle mind can *read into* the philosophy of common sense; but he has not in the least produced the conviction

Let us now pass to the psychological investigations of Reid and his followers. The favourite phrases with which Stewart so complacently describes them as 'inductive metaphysics' and 'experimental philosophy of the mind,' are the homage paid to the Objective Method by one who was too cultivated not to be aware of the triumphs of that Method; but we must not misinterpret the homage. There is very little Induction, and not a glimpse of Experiment, in all the writings of this school. There is much excellent analysis and sagacious remark. There is a liberal and philosophic spirit animating the pages: where no less than in the lectures of Thomas Brown and in the *Analysis* of James Mill, we find many valuable contributions to the science of Psychology. But, in my opinion, not one of them had a due conception of the true province of Psychology, nor of the Methods by which such a science could be established. Brown came nearest to such a conception. Not one of them saw that the disputes which had so fruitlessly been carried on could only be settled by the substitution of a new Method of inquiry, which in all other sciences had alone been found fruitful. Not one of them saw the necessity of thoroughly understanding the organism if he would understand the functions.

Thus Reid devotes a chapter to expounding his views of the proper means of knowing the operations of the mind.\* 'The chief and proper source of this branch of knowledge is accurate reflection upon the operations of our own minds.' For this it is necessary to attend to the structure of language and the course of human actions and conduct. 'The actions of men are effects; their sentiments, their passions, and their affections are the causes of those effects; and we may in many cases form a judgment of the cause from the effect. After such a statement of the Method we need not marvel at the futile results. He begins his account of the Senses with

in me of REID's having always meant what the editor supposed him to have meant.

\* *Essays*, i. ch. v.

an admission which rightly interpreted should have forced him to adopt the physiological means of investigation. He lays it down as a first truth that we can perceive no external object except through the bodily organs. For this 'we can give no reason but that such is the Will of our Maker. No man can show it to be impossible to the Supreme Being to have given us the power of perceiving external objects without such organs.' Consequently we are not to suppose these organs in their own nature necessary to perception, but only that it is the will of God that our perception is limited by our organs. On this passage Hamilton has the following absurd note: 'However astonishing, it is now proved beyond all rational doubt, that, in certain abnormal states of the nervous organism, perceptions are possible through other than the ordinary channels of the senses.' Psychology, in such hands, was in a pitiable condition. Here Hamilton obviously refers either to clairvoyance, or hallucination. These are the only abnormal states in which the ordinary channels can be considered as set aside. If he refers to clairvoyance, what are we to think of his science? If to hallucination, what are we to think of his Psychology? because, granting that the images of an excited brain are justifiably styled perceptions, is it not clear that these images are reproductions of those originally stimulated by the 'ordinary channels of sense'? The note can have no meaning unless to imply that the mind has other channels than the organs of sense; and in this meaning it is preposterous.

Although Reid insists upon the material conditions of mental phenomena, he also insists on our not considering those conditions as the causes. Some philosophers, he admits, imagine that man is 'so curiously organised that the impressions of external objects produce in him sensation, perception, remembrance, and all other operations we are conscious of. *This foolish opinion* could only take its rise from observing the constant connection which the Author of Nature hath established between certain impressions made upon our senses and our perceptions of the objects by which

the impression is made; *from which they weakly inferred* that those impressions were the proper and efficient causes of the corresponding perception.\* In other sciences an inference from *constant* connection is accepted as valid; but in Psychology it appears we are to reject it, and accept instead the valuable information that 'we perceive, because God has given us the power of perceiving, and not because we have impressions from objects'!

It is unnecessary to pursue the criticism of a system which has long since ceased to have any adherents. The Psychology of the Scotch School, though containing, as I intimated before, much available matter for students, is entirely defunct as a doctrine. It failed, as it deserved to fail. It had neither a clear aim nor a right Method. It added verbal analysis to verbal analysis, and metaphysical explanation to metaphysical explanation; meanwhile physiologists and a few psychologists were 'taking the clock to pieces'—as we shall see hereafter.

\* *Essays*, ii. ch. iv.

## EIGHTH EPOCH.

*Psychology finally recognised as a branch of Biology. The phrenological hypothesis.*

## CHAPTER I.

GALL.

## § I. LIFE OF GALL.

FRANCIS JOSEPH GALL was born at Tiefenbrunn, in Suabia, on the 9th of March, 1757. In the preface to his great work, *Anatomie et Physiologie du Système nerveux*, 1810, he narrates how as a boy he was struck with the differences of character and talents displayed by members of the same family, and how he observed certain external peculiarities of the head to correspond with these differences. Finding no clue given in the works of metaphysicians, he resumed his observations of nature. The physician of a lunatic asylum at Vienna allowed him frequent occasions of noticing the coincidence of peculiar monomanias with peculiar configurations of the skull. The prisons and courts of justice furnished him with abundant material. Whenever he heard of a man remarkable either for good or evil, he made his head a study. He extended his observation to animals; and finally sought confirmation in anatomy. The exterior of the skull he found, as a general rule, to correspond with the form of the brain.

After twenty years of observation, dissection, theorising, and arguing, he delivered his first course of lectures in

Vienna. This was in 1796. The novelty of his views excited a great sensation; one party fanatically opposing them, another almost as fanatically espousing them. Ridicule was not sparing. The new system lent itself to ridicule, and angry opponents were anxious, as opponents usually are, to show that what made them angry was utterly farcical. In 1800 Gall gained his best disciple, Spurzheim. Hitherto Gall had been aided only by a young anatomist, named Niklas, to whom he taught the new method of dissecting the brain;\* Spurzheim's mastery of anatomical manipulation, combined with his power of generalisation and of popular exposition, came as welcome aids in the gigantic task of establishing the new doctrine on a scientific basis.

In 1802 M. Charles Villers, the translator of Kant, published his *Lettre à Georges Cuvier sur une Nouvelle Théorie du Cerveau par le docteur Gall*. I have not been able to procure this Letter, but it is in many points interesting to the historian of Phrenology, because it expounds the doctrine as it was *then* conceived, and describes the localisation of the organs then fixed on by Gall. A plate represents the skull, marked by Gall himself, with the four-and-twenty organs, which at that period comprised the 'original faculties' of the mind. Among these twenty-four, there are four subsequently discarded altogether: Vital Force—Susceptibility—Penetration (independent of that which characterises the metaphysical faculty)—and Generosity (independent of benevolence). Not only are these four astonishing organs marked by Gall as representing original faculties, but the twenty organs which were afterwards retained by him are *differently* localised; so that, according to M. Lélut, from whom I borrow these details, 'of those twenty organs there is scarcely one which occupies the place Gall finally assigned to it.'†

\* GALL pays tribute to NIKLAS in the first edition of the *Anat. et Phys. du Système nerveux*, i. préface xv. In the second edition this tribute is omitted; not very creditably.

† LÉLUT: *Réjet de l'Organologie phrénologique*, 1843, p. 29.

Phrenologists should give prominence to this fact. They are bound not to pass it over. In every way it is important in the history of the doctrine. It may perhaps be satisfactorily explained; but until it is explained, it must tell against them; and for the very reason which they incessantly advance as their claim to consideration, namely, that the several organs were established by *observation*, not by theory.\* For if the doctrine had been established by a mingling of hypothesis and observation, nothing would be more likely than that the first sketch of it would be immature in conception and uncertain in details; whereas, if the doctrine grew up slowly from a gradual accumulation of rigorously verified facts, these facts would remain constant through all the tentative changes of doctrine. Gall had been twenty years collecting facts of correspondence between external configuration and peculiarities of character. He had controlled these observations by repeated verifications. Prisons, lunatic asylums, busts, portraits, remarkable men, even animals, had furnished him with facts. Unless these facts really deserve all the credit which is demanded for them, Phrenology has the ground cut from under it; and if we are to give them our confidence, upon what ground can we relinquish it in favour of subsequent facts which deny all that has been said before? If Gall could be deceived after twenty years of observation of facts which, according to his statement, are very easily observed, because very obvious in their characters, why may he not have been equally deceived in subsequent observations? If one collection of facts forced him to assign the organ of poetry to a particular spot (on the skull marked by him for M. Villers), how came another collection of facts to displace poetry, and substitute benevolence on that spot? Are the manifestations of poetry and benevolence so closely allied as to mislead the observer?

\* 'On voit par la marche de ces recherches que le premier pas fut fait par la découverte de quelques organes; que ce n'est que graduellement que nous avons fait parler les faits pour en déduire les principes généraux, et que c'est subéquentement et à la fin que nous avons appris à connaître la structure du cerveau.'—GALL: *Anat. et Phys.* i. préface xviii.

Spurzheim's assistance came at the right moment to rectify many of the hazardous psychological statements, and to marshal the facts in better order. Together Gall and he made a tour through Germany and Switzerland, diffusing the knowledge of their doctrine, and everywhere collecting fresh facts. On the 30th October, 1806, they entered Paris. In 1808 they presented to the Institute their *Mémoire on the Anatomy and Physiology of the Nervous System in general and of the Brain in particular*; and in 1810 appeared the first volume of their great work, under the same title; which work was remodelled by Gall in 1823, and published in six volumes, octavo, under the title of *Fonctions du Cerveau*.

In 1813 Gall and Spurzheim quarrelled and separated. Spurzheim came to England, Gall remained in Paris, where he died on the 22nd of August, 1828. At the post-mortem examination, his skull was found to be of at least twice the usual thickness, a fact which has been the source of abundant witticisms—for the most part feeble. A small tumour was also found in his cerebellum: 'a fact of some interest, from that being the portion of the brain in which he had placed the organ of amativeness, a propensity which had always been very strongly marked in him.'\* I know not in what sense the writer just quoted thinks the fact so remarkable. We are not accustomed to find great poets with tumours in the organ of 'imagination;' great artists with tumours in the perceptive region; great philanthropists with tumours on the frontal arch; great rebels with tumours behind their ears.†

## § II. GALL'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO SCIENCE.

The day for ridiculing Gall has gone by. Every impartial and instructed thinker, whether accepting or rejecting

\* *The English Cyclopædia*, vol. iii. *Art. Gall*.

† To anticipate the reply that the existence of disease in the organ would provoke unusual activity of the organ, it is only necessary to state that GALL's 'propensity' is not said to have been called into unusual activity shortly before his death, but to have always been very active. Had there been a causal con-



Phrenology, is aware of the immense services rendered to Physiology and Psychology, both by Gall's valuable discoveries, and by his bold, though questionable, hypothesis. He revolutionised these studies by his method of dissecting the brain, and by his assignment of definite functions to definite organs. To verify or refute his hypotheses, vast researches were undertaken; the nervous system of animals was explored with new and passionate zeal; and now there is no physiologist who openly denies that mental phenomena are directly connected with nervous structure; while even metaphysicians are beginning to study the mechanism of the Senses, and the general laws of nervous action. The time has arrived in which it seems almost as absurd to theorise on mental phenomena in defiance of physiological laws, as it would be to adopt Stahl's advice, and consider anatomical and chemical researches futile in the study of Medicine. We owe this mainly to the influence of Gall. He first brought into requisite prominence the principle of the necessary relation, in mental as in vital phenomena, between organ and function. Others had proclaimed the principle incidentally: he made it paramount by constant illustration, by showing it in detail, by teaching that every variation in the organ must necessarily bring about a corresponding variation in the function. He did not say mind was the *product* of organisation: 'nous ne confondons pas les conditions avec les causes efficientes;' all he asserted was the correspondence between the state of the organ and its manifestations.\* This was at once to call the attention of Europe to the marvellous apparatus of organs, which had previously been so little studied, except from a purely anatomical point of view, that no one, until Sömmerring (who was Gall's

nection between the disease and the activity, increase of the activity would have followed the rapid progress of the disease.

\* So also SPURZHEIM says: 'Both Dr. Gall and I have always declared that we merely observe the affective and intellectual manifestations, and the organic conditions under which they take place; and that in using the word organs we only mean the organic parts by means of which the faculties of the mind become apparent, but not that these constitute the mind.'—*Phrenology*, p. 16.

contemporary), had observed the relation between size of the brain and intellectual power, as a tolerably constant fact in the animal kingdom. This one detail is sufficient to make every reader suspect the chaotic condition of physiological Psychology when Gall appeared.

Nor has Gall's influence been less remarkable in the purely psychological direction. People in general are little aware how that influence is diffused, even through the writings of the opponents of Phrenology, and has percolated down to the most ordinary intelligences. Gall may be said to have definitely settled the dispute between the partisans of Innate Ideas and the partisans of Sensationalism, by establishing the connate tendencies, both affective and intellectual, which belong to the organic structure of man. Two psychological facts, familiar from all time to the ordinary understanding, but shrouded from all time in the perplexities of philosophy, he made the basis of his doctrine. The first of these facts is, that all the fundamental tendencies are connate, and can no more be created by precept and education than they can be abolished by denunciation and punishment. The second fact is, that man's various faculties are essentially distinct and independent, although intimately connected with each other; whence he concluded that the Mind consists of a plurality of functions. A plurality of organs became the necessary corollary of this proposition, as soon as the relation between organ and function was steadily conceived.

These two propositions have entered into the body of most psychological doctrines, although the corollary from the second is still vehemently disputed by many. No man of any intellectual eminence would now repeat Johnson's celebrated assertion of the poetic faculty being simply intellectual activity in a special direction, whereby Newton might have written *Othello*, and Shakspeare the *Principia*, had either of these great men set themselves the task. 'Sir, a man can walk as far east as he can walk west,' was thought a conclusive illustration; which indeed it was, when the 'unity'

of the faculties found no contradiction; no one would now accept it as more than a fallacious analogy.

Another conception systematised by Gall has also passed into general acceptance, namely, the pre-eminence of the affective faculties over the intellectual; also the subdivision of the affective faculties into propensities and sentiments, and of the intellectual faculties into perceptive and reflective: thus marking the progress in development from the individual to the social, from the sensuous to the intellectual, which constitutes the great progress of civilisation, in the triumph of sociality over animality.

Not only has Gall the immense merit of having decisively settled wavering conceptions respecting the Brain, and defined it as the instrument of the intellectual and moral faculties; but he has also the merit of having thoroughly grasped the significance of the Comparative Method. Conceiving the Brain as an apparatus of organs, and the mental faculties as functions of those organs, he applied this conception to the whole animal kingdom, and derived from observation of animals confirmations of his observation of man.

It may seem to the reader familiar with the current doctrines of physiologists, and unfamiliar with the history of Physiology, that this step was easy to take. Such a conclusion would be most unjust. So far from easy was the step, that illustrious anatomists before Gall had been unable to take it; and illustrious metaphysicians since Gall have been unable to follow it. Although, from the days of Hippocrates downwards, the Brain had been more or less clearly recognised, as the seat of the intellectual faculties, there was considerable hesitation as to the seat of the passions and propensities. Even Cabanis and Bichât assigned these to the viscera. Moreover those who held that the Brain was the seat of the intellect, either held that it was merely a local habitation, not a definite organ of which intellect was the function; or else they held that it was only one organ, and had very vague ideas of its functions;

they had no conception of the Brain as an apparatus of organs, no conception of each faculty having its special organ.

Thus the essential part of Gall's conception was novel; and the part that was not novel, was opportune. Even Flourens, the uncompromising antagonist of Phrenology, admits that Gall decided a wavering opinion: 'La proposition que le cerveau est le siège exclusif de l'âme n'est donc pas neuve, n'est donc pas de Gall; elle était dans la science avant qu'eût paru sa doctrine. Le mérite de Gall, et ceci même n'est pas un médiocre mérite, est d'en avoir mieux compris qu'aucun de ceux qui l'avaient précédé toute l'importance, et de s'être dévoué à la démontrer. Elle était dans la science avant Gall; on peut dire que depuis Gall elle y règne.'\* Those therefore who reject the hypothesis which is peculiar to Gall, namely the assignment of each faculty to a distinct central organ (an hypothesis only vaguely conceived by Prochaska),† must admit the importance of his arguments establishing the organic dependence of mind and the brain. That this was needed may be further seen in the reluctance which may still be observed on the part of metaphysicians to acknowledge it. Thus Sir W. Hamilton boldly asserts that '*no assistance* is afforded to Mental Philosophy by the examination of the Nervous System, and that the doctrine or doctrines which found *upon the supposed parallelism of brain and mind*, are, as far as observation extends, *wholly groundless*.'‡ When such a man, not unacquainted with Physiology, could teach his pupils this independence of mental

\* FLOURENS : *De la Phrénologie*, 1863, p. 20.

† PROCHASKA has a brief section, entitled, 'Do each of the divisions of the intellect occupy a separate portion of the brain?' This is merely a question raised without any attempt to answer it. The conclusion will show how vague were Prochaska's views: 'It is by no means improbable that each division of the intellect has its allotted organ in the brain, so that there is one for the perceptions, another for the understanding, probably also others for the will and imagination and memory.' *Dissertation on the Nervous System*, translated by LAYCOCK for the Ray Society, p. 447.

‡ HAMILTON : *Lectures on Metaphysics*, I. p. 264. At p. 404 he so far qualifies this absurd remark as to admit that 'the mind in its lower energies and affections

phenomena, we need not wonder that Jeffrey, who was wholly ignorant of science, could in his attack on Phrenology in the 'Edinburgh Review,' take up a similar position: 'The truth, we do not scruple to say it, is, that there is not the smallest reason for supposing that the mind ever operates through the agency of any material organs except in the perception of material objects, or in the spontaneous movements of the body which it inhabits; and that this whole science rests upon a postulate or assumption for which there is neither any show of evidence, nor any show of reasoning.'\* It is almost cruel to cite two such passages from two such writers; but the citations show what need there was of Gall's labours.

A slight acquaintance with the history of Anatomy also shows what a need there was for the new method of dissecting the brain originated by Gall. One sentence from his antagonist Flourens will suffice here. 'Je n'oublierai jamais l'impression que j'éprouvai la première fois que je vis Gall disséquer un cerveau. Il me semblait que je n'avais pas encore vu cet organe.'† This is not the place to expound or criticise Gall's anatomy. I only wish to call attention to his great services in having originated a new method of investigation. His own results, here and elsewhere, must be accepted as preliminary indications only, not as discoveries.

The same remark applies to the fertile suggestions by which he endeavoured to connect Psychology with Biology. He had, it must be confessed, but very imperfect ideas on both these subjects; nevertheless he had a comprehensive and eminently scientific point of view. So long as he keeps at the height of this point of view and takes a panoramic

is immediately dependent on the condition of the nervous system, and that in general the development of the brain in the different species of animals (not then of men !) is correspondent to their intelligence.'

\* Quoted by GEORGE COMBE: *Phrenology Applied to Painting and Sculpture*, 1855, p. xii.

† FLOURENS: *op. cit.* p. 180.

survey of the field, he is admirable. When he descends to details he stumbles.

He clearly saw and clearly expressed the truth that the greatest obstacle in the way of psychological research was the vicious practice of isolating human nature from the animal series, and of endeavouring to release it from the laws which govern animal life. We may, he says (but this is a mistake), without inconvenience neglect the relations of man to the inorganic world; but it is impossible to avoid endless confusion, unless we distinguish the functions man has in common with plants, and the functions he has in common with animals: the latter being obviously the functions of the nervous system.\* Finding that animals have a nervous system which in all essentials is identical with that of man, and finding also that animals have instincts, propensities, and intelligence similar, if not the same as those of man, he justly asks whether, in examining the nature and origin of human faculties, we ought not to take those of animals into account? 'L'homme, tant qu'il est animal, serait-il un être isolé du reste de la nature vivante? serait-il gouverné par des lois organiques opposées à celles qui président aux qualités et aux facultés du cheval, du chien, du singe?'† The conception here ridiculed was firmly held by metaphysicians, who amused themselves with writing long treatises on the mind as an isolated entity, detached from all physical laws, 'exerçant ses fonctions par elle-même, se servant du corps tout au plus comme d'un moyen de communication entre elle et le monde.'

His argumentation is victorious along the whole line. If, he says, our moral and intellectual faculties are independent of organic conditions, it is needless to trouble ourselves about the brain and nervous system. Man is excluded from the field of observation, except as a physical being. 'If, on the other hand, I can demonstrate an essential relation between the exercise of his moral and intellectual forces and his

\* GALL: *Fonctions du Cerveau*, i. 22 sq.

† *Ibid.* p. 48.

organisation, it will follow that the search after the organic conditions is the most important object that can occupy the physiologist; and if I can demonstrate that these organic conditions are the brain and its parts, we shall see the possibility of a doctrine of the cerebral functions, a doctrine which discloses the organs employed in the manifestation of all our propensities, all our sentiments, and all our faculties.\*

The task is delicate, and difficult. Besides its intrinsic difficulty, there is the obscuration of metaphysical prejudices. 'A tout moment, les métaphysiciens viennent ralentir les progrès des naturalistes; en général c'est aux métaphysiciens qu'il faut attribuer l'ignorance où l'on est encore sur la véritable nature de l'homme.'† These doctors were employed seeking 'the seat of the soul,' which was now supposed to be in one point, now in another. 'Au lieu de rechercher simplement des phénomènes, on se bornait, comme c'est encore l'usage, à des subtilités philosophiques; on s'épuisait en spéculations sur la nature intime de l'âme.' The union of the soul with the body, and the possibility of an intermediate action; the question whether sensations and ideas are the results of impressions on the brain, and whether they left traces, copies, of themselves there; such were the favourite topics of debate. They were all set aside when the study of the cerebral functions began.

Gall not only studied the brain in man, but studied its evolution in the animal series, and with it the evolution of instincts, propensities, faculties. He knew that the dreaded reproach of Materialism, would be thrown on such a method; but as he rejected Materialism, he was not to be alarmed by a clamour of misrepresentation. 'Quand je dis que l'exercice de nos facultés dépend des conditions matérielles, je n'entends pas que nos facultés soient un *produit* de l'organisation; ce serait confondre les conditions avec les causes efficientes.'‡ In a separate section devoted to this accusation of Material-

\* GALL: *Fonctions du Cerveau*, p. 189. † *Op. cit.* ii. 4. ‡ *Op. cit.* i. 189.

ism, he says, 'I have always declared that I leave unsought the nature of the soul as of the body, and that I never attempt to explain the essence of either of their faculties. *I confine myself to phenomena.*'\* The phenomena presented to observation, both in animals and man, he tried to connect with their material conditions; and the attempt was eminently philosophical, though, as we shall see, its results were not very successful.

### § III. GALL'S METHOD.

In the foregoing enumeration of his contributions to a real Psychology, the chief elements of Gall's Method have been indicated. What we have to do here is to bring these elements together, and mark with more precision the value to be attached to his conception of them. The point of view is important. In his vision of Psychology as a branch of Biology, subject therefore to all biological laws, and to be pursued on biological methods, he may be said to have given the science its basis.

What were the means of investigation which Biology opened to him? They were zoological observations interpreted by anatomical, physiological, and pathological indications. The phenomena presented by animals and men were compared and classified; each elementary faculty was assigned to some distinct organ, indicated as the organ of the faculty by its constant presence when the phenomena were present, by its absence in the absence of the phenomena, and by its lesion in irregularities of the phenomena.

There was another and important instrument of research, which Gall disregarded, namely, subjective analysis, an instrument so necessary that some psychologists, otherwise quite alive to the importance of biological investigation, maintain that Psychology should be erected into a separate science, mainly directed by this analysis. I shall presently

\* GALL: *Fonctions du Cerveau*, p. 228 sq. The whole section is worth consulting.



have to point out the consequences of Gall's disregard of this instrument. It is the only serious defect in his general conception of Method.

The most superficial glance at this Method discovers its novelty, its importance, and its immense sweep. Its novelty consisted in its precision. What before had been vaguely seen to be useful means of investigation, and had been applied with more or less success, he saw to be indispensable, and to need systematic co-ordination. The relations of the physical and moral, the influence of the body on the mind, and of the mind on the body, had been vaguely recognised; and by Cabanis an attempt had been made to systematise them. The general relations also of the Nervous System and the Mental Functions had been recognised. But no one had attempted a precise demonstration. No one had attempted to unveil the mysterious mechanism of physical and moral phenomena. In the experience of physicians various striking facts were recorded, showing how the influence of an idea determined a physical result analogous to that determined by a physical agent. The belief of having taken a purgative was known to act on susceptible patients, although the pill actually administered was made of bread; the terror at having taken an emetic by mistake, was known to produce violent vomitings, when no emetic stronger than pure water had been really taken; the pain of an exposed nerve in a carious tooth was known to disappear directly the patient entered the dentist's room. Such cases, and they are numberless, were quietly disposed of by attributing them to Imagination. They might as well have been attributed to the Differential Calculus.

Note how easily a phrase is made to do duty for a definite conception. Through what structural conditions Imagination was to act upon the bowels or on the teeth, that is to say, what parts of the physical organism were set in action by the image, no one thought of asking. Imagination was autocratic, freed from all conditions. Those naïve metaphysiologists who conceived Imagination as a perfectly free

agent unencumbered by material conditions, and capable of acting anywhere because it was an inhabitant of Nowhere (being spiritual it could not have a locality), felt no need of the discovery of a particular mechanism for the production of results. But physiologists who sought a scientific explanation, and who believed that each action of the nervous system took place under definite conditions, and through a definite mechanism, were called upon not to rest contented with a meaningless phrase, but to show what was the pathway of Imagination acting on the teeth to drive away the pain, and on the bowels to change bread-pills into purgatives, innocent drinks into emetics.

It is true that Gall made no attempt to disclose this mechanism of the moral and physical, nor was his physiological knowledge precise enough to warrant the attempt. But he did try to substitute definite ideas of the mental mechanism in place of the vague generalities current among philosophers; he was not content with assigning mental faculties to the nervous system in general, he tried to show what part of the nervous system was involved in each of the distinct faculties. The attempt proved a failure; but it was one of those germinal conceptions which enrich science. The hypothesis did not withstand Verification; but it was an illuminating hypothesis, because while colligating known facts and instigating research, it was one to which the process of verification could be applied. Comte compares the hypothesis of Gall with the hypothesis of Descartes. Although the 'vortices' were rejected by science, they served a preliminary purpose of great utility. 'En effet, par les tourbillons, Descartes arrachait la constitution du monde aux agents surnaturels, à la métaphysique, aux entités; posant le véritable problème, il le résolvait hypothétiquement;'<sup>\*</sup> in like manner Gall rescued the problem of mental functions from Metaphysics, and made it one of Biology. Still more illustrative is the comparison Comte makes between Gall and

<sup>\*</sup> LITTRÉ: *Auguste Comte et la Philos. positive*, 1863, p. 542.

Broussais. At a time when fevers were considered as essential maladies, morbid entities whose course had nothing to do with the conditions of the living body, Broussais, by an intuition of genius, saw that Pathology must be a particular case of Physiology, that diseases were *abnormal* conditions of the *normal* functions. He therefore propounded the hypothesis that all fevers were nothing but various forms of inflammation of the intestinal canal. The hypothesis proved false; science has rejected it; but the principle was true, and science has consecrated it.

The hypothesis of Gall had its basis in three propositions: 1, that the mental faculties are activities of the cerebral organs; 2, that Psychology is a branch of Biology; and 3, that any attempt to separate the mental from the physical organisation, as two independent factors, must lead to error. It had been the practice to separate mental from vital phenomena, and study them apart. Gall obeyed the Canon of Restitution (*Prolegomena*, § 54), which prescribes the necessity of completing psychological analysis by physiological analysis. The hypothesis he erected on this basis was that the moral and intellectual faculties are twenty-seven in number, each of which has for its organ a distinct portion of the convolutions of the cerebrum and cerebellum: this aspect of the hypothesis is Phrenology. Inasmuch as the external configuration of the skull is moulded on the configuration of the Brain, the organs are definitely indicated both as to position and size, by the topography of the skull: this is Craniology.

Since we are here considering only the Method, it would disturb the exposition if we paused to estimate the truth of an hypothesis which will challenge attention hereafter. Let me only indicate the immense difficulty and sweep of the investigations which the hypothesis demanded. That will disclose how precipitate and unwise Gall's followers have been in not at once recognising the essentially tentative nature of an hypothesis which they have blindly accepted as a final theory. It was natural that Gall himself should have had

no doubts, and should have believed that he was in possession of all the knowledge essential to his scheme. But his successors have displayed even greater confidence; which only proves how ill-instructed they have been in Biology, and how little penetrated with the true spirit of scientific scepticism.

Phrenology may be regarded as a Physiology of the Brain; or as an Art of Reading Character by means of the skull, *i.e.* Cranioscopy. Gall, I am aware, conceived that his doctrine was both; and, indeed, *if* his Physiology be true, the indications of his Cranioscopy must likewise be accepted; although it is quite conceivable that his Phrenology may be a mass of errors, and yet his Cranioscopy have empirical truth. I do not say that Cranioscopy is true; neither do I say that Physiognomy or Cheironomy is true; but we may suppose observation of the coincidence between external form and mental disposition to reach a certain empirical accuracy sufficient for the establishment of an Art, quite independent of the truth or error of the cerebral Physiology which accompanies it. Thus also Lavater's Physiognomy might have been true, although his Physiology was absurd.

Phrenology may thus be detached from Cranioscopy, and be estimated apart, each having their separate grounds of evidence, though they are mutually illuminating. On Cranioscopy nothing need be said at present, except that Gall's method of research was distinguished by its comprehensiveness and sagacity. Both in the choice of facts, and in the comparative sweep of his collection, he showed the skill and patience of an investigator. I do not say that he was not biassed by his hypothesis. I do not pretend that his facts were always accurately interpreted, or that contradictory evidence was impartially weighed. Gall was human. But making every deduction, we must still admit that so vast an array of facts, zoological, pathological, and psychological, had never before been collected by any one inquirer into this abstruse subject. And, moreover, they were statements for the most part admitting of verification.

With Phrenology the case is otherwise. It claims to be a

Physiology of the Brain ; and the very Method, which it is the glory of Gall to have introduced, insists on so vast and comprehensive an investigation of biological facts and laws, that every hypothesis must be regarded simply as an hypothesis, a tentative effort to range the facts in some available order, until the laws of nervous action have been positively ascertained, and the function of each organ placed beyond dispute. Gall conceived a luminous hypothesis. This had to be verified. The new physiology of the brain had to be tested by Anatomy, Physiology, Pathology, Zoology. What was the result ? Those who have read these pages aright will see that I throw no discredit on Gall's genius in affirming that his physiology of the brain is altogether irreconcilable with the discoveries of modern science, and that, as far as we can be said to know anything of the nervous system, his positions are one and all erroneous. Of this more anon.

Gall was precipitate. He was forced to be so. His hypothesis could not await the tardy disclosures of science ; it was a powerful stimulant to science, and meanwhile it colligated the facts then known. Gall was the Kepler of Psychology. His followers proclaim him a Newton. It is probably in consequence of this confidence in their master that while, on the one hand, we find every phrenologist since Gall, Spurzheim, and Vimont, occupied entirely with Craniology, and many even speaking with disdain of anatomists and physiologists ; on the other hand, we find them anxious to bring forward physiological and pathological evidence, whenever that evidence favours their views ; and we hear them confidently assert that Phrenology is the only true Physiology of the nervous system. This latter assertion I am quite willing to echo, if the terms be somewhat modified, and the phrase run thus :—' Phrenology aspires to be the true Physiology of the nervous system ; when that Physiology is complete, Phrenology will be complete.' But for the present we find Physiology confessing its incompleteness—confessing itself in its infancy ; whereas Phrenology claims to be complete, equipped, full-statured. Rightly considered, that very claim

is a condemnation of Phrenology, as at present understood. The pretension of being a perfect or nearly perfect system, surely implies a profound ignorance of the subject, an entire misconception of the complexity of the problem it pretends to have solved? At a time when Science finds it difficult to solve the problem of three gravitating bodies, phrenologists pretend to find no difficulty in calculating the result of forces so complex as those which constitute character; at a time when the nervous system is confessed, by all who have studied it, to be extremely ill-understood, the mental functions of that system are supposed to be established; at a time when Physiology is so rapidly advancing that every decade renders most books antiquated, a Psychology professedly founded on that advancing science remains immovable!

Gall was on the right path when he entitled his first great work *Anatomy and Physiology of the Nervous System*.<sup>\*</sup> His successors have quitted that path. In spite of his emphatic declarations, when he was engaged in his exposition of the anatomy and physiology of the nervous system,<sup>†</sup> declarations of the necessity to make the study of organ and function go hand in hand, so that he would only have his labours regarded 'as the basis of an essay towards a more perfect work;' in spite, we say, of every philosophical consideration, his successors have neglected Physiology for Cranioscopy; not one of them has made or attempted to make any discovery or extension of discovery in the direction Gall so successfully opened; and the result of this neglect has been twofold,—first, that since Gall and Spurzheim, Phrenology has not taken a single step; secondly, that all the eminent physiologists of Europe who have devoted themselves to the study of the nervous system, unanimously reject a theory which does not keep pace with the advance of science. It is very easy for

<sup>\*</sup> 'Quiconque,' he says, 'est convaincu que la structure des parties du cerveau a un rapport nécessaire et immédiat avec leurs fonctions, trouvera qu'il est naturel de réunir ces deux objets l'un à l'autre, en les considérant et en les traitant comme un seul et même corps de doctrine.'—*Anat. et Phys.* préf. xxv.

<sup>†</sup> Compare his *Anat. du Syst. nerveux*, i. 95 and 271.

phrenologists to disregard the unanimous opposition of physiologists, and to place this opposition to the account of prejudice, or the 'not having sufficiently studied Phrenology;' but an impartial on-looker sees clearly enough that, making every allowance for prejudice, the opposition rests mainly on the discrepancy between the facts stated by phrenologists and the facts which Science has hitherto registered. Had phrenologists kept themselves acquainted with what was gradually being discovered by physiologists, they would have seen that something more than prejudice must be at work when all the eminent neurologists, such as Serres, Flourens, Majendie, Leuret, Longet, Lélut, Lafargue, Baillarger, Müller, Valentin, Gratiolet, Vulpian, Wagner, and Schiff, declare against Phrenology; although every one of these is ready to admit the importance of Gall's method of dissection, ready to incorporate whatever results Gall arrived at, which can be in any way confirmed. Authorities are not reasons; but the unanimity on this point has a reason. I am indisposed to estimate a doctrine by the array of names on its side; but I cannot overlook the fact that here physiologists belonging to very opposite schools of thought all agree in rejecting the facts, no less than the doctrines, advanced by Gall; and this unanimity is the more striking because there is scarcely a single man of eminence on the other side. I do not blame phrenologists for having rendered no assistance to Physiology by their own labours; but I am forced to point out the consequences of their having neglected to follow the path commenced by Gall, and having deviated into that of simple Craniology. The neglect of which they complain, is entirely owing to their presenting a rude sketch as a perfect science, and to their keeping behind the science of their day, instead of on a level with it. Impatient of contradiction, they shut their eyes to difficulties; unable to accommodate their principles to the principles of Physiology, they contemptuously dismiss objections as 'merely theoretical,' and fall back upon their 'well-established facts.'

This point must not be shirked. Gall's merit is that of

having reduced Psychology to a branch of Biology. He must not be at once credited with a revolution, and exculpated from the results. Not only did he take his stand on Phrenology, but emphatically declared that his cranial researches were necessary in order to arrive, by means of observation, at a knowledge of the functions of the various parts of the brain.\* 'Mais on affecte d'ignorer la physiologie,' he complains, 'et de ne connaître nous et nos travaux que sous le point de vue de *cranioscopie* de *cranioscopes*.' He was justly wroth with adversaries who tried to divert public attention from his real researches by sarcasms on Cranioscopy. And Broussais, when he became a disciple, repudiated even the name of Psychology. 'Non, messieurs, la phrénologie n'est point un système de psychologie : nous ne devons pas admettre dans cette enceinte, des qualifications qui suggèrent des théories hypothétiques. La phrénologie est la physiologie du cerveau ; voilà quelle doit être la véritable acception de ce mot.' †

It is true—and this is some justification of Gall's successors—that inasmuch as Cranioscopy was really the starting-point, and means of verification, of his hypothesis, he did lay great stress on it ; affirming that to it we owed 'une physiologie et par conséquent la partie la plus essentielle de la pathologie du cerveau.' And he adds this naïve and astounding proposition : 'There is no other means possible whereby to discover the functions of the cerebral organs ; all the others serve at most to confirm what has been discovered by inspection of skulls.' ‡

This remark discloses what every biologist who reads Gall will have seen at once, that Gall had extremely imperfect views of what constituted Physiology, and how it was to be studied. That an inspection of the varieties in configuration of the skull might lead to an Art of reading character is conceivable ; but that it could by any possibility lead to a discovery of the functions of the nervous masses to which the

\* *Fonctions du Cerveau*, ii. p. 33.

† BROUSSAIS : *Cours de Phrénologie*, 1836, p. 2.

‡ *Fonctions*, ii. p. 35.



skull formed a protecting dome, even supposing that the configurations represented with perfect accuracy the forms of these masses, is assuredly not conceivable by any physiologist. And M. Flourens is thoroughly justified in affirming that Gall, who has given us an anatomy of the brain, 'has not even suspected its physiology. His phrenology, if anything, is a psychology, not a physiology.'\* It is to be observed that Gall, who acutely enough saw the impossibility of discovering functions from the simple inspection of organs, contented himself with simple inspection, and never once invoked the aid of the indispensable instrument Experiment. 'On a pendant des siècles entiers,' he says, 'confondu les tendons et les ligaments avec les nerfs, et l'organisation du cœur a si peu conduit les anatomistes à la connaissance de ses fonctions que les artères ont été considérées comme des tubes conducteurs de l'air.'† Perfectly true; and to what does it lead? Evidently to the necessity of determining function by Experiment, where Observation does not disclose it; yet this was precisely the conclusion Gall would not accept. He never experimented himself; he paid no attention to the experiments of others. In fact he had really no other mode of determining function than the extremely fallacious observation of the coincidences of configuration and character. His doctrine required an anatomical demonstration of the important position that the Brain was an apparatus of organs. Each of these organs needed definition. But unhappily science was not sufficiently advanced to give him the requisite materials; and he was too imperfectly versed in biological philosophy to have formed distinct ideas of what constituted an organ.‡

The convolutions of the Brain, which Gall has mapped out

\* FLOURENS, *op. cit.* p. 188.

† *Réponse au Rapport de M. Cuvier*, p. 245.

‡ 'Aussi tous les anatomistes ont-ils, à juste titre, traité une telle distribution comme arbitraire et désordonnée, puisque n'étant assujétie à aucune notion rigoureuse de philosophie anatomique sur la différence réelle entre un organe et une partie d'organe, elle comporte des subdivisions en quelque sorte indéfinies, que chaque phrénologue semble pouvoir multiplier à son gré.' COMTE: *Cours de Philos. positive*, iii. p. 819.

into several distinct compartments, each compartment being the organ of a distinct faculty, are in reality not more distinct than the several folds of a piece of velvet; and a little reflection discloses the absurdity of supposing that one portion of this velvet could be endowed with different properties from every other portion, simply in virtue of its superficial position. The tissue of which the convolutions consist is the same throughout its folds; and that the *mere form of convolution* has nothing whatever to do with the nature of the psychical faculties, is not only evident *à priori*, but is proved *à posteriori* by the existence of those faculties in animals with unconvoluted brains. Of this more anon.

It was Gall's imperfect conceptions of organ and function which prevented his seeing that this mode of determining function was very misleading. What would he have said to a physiologist, who, hearing that the liver formed bile and sugar, should have assigned the property of bile-formation to one lobe, and the property of sugar-formation to another lobe, no structural differences having been observed? or to one who should assign to the different lobules of the kidney functions as different as are assigned to the different convolutions of the brain? \* It is perfectly true that from inspection of an organ no idea of its function can be obtained; and his truth has blinded phrenologists who are not physiologists to the necessity of nevertheless always making anatomy the basis of every physiological analysis. No inspection of the alimentary canal could disclose to us that its function was that of digestion. Nevertheless the function of digestion, except in the crude conception of ordinary men, is only intelligible after a rigorous analysis of the several processes, buccal, stomachal, and intestinal; for the intelligence of

\* If he relied on a variety of cases in which the sugar-forming property was active and feeble in conjunction with large and small developments of one lobe, his induction would be set aside by the overwhelming force of the induction on which had been established the rule, that without differences of structure there can be no differences of property; and still less force would be allowed to an induction based on coincidences which were far from constant.

each of which, we must assign to each gland its specific secretion, and to each secretion its specific action: a physiologist who should attempt the explanation of digestion on any other mode would justly be slighted by every good biologist in Europe. If Phrenology is the Physiology of the nervous system, it must give up Gall's approximate method for a method more rigorously scientific; and, as Auguste Comte justly remarks, phrenologists, before they can take rank among men of science, must '*reprandre, par une série directe de travaux anatomiques, l'analyse fondamentale de l'appareil cérébral, en faisant provisoirement abstraction de toute idée de fonctions.*'\*

#### § IV. APPLICATION OF THE METHOD.

Observation of men and animals furnished Gall with materials from which a rough sketch of mental phenomena was produced; and whatever deficiencies this sketch presented, it had the great and lasting merit of an inductive basis. Instead of deducing a scheme of the faculties from some *à priori* fiction about the nature of the soul, or the simplicity of spiritual substance; instead of deducing the scheme from certain logical and psychological traditions; instead of deducing the scheme from verbal analyses which presented all our faculties as transformed sensations, he sought inductively to ascertain what were the elementary faculties, by ascertaining which of them were manifested separately. 'So far,' says Mr. Combe, 'from a disposition to invent a theory being conspicuous, there appears in the disjointed items of information, which Dr. Gall at first presented to the public, a want of even an ordinary regard for systematic arrangement. His only object seems to have been to furnish a candid and uncoloured statement of the facts in nature which he had observed: leaving their value to be ascertained by time and farther investigation. As

\* *Philosophie positive*, iii. p. 821. COMTE is favourable to GALL, yet see his remarks on the multiplication of the faculties, p. 823 *sq.*

1, however, as observation had brought to light the great mass of facts, and the functions of the faculties had been contemplated with a philosophical eye, a system of mental philosophy appeared to emanate almost spontaneously from previous chaos.\*

It was here, in this construction of a system, that the abuse of subjective analysis was most injurious. Observation had supplied a mass of materials, and these were roughly arranged in a hasty unsystematic way. There was no criticism applied to the observations, no analysis disentangled their complexities. Spurzheim and George Combe introduced several improvements in the nomenclature, and made the system somewhat less incongruous. But no one had the truest conception of what psychological analysis should be, its means, its conditions, and the problems it had first to solve. No one ever attempted to settle the ill-important question, How to determine whether any mental manifestation is the direct product of a Faculty, or the indirect product of two or more Faculties? how to distinguish between Faculties and Modes, between elementary actions and associated actions, between energies and synergies? Not a step towards a rough approximative induction could be taken while the scientific basis was unsettled. Thus while the metaphysicians maintained that Memory, Judgment, Attention, Will, were elementary Faculties, Gall maintained that they were only Modes of each Faculty; and Auguste Comte, in his modification of Gall's scheme, pronounces them to be synergies of the intellectual Faculties only. Who is right? Obviously the decision can only issue from some clearly defined principle of analysis, biological or psychological, *i.e.* derived from decomposition of vital phenomena (as when the instinct of nutrition or the instinct of propagation is based on a distinct physiological law) or derived from the decomposition of psychical phenomena (as when a complex action is resolved into its elementary constituents).

\* COMBE: *System of Phrenology*, 3rd edit. p. 58.

Such a clearly defined principle was unsuspected by Gall. He accepted the rude indications of observation as sufficient. Observing that some men manifested a tendency to theft, which was not manifested with equal energy by all men, but which acted blindly and persistently, he at once concluded that there was a special organ for this special instinct. Spurzheim was acute enough to see that this instinct was less special, and that theft was the manifestation of acquisitiveness. In like manner, the faculty of Cunning was by Spurzheim reduced to the simpler faculty of Secretiveness, by eliminating the intellectual element which gave it the special character of Cunning, leaving thus the primitive instinct of Secretiveness. Again, Gall observing that some men were distinguished among their companions by the activity of their veneration, at once concluded that Veneration was an elementary faculty; though a very slight consideration of the phenomena might have shown him its composite nature. By an unfortunate coincidence, the convolution which Gall assigned to this faculty of Veneration in man, was found to be conspicuously prominent in sheep. A recent phrenologist explains this coincidence by affirming that the identity of organs in nowise determines identity of function in man and animals—a suicidal admission which he thus defends: If we analyse the mental phenomenon of Veneration, we find that it has two elements: 1, the abstract tendency to respect; 2, the idea of the object addressed. 'Tout acte de vénération humaine s'accomplit de cette manière et dérive de l'action combinée de circonvolutions dont plusieurs n'existent pas dans le mouton.' \*

What function, then, has this organ in the sheep? M. Castle thinks that the gentleness and submission of the sheep are due to this instinct of veneration. Broussais sees in it the tendency of the flock to follow a leader.† The explanation seems plausible until we examine the brain of a lion or a tiger, and find the same organ there also. As M. Leuret

\* CASTLE : *Phrénologie spiritualiste*, 1862, p. 19.

† BROUSSAIS : *Cours de Phrénologie*.

pleasantly remarks, 'L'organe de la vénération pour ces derniers, il faut en convenir, est un organe parfaitement in-occupé.'\*

It is to be observed that the phrenologists have been fully alive to the synergy of organs in producing mental phenomena, and have often displayed great acuteness in their indications of synergies; but what they have not done is to establish a principle which could decide whether any given manifestation were the direct function of an organ or the product of various organs. Hence their extremely questionable admission of Wit, Ideality, Colour, Individuality, and Eventuality as original faculties; while they reject others equally special, such as a Memory for Dates, or a Memory for Names. If observation suffice, surely the frequently-observed facts of some men being incapable of remembering important dates, such as the birthdays of their children, while other men seem to remember with facility dates the least important to them, ought to constitute a claim for the independence of an organ for Dates; the faculty being not more legitimately affiliated on Individuality or Eventuality than Wit is affiliated on Comparison.

Gall's Criticism on the psychologists is effective. After enumerating their various and discordant schemes of the elementary faculties, he remarks, that whether a scheme includes two, three, four, or seven, the error is always the same, namely, that of mistaking abstractions for faculties. 'None of them designates an instinct, a propensity, a talent, or any definite moral or intellectual faculty. How can we explain by sensation, attention, comparison, reasoning, desire, the origin and exercise of such instincts as propagation, love of children, adhesiveness, the talents for mechanics, music, mathematics, poetry, &c.?' Go into a family and observe the strongly-marked disposition of its members: one is proud, the other servile; one is quarrelsome and destructive, the other timid and affectionate; one has an irresistible

\* LEURET : *Anatomie comparée du Système nerveux*, 1839, i. p. 568.

propensity to steal, another to construct machines; one is surprisingly musical, and his brother cannot distinguish one tune from another. The same nursery, the same home, the same masters, the same companions, fail to produce similar characters in differently organised brothers and sisters. If education and surrounding circumstances, he asks, had the effect of determining the direction of the faculties, and creating aptitudes—as people commonly suppose—how is it that the female bird does not sing like the male? Why do not chickens learn to coo like the pigeons they live with? Why does each species preserve its peculiarities? Above all, why do not animals suckled and reared by parents of another species, manifest the dispositions of their nurses? Would any companionship with philosophers develop in the juvenile athlete a power of seizing abstract relations and pursuing a long chain of reasoning by means of symbols? Would the society of a herd of antelopes develop in the ram the sensitive grace and agility of a deer? Hence the conclusion, confirmed by zoological comparison, that although we are not born with Innate Ideas, we have Connate Faculties and Aptitudes. But even this requires a qualification which Gall saw to be important, namely, that just as the newborn infant has not the maturity of organisation which permits the full performance of all physical functions—these gradually emerging as development goes on—neither has he the maturity of cerebral organisation which permits the performance of all the psychical functions; the Faculties grow and are developed; and their growth is dependent on the development of the organism.

Kant's great principle of seeking in the Laws of Thought a solution of the problems of Philosophy, was by Gall approached from the biological side. 'Si l'on reconnaît que les sens procurent des matériaux nombreux, que l'esprit travaille par le moyen d'instruments plus élevés, et si l'on peut établir que l'homme intérieur lui-même est doué d'une multitude de dispositions, nous devons chercher nos idées et nos connaissances en partie dans les phénomènes du monde

extérieur et dans leur emploi raisonné, *et en partie dans les lois innées des facultés morales et intellectuelles.*' \* It is true that his attempt to discover these Laws was unsuccessful; but the attempt was made fertile by his conception of the necessity (not seen by Kant) of seeking the organic laws in the organism itself. Kant sought them in subjective analysis.

Gall further saw that not only must the Laws of Thought result from the Laws of the Organism, but that the plurality of Faculties which observation indicated as existing, necessarily implied a corresponding plurality of organs. To attribute the moral and intellectual faculties vaguely to the organism or the 'temperaments' was a sterile procedure. The organism as a whole does not see when the eye is removed, does not secrete bile and saliva when the liver and salivary gland are obstructed, nor does it think when the brain is obstructed. And if the physiological functions have each of them a separate organ, how can the psychical functions be without their separate organs?

Indeed all that relates to the general propositions respecting a plurality of functions, and a plurality of organs, Gall must be admitted to have triumphantly established. It is only in the details that he is unsuccessful.

#### § V. VERIFICATION OF THE HYPOTHESIS.

Having indicated the chief points in the Method, I have now briefly to specify the chief reasons which determine the rejection of Gall's hypothesis. That it was a luminous and fertile conception, has been already acknowledged. Like all other conceptions, it had to be confronted with reality. After such a confrontation it would either pass from the condition of an hypothesis to that of a verified theory, or it would be relegated to the limbo of tentative failures. At the end of fifty years of attempted verification what is the result?

\* *Fonctions*, i. p. 84.




The broad, palpable result to which I would first draw attention is that Phrenology, assailed by ridicule, misrepresentation, argument, and passionate contempt, such as usually salute every new and revolutionary hypothesis, has not survived this opposition, has not lived down its ill repute, and converted its antagonists, or the sons of its antagonists, but has lingered with a feeble life of sectarian tradition, inspiring no new prophets, raising up no influential disciples. If vehement opposition is, unhappily, one almost universal consequence of the promulgation of a new conception, there is, happily, another universal consequence of every promulgated truth, namely, that it spreads wider and wider, and irresistibly draws successive generations into its fold. Ridicule never killed any important truth; persecution never finally suppressed it. The obstinacy of a few disciples prevents the sacred flame from dying out; by degrees it attracts more serious attention, and this attention discovers fresh evidence; the adhesion of serious minds checks the levity of superficial objectors; the ridicule ceases, and calm investigation proceeds. At this stage the new doctrine perishes, or rapidly passes into general acceptance.

How has Phrenology borne the test? Instead of surviving opposition it has decayed with the declining opposition. It has ceased to be ridiculed, it has ceased to be declaimed against as immoral, and—it has ceased to occupy attention. While science has accepted much of what is acceptable in Gall's method and results, no one has arisen to extend and improve those results, no school of phrenological investigators has kept pace with the discoveries of Anatomy and Physiology, nothing has been added to the labours of Gall, Spurzheim, and George Combe, nothing has been done to bring the doctrine into general acceptance. Here and there a clever man is found who accepts Phrenology; but he is generally (I think it may be said always) one imperfectly acquainted with the results of biological and psychological research. At any rate, not one among the eminent physiologists, psychologists, or physio-psychologists of the present

day, accepts the scheme as more than a rude hypothesis, while the vast majority reject it as a false hypothesis.

Such has been the result of fifty years' experience. Instead of gaining ground it has been losing ground. Verification has disproved, not confirmed, the hypothesis. Observation has not supported the Cranioscopy; nor has anatomical research confirmed the Physiology. The disproof is overwhelming, and on this account only has the doctrine sunk into neglect.

In the brief space to which these remarks must be restricted, I cannot, of course, pretend to marshal a tithe of the evidence which has been adduced in disproof. But there are certain crucial instances which would alone suffice to show that the hypothesis is unacceptable. I will begin with Cranioscopy, because that has not only the largest mass of facts in its favour, but is also the aspect of the hypothesis which phrenologists most resolutely advance. That the great diversities in mental manifestations may be correlated with the great diversities of cranial configuration is a proposition, probable in itself, and rendered almost certain by the facts phrenologists have collected. It is probable that every part of the physical organism carries with it the sign of some psychical peculiarity; could we only read that sign! And so long as phrenologists content themselves with discerning and registering all the cases of coincidence between certain manifestations and certain configurations, they are well employed. Such coincidences, however, must be rigidly determined, and, like all other empirical facts, must be held as mere sign-posts, until they be proved invariable, and until they be bound together by some ascertained law. Now it will scarcely be denied that the observed correspondences between special cranial configuration and mental peculiarities, do, in many instances, fail. Proportionately large 'organs' are sometimes observed in connection with very mediocre powers; proportionately small 'organs,' on the contrary, with very splendid powers. I wish rather to understate than overstate the difficulty, and I will not seek to gain



any advantage by multiplying exceptions; it is enough for the present argument if any exceptions have been observed; because any exception to an empirical generalisation is ~~fatal~~ to it ~~as~~ an empirical generalisation, and can only be set ~~aside~~ when the generalisation has ceased to be empirical, and ~~has~~ become scientific. Thus, I am aware that phrenologists ~~must~~ explain each exception to their perfect satisfaction. But, in explaining it, they quit the sphere of empirical observation to enter that of science; and thus their explanation ~~itself~~ has only the validity which can be given it by theory. To make my meaning more definite, let us suppose that ~~the~~ empirical generalisation of large chests being the cause of great muscular power, is under discussion. As an observed fact—an empirical fact—the correspondence of broad chests and muscular strength, is a valuable addition to our empirical knowledge. Taken as an indication, no one disputes the fact; but taken as a cause, and connected with a physiological theory, it bears quite a different value. The physiologist may say that the fact proves breadth of chest to admit of more perfect oxygenation of the blood, and thus causes greater muscular power. Against such a theory we bring the fact that no absolute and constant relation between broad chests and muscular power exists; if we find large chests accompanying strength we also find small chests in certain lithe, wiry frames accompanying even greater strength; the empirical generalisation is thus destroyed, the explanation is shown to be imperfect, and the ratio of muscular power is shown to depend on some other condition besides the size of the chest.

When phrenologists explain the exceptions to their empirical facts, they are on the field of pure science, and their explanations can only have value in proportion to the validity of the scientific principles invoked; and thus the Art of Craniology is perpetually forced to recur to Physiology.

Considered empirically, we must say that the mass of observations hitherto collected establishes that a causal relation of some kind does exist between the conformation of the skull and the character. No one acquainted with

these observations will deny that they are far too numerous to be set down as mere coincidences; but they require much more precision, and, above all, they require a rational basis, before they can be accepted as more than empirical indications. If a hundred men having a given cranial configuration be found to manifest an unusual power of Calculation, and if a hundred men having very ordinary power of Calculation be found to possess nothing noticeable in the cranial configuration previously fixed on as related to number, the conclusion inevitably is that *a* causal relation must exist between the configuration and the manifestation; but whether *the* causal relation is the one phrenologists have assigned is not proved by such observations; and should any one unequivocal exception be observed, it alone would suffice to prove that *the* relation was still to seek. This is a verdict of inductive Logic which has been strangely disregarded both by phrenologists and their opponents. The opponents of phrenology are too apt to argue as if the exceptional cases destroyed the cases of observed correspondence; the advocates of phrenology almost universally argue as if the exceptions were simply unexplained phenomena by no means impugning the legitimacy of their principles. They cling to the facts of correspondence, and, aware of the logical error of their opponents, aware that no amount of exceptional cases can destroy the evidence which proves *a* causal relation, have overlooked the equally imperative conclusion that one exceptional case points to an incompleteness in the generalisation; and where the exceptions are numerous the incompleteness must be great.

Now nothing is more certain than that observation in daily life, and observation of remarkable cases, disclose numerous and striking exceptions. The writings of anti-phrenologists abound in such. I will here mention but one, that of Mangiamale, the calculating boy, an excellent account of which is to be found in the work named below.\* He was the

\* LOUIS PIESSE : *La Médecine et les Médecins*, 1857. From my review of this work in *Blackwood's Magazine*, December, 1857, in an article entitled 'Phreno-

son of a Sicilian shepherd, and from infancy had given signs of a remarkable calculating power, although he had not been taught arithmetical methods, nor indeed anything of the science of Number. He was entirely self-taught; yet the rapidity with which he solved the most intricate arithmetical problems without the aid of graphic signs, was marvellous, and astounded the Académie des Sciences. Here was entirely a crucial instance for Phrenology: a faculty so exceptional in its vigour must have a corresponding development of its organ. But what was the fact? Instead of an eminence on that part of the skull assigned to the organ of Number, there was an absolute *depression*. The fact was admitted by the phrenologists; and indeed was too patent to be disputed: but Broussais and Dumortier endeavoured to evade it by affirming that Mangiamele had, in reality, no special development of the faculty of Number, he effected his marvellous feats of calculation by—genius, imagination, and extraordinary powers of induction and generalisation! The dilemma here is formidable; either the boy could subtract, divide, and multiply with astonishing rapidity and precision by means of his Causality, Comparison, Eventuality, Individuality (the organs invoked to explain his manifestations), in which case the organ of Number, established by Gall, on examination of heads of celebrated calculators, is a fiction and a superfluity, the functions being performed by other organs; or one organ may take upon itself vicariously the function of another, and all phrenological observation becomes doubtful. A man destitute of Tune may thus enchant the ears of Europe by means of his Causality; another may fill his house with the squalling children of his neighbours by the operation of his Comparison or Individuality. We can never say to what organ any action is due; and all the phrenological cases are discredited, on such a supposition. George Bidder is always cited as a clenching case of correspondence between calculating power and the configuration assigned to

logy in France,' I have borrowed the account in the text. In the same article there are other striking cases.

Number. So far good. But now comes the case of Mangiamele, with powers not less remarkable, and on his skull there is a depression instead of an elevation. That is to say, the faculty is present in the absence of the organ—or, to speak more accurately, the faculty is enormous where the organ is unusually small.

Another and still more convincing example is that of the cerebellum assigned as the organ of amateness, and considered by phrenologists to be one of the best established organs in their scheme, founded upon numerous facts of comparative anatomy, pathology, and common observation. It is only necessary to interrogate the works of comparative anatomists, physiologists, and pathologists, to see that the disproof of this hypothesis is overwhelming. What the functions of the cerebellum are, we do not know as yet; but one thing we positively know, and that is, that it is *not* the organ of sexual desire.\*

I might take each organ in turn, and show that against the facts phrenologists adduce in its favour, an array of facts can be adduced against it, sufficient, if not to disprove altogether the cranioscopic hypothesis, at any rate to throw such doubt upon it as to be reconciled only by a rational explanation, which must come from a true psychological law. The rational explanation would either show the exceptional facts to be perturbations of the law; and these perturbations might or might not admit of reduction to some subsidiary law; or it would show that the generalisation itself was imperfect. In any case the facts observed preserve their value; both the facts against, and the facts in favour of the generalisation. That the counterfacts invoked by anti-phrenologists are not always of the nature of perturbations, but of direct contradictions, may be readily shown. Although inductive Logic refuses

\* Even M. BOUILLAND, who accepts GALL's principles, but is unable to see the evidence for the localisations, and consequently rejects Cranioscropy, has recently declared, 'quant à la localisation de l'instinct de la génération dans le cervelet, je suis un de ceux qui l'ont combattue de la manière la plus résolue, mais toujours en respectant le principe fondamental de la pluralité et de la spécialité des organes cérébraux.' *Bulletin de l'Acad. de Médecine*, avril 1865, p. 586.

to conclude against the cases of correspondence simply on the ground of cases of non-correspondence (perturbations), it forces us to conclude on the ground of direct contradiction. Let us consider the case of Mangiamele. Fifty examples of the organ of Number largely developed, without corresponding activity of the functional manifestation, would not disturb the value of the observed correspondences; for these imperfect manifestations may have been due to various perturbing causes. But one case of the presence of an unusual activity of the function in the absence of the organ, or rather in a remarkable deficiency of the organ, is a direct contradiction of the supposed relation between the function and the organ; and leads either to a relinquishment of the hypothesis, or dissolves the very basis on which phrenology is erected. For if functions can be active where the corresponding organs are deficient, or if one organ can take on the function of another, cranioscopical indication is fallacious.

It is, therefore, simply on the ground of non-correspondence with fact, as observed roughly in common, and as rigorously tested by the more precise methods of science, that Cranioscopy has failed to gain general acceptance. Phrenologists have collected cases with great assiduity; these present an imposing array; but scientific scepticism brought to their examination discloses fatal discrepancies. I say nothing of the loose way in which many of the phrenological facts are determined, though this alone would greatly diminish their presumptive value: \* it is enough that daily observation,

\* 'Au lieu d'employer le mètre et la balance dans un ordre de faits qui le comporteraient si bien, Gall et Spurzheim ont toujours et leurs partisans ont presque toujours préféré la simple inspection. Les mots "plus grand, plus petit, énormément développé, il est facile de voir," se retrouvent à chacune de leurs pages, mots très-expressifs pour les hommes prévenus, mais qui dans la réalité n'ont le plus souvent aucune valeur.' LEURET: *Anatomie comparée du Système nerveux*, i. p. 430. To the same effect PARCHAPPE: *Recherches sur l'Encephale*, 1838, i. p. 10. The credulity of phrenologists is at times quite naïve. Gall mentions the case of a bookseller born blind, who had nevertheless, by means of his organ of colour, precise notions of the distinction and harmony of colours (*Fonctions*, v. p. 85); and Mr. George Combe, not in the least sceptical of such a 'fact,' records that he also knew 'a blind man who distinguished colours with great accuracy by means of touch' (*Phrenology*, p. 413). Could not Mr. Combe

practising the *same* loose methods of determination, constantly alights on glaring discrepancies; and that scientific observation, guided by precise methods, uniformly discredits the phrenological localisations.

But Cranioscopy might be true, or sufficiently true to warrant the acceptance of its facts of correspondence between cranial configuration and mental manifestations, yet Phrenology, or the Physiology of the Brain which has hitherto formed its scientific basis, might be very far from true. Gall indeed supposed otherwise. He maintained that it was purely by cranioscopic indications we could determine the cerebral functions.\* Unless the organs were all situated at the surface of the brain, and (note this point!) *were limited within the superficial limits*, Cranioscopy could be no more than Physiognomy, a rough indication of general conditions, not an anatomical guide to functions. In other words, the basis of Phrenology rests on four positions:

1. That the grey matter of the convolutions is the organic substance of all psychical actions.
2. That no other part of the nervous system has any essential connection with the mind.
3. That each distinct faculty has its distinct organ.
4. That each organ is a limited area of grey matter.

Of these four fundamental positions, only the third is true, and even that is left in vagueness, for Gall nowhere determines what constitutes a Faculty, he nowhere describes an Organ with anatomical precision. When the occasion presented itself he was contented with vaguely saying: 'I call an organ the material condition which renders the exercise or manifestation of a faculty possible.'† He held—and in this he opposed the materialist opinion—that faculties were spiritual powers which were *manifested* by means of material organs, but were in no sense the *products* of the organs.

detect the difference between distinguishing colours and distinguishing coloured objects? the one being beyond the sense of touch, the other being simply fineness of touch.

\* *Fonctions*, iii. pp. 2, 4.

† *Ibid.* i. 292.



'The muscles and bones,' he said, 'are the material conditions of movement, but they are not the faculty which causes movement; the *ensemble* of the organisation of the eye is the material condition of sight, but is not the faculty of sight. I call the material condition which renders possible the manifestation of a moral quality or an intellectual faculty *an organ of the soul*. I say that man in this life thinks and wills by means of the brain; but if any one concludes that the thinking willing being is the brain, or that the brain thinks and wills, this is as if he said the muscles are the faculty of movement, or that the organ of sight and the faculty of vision are one and the same.'\* Whence it appears that his conception of Faculty was as vague as his conception of Organ. But even on his own principles it was manifestly absurd to define an organ as the material conditions, and then to restrict these conditions to one small area of the surface of the brain.

Thus only one of his four positions can be accepted as true; the other three are all more or less false. If it is mainly to Gall's impulsion that science owes the definite notions which enable us to reject his hypothesis, we must pay him our tribute even while rejecting his views. There is nothing derogatory to him in asserting that his knowledge of the nervous system was incomplete, and that he had very imperfect notions of what, strictly speaking, constituted an Organ. On the latter point, Biology is still without a satisfactory definition; and many biologists confound *properties of tissue* with *functions of organs*. Having made this general remark, I will proceed to show, briefly, yet it is to be hoped conclusively, the untenableness of Gall's cerebral views.

1. *The grey matter of the convolutions.* 'L'on sait que les fonctions, propres à chaque système de nerfs, sont réalisées dans leur expansion périphérique; or j'ai démontré que les circonvolutions du cerveau ne sont autre chose que l'expan-

\* *Fonctions*, ii. 232.

périphérique des faisceaux dont il se compose ; par conséquent, les circonvolutions du cerveau doivent être reconnues sur les parties où s'exercent les instincts, les sentimens, les passions, les talens, en général les forces morales et intellectuelles.\*

Passing for the present all consideration of the second position, which excludes every other portion of the nervous system, and limits psychical functions to the convolutions of cerebrum and cerebellum, I remark that Gall altogether fails to seize the distinction between functions and properties of the brain, and consequently makes no attempt to define each cerebral organ, beyond the limitation of a given superficial area in an *uniform* substance. The *properties* of the velvet (to recur to our former illustration) depend on the structure of the velvet ; the *uses* to which that velvet is put are in no way determined by the *folds* in the velvet, but by the *connections* of each part with other parts : thus the skirt, bodice, sleeves, wristbands, and waistband, are various distinct parts of the velvet dress, but the properties of the velvet do not vary with this variation of the uses which they subserve. It is the same with the grey matter of the brain : that also is an uniform substance, variously folded into convolutions, and variously connected with different parts of the organism ; the special *property* of this uniform substance is Sensibility ; the special *functions* subserved by it, depend upon its organic connections. In connection with the various Senses, its functions will be perceptions of Sight, Sound, Touch, Smell, Taste. In connection with visceral organs, its functions will be perceptions of systemic sensations. In connection with muscular organs, its functions will be volitional. The brain has often been compared to a galvanic battery. Let us repeat the comparison. On the ends of the two conducting wires, two pieces of charcoal are fixed, and the result is the electric light ; the two conductors are placed in a solution, and the result is a chemical decomposition ; the two con-

\* *Fonctions*, ii. p. 13.

ductors are placed in a mixture of gases, and the result is a chemical composition; the conductors are placed in relation with a telegraphic apparatus, and the result is a transmission of a message from one country to another. But all these various results have been due to the various *applications* of the electric force, they have not been due to varieties in the battery. By no inspection of the battery could these results have been divined; by no numeration of the several galvanic couples could these phenomena have been discriminated. The phenomena did not wholly depend on the plates of zinc and copper; they did not at all depend upon the relative positions of those couples in the battery; yet to enumerate the various convolutions of the cerebrum, and affix to each, and to separate areas of each, the various functions of the mind, is as unscientific as to assign the electric light to one couple, the telegraph to another, and the chemical decomposition to a third couple, irrespective of their connections.

Of this Gall had no suspicion. As I have said, he had the vaguest ideas of what constituted an organ; and although he declared, and truly declared, that the faculties, being separate, required separate organs, he nowhere endeavours to demonstrate a cerebral organ. At one time he seems to consider it a bundle of fibres; at another a single fibre. That it could be *neither* he never suspected. 'Le cerveau consistant en plusieurs divisions dont les fonctions sont totalement différentes, il existe plusieurs faisceaux primitifs, qui par leur développement contribuent à le produire conformément aux lois auxquelles obéissent les autres systèmes . . . nous rangeons parmi les faisceaux les pyramides antérieures et postérieures, les faisceaux qui sortent immédiatement des corps olivaires, et encore quelques autres.'\* Granting the hypothesis, we should have to remark first, that the bundles were too few for the seven-and-twenty faculties; and secondly, that these bundles are not to be discriminated on the area of the convolutions. Subsequently, he was disposed to regard every

\* GALL: *Anat. et Physiol. du Système nerveux*, i. p. 271. To the same effect SPURZHEIM: *Observations sur la Phrénologie*, pp. 74, 94.

fibre in the nerves, or in the brain, as a little organ by itself.\* The conception of a fibre or a bundle of fibres constituting an organ, will surprise the philosophic biologist.

It seems to me, that the objection which arises from the preceding exposition is fatal to Gall's scheme. He affirmed that the brain was not a single organ having a single function, but a complex unity of various organs having diverse functions. He established this position by a large array of evidence. But when he came to take the next step, and assign each function to its particular organ in the brain, he was wholly without a principle of determination, he neither conceived steadily what an organ was, nor attempted anatomically to discriminate the parts of the brain that each organ involved.† Considering that there are some sixty distinct parts in the whole encephalon, each of which has received its distinct name, we were surely in need of a guide which would lead us amid the labyrinth, and point out which parts were severally grouped into distinct organs? Gall, who revolutionised the mode of dissecting the brain, had no better guide than what cranial configurations might suggest. The internal structure of this eminently complex apparatus was to be disregarded; and our attention fixed on the variations of the surface. One might as reasonably explain the mechanism of the clock by the position of the figures on its dial.

The subject of the convolutions is one which might furnish an instructive chapter, did space permit; but I must content myself with affirming that the researches of anatomists have disproved every point advanced by Gall. Curiously enough, M. Camille Dareste has placed beyond dispute the fact, that

\* *Fonctions*, i. p. 64.

† M. PARCHAPPE has well remarked, 'Il est singulier que Gall, tout en perfectionnant l'anatomie du système nerveux par d'importants travaux qui constituent son titre scientifique le plus glorieux, n'ait pas fait porter ses recherches sur les points qui eussent précisément pu servir à vérifier la légitimité de son système, s'il avait pu démontrer que la périphérie des hémisphères cérébraux se décompose effectivement en organes distincts, correspondant aux fonctions distinctes dont il admettait l'existence.' *Bulletin de l'Acad. de Médecine*, mai 1865, p. 684.

the number and depth of the convolutions bear *no* direct proportion to the development of intelligence, whereas they *do* bear a direct proportion to the size of the animal. Thus, given the size of the animal in any genus, and he can predict what are its convolutions; or *vice versa*, given the convolutions, and he can predict the size of the animal. 'Toutes les espèces à cerveau lisse ont une petite taille; toutes les espèces à circonvolutions nombreuses et compliquées sont, au contraire, de grande taille.' \*

In a word, the convolutions cannot be accepted as the 'organs' of the faculties; nor even as correctly indicating the organs. They are simply forms of an uniform tissue; this tissue has a peculiar property, Sensibility, which applied in different connections serves various functions; but the *organs constituted out of these connected parts* are no more to be identified with the particular portions of the vesicular tissue which supply their Sensibility, than the telegraph is to be identified with the plates which supply its electricity. Thus it is that the area of convolution which in one man might be connected with a peculiar mechanism, in another might be so imperfectly connected with that mechanism, or might supply so imperfect a mechanism, that the results would be different or even opposed. Of this Cranioscopy can tell nothing. It is limited to the surface. And hence it is that the skull is considered sufficient evidence. The surface of the skull tells as much as the surface of the brain; as much and as little.

I will merely in passing observe, that the axiom of which so much use is made by phrenologists, 'other things equal, size is the measure of power,' though indisputable, is fallacious, since the 'other things' never are equal. If the external indications were expressions of the internal structure, size would be a measure of power, and Cranioscopy a guide to character: unhappily it is not so.

Let us now pass to the second position on which Phre

\* *Annales des Sciences naturelles*, 3ème série, xvii. 30, and 4ème série, i. 73.

nology is based, that the cerebrum only is the seat of the psychical faculties. Gall has here the vast majority of biologists on his side. There is scarcely one teacher in a hundred who does not declare the Brain, and the Brain exclusively, to be the organ of the mind. I have elsewhere\* marshalled abundant facts and arguments in disproof of this illogical and obstructive hypothesis; but for the present it is enough to point out that Gall was in opposition to his own principles when he thus limited the seat of psychical faculties. In opposition to logic, for he thereby implied that community of structure did not carry community of property: implied that ganglia in one part of the system had not the same Sensibility as ganglia in another. In opposition to zoological observation, for he thereby implied that the instincts and propensities exhibited by animals with brains could not be manifested by animals without brains, whereas it is notorious that the instinct of propagation, the instinct of destructiveness, the instinct of constructiveness, and others, are manifested by animals having no brains, nothing but simple ganglia.

He had indeed a glimpse of the logical error when he was treating of the grey substance of the convolutions as the origin of the nerves, for he there asks, 'pourquoi auroit-elle dans le cerveau une destination différente de celle qu'elle a dans les autres systèmes nerveux?'† Had he not been misled by his hypothesis of the nutritive office of the vesicular substance (long since refuted), and had he conceived Sensibility as the property of this tissue, he would have reversed his question and asked, 'Why has this tissue Sensibility in the convolutions, and not in every other ganglionic mass?'

\* *Physiology of Common Life*, vol. ii. RUDOLPH WAGNER finds himself compelled by the evidence of experiment to retract his former views and to admit the existence of psychical manifestations in the absence of the brain. 'Je reconnais même qu'un certain nombre de phénomènes psychiques persistent chez les pigeons auxquels on a enlevé le cerveau, le cervelet, et une partie du mésocéphale.' *Broun-Séguard's Journal de la Physiologie*, 1861, iv. 551. My experiments on reptiles and insects showed the persistence of psychical manifestations after the head had been cut off.

† GALL: *Anat. et Phys.* i. 242.

Gall's principles demanded that the subjective analysis should correspond with the biological analysis, and that mental manifestations should be affiliated on the physical organs; but his Cranioscopy could not accommodate itself to such a procedure: it demanded that the brain should be the exclusive seat of the psychical faculties, and that the surface of the brain should in its varieties reveal the organs of those faculties.

If the reader has followed these few pages with assent, he will see that the basis of Phrenology is laid on shifting sand; and that if men of science have long since declined to occupy themselves with the hypothesis, it is because the alleged facts of Cranioscopy are not found to be sufficiently accurate and general to warrant confidence in that Art, and because the Psychology and Physiology which Gall and his successors offer us, are neither reconcilable with psychological analysis nor with the present condition of Anatomy and Physiology.\*

The course of our History now leads us to the important movement in Germany, which, begun by Kant, ran a rapid and brilliant career till it came to a crisis in the Hegelian school. I have placed Gall before Kant, although chronology is thereby somewhat disturbed, in order that from Kant the course of evolution might be followed without interruption.

\* Space has not permitted the citation of a tithe of the arguments and observations which discredit Phrenology. The student is referred to LÉLUT: *Réjet de l'Organologie*, and his subsequent work *La Physiologie de la Pensée*, for conclusive examples against the special localisations; also to PIÉSSER, *La Médecine et les Médecins*. With regard to Anatomy and Physiology almost any and every modern work may be consulted; but LEURET and GRATIOTET, *Anatomie comparée du Système nerveux*; or WAGNER, *Neurologische Untersuchungen*, may be specially named, the former abounding in facts drawn from comparative anatomy, which admit of no escape.

## NINTH EPOCH.

*Recurrence to the fundamental question respecting the  
Origin of Knowledge.*

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## CHAPTER I.

KANT.

## § I. LIFE OF KANT.

**I**MMANUEL KANT was born at Königsberg, in Prussia, 22nd of April, 1724. His family came originally from Scotland, and changed their name of Cant into Kant to suit the German pronunciation. This Scottish origin, when taken in conjunction with his philosophical connection with Hume, has some little interest. His father was a saddler, a man of tried integrity. His mother was somewhat severe, but upright, speaking the truth, and exacting it. Kant was early bred in a love of truth; and had before him such examples of moral worth as must materially have contributed to form his own inflexible principles.

Madame de Staël has remarked, that there is scarcely another example, except in Grecian history, of a life so vigorously philosophical as that of Kant. He lived to a great age, and never once quitted the walls of murky Königsberg. Here he passed a calm and happy existence, meditating, reflecting, and writing. He had mastered all the sciences; he had studied languages, and cultivated literature. He lived and died a type of the German Professor: he rose, he ate, he drank his coffee, wrote, lectured, took his daily walk



always at precisely the same hour. The cathedral clock, it was said, was not more punctual in its movements than Immanuel Kant.\*

He was early sent to the University. There he began and there he ended his career. Mathematics and physics principally occupied his attention at first; and the success with which he pursued these studies soon manifested itself in various publications. He predicted the existence of the planet Uranus; and Herschel himself, after discovering it, admitted Kant's having first announced it.

But none of these publications attracted much attention till the renown of his *Critique of Pure Reason* had made everything produced by him a matter of interest. Nor did the *Critique* itself attract notice at first. The novelty of its views, the repulsiveness of its terminology and style, for some time obscured its real value. This value was at length discovered and made known. All Germany rang with praises of the new philosophy. Almost every 'chair' was filled by a Kantist. Numberless books and not a few pamphlets came rapidly from the press, either attacking or defending the principles of the Critical Philosophy. Kant had likened himself to Copernicus. The disciples likened him both to Copernicus and Newton, declaring that he had not only changed the whole science of Metaphysics, as Copernicus changed the science of Astronomy, but had also consummated the science he originated.

The *Critique* was, he tells us, the product of twelve years' meditation. It was written in less than nine months. These two facts sufficiently explain the defects of its composition. In his long meditations he had elaborated his system, divided and subdivided it, and completed its heavy and useless terminology. In the rapidity of composition he had no time for the graces of style, nor for that all-important clearness of structure which (depending as it does upon the due gradation of the parts, and upon the clearness with which the parts

\* He mentions having once been kept two or three days from his promenade, by reading Rousseau's *Emile*, which had just appeared.

themselves are conceived) may be regarded as the great desideratum of a philosophical style.

But in spite of these defects—defects which would have been pardoned by no public but a German public—the *Critique* became celebrated, and its author had to endure the penalty of celebrity. He was pestered with numerous calls of curious strangers, who would not leave Königsberg without having seen him. To the curious were added the admiring. Enthusiastic scholars undertook long journeys to see their great master. Professor Reus one day walked into his study, saying brusquely that ‘he had travelled a hundred and sixty miles to see and speak with Kant.’ The visits became so numerous, that in the latter part of his life he contented himself with merely showing himself at the door of his study for a few minutes.

Kant never spoke of his own system, and from his house the subject was entirely banished. He scarcely read any of the attacks on his works: he had enough of Philosophy in his study and lecture-room, and was glad to escape from it to the topics of the day.

He died on the 12th of February, 1804, in the eightieth year of his age, retaining his powers almost to the last. He latterly, during his illness, talked much of his approaching end. ‘I do not fear death,’ he said, ‘for I know how to die. I assure you that if I knew this night was to be my last, I would raise my hands, and say “God be praised!” The case would be far different if I had ever caused the misery of any of his creatures.’

A picture of Kant’s daily habits, and many interesting traits of his character, will be found in the works named below.\* I cannot find space for such details; nor for more

\* BOROWSKI : *Darstellung des Lebens und Charakter Immanuel Kant’s*, 1804 : a biography revised by KANT himself, though not published during his lifetime. WASIANSKI : *Immanuel Kant in seinem letzten Lebensjahre*, 1804. This has been reproduced by DE QUINCEY : *Works*, iii., ‘Last Days of Immanuel Kant,’ where the English reader will do well to seek it. SCHUBERT : *Kant’s Biographie* in the edition of Kant’s works by ROSENKRANZ and SCHUBERT. Perhaps the best of all the biographies is that in KUNO FISCHER : *Geschichte der neuen Philosophie*, two large volumes of which are devoted to Kant.

than a passing mention of Kant's relation to Swedenborg, of which such unjustifiable use is often made by the admirers of the latter, who proclaim with emphasis, that Kant testified to the truth of Swedenborg's *clairvoyance*. He did nothing of the kind. In his *Letter on Swedenborg*\* he narrates two of the *reported* cases of Swedenborg's *clairvoyance*, and says he knows not how to disprove them, they being supported by such respectable testimony; but he nowhere testifies to them himself; and in the *Träume eines Geistersehers*, no less than in the *Anthropologie*, §§ 35 and 37,† his energetic contempt for Swedenborgianism and all other *Schwärmerei* is unequivocally expressed.

It is nearly a hundred years since the *Kritik* was published, and philosophers not only still meditate on it, but dispute as to the meaning of its cardinal passages. One is tempted to suspect that much of its fascination lies in its obscurity. Students first repelled are next attracted by it; piqued into vanquishing the difficulty, they end by overvaluing their conquest. When translated into the language of European thought, I believe Kant's special contributions are nowadays of slight value, and that his psychology almost everywhere must be rejected; hence I cannot withstand the conclusion, that had he written intelligibly he would seldom now be read. Be this as it may, his style is positively disgraceful. Speaking from a tolerably extensive acquaintance with such literature, I can name no other work of real power (and the power of the *Kritik* is titanic) which exhibits a like disregard of every condition of style. Its terminology, though repulsive, may have been advantageous; but its composition is inexcusable. The sentences are long, clumsy, involved; the separate clauses are seldom well constructed, and they are thrown together rather than logically subordinated. But this is not all. The phraseology is approximative when it needs sharp precision, and is vacillating to a

\* *Kleine anthropologische Schriften* (Theil vii. p. 5, ed. ROSENKRANZ).

† Zweite Abtheil. p. 89 sq. On this subject of SWEDENBORG see the full and interesting discussion in KUNO FISCHER, III. 227 sq.

remarkable degree. 'Kant,' says Mr. Mahaffy, 'honestly confesses in the conclusion of his second preface, that he feels he has no power of expressing himself clearly; and true to his word he always thinks he is explaining a matter by talking about it, and going round it, and enforcing it by mere variation of language; and yet in most cases his first statement is by far the best.' The great thinkers, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Hume, subtle as they were, had sufficient mastery of language to present their thoughts in a style that was at once intelligible and engaging. Their profundity was clear depth. To find a companion for the *Kritik* we must go back to the work of the great geometer Archimedes, whose propositions require to be read over and over again before the student seizes the meaning that is to be demonstrated, and whose demonstrations puzzle even the mathematician to follow. Kant defends himself in one place by assuming that it is the absence of a popular and entertaining style which causes the *Kritik* to be dipped into and not read; and he has a ready retort against the philosophic student who should demand entertainment.\* But the reason lay deeper; and the proof is manifest in the controversies which from the first appearance of the work down to our own day, have been 'carried on by professed Kantists respecting his meaning. In spite of all the study and all the commentaries, professors of eminence, even in this year 1870, are writing angry pamphlets against each other respecting the interpretation of Kant's views on Space and Time; † and if Germans thus fail, what chance is there for Englishmen and Frenchmen?

So little *composition* is there in the *Kritik* that a contro-

\* *Prolegomena zu jeder künftigen Metaphysik.* Werke, iii. 172, ed. HARTENSTEIN, 1838. This is the edition I cite from, unless when the exception is specially mentioned.

† TRENDLENBURG, the editor of Aristotle and author of the very remarkable *Logische Untersuchungen*, accused KUNO FISCHER, the philosopher and historian, of misunderstanding Kant. Replies followed replies. Comp. KUNO FISCHER's second edition of the work on Kant; TRENDLENBURG's pamphlet: *Kuno Fischer und sein Kant. Eine Entgegnung*, 1869; and FISCHER's pamphlet: *Anti-Trendelenburg. Eine Duplik*, 1870. After this GRAPENGIESSER entered into the fray in a spirited pamphlet: *Kant's Lehre von Raum und Zeit*. Jan. 1870. A stroke of paralysis probably prevented Trendelenburg from continuing the dispute.

versy has arisen, and is yet far from settled, respecting the changes in doctrine, as well as in exposition, introduced in the second edition of the *Kritik*. Michelet, Schopenhauer, and Kuno Fischer affirm a radical change; Ueberweg and Mr. Mahaffy affirm complete consistency.\*

Kant never writes well; but he is intelligible in other works, and repulsive only in the *Kritik*. On this account, and on others, the student is advised to leave that work in peace until he has, from other sources, mastered the Kantian principles; which may easily be done by some such course as this: Beginning with Mr. Mansel's *Prolegomena Logica*, and Victor Cousin's *Leçons sur Kant*, he may take in hand Apelt's *Metaphysik*, which reproduces the Kantian ideas in a clear style; he is then fitted for Kant's *Prolegomena*, which is a popular exposition expressly written to make the *Kritik* intelligible.†

## § II. THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

Defective as a writer, as a thinker Kant was one of the most searching and revolutionary. He produced a deep and agitating impression on the mind of Europe that can only be fitly compared with the French Revolution. Both influences were great and admirable in destruction, without carrying in them the seeds of reconstruction. Both were culminations of anarchical tendencies. Both embodied the

\* KUNO FISCHER: *Commentary on Kant's Kritik*. Translated by J. P. MAHAFFY, 1866. (This excellent translation of the chapters of FISCHER's work which relate to the *Kritik*, is enriched with acute annotations, and should be consulted by every student of KANT.) UEBERWEG: *De priore et posteriore forma Kantianæ Criticæ Rationis Puræ*, 1861, and *System der Logik*, 1865.

† 'It describes the way in which Kant reached his discoveries. It shows the whole critical investigation in its natural untrammelled course, and therefore not only shows us but facilitates our view of the inner construction of the critical philosophy.' KUNO FISCHER, *op. cit.* 24. This work, which would be easily intelligible to the English public, has not found a translator, whereas the *Kritik*, on all grounds repulsive, has been several times translated. I shall occasionally avail myself of the version by Mr. MEIKLEJOHN published in *Bohn's Philosophical Library*. (I refer to it as *The Critick of Pure Reason*, sometimes simply the *Critick*.) It is not always accurate, and Mr. MAHAFFY who has examined it, is sometimes severe in condemnation of it; but the enormous difficulty of translating German philosophical language into English equivalents should make us grateful for the effort and reluctant to find fault.

of the travail of centuries. And as the Revolution gave a new aspect to European politics, so Kant gave a new aspect to European Metaphysics. Yet there was nothing novel in his Method. There was little that was ab-  
new in his conclusions.

It will be many readers surprised at this statement, es-

Germans, and students of German Philosophy. Hegel, for example, whose opinions I never lightly  
; and whose History displays great flexibility of  
it no less than comprehensive knowledge, opens his  
I Kant with the remark that among all systems none  
little in common with its forerunners as the Kantian.  
added a thoroughly new Philosophy, one which essen-  
d nothing in common with any predecessor. By this,  
means that Kant's object was different from that of  
r thinkers, and that his Method was novel. Prede-  
regarded Philosophy as an explanation of things, a  
e of the Cosmos. In the course of evolution the  
ar sciences emerged, each of which gave its explana-  
the group of things which it treated of. Science  
d itself from Metaphysics, and Experience set Specu-  
side, as troublesome, if not futile. From this moment  
of philosophical problem was, What is the relation  
ulation to Experience? which implicitly contained  
stion: Has Speculation any authority at all in  
phy not derived from Experience? Leibnitz en-  
ed to reconcile the two. He was at once meta-  
n and man of science; a master in both; but his  
rested upon metaphysics. His differential calculus  
ed in his metaphysical law of continuity; his dis-  
of the measure of force rested on his conception of  
n. The metaphysical bias was so dominant in his  
that his scholars separated Speculation from Ex-  
e, and the Wolfian School constructed a purely  
Cosmology and rational Psychology.

Kant appeared, who regarded the true position of  
phy to be that of an independent science which stood

in relation to all the separate sciences, as these stand to their objects. Thus was the controversy between Science and Metaphysics reconciled. Philosophy, in this view, ceased to be an explanation of things, to become an explanation of our knowledge of things, 'it became a necessary science, since it explained a fact which needed explanation no less than every other fact; at the same time it became a *new* science, for it explained a fact hitherto inexplicable.' The hitherto inexplicable fact being, How is Experience possible? When a physicist seeks the explanation of a physical fact, he seeks the conditions under which it arises, the forces of which it is the outcome. Thus proceeded Kant: he sought the conditions of human knowledge, the forces out of which alone it could arise. His philosophy was everywhere and wholly *critical*; it stood in relation to the *dogmatical* as Optics stands to Vision, as Acoustics to Hearing.

Had not Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Condillac also seen that to explain our knowledge, the conditions must be investigated? Fischer is by no means disposed to deny it, but he objects that these were mere efforts, and imperfect efforts, Kant alone chose the right way, and a new way. They placed themselves at the wrong point of view; and no straining of the eye will enable us to see what lies outside the sphere of vision. They fancied they explained the facts of Cognition, but the grounds which they advanced were themselves cognitive. The true standing point was discovered by Kant in the simple truth that if Cognition is to be explained at all it must be through conditions which precede Cognition, and cannot therefore be detected either in Experience or in Reason. This is the egg of Columbus.

Hegel objects to Kant's 'insisting on our learning to swim before venturing into the water.' Fischer properly retorts that Kant's object was not to learn swimming, but to explain it. We can speak without knowledge of grammar; think, without knowledge of logic; see, without knowledge

of optics; live, without knowledge of physiology; but are these sciences, therefore, superfluous? And what these sciences are to their objects, the critical science is to Cognition. Hegel's objection is answered; but the dim sense of contradiction which prompted it was grounded on a true feeling of a fallacy in Kant's procedure. Of this fallacy more anon; let us pursue Fischer's exposition.

Bacon, without positively denying that we could know the supra-sensible, assigned to Metaphysics a sort of convent-life removed from Physics, and tended by those sterile virgins, Final Causes. Locke limited knowledge to sensibles. Berkeley followed in the same direction. Hume came to destroy even this ground of certitude. Experience can give no absolute certainty, for all judgments to be absolute must be identical, and no judgment founded on experience can be analytical. Mathematical judgments are true, because analytical; all others are dubious, because synthetical. Kant agrees with Locke that knowledge of things in themselves is impossible, there can be no metaphysic of the supra-sensible. He agrees with Berkeley that all our knowledge is knowledge of phenomena which are only our ideas. He agrees with Hume in the division of judgments into analytic and synthetical; and that all judgments of Experience are synthetic; and that it is impossible to explain either by Experience or Reason how one thing can be the cause of another.

Having thus followed Kuno Fischer through the forty-five pages in which he defends his thesis of Kant's entire originality, I must repeat my assertion that there was nothing new in the Method. The problem he undertook to solve was the problem we have seen constantly presented in modern philosophy: Have we any ideas independent of Experience? The attempts to solve it have been exhibited in the chapters on Locke, Hume, Condillac, Reid, and Gall. All agree in declaring Experience the sole source of ideas; yet since this principle led to Scepticism, there only seemed an escape in Common Sense. Kant declined the refuge of



Common Sense.\* While all agreed that Experience was the source of knowledge, he propounded the question: What is Experience? What are its constituents?

It cannot justly be said that Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Condillac, and Reid did not examine into the origin of knowledge, and set forth what they conceived to be the constituent elements of Experience. If Kant proposed a novel theory of these constituents, assuredly the attempt to furnish a theory was in nowise novel; and I cannot accept his statement, which one so often hears echoed, that his conception of a criticism of the understanding was entirely original. To investigate the conditions of Experience had always been the labour of psychologists. To separate the *a priori* from the *a posteriori* elements in knowledge, had been the special industry of Descartes, Leibnitz, and all the upholders of Innate Ideas, Fundamental Laws of Thought, &c. No one had more emphatically than Leibnitz asserted that although knowledge begins with Sensation, it is not all derived from Sensation; but that in all Experience there is a quota furnished by the mind, and this quota is distinguishable by the character of universality and necessity. While there was in truth no novelty in Kant's undertaking, there was also no novelty in his Method. He followed the old path-way, and, analysing the Mind in its developed forms without going back to the earliest stages of development, wholly missed the true conditions of Experience. This Method is in striking contrast with that pursued by him in his luminous conception of a Cosmology, which has since been worked out by Laplace and others, and has taken its place in science as the Nebular Hypothesis. The problems were strictly analogous: Psychology was called upon to explain how Experience arose, how the Mind in all its varied phenomena, could be evolved out of biological conditions; Cosmology was called upon to explain how the Planetary

\* He said it was the notable invention of modern times whereby the emptiest noodle could place himself on a level with the profoundest thinker. *Prolegomena zu jeder künftigen Metaphysik.* Vorrede.

arose, whence its movements, why the planets had elliptical orbit and revolved on their axes, and why eccentricity of the orbit increased with the distance from the sun, so that the planetary course passed into cometary—these and all related questions had to be deduced from the mechanical laws discovered by Galileo, Kepler, and Newton. But while the problems were thus analogous, very divergent were the Methods. He wrote *Natural History of the Heavens*,\* but followed another method in his attempt at a *Natural History of Mind*. In

one case he fashions an hypothesis on strictly inductive and empirical data. He starts from the material objects in which nothing is present beyond the elementary substances, and their primitive forces of attraction and repulsion: out of these substances and these forces, as known to us, he constructs the universe known to us; they are the factors of which the planetary system is the product. An analogous procedure would have been to start from Sensibility with its elementary modes of combination, and to show how from these factors the familiar product was derived. As in the one case nothing but Matter and its

modes of action were to be admitted, so in the second case nothing but Sensibility and its modes of action should have been admitted; this would have given a theory of the conditions of Experience, this would have answered the question: How is Experience possible? which would have answered the question: How are synthetic judgments a priori possible? Instead of pursuing such a course, Kant begins by asking what is there which precedes Sensibility, what is there in Experience which is not given in Sense, but antecedent to it? He might as well have asked with the philosophers of old: And chaos whence?

In a word he pursued the old Metaphysical Method, instead of pursuing the Biological Method. I do not for the

\* *Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels, oder Versuch von der Verfassung und dem mechanischen Ursprunge des ganzen Weltgebäudes, nach mechanischen Grundsätzen abgehandelt.* Werke, viii. 217-232.

present appreciate the value of this procedure, nor of its results, but only point out that his claim to have originated a new inquiry and on a new Method cannot be accepted. The *à priori* elements which he is imagined to have discovered by analysis of Experience, are the familiar Innate Ideas, Laws of Thought, Native Dispositions of the Mind, under new aspects. Here, as elsewhere, his power is displayed; the old conceptions have a new precision, and with it a tenfold value, so that after Kant no one will probably return to the old forms. But his immense power of thought has not been directed by a novel Method, and in spite of his destruction of Metaphysical dogmas, in spite of his own scientific interest and culture, he remains the fountain-head of ceaseless streams and rivulets, pouring deviously into the shoreless ocean of speculation.

Before him the majority of philosophers failing to see, or positively refusing to see, that the conditions of Experience must be sought in the conditions of the organism, imagined they should find an explanation simply by interrogating Consciousness as Experience presented it. Kant set himself to isolate the two elements *à priori* and *à posteriori*, in the hope that he might thus analyse what was due to Experience from what preceded it.

On interrogating his Consciousness, he found that neither of the two ordinary explanations would account for the phenomena: certain ideas, such as Time, Space, Causality, etc., could not be resolved into Experience alone: nor, on the other hand, although *à priori*, could they be supposed absolutely independent of Experience, being as it were only the forms (necessary conditions) of Experience.

In this conception the existence of the two distinct factors is assumed. 'That all our knowledge begins with Experience,' he says, 'there can be no doubt. For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses, and partly of themselves produce representations (*Vorstellungen*), partly rouse our powers of understanding

its activity, to compare, to connect, or to separate these, and so to convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects which is called Experience? In respect of time, therefore, no knowledge of ours is antecedent to Experience, but begins with it. But although all our knowledge begins with Experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of Experience. For, on the contrary, it is quite possible that our empirical knowledge (*Erfahrungserkenntniss*) is a compound of that which we receive through impressions, and that which the faculty of cognition supplies from itself (sensuous impressions giving merely the *occasion*), an addition which we cannot distinguish from the original element given by sense, till long practice has made us attentive to and skilful in separating it. It is therefore a question which requires close investigation, and is not to be answered at first sight—whether there exists a knowledge altogether independent of Experience, and even of all sensuous impressions.\*

Kant compares the revolution he effected in Philosophy to the revolution Copernicus effected in Astronomy. He asks now it is that Mathematics and Physics have been perfected. Thales, or whoever he was, who first demonstrated the right-angled triangle, had a luminous conception; for he found that it was not by contemplating the figure before him or deducing its properties from his concept of the figure, but found that it was necessary to bring out these properties constructed by him *a priori*, and that to arrive at *a priori* certainty he must not attribute to the object any other properties than those necessarily deduced from the concept he had formed.†

Now this, which may be the legitimate process in Mathematics, is not only an illusory process in Physics, but is the process which was actually followed until the advance of the Objective Method came to discredit it for ever. Mathematics is deductive and *a priori*; and it was because the early physicists tried to construct their science on the same *a priori*

\* *Kritik: Einleitung.* (MEIKLEJOHN'S trans. p. i.)

† *Kritik: Vorrede zur zweiten Ausgabe*, p. 14.

method that they failed egregiously. Kant, referring to Galileo and Torricelli, affirms that they also proceeded on this Subjective Method. 'They learned that Reason only sees that which it produces according to its own scheme (*was sie selbst nach ihrem Entwürfe hervorbringt*); that it must advance with principles of judgment according to invariable laws *compelling Nature to answer its questions, and not allow itself to follow Nature's lead.*' Reason, in short, is to dictate to Nature as a master, not obey her as a pupil; and Physics, we are told, owes its revolution to this luminous idea! To make Metaphysics a progressive study, he conceived that a similar revolution was necessary. Hitherto men had assumed that knowledge should accommodate itself to external objects; he now proposed to reverse this procedure, and assume that objects obeyed the laws of knowledge.\*

He calls this system critical, because it is founded on an examination of our cognitive faculties, and compares his point of view with that of Copernicus. And the comparison is in so far just, that instead of constructing our knowledge of the world out of the two factors, Consciousness on the one hand, and the World on the other, he constructed the World out of Consciousness, and our knowledge out of the laws of Consciousness. Nevertheless his attempt to deduce the laws of the phenomenal world from the laws of mind, only gave greater precision to the attempt of Descartes to deduce the world from Consciousness; it was the same as the attempts of Leibnitz and Berkeley in Method; and the *result* was very much the result obtained by Hume, namely, that we can know nothing but our own ideas, we can never know things *per se*. Kant, after analysing the operations of the mind, discovered indeed certain principles of certitude; but he admitted that those principles could not be applied to things *beyond* the mind; and that all within the sphere of our cognition was more than phenomenal. He reviews his investigation,

\* 'Bisher nahm man an, alle unsere Erkenntniss müsse sich nach den Gegenständen richten . . . man versuche es daher einmal, dass wir annehmen, Gegenstände müssen sich nach unserer Erkenntniss richten.'—*Loc. cit.* p.

men, declaring that he has gone the round of the domain of human Understanding and measured it exactly, he is still forced to admit that the domain is only an island. Nature is assigned to it invariable limits. It is the empire of ruth; but it is surrounded by a stormy and illimitable sea, upon which we discover nothing but illusions. There, on that sea, the navigator, deceived by masses of ice which appear and disappear successively before him, believing that at every moment he is about to discover land, wanders without repose, aided only by one hope; he is the plaything of the stormy waves, always forming new plans, always preparing himself for new experiences, which he cannot renounce, and yet which he can never obtain.

To the Sceptic Kant says, 'No: experience is not a deceit; human Mind has its fixed laws, and those laws are true.'

To the Dogmatist he says, 'But this Mind can never know Things *per se*. It is occupied solely with its own ideas. It perceives only the Appearances of Things. How could it be possible to know Noumena? By stripping them of the forms which our Sensibility and Understanding have impressed upon them (*i.e.* by making them cease to be appearances). But to strip them of these forms, we must annihilate Consciousness—we must substitute for our Sensibility and Understanding, a faculty, or faculties, capable of perceiving things *per se*. This, it is obvious, we cannot do. Our only means of communication with objects are precisely this Sensibility and this Understanding, which give to objects the forms under which we know them.'

To the Dogmatist, therefore, Kant's reply is virtually the same as Hume's. He proves that the Mind, from the very nature of its constitution, cannot know Things *per se*. The question then arises, Have we any other Faculty capable of knowing Things *per se*? The answer is decisive, We have no such Faculty.

The difference between Hume and Kant, when deeply considered, is this:—Hume said that the Mind was treacherous,

and as such it rendered Philosophy impossible. Kant said that the Mind was not treacherous, but limited, it was to be trusted as far as it went, but it *could* not go far enough; it was so circumscribed that Ontology was impossible.

### § III. THE PRELIMINARY POSITIONS.

Ontology being impossible, Metaphysic reduces itself to the less ambitious yet still important position of the science of the necessary limitations of knowledge. It accompanies all sciences; the 'handmaiden of wisdom,' *die Begleiterin der Weisheit*, Kant names it. To found such a Metaphysic is the object of the 'Critique of Pure Reason.'

Two positions demand special scrutiny, because on them the whole edifice will be found to rest; if they are unsound the fabric totters, if they are indisputable the system is secure. These two fundamental positions are, the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments; and the distinction between *a priori* and *a posteriori* judgments. They have played a great part in modern Philosophy, and are illustrations of the tendency (already noted in our *Prolegomena*) to confuse questions of Morphology with questions of Anatomy, questions of Metaphysics with questions of Logic. Let us first see Kant's exposition:—

Analytic judgments are those which merely write out and explain our experience, but add nothing to our store (*Erläuterungsurtheile*); thus when we say that 'Body is extended,' or that a triangle is 'a figure with three sides,' the judgment is analytic: the attribute of extension being involved in our conception of Body, and the attribute of three-sidedness being involved in our conception of a triangle. But synthetic judgments predicate some attribute not involved in the conception of the object, and they extend our experience by this addition (*Erweiterungsurtheile*); as when we say that 'a straight line is the shortest path between two points,' the conception of a straight line not involving that of a shortest path; again, when we say 'all bodies are heavy,' the

judgment is synthetic because the predicate 'weight' is not a mere writing out of our conception of bodies, it is something added to that conception.

*A priori* judgments are those which are not derived from Experience, but belong to the native structure of the mind, which structure is one of the conditions (*Bedingungen*) of Experience, rendering it possible. *A posteriori* judgments are those derived from Experience: that is to say, products of the mind and external objects, the functions of these two coefficients.

A synthetic *a priori* judgment is one which Experience may confirm but cannot originate; as when we say that 'a straight line is the shortest path between two points,' which is a truth independent of Experience, having a necessity and universality which Experience cannot bestow; for although it may show how a straight line is in numerous cases the shortest path, it cannot show that there is absolutely nowhere a shorter path between two points. A synthetic *a posteriori* judgment is one resulting from our experience, as when we say: Gold is ductile, we must already know from experience that gold is ductile before we can predicate ductility of gold.

Such, in brief, is Kant's teaching. As a logical division, this of analytic and synthetic may have its uses; all well-marked distinctions, even if purely verbal, are aids to thought; but unhappily, like other aids, they become obstacles when their artificial nature is forgotten, and verbal differences are accepted as real. Such seems to me to have been the case here. Kant regards the distinction as the keystone of the arch. He admits that it can have little use elsewhere, but says that in reference to the criticism of human understanding it is indispensable.\*

Logically, analytic judgments are concepts, synthetic judgments are the union of concepts. But psychological

\* 'Diese Eintheilung ist in Ansehung der Kritik des menschlichen Verstandes unentbehrlich.'—*Prolegomena*, § 3, p. 181. 'No subject in modern speculation,' says HAMILTON, 'has excited an intenser interest.'—REID's *Works*, p. 787.



analysis displays the concept itself as a synthesis, namely, as the *integration of perceptions*, or their combination into a whole.\*

Psychologically, synthetic judgments are only analytic judgments *in the making*: they differ as a problem stated and a problem solved. A synthetic judgment becomes analytic as soon as its elements are integrated. Thus, that 'all bodies are extended' is now an analytic judgment, because now the definition of body includes extension. That 'all bodies are heavy' is equally analytic, equally a mere writing out of our concept of body and its attributes, equally included in the comprehensive definition of body; though it once was an extension of our experience, an addition to the concept. To the physicist, as Trendelenburg remarks, weight is as much a mark of the concept 'body,' as extension is to the mathematician.† Both extension and weight are predicates; the act of predication is the same mental process in one case as in the other. There may be some difficulty in recognising the synthetical nature of the predication where the elements have been so integrated that the proposition has become an identical one; but, let us take another example: 'Fire burns.' Is this analytic or synthetic? To us, with a large experience of fire, the proposition 'fire burns' is analytic—simply a verbal proposition: what we mean by 'fire' is a subject which among other predicates has this of burning; the burning is an integral part of our concept. But to a child, whose experience of fire is less, whose concept includes brightness and form, but not burning, the addition 'it burns' would be as much a synthesis, as the addition of weight to the concept of body is a synthesis.

Kant has himself given a similar example. 'Gold is yellow metal,' is analytic, he says, because 'to know this

\* Compare on this point UEBERWEG: *Logik*, § 83. HEGEL: *Encyclopädie*, § 239. *Logik*, iii. 270 seq. TRENDLENBURG: *Logische Untersuchungen*, ii. 237 seq.; and DELBŒUF: *Logique scientifique*, p. 103.

† TRENDLENBURG: *Logische Untersuchungen*, ii. 240.

I have no need of an enlargement of my experience; my concept of gold containing the elements of its yellowness and metallic nature, I have only to analyse this concept and need not seek further.\* In other words, an analytic judgment is the explication of a definition: it is what old logicians called an *essential*, and Locke a *verbal*, proposition. In the analysis of a whole into its parts, certain parts which had been concealed are brought to light. But this whole is itself a synthesis, and was originally put together. The metallic element was discovered in gold, and, once discovered, once put there, was for ever after kept there. The slow integration of experiences converts what was originally synthetic and inductive, into what is now analytic and deductive. The progress of science consists in the gradual integration of such experiences and the transformation of synthetic into analytic judgments, so that propositions which at first were hypothetical become at last truisms. In the pre-mathematical period the concept of a circle was that of a perfectly round line, or of a space bounded on all sides by a line returning on itself. No one will say that it was a mere writing out of this concept when mathematicians discovered that every point in this line is equally distant from a point in the centre; yet this was, we see, involved in the nature of a circle, though assuredly not in the concept then formed of a circle. Now such a judgment is analytic. Further, when mathematicians enlarged their concept by the discovery of another property of circles, namely, that the length of their circumferences is to the length of their diameter in the approximate ratio of 3.14159 to 1, this was a synthesis which rapidly became integrated, and we now see that it is involved in the nature of a circle.

A judgment is *ampliative* only so long as it is hypothetical; no sooner is the proposition proved than there is an end to all increase of knowledge in that direction. To the naturalist the proposition 'All vertebrates are endowed with mind,'

\* *Prolegomena*, § 2, p. 178.

is a synthetic judgment only so long as he is in any doubt whether, in the concept vertebrate animal, mind is or is not an integral element of his enlarged experience. But all propositions concerning vertebrates were originally in this state. Decompose the concept, decompose the knowledge out of which that concept emerged, and you will find it a succession of synthetic judgments, which became analytic as each fresh experience was integrated. All judgment is predication, and all predication is synthesis. The predicate is an experience; its subject is also an experience.

Even in the most hypothetical judgment there is always the analytic characteristic, namely, that of its being an elucidation of some element involved in the concept. We never in the most daring flights of hypothesis affirm that vertebrates are vegetables, or that they have planes of cleavage like crystals. Why? Because 'vegetables' and 'crystals' are concepts that cannot be brought under the concept 'vertebrates'—experience and analogy give no indication of any such implication. Whereas 'mind,' or some of the marks by which mind is recognised, can be seen in some of the marks by which a vertebrate is recognised.

Thus judgments are analytic or synthetic at different epochs.\* The only tenable distinction is that between verbal and real propositions, and this was drawn by Locke with a precision which leaves little to be desired. Kant, who, as was intimated just now, gave old ideas a novelty by giving them a new terminology, and assigning them a new rank, has not added anything to Locke's chapter on 'Trifling Propositions,' though he regretted its unsystematic exposition.†

\* The Spanish metaphysician, NIETO SERRANO, holds a similar opinion. "En rigor, toda proposición sintetiza algo, puesto que expresa por medio de la copulativa la relación que hay entre el sugeto y el predicado, y toda proposición analiza igualmente porque es una fórmula en que aparecen separados y distintos los mismos términos que se relacionan." (*Bosquejo de la Ciencia Viriente*, Madrid, 1867, p. 44.)

† LOCKE: *Essay*, B. iv. c. viii. 'There can be no doubt of Kant's originality in discovering for himself this celebrated distinction. Kant was not very deeply read in previous philosophy, but indeed we may well excuse him for not seeing what escaped the terrible erudition of Sir W. Hamilton. Mr. Webb has shown very clearly that Locke in substance completely anticipated it.' MAHAFFY: *not in*

is a passage: 'We can know the truth of two sorts of propositions with perfect certainty: the one is of those *analytic* propositions which have certainty in them, but it is only a verbal certainty, and not instructive. And, secondly, we can know the truth, and so may be certain in *synthetic* propositions which affirm something of another, which is the necessary consequence of its precise complex idea, but not contained in it: As that the external angle of all triangles is larger than either of the opposite internal angles; which relation is the outward angle to either of the opposite internal angles making no part of the complex idea signified by the triangle; this is a real truth, and conveys with it instructive real knowledge.'

On these grounds Kant's first position must be rejected. The distinction on which he insists, whatever logical value may be assigned to it, is not one pointing to a psychological inference that has any bearing on the question of Metaphysics. Let us now pass to the still more important distinction between *a priori* and *a posteriori* judgments which assumed a new form in Kant's hands.\* All cognition was held by him to be uninformative unless it were synthetic, and uninformative unless it were *a priori*, i.e. independent of Experience and the limitations of Experience. The first task of Criticism is therefore to answer this question: How are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible? Which was only a new way of stating the old question: How can we have knowledge independent of Experience?

That all cognitions must be synthetic and *a priori*, Kant grounds on these propositions: 1. Unless synthetic, they

\*HER'S *Commentary on Kant*, p. 28. A glance at the *Prolegomena*, § 3, p. 182, will have shown both these writers that KANT was fully alive to LOCKE's priority. It is perhaps worth remarking that Sir W. HAMILTON (REID's *Works*, p. 187) connects this 'an almost gratuitous concession,' but Sir WILLIAM in writing that note is so imperfect a recollection of KANT's exposition, that he proposes to substitute the terms *Explicative* and *Ampliative*, as less ambiguous, forgetting that KANT himself so denominated them.

Diese Frage bildet den eigentlichen Cardinal- und Angelpunkt von Kant's Kritik . . . von der Antwort auf diese Frage hängt das Schicksal der Metaphysik.  
—APFELT: *Metaphysik*, p. 40.

are not real cognitions, they add nothing to our previous store. 2. Unless *à priori*, they cannot be universal and necessary, but only particular and contingent. 3. Unless universal and necessary, they cannot be certainly true.

On these points let the reader remark first that a cognition is truly such when the hypothetical element is removed and the synthetical judgment has become analytical by integration. So long as any uncertainty existed, it was a problem: it is a theorem now the uncertainty is removed. Thus, that 'bodies are extended' is a cognition: the truth may have become a truism in becoming analytic, but it has not ceased to be a cognition.

The second position is more important and equally fallacious. The assumption that if a truth is necessary and universal it must be *à priori*, and cannot have been reached *à posteriori*, is very general, and very false. It has been considered at length in our *Prolegomena*, §§ 66-74, and I need only recapitulate here the results of that discussion. Every truth is necessary, although every proposition is not necessarily true. Knowledge may be contingent, but truth is not. How we establish the truth of a proposition, is one thing; how we affirm its necessity when established, another. As soon as we see it to be true, we see its necessity. The truth that 'fire burns' is as irresistible, necessary, and may be made as universal, as that 'the angles of a right-angled triangle are equal to two right angles,' or that  $2+2=4$ .

Is there any mark by which we can recognise a necessary proposition beyond that which discloses the identity of its terms? Waiving for the present all perturbations among the phenomena, and assuming that we speak only of true propositions, what, I ask, is there to distinguish one truth as necessary from another as contingent? Every proposition affirms that *a thing is what it is*; the truth lies in affirming this much of it and no more; and the Principle of Contradiction insists on our recognising that the thing cannot be what it is and at the same time other than what it is. Now, 'universality means that the thing in question, whatever it is,

er is otherwise ; necessity means that we cannot conceive otherwise.' \* And, as I have abundantly shown, whenever I speak of a contingent truth, they *pre-suppose some nible variation in the terms of the proposition*, whereby the ig will no longer be what it now is. A necessary truth is expressed by an analytical proposition. Every analytical position is true, inasmuch as it is an identical proposition. It merely says, 'Whatever is, necessarily is.' The contingency which may hover over any proposition takes its rise in the hypothetical form: '*May* not what *now* is, be otherwise in future?' or '*Might* it not have been otherwise?' The answer is given by a readjustment of the identical proposition to suit the new case. Instead of saying 'whatever is, is,' we say 'whatever must be, must be,' and 'whatever might have been, might have been.' If the result in the end is to vary, it can only vary by a corresponding variation in the conditions.

The character of universality declares that the matter is true in all cases. The character of necessity declares that the contradictory of the assertion is impossible.' What is this saying that a necessary and universal proposition is one in which the terms are identical? No judgment affirms that when the *conditions which determine* the thing are changed, the *thing determined* remains unaltered; yet this is the suppressed fallacy of the 'in all cases.' 'But,' it is said, 'man experience can only know *individual* cases. It can never comprehend all the cases; nay more, it is perfectly impossible to know that the known cases are all the possible ones. Even with the greatest number of cases which our rich and extended experience can furnish, its judgments can only have comparative, not absolute, universality. In other words, universality and necessity can *never* be given by experience. That which is given by experience *only* I derive from without; it is in the language of philosophy, *datum à posteriori*, because it *follows from perception*. That which is *not* given by experience can never follow from

\* HODGSON : *Time and Space*, 1865, p. 10.

experience, and must, if it exist at all, exist independently before all experience; it is a datum *à priori*.\*

How is this distinction warranted? When I say 'fire burns,' I assert universality and necessity as emphatically as when I say, 'the angles of a right-angled triangle are equal to two right angles;' in both cases I am simply asserting an identical proposition. I do not say 'fire must always burn.' I have not, nor can I ever have, experience of fire in all its possible manifestations; whereas having constructed the triangle, there is nothing in its concept that I have not myself put there, and as I am thereby assured that no new properties will manifest themselves, no variation in the terms of my proposition is possible. But an assertion either about the fire or the triangle, if made universal, does not thereby lose the identity of its terms; if the terms remain *unaltered*, the proposition, in becoming universal, is unchanged. A is A; it is so now; it will be so for ever. In becoming AB, and A subsequently disappearing, leaving B only, the identity of the proposition ceases. If a fire exist which is not hot and does not burn, that is not the fire of which my proposition speaks. Thus, the terms of the proposition being altered, the conclusion is altered likewise.

There is this source of fallacy respecting propositions of arithmetic or geometry, that their terms being rigorously defined, and the relations being simple, there is no possibility of a change not at once destroying our intuition. I cannot imagine the triangle to be elsewhere composed of other angles than such as are equal to two right angles, because this would be an inaccurate description of my concept of what I have constructed and named a triangle. Whereas an object like 'fire' was not constructed by me, its properties were given in experience; and this concept being complex in its terms and relations, some of these may remain while others are changed, without destroying my intuition of the object. I shall still have an image of the 'fire.' Even

\* KUNO FISCHER : *Commentary*, p. 13.

the image is in some respects changed. But although under conceivable conditions the object 'fire' may so far been changed as not to burn, this in no way affects the universality and necessity of the proposition 'fire burns;' it only leads to the announcement of *another* proposition, namely, 'under certain conditions fire does not burn;' which, if true, is equally necessary. The contingency is not a matter of judgment, but a matter of fact; and the matter at issue reduces itself to this, that the object 'fire' in the one position is not the same as in the other. But if it is possible to change the terms thus, we may make geometrical propositions equally contingent. Everything that is, is necessary: *it* could not have been otherwise. Some *other* might have occurred in its time and place, but this is only on the supposition that *other* conditions were present which determined it. The truths of Geometry stand on no other basis. We are often told that a physical fact is contingent because no reason can be shown why it should not have been *other* than it is. A fallacy. The reason shown is that the conditions which determined the fact were *what* they were, and none other. No better reason can be shown for a mathematical fact: the angles *are* angles; the straight lines *are not* curves. If any one were to adopt the argument usually followed in respect of physical facts, and were to say, 'Why might the straight lines not have been curves? the answer would be: Because in *that* case the angles spoken of would not have existed; instead of angles curves would have existed. Thus in each case we have only to preserve our facts from alteration, and then the transformation of a particular judgment into an universal judgment is simply its unconditional realisation; just as we produce a straight line indefinitely, so may we enlarge a judgment indefinitely.

Now I then justified in affirming that 'all baboons have blue noses'? No: only in affirming that 'all blue-nosed baboons have blue noses.' The first is an induction which may be false because it *generalises conditions*; the second is a statement which must be true because it is an *unconditional*



*generalisation*; and here, as I have shown in the *Prolegomena*, lies the true distinction between contingent and necessary truths. The truths of Number and Geometry have a character of peculiar necessity which cannot belong to physical truths, simply because magnitudes are abstracted from all conditions, and their generalisation is independent of all possible interference. Kant says, Experience can only teach us that a thing is, and what it is, but never that it is necessarily so, and cannot be otherwise.\* This is inaccurate. Experience cannot tell us that the conditions which *make* the thing what it now is, will not elsewhere be changed and make it different, because Experience cannot embrace all possible future conditions; but it can and does tell us, that so long as the conditions represented by the thing remain what they are, the thing will be what it is.

Kant errs on this point in company with all philosophers who have imagined a distinction to exist, which has no psychological foundation, between general and particular judgments. Sir W. Hamilton affirms that the observation of particular cases of causality could never 'have engendered not only the strong but the *irresistible* conviction that *every* event *must* have its causes. Each of these observations is contingent'—[not at all: each is necessary, each carries with it an irresistible conviction of *its* existence]—'and any number of observed contingencies will never impose upon us the consciousness of necessity, that is, the consciousness of an inability to think the opposite. This theory is thus logically absurd. For it would infer as a conclusion the universal necessity of the causal judgment from a certain number of actual consecutions; that is, it would collect that *all must be* because *some are*.'† This is a typical specimen of the logical legerdemain in which metaphysicians delight. It first assumes that every observation of sequence is contingent;

\* *Prolegomena*: Zweiter Theil, § 15, p. 212. 'Nun lehrt mich die Erfahrung zwar was da sei, und wie es sei, niemals aber, dass es nothwendiger Weise so und nicht anders sein müsse.'

† HAMILTON: *Discussions*, p. 588.

that there is nothing whatever contingent in the fact that we observe the sequence; *that* is necessary, we are incapable of thinking it otherwise, incapable of believing that we have not the feeling. It next assumes that no number of particulars can impose a general conclusion; but how are general conclusions established except from their particulars? How do we get the idea of uniformity except from the infinite prolongation of the special cases—a prolongation which is forced upon us in the absence of any contradictory experiences, *i.e.* any change in the conditions which would abolish diversity? The conclusion is not, therefore, *all must be* because *some are*: but *all must be* because *all are*. Experience corrects our natural tendency to indefinite prolongation, *i.e.* to conclude that what has once been must always be; it teaches us that what is true in some conditions is not true in others. Every conclusion changes when the terms of the proposition are changed. If—as is undeniable—the particular experience of causation is necessary, and not contingent, inasmuch as we cannot think that the opposite is the case now in this particular case; there is equal necessity when we generalise it, and affirm that in *all exactly similar cases* the same truth will hold. Hamilton's mistake is the mistake generally committed, of silently changing the terms. Hence he says, in continuation, 'logically absurd, it is also psychologically false. For we find no difficulty in conceiving the *converse* of one or all observed consecutions; but yet the causal judgment which, *ex hypothesi*, is only the result of these observations, we cannot possibly think possibly unreal.' Now, in what sense can we be said to conceive the converse of each observed fact? We cannot conceive that we have not observed it: we cannot conceive that this A is B. But we, aware of our liability to error, conscious that much in the complex nature of things is hidden from us, can conceive that we have partially observed (and hence the contingency of our judgment), or we can conceive that—under different conditions—

the phenomena might be different. Not having constructed the object, we cannot be sure that our concept embraces all its essential elements. In consequence of this ignorance we can conceive that a stone might rise in the air, although we have always observed it to fall. Does this disturb the legitimacy of our generalisation? Not in the least. In the first place the converse of the particular judgment is only reached by an alteration of the terms; if the stone rises instead of falling, it is because the air is heavier than the stone and pushes it upward like smoke; one of the terms—i.e. weight of air, or of stone—is altered; the conclusion changes with this change. In the next place, the 'causal judgment' Hamilton has in view is that 'every event must have a cause.' This is a different judgment. It is an unconditional generalisation of the proposition that an event has an antecedent. Whether originally reached by an induction, from which the various conditions have subsequently been eliminated, is a question which may be debated; but however reached, the necessity of the causal judgment in general is not greater than the particular judgment: 'this event has a cause.'

It is needless to pursue the argument here. Enough has been said to show that the position relied on by Kant (and most other philosophers) respecting the peculiar validity assigned to necessary truths as being *à priori*, and independent of experience, is baseless. Kant is forced to hold that the demonstration of a theorem is only true in the particular instance, and to make it universally true there is need of an *à priori* intuition. But, as an acute writer well remarks, 'If a conclusion from a single instance in empirical intuition can possess only limited validity, how can a conclusion from a single instance in pure intuition possess unlimited validity? In either case the universal is deduced from the particular; what is the difference in the two cases? It does not follow that the theorem is true of all triangles possible to pure intuition simply because it is true of one, unless it equally follows that the theorem is true of all triangles possible to empirical

uition because found true of one triangle.'\* Kant would have answered this with his constant assumption of the contingency of empirical, and the necessity of pure, intuition. It is this assumption against which the student is warned, if he would not be led astray in metaphysical swamps; we shall consider it more closely by and by.

In the first edition of the *Kritik* we read: 'It is a very remarkable fact that, even with our experiences, cognitions mixed up which must have their origin *à priori*, and which only serve to supply a connection for our representations of Sense. For even if we remove from our experiences that belongs to sense, there still remain certain primitive concepts and judgments generated from them which must have originated *à priori* quite independent of experience, because we can, or at least we think we can, assert more of the objects of sense than mere experience would teach us.'

On this it may be remarked that Kant unwarrantably limits experience to Sense, and thus obscures the whole object; although his own definition of experience, 'a conscious synthesis of perceptions,'† implies the existence of an element over and above Sense, namely, that which comes; and he thereby implies, in *à posteriori* and empirical cognitions, the operation of that very factor which he declares to be peculiar to *à priori* cognitions. What he means is probably, that even in ordinary empirical knowledge there is a necessary co-operation of virtual conditions, named Laws of Thought, the original data of the mind, which, because they are original data, cannot be affiliated on individual Experience, and must therefore to this extent be *à priori*. But this only cuts the ground from under him. It proves that in every act of judgment the mind is moved according to its own Laws, and that these belong to it, and not to

\* *North American Review*, July 1864, art. on *The Philosophy of Space and Time*.

† *Prolegomena*, § 5, p. 188. 'Erfahrung ist selbst nichts Anderes als eine conscious Zusammenfügung (Synthesis) der Wahrnehmungen.' In a note to § 22, p. 223, he seems to have been aware of the contradiction, and tries to evade it, not, I think, successfully.

the objects of knowledge. In every act? Then in *à posteriori* no less than in *à priori* judgments; consequently the famous distinction between these acts is shown to be arbitrary, and to carry none of the important consequences he deduces respecting the validity of *à priori* knowledge. It proves that *all* knowledge must have an *à priori* element—namely, the virtual capacity of the knowing mind; and an *à posteriori* element—namely, the object given in experience. Knowledge is a function of the two; but the coefficients are not separable in any one particular act. The capacity has no value until it is realised; the law has no existence until it is in act, and in act it is identified with the object.\*

Recurring for a moment to the passage last quoted from Kant, let attention be drawn to the 'cognitions' which are said to be mingled with our experiences; inasmuch as he repudiated Innate Ideas, and inasmuch as his Mental Forms are only virtual conditions of Knowledge, not the Knowledge itself, this confusion of the *conditions* with the *result*—of Forms of Cognition with Cognitions—should have been sedulously guarded against. In his system, however, the confusion is an integral part; many of his deductions would be impossible if the conditions alone were assumed, and not the cognitions which result.

I have interrupted the exposition in order to discuss these topics because of their fundamental importance. If I am correct in concluding that the distinction between *à priori* and *à posteriori* judgments, like that between analytic and synthetic judgments, is a logical distinction without psych-

\* I shall presently recur to the impossibility of separating the two coefficients; meanwhile here is a passage from the *North American Review* advocating a view similar to that in the text. 'The laws of Knowledge are *à priori* and absolute independent of Experience; but knowledge itself, being from its nature the knowledge of objects and of their relations, is not possible until the presentation of objects, and is consequently so far dependent on experience. Laws are only known in phenomena; phenomena are only known according to laws; hence every act of knowledge involves both an object of the act and laws which regulate the act.'

logical validity, the pillars of the Critical Philosophy\* are undermined. Kuno Fischer in tracing the history of Kant's opinions regards this discovery of the *à priori* nature of synthetical judgments as the decisive step to which all previous advances tended; 'by this step he separated himself from Hume, and overthrew scepticism.'

#### § IV. THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE.

The famous question: How are synthetic judgments *à priori* possible? was a new form of the whole question: How can we have any knowledge independent of Experience? Kant answered it, not by assuming the existence of Innate Ideas, but as Leibnitz did, by assuming the existence of certain Forms—certain native conditions which render Experience possible, and which must be *à priori*. He gave a profound impulse to Speculation by his mode of elucidating these Forms; but the very impetus of the movement carried men away from the real path of research, namely, an objective investigation of the psychological mechanism as dependent on organic conditions.

His object was to give a theory of all the pure elements *à priori*, which enter into knowledge as distinguished from the *à posteriori* elements. He advanced five fundamental propositions:

1. That Experience does not furnish the whole of our knowledge;
2. That what it does furnish has the character of contingency and variability;
3. That the mind also furnishes an element, which element is an inseparable condition of all knowledge; without it knowledge could not be;
4. That this element has the character of universality and necessity;

\* Compare APALT: *Metaphysik*, pp. 41-50. UEBERWEG justly characterises them as assumptions which KANT never attempted to prove, and which contain the *πρότερον ψεύδος* of the system. *Grundriss d. Gesch. d. Phil.* iii. 167.

5. And that the principle of all certitude is precisely this universality and necessity.

He set himself to examine the nature of the mind, and to trace the distinctive characters of each element of knowledge, the objective and the subjective. Instead of saying, with the Sensational School, All our knowledge is derived from the senses, Kant said, *Half* of all our knowledge is derived from the senses: and the half which has another origin is *indissolubly bound up with the former half*. Thus, instead of saying with the Cartesians, that, besides the ideas acquired through the sense, we have also certain ideas which are innate, and irrespective of sense; Kant said *all* our cognitions have a double origin, and this twofold co-operation of object and subject is *indispensable* to all knowledge.

The *Critique of the Pure Reason* is an examination of the mind, with a view to detect its *à priori* principles. He calls these *pure* because they are *à priori*, because they are above, and beyond Experience. Having argued that the mind has *some* pure principles—which were never given in Experience, and must therefore be *à priori*—he is led to inquire how many the mind possessed. He does not trouble himself with investigating the nature of perception (had he done so he might have seen the error of his analysis); he contents himself with the fact that we have sensations, and with the fact that we have cognitions whose origin is not sensuous.

What does he discover? First, a Sensibility—a power of being affected by objects; this is what he calls the *Receptive* of the mind: as such the mind is passive. By this faculty representations (*Vorstellungen*) are intuited. Secondly, he discovers an Understanding (*Verstand*)—a faculty of knowing objects by means of the representations furnished by our Sensibility: this is an *active* faculty; in antithesis to Sensibility, it is a *Spontaneity*.

But our Sensibility, although passive in receiving impressions, has its laws of action, its conditions; and, to discover these conditions, we must separate that which is diverse and

multiple in our sensations from that which remains invariably the same. The objects are numerous and various; the subject remains invariable. Kant calls the multiple and diverse element by the name of *material*; the invariable element by the name of *form*. If therefore we would discover the primary conditions or laws of action of our Sensibility, we must discover the invariable elements in all sensations.

There are two invariable elements—*Space* and *Time*. They are the forms of our Sensibility. Space is the form of our Sensibility, as external; Time the form as internal.

Analyse sensations of external things as you will, you can never divest them of Space. You cannot conceive bodies without Space; but you can conceive Space without bodies. Space therefore is the indispensable condition of sensation: the Form of external Sensibility. It is not given in the materials of sensation; since you may conceive the object annihilated, but cannot conceive the annihilation of Space. Not being given in the material, it must therefore constitute the form.

Similar reasoning proves that Time is also the form of our Sensibility, considered as internal. We cannot conceive things as existing, except as existing in Time; but we can conceive Time as existing, though all things were annihilated. Things subjected to our Sensibility are subjected to it in *succession*; that is the form of our Sensibility.

Such then are the two indispensable conditions of all sensation—the two Forms with which *we* invest all the varied materials presented to us. It is evident that these two ideas of Space and Time cannot have been given in the materials, consequently are not deducible from experience; *ergo*, they are *à priori*, or, as Kant calls them, *pure intuitions*.

The forms of Sensibility being those of Space and Time, we now pass onwards to the higher operations of the mind. The function of the Understanding is to judge. It is eminently an active faculty—a spontaneity; and by it the percepts furnished through Sensibility are elevated into concepts (*Begriffe*). If we had only Sensibility, we should have sen-



sations, but no knowledge. It is to the Understanding that we are indebted for knowledge. And how are we indebted to it? Thus: the variety of our sensations is reduced to unity—they are linked together and made to interpret each other by the Understanding. A sensation in itself can be nothing but a sensation; many sensations can be nothing but many sensations, they can never alone constitute concepts. But one sensation linked to another by some connecting faculty—the diversity of many sensations reduced to unity—the resemblances, existing amidst the diversity, detected and united together—is the process of forming a concept, and this is the process of the Understanding, by means of Imagination, Memory, and Recognition.

Our senses, in contact with the external world, are affected by objects in a certain determinate manner. The result Kant calls a representation (*Vorstellung*) in reference to the object represented; an intuition (*Anschauung*) in reference to the affection itself. But this distinction is not always observed. *Vorstellung* sometimes means the image and sometimes the subjective affection. The same equivocal with *Anschauung*. When intuitions are moulded by the Understanding into concepts, the sensation is converted into a thought.

The Understanding is related to Sensibility in the same way as Sensibility is related to external things. It imposes certain Forms on the materials furnished it by Sensibility, in the same way as Sensibility imposed the Forms of Space and Time upon objects presented to it. These forms of the Understanding are the conditions of its operation.

To discover these we must ask ourselves, What the function of the Understanding?—Judgment. How many classes of judgments are there? In other words, What are the invariable conditions of every possible judgment?—They are four: Quantity, Quality, Relation, Modality. Under one of these heads every judgment may be classed.

A subdivision of each of these classes follows:—1. In judging of anything under the form of *Quantity*, we judge of

it as unity or as plurality; or uniting these two, we judge of it as totality. 2. So of *Quality*: it may be reality, negation, or limitation. 3. *Relation* may be that of substance and accident, cause and effect, or reciprocity. 4. *Modality* may be that of possibility, existence, or necessity.

In those Categories\* Kant finds the *pure Forms* of the Understanding. They render thought possible; they are the invariable conditions of all conception; they are the investitures bestowed by the Understanding on the materials furnished by Sensibility.

By the Categories, he declares he has answered the second half of the question, How are synthetic judgments, *à priori*, possible? The synthetic judgments of the Categories are all *à priori*.

But the faculties of the mind are not yet complete. Sensibility gives intuitions, Understanding gives concepts, but there is still another faculty—the crowning faculty of Reason (*Vernunft*), the pure Forms of which we have to seek.

Understanding is defined ‘the faculty of judging’ (*Vermögen der Urtheile*); Reason is the faculty of ratiocination—of drawing conclusions from given premises (*Vermögen der Schlüsse*). Reason reduces the variety of conceptions to their final unity. It proceeds from generality to generality till it reaches the *unconditional*. Every concept must be reduced to some general idea, that idea again reduced to some more general idea, and so on till we arrive at an ultimate and unconditional principle.

Reason not only reduces particulars to a general, it also deduces the particular from the general: thus, when I say, ‘Peter is mortal,’ I deduce this particular proposition from the general proposition, ‘All men are mortal;’ and this deduction is evidently independent of experience, since Peter being now alive, I can have no experience to the contrary.

\* On KANT’S use of the term categories, see HAMILTON: *Logic*, i. 197–8. On the subject generally, comp. KANT: *Prolegomena*, iii. p. 210; *Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft*, preface, pp. xvi. xviii.; and APELT: *Metaphysik*, p. 132. Then read the exposition in the *Kritik*.

These two processes of reducing a particular to some general and of deducing some particular from a general, constitute ratiocination.

Reason has three pure Forms; or, as Kant calls them, borrowing the term from Plato, *Ideas*.\* These are wholly independent of Experience; they are above Sensibility—above the Understanding; their domain is Reason, their function that of giving unity and coherence to our conceptions.

The Understanding can frame certain general concepts such as man, animal, tree; but these general concepts themselves are subordinate to a still more general Idea, embracing all these general concepts in the same way as the concept of man embraces several particulars of bone, blood, muscle, etc. This idea is that of the Universe.

In the same way all the modifications of the thinking being—all the sensations, thoughts, and passions—require to be embraced in some general Idea, as the ultimate ground and possibility for these modifications, as the noumenon of these phenomena. This Idea is that of an *ego*—of a personality—of a Soul.

Having thus reduced all the varieties of the *ego* to an unconditional unity, viz. Soul, and having also reduced all the varieties of the *non-ego* to an unconditional unity, viz. the Universe, his task would seem completed; yet, on looking deeper, he finds that these two Ideas presuppose a third—a unity still higher, the source of both the world and the *ego*—viz. God.

God, the Soul, and the Universe are therefore the three Ideas of Reason, the laws of its operation, the *pure Forms* of its existence. They are to Reason what Space and Time are to Sensibility, and what the Categories are to Understanding.

But these Ideas are simply *regulative*: they operate upon concepts as the Understanding operates upon sensations; they are discursive, not intuitive; they are never facts.

\* Compare TRENDLENBURG: *Logische Untersuchungen*, ii. 473.

ith their objects: hence Reason is powerless when employed on matters beyond the sphere of Understanding. If it attempts to operate beyond this sphere, it can draw nothing but false, deceptive conclusions—if it attempts to solve the question raised respecting God and the Universe, it falls to endless contradictions.

Respecting the illusory nature of Reason, which is often confounded with its delusory nature, I cannot do better than quote Mr. Bolton's correction\* of Sir W. Hamilton, who here, as elsewhere, displays a singular misconception of Kant:

'Kant teaches that there is a natural temptation to employ the ideas of Reason illegitimately, owing to a certain natural illusion, termed by him *transcendental illusion*, which disposes us to believe that these ideas, whose right use is purely immanent, can enable us to extend our cognitions beyond the limits of experience. Critical examination shows us that this appearance is illusory, and prevents us from being deceived by it; yet though *delusion* is thus prevented, *illusion* still remains. As examples of illusion thus existing without delusion, Kant instances the appearance of the sea, which seems to be higher at the horizon than near the shore, though we know this is not the case; and again the appearance of the moon, which seems larger near the horizon than near the zenith, though we know both by measurement and by calculation that the appearance in question is illusory.

'These views are expressed by Kant in a great number of passages, of which the following may be quoted:

'The result of all the dialectical attempts of pure Reason not only confirms the truth of what we have already proved in our transcendental analytic, namely, that all inferences which would lead us beyond the limits of experience are fallacious and groundless, but it at the same time teaches us

\* BOLTON: *Inquisitio Philosophica: an examination of the Principles of Kant and Hamilton*, 1866, pp. 109 sq. Compare also Mr. MAHAFFY'S Introduction to KUNO FISCHER, p. lxiv.

this important lesson, that human reason has a natural inclination to overstep these limits. . . .

'Whatever is grounded in the nature of our powers will be found to be in harmony with the final purpose and proper employment of those powers, when once we have discovered their true direction and aim. We are entitled, therefore, to suppose that there exists a mode of employing transcendental ideas which is proper and *immanent*; although, when we mistake their meaning, and regard them as conceptions of actual things, their mode of application is *transcendent* and delusive. . . . Thus all errors of misapplication are to be ascribed to defects of judgment, and *not to understanding or Reason*.

'I accordingly maintain that transcendental ideas can never be employed as constitutive ideas, that they cannot be conceptions of objects, and that, when thus considered, they assume a fallacious and dialectical character. But, on the other hand, they are capable of an admirable and indispensably necessary application to objects as regulative ideas, directing the understanding to a certain aim, the guiding lines towards which all its lines follow, and in which they all meet in one point. This point, though a mere idea (*focus imaginarius*), . . . serves notwithstanding to give to these conceptions the greatest possible unity combined with the greatest possible extension. Hence arises the natural illusion which induces us to believe that these lines proceed from an object which lies out of the sphere of empirical cognition, just as objects reflected in a mirror appear to be behind it. But this illusion, *which we may hinder from imposing upon us*, is necessary and unavoidable if we desire to see, not only those objects which lie before us, but those which are at a great distance behind us. . . . If we review our cognitions in their entire extent, we shall find that the peculiar business of reason is to arrange them into a *system*, that is to say, to give them connection according to a principle.

'Having thus shown the difference between the illegiti-

ite and the legitimate use of Reason—the former “transcendent,” seeking to transcend the limits of experience; the latter “regulative,” or “immanent,” not overstepping those limits, but seeking to systematise our empirical cognitions. Kant devotes the concluding portion of his work, the *Methodenlehre*, or doctrine of Method, to an examination of the principles which guide Reason, in its *legitimate* use.

‘Such is the real nature of Kant’s doctrine; and it is important to set it clearly forth, inasmuch as Sir W. Hamilton has wholly misrepresented it. He represents Kant as teaching that Reason, when *legitimately* exercised, is essentially *lusive*; whence, as he observes, the most pervading scepticism inevitably results; and he represents himself as correcting this erroneous doctrine, by discovering and showing that the antinomies expounded by Kant result only from an *illegitimate* use of Reason.’

#### § V. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN SENSIBILITY, UNDERSTANDING, AND REASON.

The three provinces of human knowledge are presided over by three powers: *Æsthetic* by Sensibility; Logic by Understanding; and *Dialectic* by Reason. The two first are constitutive, the third regulative, of Experience. These three provinces are territorial divisions of one country. Are their presiding powers simply three directions of one supreme power, or are they three distinct and autonomous powers? The country, divided into provinces, is Thought; the ruling powers one Thinking Principle, specially determined under three forms; or are they three separate principles acting in harmony?

Had the question been put in this decisive shape, there could probably have been such an answer given as would have saved a great amount of misunderstanding and discussion. It is true that Kant himself is far from clear upon the point; on what point is he not obscure? Yet had the

question presented itself to him, he would no doubt have given it a categorical answer.\*

At the close of the Introduction he says: 'There are two stems of human knowledge (which perhaps spring from a single but unknown root), namely Sensibility and Understanding. By the former objects are *given* us; by the latter objects are *thought*.' In this image, knowledge is a tree, the leaves and branches of which may have their origin in one root, or in two roots; although he obviously inclines to the former hypothesis, yet inasmuch as the root itself is unknown, he refrains from pronouncing decisively. Hegel, whose idealism obliterates all real distinctions and admits only the formal, makes Sensibility and Understanding the outer and inner aspect of the one act; and he says, 'Man is always thinking, even when he is intuiting.'† Kant would have said that intuiting is a mental activity (which is what Hegel means by thought‡), but whether it is the activity of the same power as that manifested in conceiving, cannot be decided. He would have objected to Hegel that the obliteration of differences was a sin against the canon of discipline which prescribes that varieties are not to be carelessly disregarded: *entium varietates non sunt temere minuenda*. And certainly the variations between Sensibility and Understanding need recognition, even if both be faculties of Intellect. He somewhere points out the futility of trying to reduce attraction and repulsion to one, on the ground of their both being motion. He would in like manner insist on not reducing Sensibility and Understanding to one, although the

\* 'The different phenomenal manifestations of the same substance appear at first view to be so very dissimilar, that we are inclined to assume the existence of just as many different powers as there are different effects. . . . We are required by logical maxim to reduce these differences to as small a number as possible, by comparing them and *discovering the hidden identity which exists*; . . . and the more the phenomena of this and the other power are found to be identical, the more probable does it become that they are nothing but different manifestations of one and the same power.' *Critick of Pure Reason*, p. 328.

† HEGEL: *Encyklopädie*, § 24, p. 48.

‡ Ibid.: 'Das Denken, wie es die Substanz äusserlichen Dinge ausmacht, ist auch die allgemeine Substanz des Geistigen.'

both manifestations of Thought (considered in its widest aptation). But granting the differences, there might arise the question as to their origin; whether they were differences of direction merely (*contingent aspects*, as Herbart might call them), or streams from different springs. All the analysis reveals is that the unknown something we call Intellect has three distinctly recognisable characters: Sensibility, Understanding, and Reason; and these are related in the distinguishable functions, Intuition, Conception, Ratiocination. Not only are these manifest in Experience, but they also manifest themselves as *a priori* conditions of Experience. As empirical, we know they are distinct; whether they are so transcendently, we cannot know.

One thing it is of importance to keep in view, namely, that whether Sensibility arise from the same root as Understanding, or from another, it is indubitably an essential constituent of Intellect: its functions are mental functions, not bodily functions. What Ratiocination is to Reason, what Conception is to Understanding, that is Intuition to Sensibility. This remark is made to guard against the very general error into which the connotations of the word Sensibility so easily mislead. The senses being bodily organs, and the only organs through which the Mind is affected by objects, there is difficulty in disengaging the purely mental aspect of Sensation from its physical aspect. Yet nothing more patent than that by Sensibility the mental aspect is never presented by Kant, when he is speaking of those *a priori* principles which belong to the Pure Reason.\*

While no attempt is made by Kant to establish root-dis-

In numerous passages he marks the distinction between Sensation and Intuition, the bodily aspect from the mental. Let this one suffice: 'In the transcendental Aesthetic we will first isolate Sensibility by separating it from all that Understanding, through its concepts, thinks therewith, so that nothing but empirical Intuition remains. Secondly we will lop off from this empirical Intuition everything relating to Sensation (*Empfindung*); so that, thereby, there will remain but pure Intuition and the mere form of phenomena, which is the one thing that Sensibility can furnish *a priori*.' *Kritik*, p. 61.



inctions between Sensibility and Understanding, he clearly marks their empirical characters. The one furnishes intuitions, the other concepts. Neither of these faculties has a preference over the other. Concepts without content are void; intuitions without concepts blind. It is as incumbent on the mind to make its concepts sensible, as to make its intuitions intelligible. These faculties are not interchangeable. Understanding is incompetent to intuit; Sensibility is incompetent to think; only by their union can Knowledge arise. Hence the division between *Æsthetic*, the science of the laws of Sensibility, and Logic, the Science of the laws of Understanding.

Since the Understanding can judge but not intuit, and Sensibility can intuit but cannot judge, a marked distinction in the *direction* of these powers is patent. Yet since the Understanding is forced to rely on intuitions for its material, Sensibility is forced to rely on the excitation from external objects of its material, and since the action of both the faculties is that of giving form to the material, the *distinction in direction* is accompanied by a *community in nature*; and the question arises: Is this community an identity?

The Mind is, by Kant, regarded as manifesting three Faculties: the Faculty of Cognition, the Faculty of Moral Feeling, and the Faculty of Desire: *Erkenntnisvermögen*,\* *Gefühlvermögen und Begehrungsvermögen*. As a parallel we may consider the biological conception of Animal Life manifesting the Nutritive Functions, the Sensori-motor Functions, and the Reproductive Functions. The distinctively animal functions of Sensation and Movement may be studied apart, as Kant studies the Cognitive Functions in the *Critique*. Let us try and penetrate his meaning by presenting it in this parallel. We have before us three definite functions, Sensation and Movement. The differences in their phenomena are so obvious that a super-

\* Also styled *Denkvermögen*. This identification of Cognition with Thought will have to be kept in view during the discussion of Mental Forms.

consideration would pronounce them to be wholly different in origin. Although both are functions of the organism, they are not only different functions, but imply distinct agents. Physiology, however, reveals that these functions have a common origin in the Nervous System; no muscle is moved except on the stimulus of a nerve; no action is excited except on the stimulus of a nerve. Were otherwise would the answer have run, had the distinction related to two fundamental properties of tissue, instead of two functions. Had we, instead of Sensation and Movement, asked whether Contractility and Sensibility\* were of different origin? there could have been no hesitation. Contractility is a property of one tissue; Sensibility is the property of another tissue; and the two properties are no more identical than muscle and ganglion are identical. There may be Contractility without Sensibility; there may be Sensibility without Contractility. Whereas in the animal organism there can be no such separation of Sensation from Movement, the primary condition of both being the same neural stimulus.

Regarded in this light, we may say that the common but unknown root for Sensibility and Understanding, is the nervous system. All thinkers are agreed as to the powers being powers of the one Intellect; the only doubt is whether they are powers as distinct as Sensibility and Contractility, having distinct tissues for their bases; or powers arising in a common basis which everywhere determines reaction, as the neural stimulus determines Sensation and Movement. Kant leaves this undecided, though he inclines to the second view.

The differences in effects presuppose corresponding differences in the causes; and since the phenomena of Sensibility and Understanding are not to be deduced from each other, Kant insists on regarding them as due to different faculties, whether they have or have not a common root.

\* 'Sensibility' here means a physiological property, not the psychological notion which KANT treats of.

Movement differs from Sensation, because the one involves muscle, and the other involves the brain: the differences arise from a common impulse in two different directions. In like manner Sensibility differs from Understanding, because the one involves intuitions and the other concepts: the differences arise from a common impulse in two different directions. The divergence of these directions prevents the one from ever replacing the other.

Thus we must regard Kant as teaching *positively*, that Sensibility and Understanding are two mental faculties of equal dignity; and *hypothetically*, that these two faculties have a common basis, which renders their *united action* a necessary condition. They cannot exist apart; they cannot act apart.\*

What is their mode of union? Being so different in direction, how do they meet to produce images of things? This is effected by what Kant calls the *schematism*. By this process sensible objects are brought under intelligible concepts. The link between Sensibility and Understanding is the productive Imagination, without which no impression could become an image. 'That the faculty of Imagination,' he says, 'is a necessary ingredient in perception, has not perhaps as yet struck any psychologist. This arises partly from confining the faculty to mere reproduction, partly because it was thought that the senses not only gave impressions but combined them, and so brought images of objects before us.' There is need for some intermediate which shall be at once sensuous or *à posteriori*, and intellectual or *à priori*. Such are Space and Time: on the one side they are *pure*, and homogeneous with the Categories; on the other side they are *sensuous*, and homogeneous with objects, since only through them can objects be perceived. The quality of Time is that of a transcendental *schema*; and the use which the Mind puts it to is the schematism of the pure Intellect. The schema is a product of the Imagination; but must not be

\* This position has an important bearing on the subject discussed in the succeeding section, on the Mental Forms.

led simply as an image, which is an individual perception; whereas the schema is the *category as a picture*, the form in which the category is applicable to the phenomenon as such.

The distinction between Sensibility and Understanding is of the utmost importance in the Critical Philosophy, as defining the reach and limits of Knowledge. Leibnitz confuses the distinction on confused and clear representations. Compared,' says Kant, 'all things with each other simply means of concepts, and therefore could find only such distinctions as can be found among concepts. He did not see the conditions of sensuous Intuition contained within their tests of distinction, because he regarded Sensibility as only a confused kind of representation, not a source of intellectual representation.' He adds that Leibnitz committed the mistake of intellectualising phenomena, as Locke had rationalised the conceptions of the Understanding. Instead of recognising two sources which can only present objects in conjunction, each of these philosophers could see but one source, this was directly applied to things in themselves, the other faculty had apparently nothing to do but to use or rearrange the representations of its rival. The *intellectualise* may here be explained. In his letter to Kant defines *Intellectual-Vorstellungen* 'those which are modifications of the soul through objects,' in other words, which have not a sensuous basis. Yet since he makes Space and Time *a priori* subjective Forms of the Intellect (though he calls them Forms of Sensibility), there seems a manifest contradiction, which is, however, only an ambiguity. Many writers have been misled by it. Schopenhauer and Hegel reproach him with the contradiction of having first extended these as Forms of Intellect, and then denied them to be intellectual.\* The ambiguity is simply this, that while the Intellect is limited to mental operations *irrespective* of any

SCHOPENHAUER : *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, 3rd edit. 1859, i. 516, and 525.

external relations, Sensibility is the union of the internal and external, and has thus the special distinction from all other mental activities of being directly connected with the external world through the medium of the Senses. Locomotion is not less a nervous action because it is also a muscular action. Intuition is not less an intellectual operation because it is also a physical operation. When Leibnitz is said to have intellectualised the sensuous representations, the reproach conveyed is that he disregarded the special distinction of their basis in sense, and regarded them only as less clear than the representations of intellect.

I do not pretend that Kant is uniformly consistent in his exposition. The contradictory assertions which abound in his pages have been a source of endless dispute. He is so loose a writer that one may find passages to establish almost any view of his system. Schopenhauer has brought together a series of flatly contradictory positions: but those in which he shows that Kant, in spite of the distinction between Intuition and Thought, interpenetrated Intuition with Thought, and Thought with Intuition,\* seem to me, apart from some vacillation and obscurity in Kant's own mind, reconcilable on the ground of the community between Sensibility and Understanding, and the necessity of their united action. Schopenhauer says that the conclusion from Kant's principles is, that there would be for us an *intuitable* world, even were there no Understanding. I answer that this conclusion would only be valid on the supposition that Sensibility and Understanding were two disconnected faculties, not on the supposition of their being two inseparably united faculties. It is this latter view which reconciles all the contradictions Schopenhauer brings forward (p. 522) from passages asserting that the Understanding determines Intuition through the Categories.

Let us now pass to the distinction between Understanding and Reason. This couple is marked off from Sensibility

\* Op. cit. pp. 520-1.

the absence of all direct relation with objects. (Kant does not propound the doubt whether these two faculties have or have not a common root; he probably considered their community self-evident.) Both are faculties of conception; but the concepts differ in kind; the operations differ in kind. The concepts differ in this: those of the Understanding refer to phenomena, and are conditioned; those of the Reason refer to noumena, and are unconditioned. The one is employed on the material furnished by Sensibility. The other deals with objects freed from all possible conditions of experience or Sensibility. The operations differ in this: Reason employs Ideas alone in the consideration of its objects, and by these determines the Understanding, which then proceeds to make an empirical use of its concepts. Sensibility is thus constitutive; Reason is simply regulative. One gives knowledge, the other orders it.

There has been much dispute on this point among the interpreters of Kant. Each party finds its justification in Kant's own statements. While I agree with those who maintain that there is a real distinction between the two faculties, one quite as valid as that between Sensibility and Understanding, and accept Mr. Mahaffy's statement that 'the faculty which imposes conditions can hardly be identified with that which advises us to break down and overstep conditions,' I think Kant implies a fundamental identity with only a divergence in direction. Two points of view are presented: in the one we have Knowledge and its conditions; in the other we have the Intellect as a Knowing Faculty.

[*As Knowledge.*—The world of Sense and the world of Thought are thus distinguishable: the former is variable owing to the variations in the beholders, whereas the latter, which lies at the basis of all phenomena, remains always one and the same.\* Had we only Sense and its Intuitions the world would be a perpetual flux of phenomena, in which one thing would never again be recognised, and no generality could be conceived. But having Thought, which is con-

\* *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten.*

cerned only with generalities, we recognise by it the permanent and essential underlying the variable and accidental. Without a criterion of Truth (namely Necessity and Universality) every man would differ from every other, each being his own standard. All Sense Knowledge is particular; all Rational Knowledge general.

II. *As a Knowing Faculty.*—But when we investigate the Intellect we find that its three faculties, however superficially distinguishable, are identical in essence; not simply because they have their common ground in the Intellect, as the Intellect has its ground in common with Feeling and Will; but more directly in its constitution as an *à priori* faculty, and in its mode of action as a *regulative* faculty. Kant, indeed, assigns the regulative action specially to Reason. But if we examine closely, we shall find that just as the ideas are made to regulate conceptions, so are the Categories made to regulate Intuitions,\* and so are Space and Time made to regulate perceptions. This identity has been insisted on by many of Kant's critics, in regard to Reason and Understanding, and indeed has been made a reproach; but I am not aware of the extension to Sensibility having been made, though its evidence seems to me irresistible. The function of all three is to give synthetic unity. The function of all three is to give form to material. The only differences lie in the material operated on, and in the consequent products.

Thus, and thus only, can I consistently interpret the phrases which seem so contradictory, in which space is spoken of as a concept, and even as a concept of Reason *Vernunftbegriff*.† When Kant declares absolute space to be a concept of Reason, is it not that he is considering space unconditioned; and is he not led to this concept precisely he is led to the concept of Universe,—the world carried up

\* 'These regulative principles Kant carefully distinguishes from the dynamic principles of the understanding, which he also calls regulative. The latter are regulative of phenomena; the former of experience.'—MAHAFFY, p. 270.

† *Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaften.*—Werke, viii. 564.

unconditioned,—and the concept of God,—the active  
it of the Universe, carried up to the unconditioned?

The argument on this section cannot be better summed  
up than in Kuno Fischer's review of the whole *Kritik*: 'It  
completely surveyed the domain of human reason as far  
as its cognitive faculties reached, and distinguished its  
faculties according to their primitive conditions. These  
faculties were, Sensibility, Understanding, and Reason:  
each of these faculties has its original native formative  
principles, by the co-operation of which scientific knowledge  
is produced. These principles are, pure intuition, pure con-  
cept of the understanding, and ideas. Each of them con-  
tains, after its fashion, unity and connection. They are  
distinguished as to *what* they combine. What each of these  
faculties has combined is its peculiar product. This product  
poses the problem of a new connection for another faculty  
of human reason. So the product of intuition becomes  
the problem for the understanding; the product of the under-  
standing for the reason. Intuition connects sensuous im-  
pressions, and makes of them *phenomena*. These being the  
act of our intuition are the object of our understanding.  
Understanding connects phenomena, and makes of them  
concepts or *experience*. Experience is the product of our  
understanding, it is the object of reason. Reason connects  
experiences, and makes of them a whole, a scientific system  
which continually progresses without ever completing itself.  
Sensuous impressions can only be connected into phenomena by  
means of space and time; these are the form-giving principles  
of sensibility. Phenomena can only be connected with ex-  
periences by the Categories; these are the form-giving prin-  
ciples of the understanding. Experiences can only be con-  
nected into a scientific system by means of Ideas; these are  
the form-giving faculties, or, more accurately, those which give  
form or aim to our reason.'

We have thus Intellect or the Faculty of Cognition, with  
three *modes*: Sensibility, Understanding, and Reason.  
These three Modes are to be understood as three



divergent directions of one Force, or three separate Forces acting independently, may be disputed. Kant is by no means clear on this point. But on one point there can be no dispute, namely, that all three are factors of the Intellect.\*

With this result let us now proceed to another topic.

### § VI. THE MENTAL FORMS.

It has long been customary in English literature to speak of Kant's *à priori* principles, namely Space and Time, the Categories, and the Ideas, as 'Forms of Thought,' assigning them respectively to Sensibility, Understanding and Reason, which are the three Faculties of the Intellect. This, although sanctioned by Kantists like Whewell, and by erudite philosophers like Sir W. Hamilton, has recently been pronounced a gross perversion of Kant's meaning. A curious and animated discussion on the point occupied the pages of a scientific periodical.† In that controversy I was led to uphold the customary phrase, in spite of its obvious variation from Kant's language, because it accurately expresses Kant's meaning when translated into English. My opponents argued—quite superfluously, I think—that inasmuch as Kant uses the term Thought only to express acts of Judgment, and sharply demarcates Intuition from Judgment, it was flagrantly erroneous to speak of Space and Time, *i.e.* the forms of Intuition, among the forms of Thought. And in an *exposition* of Kant such a procedure would have been manifestly erroneous; this, however, I had carefully abstained from; while in an *interpretation* of Kant, translating him into English, I followed the English practice because that seemed correct. For the distinction insisted on by my opponents would, unless very carefully watched, have

\* REINHOLD's completion of KANT's system had its basis here. He found one character in the three faculties, namely, that of being representative. Intuitions were immediate representations, conceptions were mediate representations, and ideas were representations of the unconditioned. The Intellect was thus one Representative Faculty.

† See the various letters which were published in *Nature*, Nos. 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15, in the beginning of this year (1870).

seriously misrepresented the Kantian system, by denying—as some indeed seemed to deny—that Sensibility, Understanding and Reason were three Faculties of the one Intellect, three branches of a common tree.

The phrase Forms of Thought is used as tantamount to the Fundamental Laws of Intellect, and is meant to embrace all those *à priori* principles of Pure Reason, which are supposed to be anterior to, and independent of, Experience. Thought is here taken as the supreme genus (Pure Reason), under which range the subgenera, Intuition, Judgment and Reason. Nor is this classification to be impugned because Kant limits the term Thought to Conception. In scientific language the term Animal expresses the supreme genus under which all living beings, exclusive of plants, are ranged; but in ordinary language we distinguish Animal from Man, and sometimes even Animal from Bird, without equivocation. If a biologist insist upon restricting the term Man, so as to withdraw it from the general term Animal, we may follow him when expounding his views; but when we come to interpret his views according to received biological principles, we must speak of Man as an Animal, especially if we can show that in spite of his technical language he meant by Animal all that we mean by it, and that if we denied the animality of his Man, we should be at variance with his principles. It is thus with Kant; he uses Thought in a technical restricted sense, distinguishing it from Intuition. But the current English use of the word expresses all operations of the Thinking Principle, and is tantamount to the common intellectual ground of Sensibility, Judgment, and Reason. For observe, if we are to restrict the term Thought to acts of the Understanding, and affirm 'that the only forms of Thought in Kant's sense are the Categories,' then on like grounds we must deny the term to the acts of Reason, which Kant also separates from Understanding; thus if Intuitions are improperly termed Thoughts, not less improperly are Ideas termed Thoughts. The logical shears which cut away Sensibility also lop off Reason, since neither

of these is endowed with Categories. Whereas, if we follow the old phraseology, we find that Kant's Forms of Thought (*i.e.* pure *à priori* principles) are 1st, Space and Time, which determine intuitions; 2nd, the Categories which determine concepts; and 3rd, the Ideas which determine transcendental rules. By thus placing Space and Time beside the Categories and the Ideas, we classify the whole of those *à priori* principles supposed to constitute the common intellectual furniture not given in Experience—the *intellectus ipse* of the *à priori* school.\*

It has been urged indeed 'that the Sensibility, according to Kant, is not spontaneous or active, like the Understanding. The forms then (*i.e.* the institutions of Time and Space) are not, cannot be, products of the *activity* of any faculty, and therefore cannot be forms of *Thought* in any legitimate sense of the word. Let it be used in the widest sense possible; let it stand for the *active faculty of mind in general*; and then it can be proved that Kant would have refused to refer to it the forms of general Sense, because he denied to general Sense any activity whatever.'† Is not this acute and well-informed writer here misled, as many others have been, by Kant's not very clear language? Kant always speaks of Sensibility as a receptivity in contradistinction to the spontaneity of the Understanding; but does he thereby mean to deny its activity? I think not. As the question involves important consequences, we may pause to consider it. There seems to be a general misconception arising from not distinguishing between the two kinds of action insisted on by Leibnitz, and adopted by Kant: namely, mechanical action, which is excited from without (*an appulse* I have called it), and spontaneous action, excited from

\* 'Die Materie aller Erscheinung ist nur *à posteriori* gegeben, die Form derselben aber muss zu ihnen insgesamt im Gemüthe *à priori* bereit liegen' *Kritik: Transcend. Aesthetik*, § 1, p. 60. 'Space and Time,' says SCHWEGELE 'are also subjective additions, forms of sensuous perception, and no less native to the mind than the *à priori* notions, the categories themselves.' *Handbook to the History of Philosophy*, translated by STIRLING, 1867, p. 211.

† Dr. INGLEBY in *Nature*, No. 45, p. 375.

thin (an *impulse*). The action of Sensibility is always determined from without—it is therefore a Receptivity, a *passion*; that of Understanding is determined from within—it is therefore a Spontaneity. 'We apply the term Sensibility,' says Kant, 'to the receptivity of the mind for impressions, in so far as it is in some way affected; and on the other hand we call the faculty of spontaneously producing presentations, or the spontaneity of cognition, Understanding.'\*

Now the point we have to settle is that he regarded this receptivity as an activity. This has been made clear in our preceding section, which exhibited Sensibility as one of the modes of Intellectual action, one of the form-giving *a priori* principles. Intuition is the *action* of Sensibility. We must keep in view the fact that Kant is treating of the mental organism, not the bodily organism, and that he expressly defines Sense as a property of the Mind.† If the Intellect did not *react through Sensibility* on the impressions of external objects—the forms of this reaction being the *a priori* conditions Space and Time—there would be no meaning in assigning Sensibility as a mental function; no meaning in classing it among faculties of Cognition. But Kant says: 'the impressions of sense give the first occasion for bringing into action the whole faculty of cognition, and for the production of experience, which contain two very dissimilar elements, namely a matter for cognition, given by the senses, and a certain form for the arrangement of the matter, arising out of the *inner fountain of pure intuition and thought*; and these, on occasion given by sensuous impressions, are called into exercise and produce conceptions.'‡ Here the activity of intuition and thought is placed on the same level. Again: 'The first question which occurs in consider-

\* *Critick of Pure Reason*, p. 45. Compare the opening paragraph of the second *Aesthetic*.

† Vermittelst des äusseren Sinnes (einer Eigenschaft unseres Gemüths), stellen Gegenstände als ausser uns vor.—*Kritik : Transcend. Aesthetik*, § 2, p. 62.

*Critick of Pure Reason*, p. 72.

ing our representations is, to what faculty of cognition do they belong? To the Understanding or Sensibility?' Can a faculty be conceived without activity? If the sensation is the reception of an impression, there must also be a reaction from within: 'The effect of an object,' he says, 'upon the faculty of representation, so far as we are affected by the said object, is sensation. But that in which our sensations are merely arranged and by which they are susceptible of assuming a certain form cannot itself be sensation.'\* The receptivity applies solely to the impressions; the reactivity is that of the 'inner fountain of pure intuition.' It is to be borne in mind that Kant expressly divides Sensibility into two factors: Sensation and Imagination. The activity of the Imagination is undeniable; it belongs, he says, to the transcendental action of the Mind: *ein Grundvermögen der menschlichen Seele, das aller Erkenntniss à priori zum Grunde liegt*.† Indeed it is the very reproach urged by Herbart against Kant's admission of Sensibility as a Faculty, that if this were so, 'there would be laws of its action, but no such laws are discernible.'‡

If the Sensibility is *distinguished* from the other faculties by its receptivity of impressions, not only those made on the outward Sense by objects, but also those made on the inward Sense by the play of thought (*Gedankenspiel*), it is not less *identified* with the other faculties by its form-giving action on the impressions. Were it purely passive, did it not react on impressions, clutching them in its grasp and *impressing on them its forms*, sensations would be the mirror-like reflections of objects, and there would be no mental reconstructions, except those effected by the Understanding. But this would be an upsetting of the whole Kantian system. It would destroy his distinction between thing *per se* and phenomenon. It would present all the elements given in Sense as elements of things *per se*. Space and Time would no longer be subjective conditions impressed on objects, but objective condi-

\* *Critick of Pure Reason*, p. 21. † See the first ed. of the *Kritik*, pp. 642, 656.

‡ HERBART: *Psychologie als Wissenschaft*, 2. Theil, § 125.

is impressed on the subject. Sensibility would no longer be a recipient, but a mere receptacle.\*

Let me admit, however, that it is not quite certain whether Kant foresaw the reach of such an interpretation. The notation of the terms Receptivity and Sensibility may have misled him, as they seem to have misled many German and English writers. If we turn to his *Anthropologie* for an elucidation, this is what we read: 'As respects the state of Representation my mind (Gemüth) is either *active* and exerts *power* (*facultas*), or it is *suffering* [passive] and consists in *graspiness* (*Empfänglichkeit*, *receptivitas*). A cognition attains both bound in one. . . . Representations in respect of which the mind is suffering, through which therefore the object is *affected*, belong to Sensibility; those, however, which contain merely an *action* (thought) belong to the intellect. The former has the character of *passivity*.' †

No language seems plainer, and it reads like a complete reversal of the position I am maintaining. It is on the strength of such language here, and in some other places, that I made the qualified assertion respecting his views. Convinced as I am that a consistent Kantist cannot maintain Sensibility to be distinguishable from Understanding by the simple character of inactivity as opposed to activity, but only by the character of receptivity as opposed to spontaneity, I doubt whether Kant himself may not have understood the language in the sense which some of his readers have adopted. The question is not easy of answer, for Kant,

Mr. Mahaffy truly remarks, although a very technical is no means an accurate writer; and although in the present use his words seem unequivocal enough, it is eminently probable that they misrepresent his meaning. ‡ Let us try

\* SCHELLING, in his critique of COUSIN, reproaches him with overlooking this activity, which unconsciously transforms an impression into a representation, COUSIN only admitting the activity of voluntary attention. FICHTE also expressly teaches that passivity (*Leiden*) is only a quantum of activity. *Wissenschaftslehre*, pp. 70, 101.

† *Anthropologie*, I. Theil, § 7, pp. 137.

‡ Since this was written, I have met with a striking confirmation of the correctness of my interpretation of KANT; and it is the more valuable, be-

if we cannot interpret them according to the Kantian doctrine.

Sensibility is receptive, and as such passive. Does this mean that Sensibility in itself is not an agent in mental operations, that it is inactive? No. Sensibility is one of the organs of the Intellect through which things are grasped. It is distinguished from the other mental organs in having a bodily organ (Sense) as the immediate condition of its action. Because, under their more familiar aspect, the senses are regarded solely as bodily organs, their action as physiological, and in this are discriminated from Thought, which is mental function, there is a general disposition to regard Sensibility as essentially opposed to Thought. Yet until bodily actions become psychical they are not sensations, in the true significance of the term. Sensations are naked impressions until clothed in mental forms, when they are intuited. Intuition is the *action* of intuiting. All sensations must be represented under the forms of Space and Time, these being the two supreme genera or conditions rendering physical sensation possible as psychical sensation.

Since therefore we have in Sensibility a psychical side—the pure *à priori* forms—and a physical side, the bodily organs,—we may understand how it is passive in reference to the bodies which act upon it, and active in reference to the

cause not only will the interpretation seem paradoxical to most students, but a doubt is permissible whether Kant himself held the view attributed to him as a necessary part of his doctrine. In such a case, it is decisive when we find Kant's earliest illustrious disciple, REINHOLD, expounding the Kantian doctrine of Intuition precisely as I have interpreted it. REINHOLD limits receptivity to the *matter* of a representation; its *form* is given by the activity of the faculty—'apprehension,' he calls it: 'sie ist die erste Handlung des formgebenden Vermögens, der erste und geringste Grad der Spontaneität.'—(*Neue Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens*; III. Buch: *Theorie der Sinnlichkeit*, p. 359.)

On the other hand it must be admitted, that another disciple of Kant suggests this very interpretation as an improvement. In his *Neue Kritik der Vernunft*, FRIES says that Kant's phrase, 'the forms of sensibility,' is ambiguous; since it may mean either that Space and Time are the forms which Sensibility *has*, or that they *are* the forms which spring from Sense; the second is the correct meaning, according to FRIES, for the form which Sensibility *has* is not Space, but rather the pure Intuition—our mathematical intuitive faculty. This *Anschauungsvermögen* is erroneously styled a receptivity. Its receptivity consists in its excitability. But the intuition itself, *Das Anschauen*, is spontaneity. So diversely may KANT be interpreted by disciples.

ul which reacts. The necessity it is under of being stimulated by things before its reactivity is called out—there being ly the bodily organs of Sense as the direct medium of communication between things and the soul—is characterised by the term Receptivity. It must be borne in mind that Kant applies the term Receptivity to the Inner Sense no less than to the bodily Senses; and 'when the Ego beholds itself, intuitively itself, the Ego is passive, and suffers, inasmuch as it is directly affected through the play of thought' (*leidet sofern durch sein eigenes Gedankenspiel afficirt wird*).<sup>\*</sup> Now no one will venture to question the activity of the Ego. The Receptivity of Sense, as we have over and over again declared, is simply the necessity of direct presentation of the object. But as this necessity does not exist for the Understanding which simply acts by conjoining the elements furnished through Sensibility, the term Spontaneity is applied as distinguishing the synthetic activity of Judgment. This, Kant says, 'is of all Representations the only one that cannot be given through objects, but can only be arranged by the subject itself because it is an act of its spontaneity.'<sup>†</sup>

Having thus established the precise meaning in which we are to understand the application of the distinction between Receptivity and Spontaneity, characteristic of Sensibility and Understanding, we may now examine in what respect Intuition can be regarded as Thought,—not in the Kantian acceptance of the term, but in the ordinary English acceptance of it. Kant's phraseology may all the more be disregarded since he himself constantly violated it. Although emphatically declaring that Space and Time are intuitions, and not concepts, it has already been noted that he also speaks of them as concepts, and even says that he has 'succeeded in distinguishing and isolating the pure elementary concepts of Sensibility (Space and Time) from those of the Understanding.'<sup>‡</sup>

<sup>\*</sup> *Anthropologie*, § 23.

<sup>†</sup> *Kritik: Deduction d. v. Verstandesbegriffe*, § 15, p. 128.

<sup>‡</sup> *Prolegomena zu jeder künftigen Metaphysik*, § 39, p. 244: 'die reinen Elementarbegriffe der Sinnlichkeit (Raum und Zeit) von denen des Verstandes zu unterscheiden und abzusondern.'



We will first show that he regarded Intuition as an intellectual power, *Seelenkraft*. In his letter to Herz of June 7, 1771, he speaks of the importance of discerning clearly the difference between objects and the subjective principles of the forces of the human mind, not those of Sensibility alone, but also those of Understanding ('was auf subjectivischen Principien der menschlichen Seelenkräfte, nicht allein der Sinnlichkeit, sondern auch des Verstandes beruht'); and in many passages he speaks of it as an *Erkenntnisskraft*. Now a force that is not active, an intellectual faculty that is not a thinking faculty, is a *contradictio in adjecto*.

We will next show that, however it may vary from the Kantian terminology, the phrase Forms of Thought correctly expresses in English the Kantian meaning. No one, who has followed us through the preceding section, can have a doubt on the matter; but we may not unprofitably show that so eminent an expositor as Kuno Fischer adopts a similar view. We have already quoted him as setting forth the community of the three faculties; let us now consider the following passage: 'Space and time are the primitive operations of the intuiting Reason—*die ursprünglichen Handlungen der anschauenden Vernunft*—the Categories are the primitive operations of the pure understanding.\* Two points are noticeable: 1. That Intuition is expressly named an operation. 2. That it is an operation of Reason. As an operation, he calls attention to its distinction from an innate idea. Intuitions and judgments are not innate as Descartes and Leibnitz supposed, but primitive operations, necessary functions. 'As mathematical quantities only come into existence, by being intuited or constructed, so the pure concepts only exist when they are thought.' A few pages further on, Fischer says: 'The Intuition produces the form, the sensation produces the content of a phenomenon. The form of every phenomenon is *à priori*; the content is given as a sensuous datum from without, that is to say not produced by the Pure Reason, and hence *à posteriori*.'

\* KUNO FISCHER, iii. 381.

ies remarks on the unfortunate ambiguity in the words *ig in ung*, such as *Anschauung*, *Vorstellung*; which exists in our English words ending *ion*, as Sensation, Action, they signify both the acting and the act, the mind feel- and the object felt. Intuition is Beholding; considered ctively, it is a mental operation; objectively, it is the act of that operation, the Beheld. Time and Space may fore be considered as pure forms of the mental operation lding; or as products of that operation. In the one case are transcendental, in the other empirical. Just as we k of Sensation in general, and of particular sensations, Kant speaks of intuition as the general faculty, and of tions as the acts and products of that faculty.\* We times hear it asserted that Space and Time are Forms, equently neither acts nor products. Are they not both? pure Forms they are simple Possibilities; as Intuitions are acts; and as Concepts (*Begriffe*) they are certainly ucts. It is a mistake to suppose because Space and are pure forms which exist ready made, so to speak, *a priori* in the mind, that therefore the mind is not e *through* these forms, *under* these conditions. In no can we escape the admission of the mind as active, 1 it passes out of the potential into the actual condition, the pure forms which Kant assumes as ready made are potential. On this point we shall have to enlarge in ising the *Critique*.

we now come to the second point in Kuno Fischer's

Time and Space are not simply forms of sensuous Intuition, but Intuitions selves (which contain a manifold), consequently represent this manifold in termination *a priori* of the unity.' KANT adds in a note: 'Space repre- l as an object (*Gegenstand*) such as Geometry requires, contains more than mple form of Intuition, namely, the *comprehension* of the manifold in an e representation, according to the Form of Sensibility, so that the *Form of tion* simply gives the manifold, but the *formal Intuition* gives the unity. unity I had only assigned to Sensibility, in the *Asthetik*, to indicate that antecedent to all concepts, although indeed it *presupposes a synthesis which not belong to the senses*, through which alone, however, all concepts of Space Time are rendered possible.'—*Kritik*; 'Deduction d. r. Verstandesbegriffe,'

, p. 147.

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sentence: Intuition is said to be an operation of Reason. On a superficial view this seems a perversion of Kant, not less monstrous than the speaking of Space and Time as Forms of Thought. And it is so; not less monstrous; not more; for there is no perversion in either case. The ambiguity is in both cases similar. Kant uses the term Reason with two very different meanings: in the one it signifies the general faculty which contains all the principles of cognition; in the other it signifies the particular faculty which contains only the regulative principles. It is both the supreme genus, usually spoken of as Pure Reason, and the subgenus, Vernunft, having a co-ordinate rank with Sensibility and Understanding. In like manner English writers use the term Thought as the supreme genus containing all activity of the Thinking Principle; and as the subgenus containing only combinations of ideas, apart from emotions and sensations. Thought in the abstract always means mental activity in the abstract; and the phrase Forms of Thought was applied to Space and Time, *not* because Intuition furnishes the matter to Thought (in Kant's sense)—and forms of Intuition must therefore indirectly be forms of Thought—but because Intuition equally with Judgment is a mental function, and as such is Thought.

I endeavoured to make this clear in the Letters published in *Nature*; but my opponents were unconvinced, and I can only hope that the result of the foregoing discussion will be more successful. One point more is all that need be noticed. It cannot be passed over without slighting the challenge of one who deserves respect. In my Letters I had explained the Kantian meaning of intuition to be that of a mental function, differing from Judgment as intuitive thought differs from discursive thought. Dr. Ingleby therefore declared the main issue between us to be this: 'Did Kant mean that man has Intuitive Thought?' And this question Dr. Ingleby emphatically negatives. Nor can I impugn his denial, seeing that he declares that he limits 'Thought as the genus of which Understanding and Reason are the

cies.\* I must first remark that such a restriction is simply begging the question against an adversary who wrongly included Intuition under the genus, *beside* Understanding and Reason. Not to insist on this, let me answer

Ingleby's question, by first asking: Is it correct, in English, to speak of forms of Reason as forms of Thought? this be admitted—and it must be admitted unless general usage be made to give way to particular interpretations—the question in which he expresses the main issue may be thus put: Did Kant mean that man has Intuitive Reason? The answer is unequivocal. In his chapter on the Discipline of Pure Reason, Kant declares that he has 'attempted to show a great difference which exists between the *discursive employment of reason* in the sphere of conceptions and its *intuitive exercise* by means of the construction of conceptions. . . . Our knowledge relates finally to possible intuitions, for it is sense alone that present objects to the mind. An *a priori* non-empirical conception contains either a pure intuition and in this case it can be constructed—or it contains nothing but the synthesis of possible intuition, which was not even *a priori*. In this latter case it may help us to form synthetic *a priori* judgments, but only in the discursive method of conceptions, not in the intuitive by means of the construction of conceptions.'†

It is not to vindicate the use of a phrase by others and myself that I have entered on this digression, but to bring it by means of it some obscure and ill-understood points in Kant's teaching. So little importance do I attach to the phrase 'forms of Thought' that henceforth I shall avoid it; not because it improperly expresses Kant's meaning, but because writers like Prof. Sylvester, Dr. Ingleby, Prof. Bradley, and Mr. Monck have misinterpreted it into a perversion of Kant's meaning; and as it is eminently desirable not

\* *Nature*, No. 14, p. 361.

† *Kritik*, p. 543. The passage is quoted from Mr. MEIKLEJOHN's translation, 1883. The propriety of KUNO FISCHER's phrase is thus evident, as also that of G. MAHAFFY, p. 248, 'Reason only intuits through space and time.'

to add to the already large amount of equivocal phrases current, may we not replace Forms of Thought by Mental Forms, and thus escape the danger?

### § VII. RESULTS REACHED.

Reviewing the exposition of Kant's doctrine, we are landed in the conclusion that knowledge is, in its very constitution, purely subjective, *ergo* relative. To attempt to transcend the sphere of Consciousness is vain and hopeless; nor is it wise to deplore that we are 'cabin'd, cribb'd, confined' within that sphere from which we never can escape. As well might the bird, when feeling the resistance of the air, wish that it were *in vacuo*, thinking that there it might fly with perfect ease. Let us therefore content ourselves with our own kingdom, instead of crossing perilous seas in search of kingdoms inaccessible to man. Let us learn our weakness.\*

FIRST RESULT.—A knowledge of things *per se* (*Dinge an sich*) is impossible, so long as knowledge remains composed as at present; consequently Ontology, as a science, is impossible.

But, it may be asked, if we never knew noumena (*Dinge an sich*), how do we know that they exist? The answer is simple: Their existence is a necessary postulate. Although we can only know the appearances of things, we are forced to conclude that the things exist. Thus, in the case of a rainbow, we discover that it is only the appearance of certain drops of water: these drops of water again, although owing their qualities to our Sensibility, nevertheless exist. They do not exist *as* drops of water, because drops of water are but phenomena; but there is an unknown something which, when affecting our Sensibility, appears to us as drops of water. Of this unknown something we can affirm nothing except that it necessarily exists because it affects us. We

\* Compare the fine passage at the close of the Introduction to the *Kritik*.

a conscious of being affected. We are conscious also that at which affects us must be something different from ourselves. This the law of causation reveals to us.

A phenomenon, inasmuch as it is an appearance, presupposes a noumenon—a thing *which appears*,—but this noumenon, which is a necessary postulate, is only a negation to it. It can never be positively known; it can only be known under the conditions of Sense and Understanding, *ergo* as a phenomenon.

SECOND RESULT.—The existence of an external world is a necessary postulate, but its existence is only logically affirmed.

From the foregoing it appears that we are unable to know anything respecting things *per se*; consequently we can never predicate of our knowledge that it has objective truth.

But our knowledge being purely subjective and relative, can we have no certainty?—are we to embrace scepticism? No.

THIRD RESULT.—Our knowledge, though relative, is *certain*. We have ideas \* independent of experience; and these ideas have the character of universality and necessity. Although we are not entitled to conclude that our subjective knowledge is completely true as an expression of the objective fact, yet we are forced to conclude that within its own sphere it is true.

FOURTH RESULT.—The veracity of consciousness is established.

FIFTH RESULT.—With the veracity of consciousness, is established the certainty of morals.

It is here we see the importance of Kant's analysis of the mind. Those who reproach him with having ended, like Hume, in scepticism, can only have attended to his *Critique of the Pure Reason*, which certainly does, as we said before, furnish a scientific basis for scepticism. It proves that

\* Here we see the effect of confusing cognitions with conditions of cognition. It is not ideas that are independent of experience, but the organic conditions on which ideas depend.

knowledge is relative; that we cannot assume things external to us to be as we conceive them: in a word, that Ontology is impossible.

So far Kant goes with Hume. This is the goal they both attain. This is the limit they agree to set to the powers of the mind. But the different views they took of the nature of mind led to the difference we before noted respecting the certainty of knowledge. Kant having shown that consciousness, as far as it extended, was veracious; and having shown that in consciousness certain elements were given which were not derived from experience, but which were necessarily *true*; it followed that whatever was found in consciousness independent of Experience, was to be trusted without dispute.

If in consciousness I find the ideas of God, and Virtue, I cannot escape believing in God, and Virtue. This belief of mine is, I admit, practical, not theoretical; it is founded on a *certainty*, not on a *demonstration*; it is an ultimate fact, from which I cannot escape—it is not a conclusion deduced by reason.

The attempt to demonstrate the existence of God is an impossible attempt. Reason is utterly incompetent to the *task*. The attempt to penetrate the essence of things—to know things *per se*—to know noumena—is also an impossible attempt. And yet that God exists, that the World exists, are irresistible convictions.

There is another certitude, therefore, besides that derived from demonstration, and this is moral certitude, which is grounded upon belief. I cannot say, 'it is morally certain that God exists,' but I must say, 'I am morally certain that God exists.'

Here comes into play the operation of what Kant calls 'the intelligible character.' What is that? It is that which is not and cannot be an object of the senses, not a phenomenon. If an object which is a phenomenon when under the conditions of Sense and Understanding, possesses in itself a faculty not sensible, yet capable of affecting sense, this faculty, or this *causality*, may be regarded under two aspects

under the *intelligible* aspect in which its action *per se* is presented, and under the *sensible* aspect in which its sensuous effects are presented. 'For as phenomena not being things *per se* must have a transcendental object for their basis, there is no reason why we should not ascribe to this object, in addition to the property by which it appears in effect, a causality which does not appear.' In other words, the causality must have a cause, and this cause is *intelligible* only, not phenomenal. Since every cause must have a *character*, without which it would not be cause, the phenomenal causality is its empirical character; the noumenal is its intelligible character. Whatever is true of empirical causality must be false of intelligible cause. In phenomenal causality everything is subject to Time, succession. But the intelligible cause is free from all conditions. In a world removed from the sensuous restrictions of Time, no action begins or ceases, no action is determined by an antecedent. In such a world nothing happens, there is nothing which requires dynamical determination, and for the same reason no nexus between phenomena. 'It would be quite correct to say that the subject originates its effect in the sensible world from itself, spontaneously, although the action does not begin in itself.' In one word, this is the region of pure Freedom, which transcends the region of Necessity, or the phenomenal world.

It is this idea of Freedom which forms the basis of Kant's *Critique of the Practical Reason*, an investigation into the Reason, no longer as purely theoretical, but as practical. Man is a being who acts as well as knows. This activity must have some principle, and that principle is *freedom of will*.

As in the theoretical part of Kant's system we saw the Suprasensible and Unconditioned presupposed as existent (under the name of things *per se*), but not susceptible of being known or specified; so in this practical part of the system we find the principle of Freedom altogether abstract and indeterminate. It realises itself in acts.



In the very constitution of his conscience, man discovers the existence of certain rules which he is imperatively forced to impose upon his actions; in the same way as he is forced by the constitution of his reason to impose certain laws upon the materials furnished him from without. These moral laws have likewise the character of universality and necessity. The idea of virtue never could be acquired in experience, since all we know of virtuous actions falls short of this ideal which we are compelled to uphold as a type. The unalterable idea of justice is likewise found, *à priori*, in the conscience of men. This indeed has been denied by some philosophers; but all *à priori* truths have been denied by them. They cite the cruel customs of some savage races as proofs that the idea of justice is not universal.\* Thus, some tribes are known to kill their old men when grown too feeble; and they test their strength by making these old men hold on to the branch of a tree, which is violently shaken, and those that fall are pronounced too weak to live. But even here, in spite of the atrocity, we see the fundamental ideas of justice. Why should they not abandon these aged men to all the horrors of famine and disease? and why put them to a test? Look where you will, the varied customs of the various nations peopling the earth will show you different notions of what is just and what is unjust; but the *à priori* idea of justice—the moral law from which no conscience can be free—that you will find omnipresent.

Out of this moral law the Practical Reason deduces regulation of society. One might object indeed to it that there is a manifest contradiction in deducing practical conclusions from a premise which is confessedly unknowable. So far from practical guidance needing the inspiration and the sanction of motives drawn from a source which is above and beyond Experience, it is precisely in practical life that the guidance of Experience is sufficient and felt to be so. Only speculative restlessness requires better bread than ca

\* Kant alludes to Locke.

be made of wheat. But Kant, aware of the all-shattering force of his critical principles, and dreading for others, if not for himself, the destruction of all Theology and theological Ethics, which the logical application of these principles necessarily effected, tried to rescue men from practical scepticism, and not content with the only alternative open to him, namely, to set aside the speculative basis altogether, and rely solely on Experience, he attempted to justify on speculative grounds the conclusions which speculation repudiated. He boldly raised a structure upon a basis which he had shown to be the negation of all knowledge; and thus followed the metaphysical procedure so happily expressed by Royer Collard, *de puiser l'ignorance à sa source la plus élevée.*

### § VIII. CRITICISM OF THE 'KRITIK.'

Although the foregoing exposition has only included the chief positions of the Critical Philosophy, it will serve perhaps both as an introduction to the study, and an indication of the contribution to History which that system made. In pursuance of our plan we must now scrutinise the value of that contribution. The distinction between Analytic and Synthetic judgments, and the assumption of universal and necessary judgments being only attainable *à priori*, we have already seen reason to reject; yet as these are the foundations on which the whole system rests, it may be desirable to enforce our rejection by showing that not only does Experience furnish judgments universal and necessary, but that the attempt to derive them from any other source is chimerical and without a basis.

First let us understand what Experience includes. I have already (*Prolegomena*, § 59) noticed Kant's unwarrantable restriction of it to mere sensation. Only on such a restriction is his argument tenable for a moment. Yet he himself often uses Experience as the product of sensation and

rationation;\* which is all we claim as a ground for our discussion. If therefore by Experience we mean the sum of the mental modifications, it is clear that since necessary and universal judgments are found among those modifications, and cannot be found apart from them, they also must belong to the domain of Experience. When the advocates of the *a priori* existence of such principles appeal to the universality and necessity of certain judgments as irresistible proof of their being beyond the reach of Experience, they commit a double oversight: they overlook the fact that these judgments are generalisations from experience; and they overlook the fact that the universality and necessity are only applicable to the phenomenal world. When I say that an axiom or a mathematical proposition is necessarily true, and true in all times and places, what ground have I for this assertion, except that I am compelled to think so, cannot think otherwise, even when extending the proposition beyond the range of my experience? But this compulsion is subjective; it is the constitution of my mind which forces me to think a certain proposition in a certain way, and no other. I do not know that in other worlds, and under other conditions, the straight line will be the shortest path between two points; for I know nothing of other worlds. If I am compelled to think this proposition it is because it expresses *all* the presupposed mathematical elements. I am equally compelled to think that every son must have had a father and a mother. In other worlds men *may* be spontaneous products of 'equivocal generation.' I do not know what may be or may not be. I do not therefore assert the universality and necessity of the *conditions*; but I nevertheless assert the universality and necessity of every identical proposition; so long as its terms remain unaltered, any particular proposition

\* BONA MEYER remarks truly on this point, that KANT not seldom, where he speaks of Experience, has chiefly in view the sensuous aspect of this twofold product; and it then means no more than our perception of the external phenomena of bodies and the internal phenomena of our minds; and from this Experience, *a priori* concepts cannot be derived.—*Kant's Psychologie dargestellt und erörtert*, 1870, p. 161.

must be universally true. I do not assert that every man *must* have had a father and a mother; I assert that every *son* must. I cannot conceive it otherwise, because this expresses all my experience. I cannot conceive 'son' otherwise than in relation to 'parents,' because this is what the terms express: the proposition is identical.

Kant says with emphasis—and his whole system is an illustration of it—that all knowledge begins in Experience, that no ideas have reality except in as far as they reflect Experience. The logical conclusion would be that all judgments, even the universal judgments, must be products of Experience. But he says, No; although all knowledge begins with Experience it is not all *derived* from it. Over and above the Experience there are the conditions which render it possible, and which give it determinate directions. These conditions he considers *a priori*; the products are *a posteriori*.

Perverting the Aristotelian and Scholastic use of these terms, which made *a priori* judgments *ex causis*—and the *a posteriori* judgments *ex effectibus*—Kant twists the terms into a signification of judgments anterior to Experience and judgments posterior to Experience. He makes *a priori* mean that which springs from the mind itself; *a posteriori* that which springs from the mind in its experience of things. But this is not only a perversion of the Aristotelian distinction, it is a psychological perversion. We may justly say that Leverrier discovered Neptune *a priori*. Before any human eye had seen that planet, his intellect had foreseen it. He had determined its position before experience of it; but the conditions of that determination had been previously furnished by experience. He had foreseen it, because he had seen the effects in the causes; but these causes had previously been seen in phenomena. The generalisations from Experience daily enable us to foresee *a priori* what effects will result.\* But we can never take our stand-

\* FICHTE in the Introduction to the *Wissenschaftslehre* excellently remarks that the *a priori* and *a posteriori* are in a true philosophy not two but one viewed in different ways. Thus a number is *a posteriori* when regarded as *given*; it is *a priori* when regarded as a product of its factors.

ing-point outside Experience, and thence survey phenomena. Yet this is what Kant professes to do with his distinction of *d priori* as the rational origin, from the *d posteriori* as the experimental origin. He makes the logical separation real. Having first isolated sensation from its conditions and its products, he can have no difficulty in showing that Knowledge contains other elements besides sensation. Did any one ever maintain that sensation *alone* was capable of furnishing knowledge? Did any one ever maintain that beside the mere feeling excited by the contact of sense with an object, there was not also the necessary implication of certain organic conditions which rendered the feeling possible, and which gave it its special character? Did any one ever maintain that there was not a general uniformity in these conditions which rendered the results uniform, so that all minds would feel alike when all were acted on alike; and also a certain individuality in these conditions, whereby, amid general uniformity of result, there would likewise be individuality of impressions? That psychologists were far from clear on this point may be admitted; but no one ever altogether overlooked it.

Although the spontaneity of Mind was never *wholly* denied, even by those of the Sensational School who regarded Mind as a product of the Senses, nevertheless opinions on this important point were singularly vague. Locke, as we have seen, presupposed certain native Faculties. Condillac presupposed certain native Capacities. Cabanis and de Tracy presupposed certain Laws of Sensibility. All the schools presupposed certain laws of mental combination. These constituted the subjective conditions of Experience—whatever spontaneity could be attributed to the Mind was assigned to them. But no one accurately defined them. It was Kant's immense merit to have seen clearly the need of accurately determining what these subjective conditions were. He was the first who attempted a clear exposition of the subjective and objective elements in Thought. The attempt made an epoch. Unhappily, having approached a psycho-

logical problem from the wrong side, and employing the Metaphysical Method of subjective analysis where the Biological Method of objective analysis was equally indispensable, he not only failed to discover what were the conditions of Sensibility and the Laws of Thought, but by the very potency of his genius retarded progress in that direction.

His initial mistake, almost inevitable on the Method he pursued, is that of transporting into Psychology the old Aristotelian error of Matter and Form as elements separable in reality because they are separable in abstraction. Hence the Forms of Thought became for him ready-made factors, anterior to and independent of Experience. Had he profoundly considered the Aristotelian distinction, he must have had his eyes opened to the conclusion that the Forms of Thought should be sought either physiologically, *i.e.* in the organic conditions; or psychologically, *i.e.* in the evolution of Thought. The fact that we think at all is assuredly determined by our being so organised that thought is the activity of the organs; this organisation is therefore *a priori*, *i.e.* anterior to any thought. Now physiological, and psychological, analysis discloses that we are forced to think as *successive* what in nature is *simultaneous*; that deep down in the very constitution of consciousness lies the indispensable condition of *change*; that inwoven with all psychical experience there is the unalterable presence of the action of *judgment*—the union of a predicate with a subject; these, and several other conditions of Thought, which we cannot expound here, must have disclosed themselves to him; but how would they have presented themselves? as *ready-made* Forms (*fertige Formen*), or as Forms *in the making*? as pre-existent factors, or as evolved results? The Aristotelians, and with them Kant, confounding the potential with the actual, the conditions with the results, would answer this question plainly in favour of the first alternative. Because the form of the oak is evolved from the acorn, they would declare the form to pre-exist in the acorn.\* We, knowing

\* On this fallacy see what is said in the *Prolegomena* to this History, § 51. Compare also the chapters on LEIBNITZ and HEGEL.

that under suitable conditions the acorn will develop into the oak, and, if it develop at all, will assume the Form of an oak, and no other, are allowed to say without danger that the stem, branches, and foliage are organic Forms potentially existing in the acorn. But a scientific Botany is not content with this. Nor will it permit us to say that stem, branches, and foliage are ready made in the acorn, prior to all those influences of heat, moisture, air and manure, which will render possible their evolution. In like manner a scientific Psychology refuses to accept the evolved results of Experience as *a priori* conditions of Experience; refuses to accept the Forms *into* which Thought necessarily develops as the pre-existing and perfected Forms *through* which it is determined.

That Kant did regard the Forms as wholly independent of organic conditions, is certain. He was not satisfied with assuming the existence of original aptitudes out of which the Forms might grow. 'It is quite possible,' he says, 'that some one may propose a sort of preformation system of Pure Reason, in which the Categories are neither self-conceived, *a priori* first principles of cognition, nor derived from experience, but are merely aptitudes for thought implanted in us contemporaneously with our existence.' He rejects this suggestion on the ground that 'the Categories would thereby lose their character of objective necessity. Nor would there be wanting persons to deny the subjective necessity of the Categories, though they must feel it. Certainly we could never dispute with any one about that which merely depended on the manner in which he was organised.'

Why not? Can we have any better security? And does not Kant himself reduce all certainty to this subjective ground, denying that we can have objective certainty?

Indeed, the very outcome of the *Kritik* is that we can have no knowledge of anything beyond the range of our subjectivity; yet nevertheless we are told that the very necessity and universality of judgments, which are only valid for the world of sense, and cannot be applied to noumena, prove the

mind to be endowed with possessions not organically dependent upon Sense.

To make his error apparent, let us see it as a biological proposition. Growth may be regarded as the analogue of Experience; it is the experience of the body, as experience is the growth of the mind. As an abstract term it comprehends a multiplicity of concretes. Growth depends on Nutrition, Experience on Sensation. Nutrition has its conditions, and laws, which determine its direction; we may consider it *d priori*, when we consider Nutrition *ex causis*; or *d posteriori* when we consider it as Growth, *ex effectibus*. The conditions and laws have to be ascertained by research; and, when ascertained, may be expressed in neat formulas. But what should we biologists say to a philosopher who, having learned these formulas, pretended that they were Forms of Life, pre-existent to all Growth, independent of all Nutrition, drawn from a higher source? We should say what positive psychologists will say to Kant: you are committing the metaphysical fallacy of erecting your *posterius* into a *prius*, your product into a factor.

The distinction between *d priori* and *d posteriori* is not that of antecedent to experience and subsequent to experience, since both are judgments of the Intellect, and there is no Intellect in reality (but only as a potentiality) before Experience, which is Intellect in action; the distinction is therefore logical only: *d priori* when *ex causis*, when we view the conditions; *d posteriori* when *ex effectibus*, when we view the *conditions in action* or in result. Kant, who denied Innate Ideas, and declared all ideas *d priori* and *d posteriori* to be acquired, nevertheless supposed that the conditions of Thought might be isolated, and might exist apart, because they could be logically separated from the acts of Thought.

The Mental Forms, like the Vital Forms, may be abstracted from the particular acts of the organism and their consequences; just as we may abstract the form of a river, and draw it on a map, without taking in either the river-stream or the river-banks. Yet, just as no one conceives this Form



to have pre-existed, but knows that it was produced as the resultant of the stream-force on the one hand, and the cohesive resistance of the banks on the other, each co-operant, each opposed; so do we conceive that Vital Forms and Mental Forms are the products of organic conditions acting on the stimulus of external objects.

Here may be raised the interesting question: In what sense did Kant understand the Mental Forms? And first: Did he understand them as ready-made moulds, into which the contents of unshaped material were poured? I must confess that, after painful search, I am unable to extract from his pages any decisive answer. That the forms lie ready in the mind, and were not produced by sensations, is unequivocally and uniformly asserted; but whether he regarded these forms as more than potential existences—the only possible forms in which sensation and thought could become actual—cannot positively be decided. At times his language is unequivocal. Here is a brief sentence from the first edition: 'Space and Time are indeed *a priori* Representations which dwell with us as Forms of our sensuous Intuition, even before a real object has through sensation determined our Sense to represent it under those sensuous relations.'

The vacillation of expression may be due to his never having felt the real difficulty, never having distinguished the potential form from the actual form. An illustration may help us here. Crystals have their special forms. We, having discovered these, assert that the solutions, *when* they crystallise, must do so in these forms, and none other: such are the only forms these solutions will assume in crystallisation. The physicist is under no misgiving on this point; but the metaphysicist, failing to appreciate the distinction between possibility and reality, concludes that the forms pre-exist in the solution. Such I incline to think was the fallacy which misled Kant. In his reply to Eberhard\* he

\* In the edit. of ROSENKRANZ, i. 444.

the *Critique* 'allows of no innate or unacquired (*anerworbene*) representations; all of them, intuitions and concepts, are acquired. But there is, to speak with Jurists, a *passive* acquisition or inheritance, consequently of that which previously did not exist, hence belonged to us before this act. Such are the Form of things in general and Time, and the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition; for neither of these are drawn from objects as material to our cognitive faculty, but are brought *à priori* into the faculty out of itself. There must, however, be a *ground* or condition in the mind which renders possible these representations are so and not otherwise, and this *ground* or condition is innate. So, for example, the first condition of the possibility of an intuition of Space is not the representation of Space itself. (So ist der *ursprüngliche* Grund der Möglichkeit einer Raumanschauung angeboren, nicht die Raumvorstellung selbst.) He deduces the whole group of *à priori* form-giving principles as the *conditions of mental action*. In so far he is not at variance with philosophers of the experiential school. But observe the dilemma: If these principles are merely *conditions*, which only come into actual existence through experience, then their *à priori* existence is a metaphysical *assumption*; whereas, if they are *à priori*, and pre-exist as ready-forms in the mind, then they are, what Kant emphatically declares them not to be, innate.

The school of Locke pronounced that all our knowledge is limited to experience of things as they appear to us; consequently Ontology was impossible. The school of Descartes maintained that we have another purer source of knowledge, anterior to Experience, authenticated by the *marks* of necessity and universality, which prove it to be *true*; since these characters cannot be given *à posteriori*; Ontology is possible. This view was adopted by many of its followers, but Kant himself said: We have, it is true, an *à priori* source of knowledge, having this specified authentication; but inasmuch as it is only applicable to

the material of Experience, and not applicable beyond Experience, Ontology is impossible.

The followers were at least more consistent than their master. The very characters of necessity and universality fail to authenticate the *à priori* origin, inasmuch as only *within* the region of Experience are these applicable, and only *from* Experience could they have been evoked, being, as Kant admits, the forms of Experience in action, possibilities which become actualities in constituting Experience;\* as the conditions of Nutrition pass from conceivable possibility into visible actuality in Growth, or as the form of the river comes into existence when the conditions of that form (stream-force and bank-force) co-operate.

Our answer to the question: Did Kant understand the Mental Forms as ready-made moulds? must be, therefore, no less equivocal than his own exposition. We must say that he did regard them as ready-made, 'lying ready in the mind,' and in so far antecedent to all Experience, in so far *à priori*. We must also say that he did not regard them as actually existent, but only as potentially existent, the possible conditions of Experience; and in so far they are evolved in Experience, in so far *à posteriori*. From this equivocate and this contradiction there is no escape. Its origin must be sought in his false Method.

By refusing to consider the Mental Forms as results of the organism, Kant shut himself out from the possibility of discovering them. A little attention to biological data would have shown him that his enumeration of the forms was incomplete, and that his conception of them as ready-made was false. The forms he enumerates are too few to express the subjective conditions. He omits Pleasure and Pain, for example, which are inseparable elements of all Sensation, determining all Action. He says nothing of the various Senses, and their conditions; although obviously the reason

\* 'Space and Time, pure as these conceptions are from all that is empirical, and certain as it is that they are represented fully *à priori* in the mind, would be completely without objective validity, and without significance, if their necessary use in the objects of experience were not shown.'—*Critick*, p. 118.

by vibrations of a given rapidity produce only the sensation of light, and other vibrations only the sensation of heat, lies in the organisation of the retina and the skin-nerves. He would not deny that Light, Heat, and Sound, although special and not universal forms, were Forms of Sensibility in which we clothe the *Ding an sich*; just as Space and Time are universal Forms in which we clothe the *Ding an sich*. Nay, seeing that he used all his ingenuity to show that the Categories of the Understanding played the same part as the senses in respect of the objective world, it is surprising that he did not also see that *every* subjective condition was entitled to the rank of a Mental Form, an *a priori* element. Every organ necessarily brings with it its special forms, *i.e.* the special modes under which its activity can go on, modes which determine the reception of stimuli, and thus determine the sensation. Sounds and Images, in their subjective aspects, are not less *a priori* than Concepts. If we can only think under certain Categories, so likewise we can only feel under certain organic conditions.

Waiving, however, the incompleteness of his enumeration, and accepting Space and Time, the Categories, and the Ideas

Reason as the *summa genera*, I will consider only the solidity of his argumentation. Here, *in extenso*, are the four positions on which he grounds the *a priori* and purely subjective nature of Space.

'1. Space is not a conception which has been derived from outward experiences. For in order that certain sensations may relate to something without me (that is, something which occupies a different part of space from that in which I am); in like manner, in order that I may represent them not merely as without of and near each other, but also in separate places, the representation of space must already exist as a foundation. Consequently, the representation of space cannot be borrowed from the relations of external phenomena through experience; but on the contrary, this external experience is itself only possible through the said antecedent experience.

'2. Space, then, is a necessary representation, *a priori*, which serves for the foundation of all external intuitions. We never can imagine or make a representation to ourselves of the non-existence of space, though we must easily enough think that no objects are found in it. It must therefore be considered as the condition of the possibility of the phenomena, and by no means as a determination dependent on them;\* and is a representation, *a priori*, which necessarily supplies the basis for external phenomena.

'3. Space is no discursive, or, as we say, general conception of the relations of things, but a pure intuition. For in the first place we can only represent to ourselves one space; and when we talk of divers spaces, we mean only parts of one and the same space. Moreover, these parts cannot antecede this one all-embracing space, as the component parts from which the aggregate can be made up, but can be cogitated only as existing in it. Space is essentially one, and multiplicity in it depends solely upon limitations. Hence it follows that an *a priori* intuition (which is not empirical) lies at the root of all our conceptions of Space. Thus, moreover, the principles of geometry—for example, that in a triangle two sides together are greater than the third—are never deduced from general conceptions of line and triangle, but from intuition, and this *a priori* with apodeictic certainty.

'4. Space is represented as an infinite given quantity. Now every conception must indeed be considered as a representation which is contained in an infinite multitude of different possible representations, which therefore comprises these under itself; but no conception, as such, can be so conceived as if it contained within itself an infinite multitude of representations. Nevertheless, Space is so conceived

\* Here the confusion between possible and actual is felt. The Space-form, as a possibility, is not dependent on objects; but as an actuality, it is evolved by objects, and is therefore dependent on them. Kant forgets that in thinking objects away, we still leave the thinker as an object in space. Our familiar experience of things removed from before our eyes, leaving what is called 'empty space' behind, enables us to conceive all objects (except ourselves) removed.

, for all parts of space are equally capable of being produced into infinity. Consequently, the original representation of Space is an intuition *à priori*, and not a conception.\*

Psychologists of the experiential school expound the generation of our idea of Space as an abstract idea gathered from concrete experiences. Kuno Fischer proclaims this generation to be a perfect illustration of what an explanation could not be.† 'It presupposes,' he says, 'that which it is to explain. Space and Time are already perfectly present in the experiences from which they are supposed to be abstracted. There is no impression, no perception, no representation, which is *not* in Space and Time.' Surely it must be said of all abstractions, that they are presupposed in their elements? He will not allow this. According to him, the abstract idea Man is made up of particular ideas, men; but Space and Time are not made up of spaces and times, they precede these particulars. 'It is impossible to deduce Space and Time from our perceptions, simply because our perceptions are only possible through Space and Time.'

The fallacy of the argument may most briefly and convincingly be exhibited in an illustration. He would admit that Experience is not *à priori*. If it has any meaning at all, it is *à posteriori*. Apply his argument to it. 'Experience cannot be derived from without. It is impossible to deduce sensations and perceptions from Experience, because they presuppose it; in every particular experience there is the antecedent groundwork Experience which determines the possibility of the particular.'

Kant would probably answer, 'No, there is an *à priori* condition, which renders Experience possible; there is not an *à priori* experience.' To which one might reply that Space may have its *à priori* condition in the nature of the mental organism, but this condition is not itself Space; and

\* *Critick of Pure Reason*, p. 23. Compare UEBERWEG: *Grundriss der Gesch. der Philos.*, iii. p. 172, for an answer to this fourth position, showing that infinity is only a reflection predicated of possible space, actual space being always a finite concept.

† KUNO FISCHER: *Kant's Leben und die Grundlagen seiner Lehre*, 1860, p. 128. Compare his *Commentary*, p. 36.

Space therefore must be evolved as the product of the two coefficients, the organism on the one hand and the medium on the other, the two together making Experience. Disengaging the topic from the ambiguity of potential forms, we see that on Kant's own principles Space and Time are not *à priori*, not independent of, and anterior to, Experience; consequently that this pillar of the Critical Philosophy rests on a foundation of drifted sand. Yet, so completely has Kant's argumentation enchained the assent of his countrymen, that there is scarcely a single philosopher who has not accepted it; whereas it is rare to find a philosopher in England or France who does not reject it. To the German mind, whatever else may be open to doubt in Kant's system, the discovery of the true nature of Space and Time as *à priori* conditions of Experience admits no doubt.

No little confusion arises from the want of precise definitions. Sometimes Space means Place, sometimes Extension, sometimes Outness. *Place*, or that which contains objects, is obviously an abstract from Experience. *Extension* is likewise engendered in Experience. But the mere *Outness* which is said to underlie all our experiences of sense and to be *implied* in every conception of Place or Extension, is an element involved in Self-consciousness. The Ego cannot be conscious of Self without in the same act being equally conscious of Not Self. Whatever is not Self is out of Self. The inner and outer worlds thus contemporaneously emerge.

Looking at Consciousness in this way, and not by Psychogeny tracing the primitive conditions anterior to the emergence of Self, we may agree with Kant that Space, *i.e.* Outness, is a primitive and universal form of Consciousness in respect of the Not Self; and that Time is a primitive form of Self or Innerness. If Space be identified with Not Self, and Time with Change, they may be accepted as the primitive conditions of all *objective presentation*, and of all *subjective modification*; as such primitive conditions, they may be said to be virtually *à priori*. But in thus rescuing Kant's *à priori*,

moving it to another foundation, we wholly destroy his. He makes Space the form of the external senses condition of self-consciousness, and Time the form of eternal sense (not the condition of all consciousness). In *Kritik* he gives no description of these two senses, but in *Anthropologie* he is more explicit. This is what he stands by them.\* 'Sensibility as a cognitive faculty has two elements: Sense and Imagination. The first faculty of Intuition, when the objects are present: second, when the objects are absent. The senses, however again subdivided into the outer and inner (*sensus externus, internus*). The first is that in which the body is affected by bodily things; the second that in which it is affected through the mind. This latter, again, is to be distinguished from the feeling of Pleasure or Pain, which may be called the innermost sense (*sensus interior*). The bodily senses are divided into vital senses (*sensus vagus*) and the fixed senses (*sensus fixus*)—that is, 'the five senses,' and the 'real sensations' of modern writers. Kant passes in the five senses, explaining their share in the perception of external objects, and also their inner relations. He treats of the Inner Sense. 'It is not the pure apprehension, a consciousness of what the man *does*, for this belongs to the faculty of thought, but what the man *suffers*, in far as he is affected by the play of his own thought. There is only one Inner Sense, because it is not by its organs that man inwardly feels himself.' The truth is, that only by a loose metaphor can we speak of an Inner Sense at all; and the attempt to class it beside the other Senses leads to endless confusion. In the *Kritik*, Kant says that it is solely on account of the inner representations *given* to the mind without spontaneity that they are classed under Sensibility, which he had previously distinguished as receptivity. The chaotic nature of his classification reveals itself at every step. Thus he is forced to

\* *Anthropologie*, § 13, pp. 153-54.



confess that only three of his five Outer Senses are pre-eminently objective; the other two (Taste and Smell) are more subjective than objective, relating rather to feeling than to knowledge. Again, speaking of the Sense of Hearing, he says, 'The form of objects are not given by it, nor are articulate sounds in themselves objects, but only inward feelings.' He admits, moreover, that all the outer senses yield representations which become inward when the intensity of impressions is increased. But since he always defines the Inner Sense to be the consciousness of what is passing within (and in one place as the special Form under which the intuition of the inward changes is possible\*), it is clear that, on his own showing, to say Space is a Form of Sensibility is incorrect. It is not the form of Sensibility in general; not even of the outer senses; since we have numerous sensations from without which have no space-relations, sometimes not even that outness which belongs to all Not Self; and except as mere outness, it is incorrect to assign Space to Sensibility at all; for although there is a condition under which all intuition of objects is possible, this condition itself is not Space, but Space is the abstraction of all our concrete experiences of Outness. We must therefore say that Sensibility has *two directions*, one outwards, the other inwards; one relating to objects, the other to the feelings; one to Not Self, the other to Self. But it is no less clear, from Kant's principles, that the *direction* of Sensibility is not determined by a special sense, nor by an *a priori* Form, but by the nature and intensity of the sensation. There is no outer sense specially directed to the Not Self; no Form of Sense which determines this outward direction, and is itself Space. Many of the sensations received through the outer senses have no space-relations at all, and, when intense, cease to have even outness, and become inward feelings; on the other hand, inward feelings also acquire outness, and are 'objects' of Consciousness.

\* *Kritik: Transcend. Aesthetik*, § 2. p. 62.

to the very same tendency towards *projection* which arises all perception. For we must not be misled by the ideality with which sensations are projected outwards, either in the body, or at distances from the body; this is pure sensation itself, but an act of judgment; and who insisted on the pre-eminently receptive nature of Sensibility, ought not to have overlooked the fact that the projection outwards of a sensation felt within, was an act antecedent to the reception of an impression. Whether the act of Sensibility or Judgment might be a matter of terms; but that it was subsequent to the reception of the sensation would suffice to prove that it could not be a ready-made Form, or primary condition of Sensibility. A more penetrating psychology would have shown Kant instead of Space and Time being the primary conditions of Experience, the principle of Difference was the primary condition of Space and Time. Neither emerge until the distinction between Self and Not Self emerges. But on his own grounds, we must altogether reject the ascription of Space to the Outer Sense, and of Time to the Inner Sense. The mere outness, or externalisation, of sensation is the product of manifold experiences; as we know in the difficulty infants have in localising their sensations; it is admitted as anterior to Experience only by the logical act of transposing a result to the position of a principle. In this manner, the elements of Difference which are given in sensation, and from which Quantity and Number are deduced, are transposed from factors into results, and the conditions are presented as primitive conditions. The conception of Space is originally founded on the vague feeling of separation, which again is only a projection from Self of a primitive feeling of Difference or Separation; and that this conception is purely subjective, and does not represent an act, nor a quality of objects, may fairly be granted. We may admit the ideality of Space, as we admit the ideality of the Calculus, without denying that objects, apart from consciousness, have positive qualities represented in

consciousness by the elements of Difference, out of which Space is constructed; just as we may admit that objects *per se* may have relations which only in phenomena are numerical, and from which we form the Calculus.

Kant, it is notorious, admits the objective validity of Space and Time, though they are only subjective Forms. He admits their empirical reality. But he denies that they have any application whatever to things *per se*. Here he oversteps his own boundaries. Having affirmed that things *per se* are wholly beyond the reach of knowledge, he brings them within that reach directly he affirms what they have *not*. We cannot know that Space and Time do not belong to noumena, if we do not know noumena at all. Noumena may agree with phenomena in this and many other points. Indeed, before we accepted any negative respecting them, we should need stringent proof. What proof does Kant propose? Simply that because Space and Time are true of phenomena they must be false of noumena. *Non constat*. Why not true of both? Phenomena are the noumena as represented in consciousness; why assume that in and out of consciousness there is more than a formal difference? or how prove it? Here we once more return to his old position that Space and Time being ready-made Forms, solely belonging to the Mind, they cannot belong to what is not Mind. It is the iteration of his fundamental hypothesis of *a priori* Forms; an hypothesis accepted by his countrymen without demur, an hypothesis which has everything against it. The very process by which he pretends to discover the forms is a sheer impossibility. To lay bare what is *a priori* in our empirical intuitions, we are told to eliminate every element that is not empirical, everything belonging to sensation; but this we cannot do—it is asking us to leap over our own shadow. To eliminate the elements furnished by sensation, we must first know what are the elements not furnished by sensation. We must thus know the *a priori* elements before we can isolate them. The only criterion vouchsafed is that impracticable criterion of necessity and universality; as if a

isation were not as necessary as an axiom, provided the conditions of the sensation be preserved!

I affirm that the attempt to discriminate the objective in the subjective, the *à posteriori* from the *à priori* elements of consciousness, is utterly chimerical. I here use the term objective as signifying what is given in sensation, which is one of the Kantian meanings, and corresponds with the *posteriori* element. The distinction between these two elements is considered the great achievement of the Critical philosophy. The doctrine of the relativity of Knowledge, never wholly absent from speculation since the days of Protagoras, assumed in Kant's hands a precision and influence which gave an immense impetus to Speculation. Nevertheless, there was an initial misconception in his attempt to isolate the elements of an indissoluble act. It was one thing to assume that there are necessarily two coefficients in the function; another thing to assume that these could be isolated and studied apart. It was one thing to say, Here is an organism with its inherited structure, and aptitudes dependent on that structure, which must be considered as necessarily determining the forms in which it will be affected by external agencies, so that all experience will be a compound of subjective and objective conditions; another thing to say, there is the pure *à priori* element in every experience, the form in which the mind impresses on the matter given externally. The first was an almost inevitable conclusion; the second was a fiction. Psychology, if it can show us anything, can show the absolute impossibility of our discriminating the objective from the subjective elements. In the first place, the attempt would only be possible on the ground that we could, at any time and in any way, disengage Thought from its content: separate in Feeling the object as it is out of all relation to Sensibility, or the subject as pure subject. If we could do this in one instance, we should have a basis for the investigation. The chemist who has learned to detect the existence of an acid by its reactions in one case, can by its reactions detect it in other cases. Having experience

of an acid and an alkali, each apart from the other, he can separate them when finding them combined in a salt, or he can combine them when he finds them separate. His analysis and synthesis are possible, because he has elsewhere learned the nature of each element separately. But such analysis or synthesis is impossible with the objective and subjective elements of thought. Neither element is ever given alone. Pure thought and pure matter are unknown quantities, to be reached by no equation. The thought is necessarily and universally subject-object; matter is necessarily, and to us universally, object-subject. Thought is only called into existence under appropriate conditions; and in the objective stimulus, the object and subject are merged, as acid and base are merged in the salt.\* When I say that the sensation of light is a compound of objective vibrations and retinal susceptibility, I use language which is intelligible and serviceable for my purpose; but I must not imagine that the external object named vibration is the *Ding an sich*, the pure object out of all relation to sensibility; nor that the retinal susceptibility is pure subject, involving no vibration. Kant himself would assure me that the vibrations were as subjective as the susceptibility. Indeed, seeing that he denied altogether the possibility of a knowledge of pure object, the *Ding an sich*, it was a violent strain of logic to conclude that in thought he could separate this unknowable object from the subject knowing it. And if we keep within the circle of phenomena, and seek only the *à priori* and *à posteriori* elements of Experience, merely saying this element is, and this is not, furnished by Experience, we commit the same oversight—we pretend to separate that which is never given to us separable. Indeed, one needs but a little attention to the facts of Psychology to see that the exact *reverse* of Kant's position must be taken: the *à priori* principles said by him to precede Experience

\* 'Der menschliche Geist ist als getrennter Geist nicht der göttliche und lebt von der Erregung, die empfängt, um das Empfangene selbstthätig in sein Eigenthum zu verwandeln.'—TRENDLENBURG: *Logische Unters.* i. 135.

recognised as *experiences organised*. Whatever truly is *a priori* (in Kant's sense) cannot be known *a posteriori*. Yet need but a glance at Kant's writings to perceive that his *a priori* principles are all discovered and proved *a posteriori*. What would his principle of Causality be, were there no *a posteriori* experience of Change? Whence Quantity, were there no objects quantified? Is not the very Ego an empirical representation according to him?

Let me now recapitulate the course of our argument, which presented under various aspects the fundamental errors of Kant's system. Only these fundamental errors have been noticed, partly because with these the system falls, and partly because it is precisely these that German critics neglect. We have seen that the criterion incessantly invoked is no criterion at all. The necessity and universality of a judgment cannot establish its *a priori* character, its independence of experience, if we understand by Experience more than multiple sensation, and more than the individual experience of any one man—if we understand by it all that has been solved and organised in the race, and registered in science. Our grounds for denying Kant's position were that all rational propositions are necessarily and universally true, whether these be axioms, or sensible experiences of indubitably *a posteriori* character; on the other hand, no propositions are true unless identical. Further, that since on Kant's showing these *a priori* principles have no application except to Experience, are not true except in regard to phenomena, their existence anterior to, and independent of, Experience otherwise than as the already organised Experience of the subject is untenable. And it is because Kant perverts the meaning of *a priori* from *ex causis* to *ante experientiam*, and overlooks the fact that the organised experience enables us to foresee, *ex causis*, what individual experience has not yet reached, that his argument wears its plausible aspect when he says we have within us judgments which we could never have experienced. His leading mistake is the adoption of

the scholastic distinction between Matter and Form, as if these logical separables were real separables, independent existences, one added to the other. And his escape from the obvious absurdity of this notion was in the adoption of the other scholastic distinction of potential and actual existence.

We then considered his hypothesis of Mental Forms, and perceived this dilemma : either the Forms of Space and Time, and the Categories, are ready-made, actual forms, existing prior to all Experience ; or they are simply possible forms, existing ideally in the conditions out of which Experience will evolve them. In the first case they are *à priori*—but then they are the same as Innate Ideas, which he repudiated. In the second case they are *à posteriori*—being *functions* of the conditions and experience. The first of the alternatives is contradictory and absurd ; the second is contradictory of his system, but is rational.

We then examined his doctrine of Space and Time as purely subjective Forms, having no equivalent objective relations, and saw reason to conclude that in all points it was defective. It neither established Space and Time as *à priori* principles, nor even as forms of Sensibility. Nor did it prove the essential point, that Space and Time were not abstractions from the concrete experiences of objects.

It was then shown that Kant's attempt to isolate the objective from the subjective elements was chimerical, and that he himself always drew his *à priori* principles from *à posteriori* materials ; like every one else, he drew his conceptions of causes from his experience of effects. Having drawn these out, he transformed his *posterius* into a *prius*, and placed the cart before the horse.

I cannot refrain from citing here a characteristic example of this fallacy, which plays so great a part in *Metaphysics*. The question of man's erect position has in all times occupied biologists, and often interested philosophers. It has been debated whether man owes this position to his reason, or his reason to this erect position. An Italian anatomist of the last century, Moscati, wrote a treatise to prove the former

esis, showing how for a mere animal the erect position was disadvantage. Kant reviewed this work with great approbation, and argued that because man was destined for society, and his reason taught him that for society the erect position is the most suitable, hence he overcame the animal tendency, and walked erect!

Want of space forbids my touching on other points in Kant's system, although his position with respect to Idealism, and the contradictions involved in his conception of Freedom as a *Ding an sich*, might profitably engage us at some length. Were there not disputes on all points connected with his system, one might marvel at the wide divergence of opinion respecting his Idealism. I have myself no doubt that Kant was sincere in his repudiation of Idealism.\* Indeed, what meaning could there have been in repeated declarations that things *per se* were unknowable, unless he believed in things existing *per se*? What significance has his apparatus of cognition, unless it fashion for us appearances of things that are otherwise than as they appear? In summing up the 'Transcendental Æsthetic,' he remarks that the 'things we intuit are not in themselves the same as our representations of them, nor are their relations in themselves what they appear to us.' It is perfectly true that the emphasis he throws on the subjective element, and the way in which the mind creates *its* objects, has by many been interpreted into evidence of his Idealism. But here it is forgotten that he never overlooks the distinction between the phenomena which the mind fashions, and the noumena which it only postulates.

The most unsatisfactory part of Kuno Fischer's otherwise careful and penetrating exposition of Kant, seems to me his persistent effort to make out Kant's Idealism. Whether the Critical Philosophy must espouse Idealism or confess itself overthrown is one thing, whether Kant himself saw this is another. Fischer, having convinced himself that Idealism is the logical outcome of the system, is convinced that Kant

\* See *Anhang* to the *Prolegomena*, iii. 303.



could hold no other doctrine. 'All objects of possible experience are phenomena. All phenomena are nothing but representations within us; they cannot be things *per se*, any more than things *per se* can be phenomena. This is the strictly idealistic teaching of the critical philosophy.\* The answer is simple. All *objects* are phenomena; but the conditions of possible experience involve an existence known, as well as an existence knowing; the existence known is a phenomenon, and this phenomenon is only the known aspect of the noumenon which is unknown. But we must not pause to vindicate Kant's consistency; the more so as Mr. Mahaffy has ably done so, and satisfactorily set aside Schopenhauer's pretended discovery of a suppression of the Idealistic teaching contained in the first edition of the *Critique*. Rightly or wrongly, Kant did maintain the existence of a world beyond the world of phenomena. The *Ding an sich*, the objective noumenon, could not, he affirmed, be known by us, because it necessarily became a phenomenon in becoming known. But it nevertheless existed, and its existence was a necessary postulate. We only know *that* it is, not *what* it is.† The Idealist might, perhaps, justifiably retort upon him, that this Noumenon was only a *suppressed category*—a postulate of the Understanding, and, as such, no less subjective than Time and Space, or Cause and Effect. Again, when Kant attempts to discriminate between Phenomenon and Phantasm (*Erscheinung* and *Schein*), in that the Phenomenon has an objective cause, the Idealist might retort, But you have shown that Causality itself is only a subjective category.

\* KUNO FISCHER: *Commentary*, p. 172.

† Mr. MANSEL makes the following objection. 'When Kant declares that the objects of our intuition *are not* in-themselves as they appear to us, he falls into the opposite extreme to that which he is combating; the Critic becomes a Dogmatist in negation. To warrant this conclusion we must previously have compared things as they are with things as they seem; a comparison which is, *ex hypothesi*, impossible. We can only say that we have no means of determining whether they agree or not.—*Prolegomena Logica*, p. 82. But KANT is justified, if once the position be allowed that we necessarily mingle the conditions of our Sensibility with the external stimulus; to the extent in which the subject is a factor, to that extent must it be a modifier.

I must close here this necessarily imperfect account of the atest of modern metaphysicians, and, in closing it, I cannot ter express my sense of his greatness than by advising student to undertake a careful and meditative reading and reading of the *Kritik*, the *Prolegomena*, and the *Anfangs-unde der Naturwissenschaft*; not as sources of available owledge, but as examples of metaphysical power. I have be- e likened the Critical Philosophy to the French Revolution, h destroying much that will probably never be restored, t neither founding a solid result. Feudal institutions have appeared; the ardent belief in a Republic as the political nacea has survived, in spite of bitter experience and suc- sive failure. In like manner, Scholastic traditions have appeared; Philosophy is no longer living upon 'demon- ations of the existence of God,' and such like achievements; t the ardent belief in the Metaphysical Method as a means explaining the Universe has survived, in spite of incessant ilure. The republicans of to-day admit that the Gironde was competent and the Convention a mistake; but their faith in e Republic is unquenchable by failure. The metaphysicians limit that Kant's system was incomplete, Fichte's a failure, d that Hegel's is a ruin; but their faith in German hilosophy is unquenchable, and in this they are all followers t Kant. Now although, as I conceive, Kant was mistaken t Method and fallacious in results, this was the fault of etaphysics, not the weakness of the metaphysician; seeing, erefore, that metaphysical problems must be mooted, if only order that we should learn their insolubility, his writings mand attention by their powerful argument, and their imulating dialectics.



## TENTH EPOCH.

*Philosophy once more asserts a claim to absolute Knowledge*

## CHAPTER I.

## FICHTE.

## § I. LIFE OF FICHTE.

JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE was born at Rammenau, a village lying between Bischofswerda and Pulsnitz, Upper Lusatia, on May 19, 1762.\* His childhood, of which many touching anecdotes are related, was signalised by extraordinary intellectual capacity and great moral strength. He was a precocious child, and long before he was old enough to be sent to school he learned many things from his father, who taught him to read, and taught him the pious son's maxims and proverbs which formed his own simple stock. With nature was mixed an enchanting element—the stories of his wanderings in Saxony and Franconia, stories to which Johann listened with never-tiring eagerness. It was precisely the vague longings which these recitals inspired, that led him to wander into the fields, quitting his companions far away and enjoy the luxury of solitude. This profoundly meditative child is at his ease in solitude. He spends his hours, gazing into the far distance, or in mournful yearning at the silent sky over-arching him. The sun goes down

\* See the biography by Fichte's son—*Fichte's Leben und literarischer Wechsel*, 2 vols. 1836.

the boy returns home melancholy with the twilight. He sees this so constantly that neighbours remark it; comment on it; and, in after-years, when that boy has become a renowned man, they recur to it with sudden pleasure, not forgetting also that they had 'always said there was something remarkable in the boy.'

Fichte's progress was so rapid that he was soon entrusted with the office of reading family prayers; and his father cherished the hope of one day seeing him a clergyman.

Fichte had become a *Candidatus Theologiæ*, but his patron died, and with him died all hopes of being a clergyman. His prospects were gloomy in the extreme; but he was relieved from anxiety by being offered the situation of private tutor in a family in Switzerland. He soon afterwards made acquaintance with Lavater and some other literary men. He also formed an attachment, which was to last him through life, with a niece of Klopstock.

His tutorship was remarkable. The parents of his pupils, although neither perfectly comprehending his plans, nor approving of that part which they did comprehend, were nevertheless such admirers of his moral character—they stood in such respectful awe of him—that they were induced to submit their own conduct with respect to their children to his judgment. We presume that all well-meaning tutors occasionally make suggestions to parents respecting certain points in their conduct towards the children; but Fichte's plan is, we fancy, quite unexampled in the history of such relations. He kept a journal, which he laid before them every week, and in which he had noted the faults of conduct of which they had been guilty. This lets us into the secret of Fichte's firm and truthful character, as much as anything we know about him. It was from such a soil that we might expect to find growing the moral doctrines which afterwards made his name illustrious. But this domestic censorship could not last long; it lasted for two years; and that it should have lasted so long is, as has been remarked, strong evidence of the respect in which his character was held. But

it was irksome, insupportable, and ended at length in mutual dissatisfaction. He was forced to seek some other mode of subsistence. He went to Leipzig, where he gave private lessons in Greek and Philosophy, and became acquainted with the writings of Kant. This was an important event to him. Hear in what terms he speaks of it :—

‘I have been living, for the last four or five months in Leipzig, the happiest life I can remember. I came here with my head full of grand projects, which all burst one after another, like so many soap-bubbles, without leaving me so much as the froth. At first this troubled me a little, and, half in despair, I took a step which I ought to have taken long before. Since I could not alter what was without me, I resolved to try and alter what was within. I threw myself into Philosophy—the Kantian, *videlicet*—and here I found the true antidote for all my evils, and joy enough into the bargain. The influence which this Philosophy, particularly the ethical part of it (which however is unintelligible without a previous study of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*), has had upon my whole system of thought, the revolution which it has effected in my mind, is not to be described. To you especially I owe the declaration, that I now believe, with all my heart, in free will, and that I see that under this supposition alone can duty, virtue, and morality have any existence. From the opposite proposition, of the necessity of all human actions, must flow the most injurious consequences to society; and it may, in fact, be in part the source of the corrupt morals of the higher classes which we hear so much of. Should any one adopting it remain virtuous, we must look for the cause of his purity elsewhere than in the innocuousness of the doctrine. With many it is their want of logical consequence in their actions.

‘I am furthermore well convinced that this life is not the land of enjoyment, but of labour and toil, and that every joy is granted to us but to strengthen us for further exertion; that the management of our own fate is by no means required of us, but only self-culture. I trouble myself therefore not

to all concerning the things that are without; I endeavour not to appear, but to *be*. And to this perhaps I owe the deep tranquillity I enjoy; external position however is well enough suited to such a frame of mind. I am no man's master, and no man's slave. As to prospects, I have none at all, for the constitution of the church here does not suit me, nor, to say the truth, that of the people either. As long as I can maintain my present independence I shall certainly do so. I have been for some time working at an explanatory abridgment of *Kritik der Urtheilskraft* (Critical Inquiry into the Faculty of Judgment), but I am afraid I shall be obliged to come before the public in a very immature state, to prevent being foretalled by a hundred vamped-up publications. Should the child ever make its appearance, I will send it to you.\*

It was in consequence of his admiration of Kant, that, after several ineffectual attempts to settle himself, he went to Königsberg. Instead of a letter of introduction, Fichte presented Kant with a work, written in eight days, and which bore the title of *A Critique of every possible Revelation*. Kant at once recognised his peer, and received him warmly. But Kant himself, though celebrated, was neither rich nor influential. Fichte's affairs were desperate. We have his own confession in the fragments of a journal which he kept at the time:—

'August 28.—I yesterday began to revise my *Critique*. In the course of my meditation some new and excellent ideas were excogitated, which convinced me that my work was superficial. I endeavoured to carry out my investigation to-day; but my imagination led me so far away, that I could do nothing. I have reckoned my finances, and find that I have just enough to subsist on for a fortnight. It is true this is not the first time in my life that I have found myself in such an embarrassment, but I was then in my own country; besides, in growing older, one's sense of honour becomes more delicate, and distress is more and more of a hardship. . . .

\* It was never printed; probably because, as he here anticipates, he was foretalled.

I have not been able to make any resolution. I certainly shall not speak on the subject to M. Borowsky, to whom Kant has given me an introduction. If I speak to any one, it shall be to Kant himself.

'Sept. 1.—I have made a resolution which I must communicate to Kant. A situation as tutor, however reluctantly I might accept it, does not even offer itself; while, on the other hand, the incertitude in which I am placed does not allow me to work. I must return home. I can perhaps borrow from Kant the small sum necessary for my journey. I went to him to-day for that purpose, but my courage failed me; I resolved to write to him.

'Sept. 2.—I finished my letter to Kant, and sent it.

'Sept. 3.—Received an invitation to dinner from Kant. He received me with his usual cordiality; but informed me that it would be quite out of his power to accede to my request for another fortnight. Such amiable frankness!

'I have done nothing lately; but I shall set myself to work, and leave the rest to Providence.

'Sept. 6.—Dined with Kant, who proposed that I should sell the MS. of my *Critique* to Hartung the bookseller. "It is admirably written," said he, when I told him I was going to rewrite it. Is that true? It is Kant who says so.

'Sept. 12.—I wanted to work to-day; but could do nothing. How will this end? What will become of me a week hence? Then all my money will be gone.'

These extracts will not be read without emotion. They paint a curious picture in the life of our philosopher: a life which was little more than a perpetual and energetic combat.

The *Critique* was published anonymously, and gained immense applause; partly, no doubt, because it was generally mistaken for the production of Kant himself. The celebrity acquired when the authorship was disclosed was the means of procuring Fichte the chair of Philosophy at Jena, the offer of which was made him towards the end of 1793.

Jena was then the leading University of Germany; and Fichte might flatter himself that at length he had a settled

sition, in which he might calmly develop his scientific aims. But his was a Fighter's destiny. Even here, at Jena, he found himself soon opposing and opposed. His endeavours to instil a higher moral feeling into the students met with his anxiety for their better culture—only brought on him an accusation of endeavouring to undermine the religious institutions of his country; and his speculative views brought him the charge of atheism.

Atheism is a grave charge, and yet how lightly made! The history of opinion abounds in instances of this levity; but scarcely ever was a charge more groundless in appearance than that against Fichte, whose system was atheistic only in superficial appearance. Nevertheless the cry was raised, and he had to battle against it. It is understood that the government would have been willing to overlook the publication of the work which raised this cry, if Fichte had made any sort of explanatory modification; but he would not hear of it, tendered his resignation, and soon afterwards found an asylum in Prussia, where he occupied the chair at Erlangen, and afterwards at Berlin. From his career at Berlin we will select one incident typical of his character.

The students assembled in crowds to hear their favourite professor, who was to lecture that day upon duty—on that duty whose ideal grandeur his impassioned eloquence has revealed to them. Fichte arrived, calm and modest. He started with his usual dignified calmness, rising into fiery bursts of eloquence, but governed by the same marvellous power of logic as before. He led them to the present state of affairs. On this topic he grew still more animated; the ringing of drums without frequently drowning his voice, and giving him fresh spirit. He pointed to the bleeding wounds of his country; he warmed with hatred against oppressors; and enforced it as the duty of every one to lend his single arm to save his country.

'This course of lectures,' he exclaimed, 'will be suspended till the end of the campaign. We will resume them in a free country, or die in the attempt to recover her freedom.' Loud



shouts respondent ring through the hall; clapping of hands and stamping of feet make answer to the rolling drums without; every German heart there present is moved, as at the sound of a trumpet. Fichte descends; passes through the crowd; and places himself in the ranks of a corps of volunteers then departing for the army. It is the commencement of the memorable campaign of 1813.

In another year he was no more; he fell, not by a French bullet, but by the fever caught while tending his loved wife, who herself had fallen a victim to her attendance on unknown sufferers. On January 28, 1814, aged fifty-two, this noble Fichte expired.

There are few characters which inspire more admiration; we must all admire 'that cold, colossal, adamantine spirit standing erect and clear, like a Cato Major among the degenerate men; fit to have been the teacher of the Stoa, and to have discoursed of beauty and virtue in the groves of Academe! So robust an intellect, a soul so calm, so lofty, massive, and immovable has not mingled in philosophical discussion since the time of Luther. For the man rises before us amid contradiction and debate like a granite mountain amid clouds and winds. Ridicule of the best that could be commanded has been already tried against him; but it could not avail. What was the wit of a thousand wits to him? The cry of a thousand choughs assaulting that old cliff of granite; seen from the summit, these, as they winged the midway air, showed scarce so gross as beetles, and their cry was seldom even audible. Fichte's opinions may be true or false; but his character as a thinker can be slightly valued only by those who know it ill; and as a man approved by action and suffering, in his life and in his death, he ranks with a class of men who were common only in better ages than ours.'\*

\* CARLYLE.

## § II. FROM KANT TO FICHTE.

Although the logical outcome of Kant's all-shattering Critique would have been the relinquishment of metaphysical speculation, and the restriction of all speculation to the sensible world of Experience, his unfortunate adherence to the old fallacy of an *à priori* source of Knowledge, antecedent in time, and higher in validity to the sources from which it was evolved, kept the imaginary issues into a suprasensible world still open, and tempted speculation again and again to found a Philosophy *somewhere* in the dim Beyond. Experience was still despised; the Methods of Experience were disregarded. Self-introspection was held to be the only rational procedure. The mystery of things was sought in the unravelment of logical knots.

Reinhold began by perfecting Kant. He found in Kant a luminous account of our perceptions, *Vorstellungen*, but a very obscure account of the faculty by which these were produced. The old metaphysical yearning for a single Principle from which to deduce all phenomena made him seek this Principle in a representative Faculty. This was an easy transition to the Idealism of Sigismund Beck and Fichte. Beck showed that Kant's principles required a demonstration of the link between the Object and the Subject—in other words, an answer to the old question: How can Matter act on Mind? And he easily proved that no such answer was forthcoming; that, on the contrary, the only way to meet the question was to deny its legitimacy, to declare there was *no* link, nor any need of such; the assumption of an Object that was not itself the product of a Subject—of Matter that was not a phenomenon of Mind—was illusory. According to Beck, the realism of Kant was a betrayal of the critical stand-point, a relapse into the old dogmatical mode of thought; or, as Jacobi expresses it, 'Without the assumption of a thing *per se* as an object, we cannot get into the critical system; and with this assumption, we cannot

remain in it' \* Beck concluded that the Object must be accepted only as a product of the representative conditions.

The scepticism of Schultze and Maimon having played havoc with the dogmatic part of the Kantian system, Jacobi's insistence on the supremacy of Faith, and its instrument the Intellectual Intuition, found an eager welcome. As Kant maintained Sense to be a faculty whereby we are affected from the sensible side, so Jacobi maintained Reason to be a faculty whereby we are affected from the supra-sensible side.

Combine these various tendencies, and the genesis of Fichte's system is apparent. My limited space forbids any attempt to expound this genesis in detail; the excellent work of Kuno Fischer devotes some 200 pages to it; and to those pages or to Michelet's history the student is referred.† Of all these post-Kantian attempts one is tempted to say with Hegel: 'Now-a-days we have come out of the Kantian philosophy, and every one pretends to have got further. To get further has nevertheless a twofold sense: it may be further forwards or further backwards. Many of our philosophic efforts are, when seen in their twilight, nothing more than the procedure of the old Metaphysic, an uncritical casting about (*ein unkritisches Dahindenken*), according to the thinker's capacity.'‡ Only those who have wasted precious hours in trying to extract rational suggestions from the mass of works produced at this period, and subsequently, can form any conception of the terrible significance of Hegel's sarcasm on the 'getting further backwards' which is visible on all sides. I will cite but one example, and I choose an eminent one. Bardili is perhaps the most considerable of Fichte's predecessors; yet this is what he naïvely advances as a great discovery:—Every one must admit as an irresistible postulate that whatever is *real* must

\* JACOBI : *Werke*, ii. 304.

† KUNO FISCHER : *Gesch. d. neuern Phil.* Bd. V. *Fichte und seine Vorgänger*, 1868. MICHELET : *Geschichte der letzten Systeme*, 1837. Bd. I.

‡ HEGEL : *Encyklopädie*, § 41, p. 87.

first be *possible*. Nevertheless every one has the notion of reality before that of possibility, which he subsequently seeks to explain. But even this reality would not be known to him, had not a sensuous stimulus preceded it. Now it is obvious that the Possibility which is always presupposed for every Reality must be sought in the nature of Thought. Hence there is something in man which is *virtually* the First—which is last in the order of consciousness, yet precedes both the notion, and the stimulus, in the order of Being. To call this First, this Determining, a mere Nothing, would be to call Reality itself a Nothing, since Reality itself could not be unless Possibility preceded it. Hence the conclusion: *Thought is the ground of all*. If man knew the Possibility of everything, he would know the ground of everything; and if he knew the ground, he would at the same time know everything in and under the necessity through which and under which it is *this thing*: in other words, he would know the thing *per se*. Thus while the subjective process is Sense-impulse, Reality, Possibility, the objective process is Possibility, Reality, Sense-impulse. What *seems* last is really *first*.\*

It is needless to criticise such speculation. Enough is done if attention be called to it, and to its naïve presentation of the 'potential fallacy' which incessantly reappears in German Philosophy.

Kant's exposition of the ideality of Space and Time, and the unknowable nature of the *Ding an sich*, easily led to a complete denial of any external reality which was not a mere externalisation of Consciousness. If Space and Time are only representations, then, as Jacobi remarked, the objects in Space and Time are only representations. Our external intuitions refer to objects in Space; but Space is within us,

\* BARDILI's und REINHOLD's *Briefwechsel über das Wesen der Philosophie*. München, 1804, pp. 24-6. MICHELET, though giving a good analysis of BARDILI's *Logik*, does not seem to know this later work, the chief interest of which perhaps rises from the generous ardour which animates the truth-loving REINHOLD, making him declare himself the disciple of his younger rival. Philosophers are rarely thus imposed to forsake their own systems to embrace the system of a contemporary.

and what is in Space cannot therefore be without us. The permanent object of external intuition is Matter; but Kant declares Matter to be only an Appearance—'the movable in Space.' In a word, the objects supposed by Common Sense to be out of us are shown by Kant to be constructed out of sensible modifications and the forms of Pure Reason. It is we who create the world. This was what Jacobi read in Kant. Maimon also pointed in the same direction; and Fichte's 'boundless admiration' for Maimon is known.

We can therefore understand how Fichte persisted in declaring that his system was identical with Kant's, though reached by a different route, and expressed by another form. It was *his* interpretation of Kant. But since Kant himself decisively repudiated this interpretation,\* and may at least be credited with having the best right to affirm what was, and what was not, his meaning, we shall do well to abide by his decision, even should we think that Fichte's interpretation is the more consistent with the Kantian principles. I have already expressed the opinion that Kant was not an Idealist. If he is to be reproached with his postulate of the *Ding an sich*, an equivalent reproach may be urged against Fichte's postulate of the Appulse (*Anstoss*), of which we shall hear presently. Kuno Fischer, who strives his utmost to establish Kant's Idealism, endeavours to prove that Fichte's 'intellectual intuition' is no more than Kant's 'pure apperception';† and so great is the obscurity of the *Kritik*, that one finds it difficult to say what precisely was Kant's meaning. But I cannot agree that Kant held 'the pure Ego as the condition of all Consciousness, the condition of the sum total of Experience, consequently the Ego is the source from which the universe is to be deduced.' In this argument Fischer, following Jacobi, Fichte, Hegel, and others, seems to me to misrepresent Kant's position by the unobserved

\* A repudiation which elicited from FICHTE the sarcasm (in a letter to REINHOLD) that KANT was a *Dreiviertelskopf*—'the three-fourths of a philosopher'; and that the 'holy spirit in Kant' spoke more truly in the *Kritik* than Kant's individual person had thought.

† *Op. cit.* v. 478.

stitution of *a* condition for *the* condition. That the Ego is one of the conditions of Consciousness, and the one which impresses on it its peculiar form, giving unity to the manifold in Sense, no Realist ever doubted; that it is the *sole* condition, only the Idealists affirm. Beside the condition, the *I*, Kant assumed another condition, the Non-Ego; beside the *Ich* there was the *Ding an sich*. Nor is this position rendered doubtful by the suggestion Kant throws out in the 2nd edition, that the Thing *per se* underlying all phenomena may be one and the same thinking substance with the Ego—it is a possibility not to be denied simply 'because we know nothing of the Thing *per se*, and cannot, therefore, say herein the Ego is different from it'—and even if the identity is affirmed, it is only an affirmation of Monism, not of Idealism.

It is time, however, to address ourselves to Fichte's own views. These are expounded in an abstract and repulsive style in his *Theory of Science*, and in a rhetorical popular style in his *Destination of Man*. I shall borrow from both, without, however, verbally following either.

By way of preliminary, let us observe the use, and the equivocal use, made of the term *setzen* by Fichte and most of his successors. In English it is commonly translated 'to posit,' which has an uncouth look; 'to pose' would, however, be misleading, because that term has already its application, signifying 'to adopt an attitude;' otherwise, 'to pose' would harmonise with all the other terms, 'suppose,' 'propose,' 'propose.' *Satz* is a proposition; *setzen* is to pose (or posit); *Voraussetzung* is a supposition. When we make a proposition, we affirm a predicate of a subject; but when a German *setzt* one idea besides another, he is apt to conclude that *Setzen* is an action which has for its result an objective effect—it is a *Thathandlung*, and the affirmation thereby becomes a reality. Hegel regards this equivocalness of the German language as a proof of its philosophic insight.

## § III. FICHTE'S SYSTEM.

We are supposed to perceive external objects through the ideas which these objects excite in us. But this assumption is not warranted by the facts of consciousness. What is the fundamental fact? It is that I have in my mind a certain idea. This, and this only, is primarily given. When we leave this fact in quest of an explanation, we are forced to admit either that this idea is spontaneously evolved *by me*; or else some *not-me* — something different from myself has excited it *in me*.

Kant postulated the existence of a Non-Ego, but declared that we know nothing of it. In this he followed Locke and the majority of philosophers.

Truly, said Fichte, we know nothing of it; we can only know that which passes within ourselves. Only so much as we are *conscious* of, can we know; but in consciousness there is no *object* given, there is only an *idea* given. Are we forced by the very laws of our reason to suppose that there is Non-Ego existing?—are we forced to assume that these ideas are images of something *out* of us and independent of us? To what does this dilemma bring us? Simply to this: that the very assumption, here called a necessary consequence of our mental constitution—this Non-Ego, which must be postulated, is, after all, nothing but a postulate of our reason; is therefore a *product of the Ego*. It is the Ego which thus *creates the necessity* for a Non-Ego; it is the Ego which thus, *answering to the necessity, creates the Non-Ego wanted*. Ideas, and nothing but ideas, are given in the primary fact of consciousness. These are the products of the *activity* of the Ego; and not, as is so commonly asserted, the products of the *passivity* of the Ego. The soul is no passive mirror reflecting images. It is an active principle creating them. The soul is no lifeless *receptivity*. Were it not brimming over with life and activity, perception would be impossible. One stone does not perceive another. A mould does not perceive the liquid that is poured into it.

Consciousness is in its very essence an activity. Well, then, if in its activity it produces images, and if by the laws of its nature it is forced to assume that these images have some substratum, what is this assumption but *another* form of the soul's activity? If the Ego is conscious of its changes, and yet is forced to attribute these changes to some external cause, what is this very act of assuming an external cause but the pure act of the Ego?—another change in the consciousness?

You admit that we cannot know Substance; all our knowledge is limited to accidents—to phenomena. But, you say, you are forced to assume a Substance as the basis of these accidents—a noumenon as that whereby phenomena are possible; and yet you cannot *know* this noumenon. Fichte answers: If you cannot *know* it, your assumption, as the mere product of your reason, is nothing more nor less than another form of the activity of the Ego. It is *you* who assume; and you assume *what* you call Substance. Substance is nothing but the *synthesis of accidents*. And it is a mental synthesis.

Thus Fichte founded Idealism upon the basis of consciousness, which was the admitted basis of all certitude; and he not only founded Idealism, but reduced the Ego to an activity, and all *knowledge* to an *act*.

The activity of the Ego is of course an assumption, but it is the only assumption necessary for the construction of a science. That once admitted, the existence of the Non-Ego, as a product of the Ego, follows as a necessary consequence.

Every one will admit that  $A=A$ ; or that *A is A*. This is an axiom which is known intuitively, and has no need of proof. It is the proposition of identity (*Satz der Identität*). It is absolutely true. In admitting this to be absolutely true, we ascribe to the mind a faculty of knowing absolute truth.

But in saying *A equals A*, we do not affirm the *existence* of *A*; we only affirm that *if A exists, then it must equal A*. And the axiom teaches us not that *A exists*, but there is a



necessary relation between a certain *if* and *then*; and this necessary relation we will call *x*. But this relation, this *x*, is only *in* the Ego, comes only *from* the Ego. It is the Ego that judges in the preceding axiom that  $A=A$ ; and it judges my means of *x*.

To reduce this to language a little less repulsive, we may say that, in every judgment which the mind makes, the act of judging is an act of the Ego.

But as the *x* is wholly in the Ego, so therefore is *A* *in* the Ego, and is posited *by* the Ego. And by this we see that there is *something* in the Ego which is for ever one and the same, and that is the *x*. Hence the formula, 'I am I: Ego = Ego.'

We come here in the *Cogito, ergo sum*, of Descartes, as the basis of all certitude. The Ego posits itself, and *is* by means of this very self-positing. When I say 'I am,' I affirm, in consciousness, my existence; and this affirmation of my consciousness is the condition of my existence. The Ego is therefore at one and the same time both the activity and the product of activity; precisely as thought is both the thinking, activity, and the product thought.

'According to Idealism,' he says, 'Intelligence is a *Doing* (*Thathandlung*), and absolutely nothing else; it is even incorrect to speak of it as an *Active*, for such a term points to something existing in which the activity inheres.' Here he expresses obscurely the truth that Intelligence is a Function.

There are three fundamental positions, one absolutely unconditioned, the two others relatively so. The logical relations are Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis. (The famous trichotomy of Hegel's Method has its origin here.) We have expounded the Thesis, the proposition of identity; let us now pass to the Antithesis, the proposition of contradiction.

The position  $A=A$  has its counter-position in Non-A  $\neq$  not= $A$ . The certainty of this is not less than the certainty of its predecessors. But it is so far conditioned, that, if  $A$  did not exist, there could exist no Non-A. In knowing *A*,

necessarily know its opposite. Hence the Ego not only posits itself, but, in so doing, contra-poses a Non-Ego.

Here we have the ground of the fundamental truth 'No object without a subject, no subject without an object.' 'The Intelligence,' he says, 'sees itself, and this seeing of itself is directly connected with all that belongs to Intelligence; and in this union of *Being* and *Seeing* consists the nature of Intelligence. Whatever is in the Intelligence, whatever it is itself, it is *for itself*, and only thus is it Intelligence. I think this of that object. Now what does this mean, and how do I appear to myself in this thought? I produce certain conditions within myself, if the object is a mere invention; but if the objects are real, and exist without my invention, I simply contemplate as a spectator the production of these conditions within me. They are within me only so far as I contemplate them; my contemplation and their Being are inseparably united. A thing is this or that; but *for whom* is it? No one who comprehends the question will reply: For itself. He must add an Intelligence *for* which the thing is to be.'

Without an Ego there is no Non-Ego, no Object, no World. A world *per se*, a world of *Dinge an sich*, is unthinkable; but a World as Object, as Representation, as Non-Ego, is demonstrable. Without Sensibility there would be no sensibles; without Thought there would be no intelligibles.

The third position, Synthesis, unites both Thesis and Antithesis, and resolves the contradiction in a higher identity. Hence it is called the *Satz des Grundes*—the 'principle of Reason.' The Ego contra-poses the Non-Ego; but the Non-Ego supposes the Ego. The Ego thus posits itself as a contradiction, or, what is equivalent, posits itself as the unity of contra-positions. But the union of contra-positions in one subject is contradictory. The Ego is therefore posited as a Contradiction. It is this Contradiction in virtue of its nature. (Here we see Hegel's standing-point.) But every contradiction demands a solution. Thus in the Ego there is needed a *Doing* (*Thathandlung*), which solves the two preceding *Doings*; and this is the Synthesis.

The great point Fichte has endeavoured to establish is the identity of being and thought—of existence and consciousness—of object and subject. And he establishes this by means of the Ego considered as essentially an activity.

Hence the conclusion drawn in the practical part of his philosophy, that the true destination of man is not thought, but action, which is thought realised. 'I am free,' he says. That is the revelation of consciousness. 'I am free; and it is not merely my action, but the free determination of my will to obey the voice of conscience, that decides all my worth. More brightly does the everlasting world now rise before me; and the fundamental laws of its order are more clearly revealed to my mental sight. My *will alone*, lying hid in the obscure depths of my soul, is the first link in a chain of consequences stretching through the invisible realms of spirit, as in this terrestrial world the action itself, a certain movement communicated to matter, is the first link in a material chain of cause and effect, encircling the whole system. The will is the efficient cause, the living principle of the world of spirit, as motion is of the world of sense. I stand between two worlds, the one visible, in which the act alone avails, and the intention matters not at all; the other invisible and incomprehensible, acted on only by the will. In both these worlds I am an effective force. The Divine life, as alone the finite mind can conceive it, is self-forming, self-representing will, clothed, to the mortal eye, with multitudinous sensuous forms, flowing through me and through the whole immeasurable universe—here streaming through my veins and muscles, there pouring its abundance into the tree, the flower, the grass. The dead, heavy mass of inert matter, which did but fill up nature, has disappeared, and, in its stead, there rushes by the bright, everlasting flood of life and power, from its Infinite Source.

'The Eternal Will is the Creator of the world, as he is the Creator of the finite reason. Those who will insist that the world must have been created out of a mass of inert matter, which must always remain inert and lifeless, like a vessel

made by human hands, know neither the world nor him. The Infinite Reason alone exists in himself—the finite in him; in our minds alone has he created a world, or at least that by and through which it becomes unfolded to us. In his light we behold the light, and all that it reveals. Great, living Will! whom no words can name, and no conception embrace! well may I lift up my thoughts to thee, for I can think only in thee! In thee, the Incomprehensible, does my own existence, and that of the world, become comprehensible to me; all the problems of being are solved, and the most perfect harmony reigns! I veil my face before thee, and lay my finger on my lips!’

The ground-principles of Fichte's idealism having been given, we have now to see how he avoids the natural objections which rise against such a doctrine. But first let us notice how this deification of personality was at once the most natural product of such a mind as Fichte's, and the best adapted to the spirit of the age which produced it. His doctrine was an inspiration of that ardent and exalted spirit which stirred the heart of Germany, and made the campaign of 1813 an epoch in history. Germany then was deficient in energetic will. It had armies, and these armies were headed by experienced generals. But among them there was scarcely another, beyond the impetuous Blücher, who had steadfast will. They were beaten and beaten. At length they were roused. A series of insults had roused them. They rose to fight for fatherland, and in their ranks was Fichte, who by deed as well as doctrine sought to convince them that in Will lay man's divinity.

The question being, *What is the relation of Object and Subject?* and Fichte's solution being *Object and Subject are identical*, it followed from his position that inasmuch as an Object and a Subject—a Non-Ego and an Ego—were given in knowledge, and the distinction between them by all men supposed to be real, the origin of this distinction must arise in one of two ways: either the Ego must posit the Non-Ego, wilfully and consciously (in which case mankind would never

suppose the distinction to be a real distinction); or else the Ego must cause the Non-Ego to be, and must do so necessarily and unconsciously.

How does Fichte solve the problem? He assumes that the existence of the very Ego itself is *determined* by the Non-Ego; and in this way: To be, and to be conscious, are the same. The existence of the Ego depends upon its consciousness. But to be conscious of Self is at the same time to be conscious of Not-Self; the correlates Self and Not-Self are given in the same act of consciousness. But how is it that we attribute reality to Not-Self? Just as we attribute reality to Self, namely, by an act of Consciousness. Not-Self is given in Consciousness as a *reality*, and therefore we cannot suppose it to be a phantom.

We may pause here to remark how all the witticisms against Idealism fall to the ground. The wits assume that when it is said the World is produced by the Ego, this World must be held as a phantom. Now nobody ever believed that external objects had no reality; the only possible doubt is as to whether they have any reality *independent* of mind.

In consciousness we have a twofold fact, namely, the fact of Self, and the fact of Not-Self, indissolubly given in one. We conclude therefore that Consciousness—that the Ego—is partly self-determined, and partly determined by not-self. Let us suppose the entire reality of the Ego (that is, in its identity of Subject and Object) represented by the number ten. The Ego, conscious of five of its parts—or, to speak with Fichte, *positing* five—does by that very act posit five parts *negatively* in itself. But how is it that the Ego can posit a negation in itself? It does so by the very act of Consciousness; in the act of separating five from ten, the five remaining are left passive. The negation is therefore the passivity of the Ego. This seems to lead to the contradiction that the Ego, which was defined as an Activity, is at the same time active and passive. The solution of this difficulty is that it is Activity which determines Passivity,

and reciprocally. Let us suppose the absolute reality as a whole: this is entirely in the Ego, and has a certain quantity. Every quantity less than this totality will, of necessity, be negation, passivity. In order that a less quantity should be compared with the totality and so opposed to it, it is necessary there should be some relation between them; and this is in the idea of divisibility. In the absolute totality, as such, there are no parts; but this totality may be compared with parts and distinguished from it. Passivity is therefore determinate quantity of Activity, a quantity compared with the totality. In regard to the Ego as absolute, the Ego as limited is passive; in the relation of Ego as limited to the Non-Ego, the Ego is active and the Non-Ego passive. And thus are activity and passivity reciprocally determined.

The result of this and much more reasoning, is the hypothesis that when mankind attribute to objects a real existence they are correct; but they are incorrect in supposing that the Object is independent of the Subject; it is identical with the Subject. The common-sense belief is therefore correct enough. It is when we would rise above this belief, and endeavour to philosophise, that we fall into error. All the philosophers have erred, not in assuming the reality of objects but in assuming the reality of *two* distinct, disparate existences, Matter and Mind; whereas we have seen that there is only one existence, having the twofold aspect of Object and Subject.

Nor is the distinction unimportant. If Dualism be accepted, we have no refuge from Scepticism. If we are to believe that *Dinge an sich* exist—that Matter exists independently of Mind, exists *per se*—then, says Philosophy, are we doomed to admit only a possible knowledge of phenomena. The things in themselves we can never know; we can only know their effects upon us. Our knowledge is relative, and never can embrace the absolute truth.

But if Idealism be accepted, the ordinary belief of men is not only respected, but confirmed; for this belief is, that we do know things in themselves, and that the things we know

*do* exist. The Dualist forces you to admit that you *cannot* know things in themselves; and that your belief in their existence is merely the postulate of your Reason and is not *immediately* given in the facts of Consciousness. The Idealist, on the contrary, gives you an *immediate* knowledge of things in themselves, consequently opens to you the domain of absolute Truth. He only differs from you in saying that these things, which you immediately know, are part and parcel of yourself; and it is *because* you and they are indissolubly united, that immediate knowledge is possible.

'But,' says Realism, 'I know that objects are altogether independent of *me*. I did not create them. I found them there *out* of me. The proof of this is that if, after looking at a tree, I turn away, or shut my eyes, the image of the tree is annihilated, but the tree itself remains.'

'No,' answers Idealism, 'the tree itself does not remain: for the tree is but a phenomenon, or collection of phenomena; the tree is a Perception, and all perceptions are subjective. You suppose that every one must admit that our *perceptions* are different from their *objects*. But are they different? That is precisely the question at issue; and you assume it. Let us be cautious. What is an object—a tree, for instance? Tell me, what does your Consciousness inform you of? Let me hear the fact, the whole fact, and no *inference* from the fact. Is not the *object* (tree) one and the same as your *perception* (tree)? Is not the tree a mere name for your perception? Does not your Consciousness distinctly tell you that the Form, Colour, Solidity, and smell of the Tree are *in you*—are affections of your Subject?'

'I admit that,' replies Realism; 'but although these are *in me*, they are caused by something *out of me*. Consciousness tells me that very plainly.'

'Does it so? I tell you that Consciousness has no such power. It can tell you of its own changes; it cannot transcend itself to tell you anything about that which causes its changes.'

'But I am irresistibly compelled to believe,' says Realism,

'that there are things which exist *out* of me; and this belief, because irresistible, is true.'

'Stop! you run on too fast,' replies Idealism; 'your belief is not what you describe it. You are not irresistibly compelled to believe that things exist, which said things lie *underneath* all their appearances, and must ever remain unknown. This is no instinctive belief; it is a philosophic inference. Your belief simply is, that certain things, coloured, odorous, extended, sapid, and solid, exist; and so they do. But you infer that they exist *out* of you? Rash inference. Have you not admitted that colour, odour, taste, extension, etc., are but modifications of your sentient being; and if they exist *in* you, how can they exist *out* of you? They do not: they seem to do so by a law of the mind which gives objectivity to our sensations.'

'Try your utmost to conceive an object as anything more than a synthesis of perceptions. You cannot. You may infer, indeed, that a *substratum* for all phenomena exists, although unknown, unknowable. But on what is your inference grounded? On the impossibility of conceiving the existence of qualities—extension, colour, etc.—apart from some substance *of which* they are qualities. This impossibility is a figment. The qualities have no need of an objective substratum, because they have a *subjective* substratum: they are the modifications of a sensitive subject; and the *synthesis* of these modifications is the only substratum of which they stand in need. This may be proved in another way. The qualities of objects, it is universally admitted, are but modifications of the subject: these qualities are *attributed to* external objects; they are dependent upon the subject for their existence; and yet, to account for their existence, it is asserted that some unknown external substance must exist as a substance in which they must inhere. Now it is apparent that inasmuch as these qualities are subjective and dependent upon the subject for their existence, there can be no necessity for an object in which they must inhere.'



Fichte answers the argument of Realism, that there must be some ground or reason for every sensation, and this ground is what we call Object, by asking: 'But how do you know, or how can you prove to me, that a ground is necessary? Why not rest contented with the fact that something *is*, instead of presupposing that it must have *become* through some foreign source? You have been wont to *think a ground* to everything, but forget that the ground itself is *your thinking*.'

We may here call attention to the obscure and defective exposition which Fichte gives of the Non-Ego, and which, Hegel truly remarks, carries him no way beyond Kant's *Ding an sich*. Fichte says the Non-Ego is neither a real ground, nor a thing *per se*, but simply an object—a representation. It is not the real ground of the affection of the Ego, otherwise it would be a thing *per se*; but it must be represented or imagined as such. This representation the Ego necessarily produces from itself—it is the *productive imagination* which posits it.\* Who does not recognise Kant in this?

The Ego is essentially active; it must reflect on its activity, and thereby produce a new activity; on which in turn it reflects. Each of these reflexions was an elevation. First it reflects on its primitive activity, and finds itself limited. Next it reflects on its sensations, and raises itself to Intuition; reflects on its Intuition, and images what it intuits; reflects on its Imagination, and understands what it images; reflects on its Representations, and judges what it represents; finally, reflects on its Judging Faculty, and grasps it as the Power of Abstraction—as pure subjectivity, as the Ego which is only determined by itself.

But all these reflections, limitations, are due to what he calls an Appulse (*Anstoss*). Whence this? He is silent. He assumes, he does not deduce, it. Hegel therefore remarks that 'the *Anstoss* remains an unknown External, and the Ego a conditioned, which has another opposed to it. Thus

\* *Grundlage der Wissenschaftslehre*, ii. § 4.

remains at the stand-point of Kant, namely, that we know the finite, the infinite lying beyond the reach of thought. What Kant calls the *Ding an sich* is with the Appulse from without, the abstraction of some man the Ego, which has no other office than that of negative.\*

ly as Fichte's Idealism differs from Berkeley's we see postulate of an Appulse a close affinity with Berkeley's of the Deity. There is a further resemblance in conception of the Absolute Ego—the Supreme Subject, of the universe is the Object. For in spite of much that has been written, and the equivocalness of his language put out, it is certain that he, no less than Berkeley, reached the monstrous though logical conclusion that individual Ego and its world existed. Such a conclusion is indeed rigorous if the basis of Consciousness be fully accepted. If nothing exists except my thoughts, no other mind can exist beyond my thought of it. The only way we have for believing in the existence of other minds is on a ground stronger than the ground for believing in the existence of other bodies. But this sublime Egoism is too near to Reason; it must therefore be escaped; and Berkeley escapes by assuming a Deity, and his mode of escape is on our minds. Fichte escapes by assuming an Absolute Ego—the *reine Form der Ichheit welche noch nicht umschrieben ist*—the pure Essence of Reason. Thus, in a new way man the image of God. An image only; and, as Philosophy can teach us, destined to disappear, and to return to its original source; only the Moral Life is immortal—we live hereafter in our beneficence; we perish as mortals.

It is not to pause to point out the incoherence of this doctrine with its principles, nor indeed to discuss those principles, enough has been done if the system itself has been made intelligible.

to exhibit Fichte's Idealism is, strictly speaking, all that

\* HEGEL: *Encyklopädie*, § 60, p. 124.

my plan imposes; but although his philosophical doctrines are all founded upon it, and although it was the doctrine which made an epoch in German Philosophy, consequently the doctrine which entitles him to a place in this History, nevertheless I should be doing him injustice and misleading my readers if I did not give some glimpse of his moral system.\*

#### § IV. APPLICATION OF FICHTE'S IDEALISM.

The Ego is essentially an Activity; consequently free. But this free activity would lose itself in infinity, and would remain without consciousness—in fact, without existence—did it not encounter some *resistance*. In the effort to vanquish this resistance, it exerts its Will, becomes conscious of something not itself, and *thereby* becomes conscious of itself. But resistance limits freedom, and as an Activity the Ego is essentially free—it is irresistibly impelled to enjoy perfect freedom. This expansive force, which impels the Ego to realise itself by complete development, and thereby assimilate the Non-Ego—this force, in as far as it is not realised, is the *aim* of man's existence—it is his duty.

Here a difference from the ordinary schools of morality begins to show itself. Duty is not a moral obligation which we are free to acknowledge or reject; it is a pulse beating in the very heart of man—a power inseparable from his constitution; and according to its fulfilment is the man complete.

The world does not exist because we imagine it, but because we *believe* it. Let all reality be swept away by

\* Those who are curious to see what he himself makes of his system are referred to his *Wissenschaftslehre* (of which a French translation by M. PAUL GRIMMLOT exists under the title of *Doctrine de la Science*, and an English one by KROEBER, published in America), or, as a more popular exposition, to his *Bestimmung des Menschen*, a French translation of which has been published by M. BARCHOT DE PENHOEN, under the title *Destination de l'Homme*, which, from the character and learning of the translator, is, we have no doubt, an excellent version. An English translation has also been made by Mrs. PERCY SINNETT, which can be recommended. *The Nature of the Scholar* and *The Characteristics of the Present Age* have also been translated by Mr. W. SMITH.

scepticism—we are not affected. Man is impelled by his very nature to realise his existence by his acts. Our destination is not thought, but action. Man is not born to brood over his thoughts, but to manifest them—to give them existence. There is a moral world *within*; our mission is to transport it *without*. By this we create the world. Socrates rapped the scepticism to which Philosophy had irresistibly led by seeking a solution of the problem in Conscience. In the same manner, Fichte led by Kant's philosophy to Idealism, and, dissatisfied with the mere phantom-world\* of Intelligence, sought a solution in the real world of Action. The Moral Force was to supply what the Intellect could only see. God creates the world in creating Conscience. The world only exists in us and by us. When we die it vanishes, not we; we pass into another world, the product of our moral life.

Our world is not a visionary world simply because its existence is within us; action makes it real. For what is the condition of existence?—what determines Thought to *be*? Simply that it should realise itself as an object. The Ego as *simple Subject* does not exist; it has only a potentiality of existence. To exist, it must realise itself and become *Subject-object*.

Mark the consequence:—Knowing that we carry within the moral world, and that upon ourselves alone depends the attainment of so sublime an object as the manifestation of this world, it is to ourselves alone that we must direct our attention. This realisation of the world, what is it but the complete development of ourselves? If we would *be*, therefore if we would enjoy the realities of existence—we must develop ourselves in the attempt to realise incessantly the beautiful, the useful, and the good. Man is commanded to be moral by the imperious necessity of his own nature. To

\* 'Was durch das Wissen, und aus dem Wissen entsteht, ist nur Wissen. Alles Wissen ist aber nur Abbildung, und es wird in ihm immer etwas gefodert, das, in Bilde entspreche. Diese Forderung kann durch kein Wissen befriedigt werden. Denn diese ganze, Sinnenwelt entsteht nur durch das Wissen, und ist selbst nur Wissen; aber Wissen ist nicht Realität, eben darum weil es Wissen ist.'—*Bestimmung des Menschen*. Buch II.

be virtuous is not to obey some external law, but to fulfil an internal law: this obedience is not slavery, but freedom; it is not sacrificing one particle of freedom to any other power, but wholly and truly realising the power within us of being free.

Life is a combat. The free spirit of man, inasmuch as it is finite, is limited, imperfect; but it incessantly struggles to subjugate that which opposes it—it tends incessantly towards infinity. Defeated in his hopes, he is sometimes discouraged, but this lasts not long. There is a well-spring of energy for ever vital in the heart of man; an ideal is for ever shining before him, and that he must attain.

Man knows himself to be free; knows also that his fellow-men are free; and therefore the duty of each is to treat the others as beings who have the same aim as himself. Individual liberty is therefore the principle of all government; from it Fichte deduces his political system.

And what says Fichte respecting God? He was, as we know, accused of atheism. Let us hear his real opinions. In his answer to that charge we have an abstruse, but at the same time positive, exposition of his views.\* The common view is, that God created the world out of an inert mass of matter; and from the evidence of design in this created world we infer an intelligent designer. Fichte could not accept this view. In the first place, what we call the World is but the incarnation of our Duty (*unsere Welt ist das versinnlichte Material unserer Pflicht*). It is the objective existence of the Ego: we are, so to speak, the creators of it. Such a statement looks very like atheism, especially when Fichte's system is not clearly apprehended: it is, however, at the worst, only Acosmism.

Nor could Fichte accept the evidence of Design, because Design is a mere conclusion of the understanding, applicable only to finite, transient things, wholly inapplicable to the infinite: Design itself is but a subjective notion.†

\* *Gerichtliche Verantwortungsschriften gegen die Anklage des Atheismus.*

† *Ibid.* p. 43.

God,' says Fichte, 'must be *believed* in, not *inferred*. It is the ground of all conviction, scientific or moral. Why do you believe in the existence of the world? It is nothing more than the incarnation of that which you carry within you, yet you believe in it. In the same way God dwells in your Consciousness, and you believe in him. He is the Moral Order (*moralische Ordnung*) of the world: as such we can know him, and only as such. For if we attempt to ascribe to him Intelligence or Personality, we at once necessarily fall into anthropomorphism. God is infinite: therefore beyond the reach of our *science*, which can only embrace the finite, but not beyond our *faith*.\*

By our efforts to fulfil our Duty, and thus to realise the Good and Beautiful, we are tending towards God, we live in the measure the life of God. True religion is therefore the realisation of universal reason. If we were all perfectly equal, we should be one; for there is but one Liberty. If we had all the same convictions, the law of each would be the law of all, since all would have but one will. To this we are tending; to this Humanity is tending.

The germ of mysticism which lies in this doctrine was fully developed by some of Fichte's successors, although he himself had particularly guarded against such an interpretation, and distinguishes himself from the mystics.

Let us now pass to Fichte's Philosophy of History.

The historian only accomplishes half of the required task. He narrates the events of an epoch, in their order of occurrence, and in the form of their occurrence; but he cannot be assured that he has not omitted some of these events, or that he has given them their due position and significance. A philosopher must complete this incomplete method. He must first form some idea of the epoch—an Idea *à priori*, independent of experience. He must then exhibit this Idea always dominant throughout the epoch—and manifesting itself in the multiplicity of facts, which are but its incarnation.

\* *Sittenlehre*, pp. 189, 194.

What is the world but an incarnation of the Ego? What is an epoch but an incarnation of an Idea?

Every epoch has therefore its pre-existent Idea. And this Idea will be determined by the Ideas of the epochs which have preceded it; and will determine those which succeed it. Hence we conclude that the evolutions of Ideas—or the History of the World—is accomplished on a certain *plan*. The philosopher must conceive this plan in its totality, that he may from it deduce the Ideas of the principal epochs in the history of Humanity, not only as past, but as future.

The question first to be settled is this: What is the ground-plan of the world? or, in other words, according to Fichte, What is the fundamental Idea which Humanity has to realise?

The answer is: The Idea of Duty. This, in its concrete expression, is: To fix the relations of man to man in such order that the perfect liberty of each be compatible with the liberty of the whole.

History may thus be divided into two principal epochs. The one, in which man has not established the social relations on the basis of reason. The other, in which he has established them, and knows that he has done so.

That Humanity exists but for the successive and constant realisation of the dictates of reason is easily proved. But sometimes Humanity has knowledge of what it performs, and why it performs it; sometimes it obeys but a blind impulse. In this second case, that is to say, in the first epochs of the terrestrial existence of Humanity, Reason, although not manifesting itself distinctly, consciously, nevertheless exists. It manifests itself as an instinct, and appears under the form of a natural law; it manifests itself in the intelligence only as a vague and obscure sentiment. Reason, on the contrary, no sooner manifests itself as Reason, than it is gifted with consciousness of itself and its acts. This constitutes the second epoch.

But Humanity does not pass at once from the first to the

ond epoch. At first Reason only manifests itself in a few men, the Great Men of their age, who thereby acquire authority. They are the instructors of their age; their mission is to elevate the mass up to themselves. Thus Instinct diminishes, and Reason supervenes. Science appears. Morality becomes a science. The relations of man to man become more and more fixed in accordance with the dictates of Reason.

The entire life of Humanity has five periods. I. The domination of Instinct over Reason: this is the primitive age.

The general instinct gives place to an external dominant authority: this is the age of doctrines unable to convince, and employing force to produce a blind belief, claiming unlimited obedience; this is the period in which Evil arises. II. The Authority, dominant in the preceding epoch, but constantly attacked by Reason, becomes weak and wavering: this is the epoch of scepticism and licentiousness. III. Reason becomes conscious of itself; truth makes itself known; the science of Reason develops itself: this is the beginning of that perfection which Humanity is destined to attain. IV. The science of Reason is applied: Humanity measures itself after the ideal standard of Reason: this is the epoch of Art, the last term in the history of our species.



## CHAPTER II.

*SCHELLING.*

## § I. LIFE OF SCHELLING.

**F**REDERICK WILLIAM JOSEPH SCHELLING was born in Leonberg, in Würtemberg, January 27, 1775. At the University in Tübingen he first knew Hegel; their friendship was enduring and productive. At Leipzig he studied Medicine and Philosophy; in the latter he became the pupil of Fichte; he afterwards filled Fichte's vacant chair at Jena, where he lectured with immense success. In 1807 he was made a member of the Munich Academy of Sciences. And in Bavaria, honoured, rewarded, and ennobled, he remained till 1842, when the King of Prussia seduced him to Berlin; and there, in the chair once held by Hegel, he opened a series of lectures, in which he was to give the fruit of a life's meditation.

His appearance at Berlin was the signal for violent polemics. The Hegelians were all up in arms. Pamphlets, full of personalities and dialectics, were launched against Schelling, apparently without much effect. His foes at length grew weary of screaming; and he continued quietly to lecture. In 1845 I had the gratification not only of hearing him lecture on Mythology to large audiences, but also of hearing him in the expansiveness of private conversation pour forth his stores of varied knowledge. His intellectual vigour was such, that although seventy summers had whitened his hair, he seemed to have still a long lease of life; and indeed he continued nine years longer to inspire the respect of all who knew him. He died on August 20, 1854.

## § II. SCHELLING'S DOCTRINES.

Schelling is often styled the German Plato. In such parallels there is always some truth amidst much error. Schelling's works unquestionably exhibit great power of vivid imagination conjoined with subtle dialectics; if on this ground he is to be styled a Plato, then are there hundreds to share that title with him. His doctrines have little resemblance to those of his supposed prototype. Curiously enough, his head was marvellously like that of Socrates; not so ugly, but still very like it in general character.

Schelling may be regarded as having been the systematiser of a tendency, always manifesting itself (it had not escaped the observation of Tacitus), but then in full vigour in Germany the tendency towards Pantheism. This tendency may be recognised in the clear Goethe, no less than in the mystical Valis. In some way or other, Pantheism seems the natural issue of almost every Metaphysic of Religion, when rigorously carried out; but Germany, above all European countries, has, both in poetry and speculation, the most constantly produced it. Her poets, her artists, her musicians, and her thinkers, have been more or less Pantheists. Schelling's attempt, therefore, to give Pantheism a scientific basis could not but meet with hearty approbation.

We may here once more notice the similarity, in historical position, of the modern German speculations to those of the Alexandrian Schools. In both the incapacity of Reason to solve the problems of Philosophy is openly proclaimed; in both some higher faculty is called in to solve them. Plotinus called this faculty *Ecstasy*. Schelling called it the *Intellectual Intuition*. The Ecstasy was not supposed to be a faculty possessed by all men, and at all times; it was only possessed by the few, and by them but sometimes. The Intellectual Intuition was not supposed to be a faculty common to all men; on the contrary, it was held as the endowment only of a few of the privileged: it was the faculty for philosophising.

Schelling expresses his disdain for those who talk about not comprehending the highest truths of Philosophy. 'Really,' he exclaims, 'one sees not wherefore Philosophy should pay any attention whatever to Incapacity. It is better rather that we should isolate Philosophy from all the ordinary routes, and keep it so separated from ordinary knowledge that none of these routes should lead to it. Philosophy commences where ordinary knowledge terminates.'\* The highest truths of science cannot be proved, they must be apprehended; for those who cannot apprehend them there is nothing but pity: argument is useless.

After this, were we to call Schelling the German Plotinus, we should perhaps be nearer the truth than in calling him the German Plato. But it was for the sake of no such idle parallel that we compared the fundamental positions of each. Our object was to 'point a moral,' and to show how the same forms of error reappear in history, and how the labours of so many centuries have not advanced the human mind in this direction one single step.

The first point to be established is the nature of Schelling's improvement upon Fichte: the relation in which the two doctrines stand to each other.

Fichte's Idealism was purely subjective Idealism. The Object had indeed reality, but was solely dependent upon the Subject. Endeavour as we might, we could never separate the Object from the Subject, we must never conceive a possible mode of existence without being forced to identify with it a Subject. Indeed the very conception itself is but an act of the Subject. Admitting that we are forced by the laws of our mental constitution to postulate an unknown something, a Noumenon, as the substance in which all phenomena inhere, what, after all, is this postulate? It is an act of the Mind; it is wholly subjective; the necessity for the postulate is a mental necessity. The Non-Ego therefore is the product of the Ego.

\* *Neue Zeitschrift für speculative Physik*, ii. 34.

There is subtle reasoning in the above ; nay more, it contains a principle which is irrefutable : the principle of the identity of Object and Subject in knowledge. This Schelling adopted. Nevertheless, in spite of such an admission, the nullity of the external world was too violent and repulsive a conclusion to be long maintained ; and it was necessary to see if the principle of identity might not be preserved, without forcing such a conclusion.

The existence of the objective world is as firmly believed in as the existence of the subjective : they are, indeed, both given in the same act. We cannot be conscious of our own existence without at the same time inseparably connecting it with some other existence from which we distinguish ourselves. So in like manner we cannot be aware of the existence of anything out of ourselves without at the same time inseparably connecting with it a consciousness of ourselves. Hence we conclude that both exist ; not indeed separately, not independently of each other, but *identified* in some higher power. Fichte said that the Non-Ego was created by the ego. Schelling said that the two were equally real, and that both were identified in the Absolute.

Knowledge must be knowledge of something. Hence knowledge implies the correlate of Being. Knowledge without an object known, is but an empty form. But Knowledge and being are correlates ; they are not separable ; they are identified. It is as impossible to conceive an Object known without a Subject knowing, as it is to conceive a Subject knowing without an Object known.

Nature is Spirit visible ; Spirit is invisible Nature : \* the absolute Ideal is at the same time the absolute Real.

Hence Philosophy has two primary problems to solve. In the *Transcendental Philosophy* the problem is to construct Nature from Intelligence—the Object from the Subject. In the *Philosophy of Nature* the problem is to construct Intelli-

\* Our readers will recognise here a favourite saying of COLERIDGE, many of whose remarks, now become famous, are almost *verbatim* translations from SCHELLING and the two SCHLEGELS.

gence from Nature—the Subject from the Object.\* And how are we to construct one from the other? Fichte has taught us to do so by the principle of the identity of Subject and Object, whereby the productivity and the product are in constant opposition, yet always one. The productivity (*Thätigkeit*) is the activity in act; it is the force which develops itself into all things. The product is the activity arrested and solidified into a fact; but it is always ready to pass again into activity. And thus the world is but a balancing of contending powers within the sphere of the Absolute.

In what, then, does Schelling differ from Fichte, since both assert that the product (Object) is but the arrested activity of the Ego? In this: the Ego in Fichte's system is a finite Ego—it is the human soul. The Ego in Schelling's system is the Absolute—the Infinite—the All which Spinoza called Substance; and this Absolute manifests itself in two forms: in the form of the Ego and in the form of the Non-Ego—as Nature and as Mind.

The Ego produces the Non-Ego, but not by its own force, not out of its own nature; it is universal Nature which works within us and which produces from out of us; it is universal Nature which here in us is conscious of itself. The souls of men are but the innumerable individual eyes with which the Infinite World-Spirit beholds himself.

What is the Ego? It is one and the same with the act which renders it an Object to itself. When I say 'myself'—when I form a conception of my Ego, what is that but the Ego making itself an Object? Consciousness therefore may be defined the objectivity of the Ego. Very well; now apply this to the Absolute. He, too, must be conscious of himself, and for that he must realise himself objectively. We can now understand Schelling when he says, 'The blind and unconscious products of Nature are nothing but unsuccessful attempts of Nature to make itself an Object (*sich selbst zu reflectiren*); the so-called dead Nature is but an unripe Intelli-

\* *System des transcendentalen Idealismus*, p. 7.

ence. The acme of its efforts—that is, for Nature completely to objectise itself—is attained through the highest and ultimate degree of reflection in Man—or what we call *Reason*. Here Nature returns into itself, and reveals its identity with that which in us is known as the Object and subject.\*

This function of Reason is elsewhere more distinctly ascribed as the total *indifference-point* of the subjective and objective. The Absolute he represents by the symbol of the magnet. Thus, as it is the same principle which divides itself in the magnet into the north and south poles, the centre of which is the indifference-point, so in like manner does the Absolute divide itself into the Real and Ideal, and holds itself in this separation as absolute indifference.† And as in the magnet every point is itself a magnet, having a North pole, a South pole, and a point of indifference, so also in the Universe, the individual varieties are but varieties of the eternal One. Man is a microcosm.

Reason is the indifference-point. Whoso rises to it rises to the *reality* of things (*zum wahren Ansich*), which reality is precisely in the indifference of Object and Subject. The basis of Philosophy is therefore the basis of Reason; its knowledge is a knowledge of things as they are, *i.e.* as they are in Reason.‡

The spirit of Plotinus revives in these expressions. We have in them the whole key-stone of the Alexandrian School. The Intellectual Intuition by which we are to embrace the Absolute, is, as before remarked, but another form of the Alexandrian Ecstasy. Schelling was well aware that the Absolute, the Infinite as such, could not be known under the conditions of finity, cannot be known in personal consciousness. How, then, can it be known? By some higher faculty which discerns the identity of Object and Subject—

\* *System des transcendentalen Idealismus*, p. 5.

† Hence SCHELLING's philosophy is often styled the Indifference Philosophy.

‡ *Zeitschrift für speculative Physik*, vol. ii. Heft 2.

which perceives the Absolute as Absolute, where all difference is lost in indifference.

There are three divisions in Schelling's system: the philosophy of Nature, the transcendental philosophy, and the philosophy of the Absolute.

His speculations with respect to Nature at first met with considerable applause in Germany. Ingenious they certainly are, but vitiated in Method; incapable of verification. Those who are curious to see what he makes of Nature are referred to his *Zeitschrift für speculative Physik*, and his *Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur*. The following examples will serve to indicate the character of his speculations.\*

Subject and Object being identical, the absolute Identity is the absolute totality named Universe. There can be no difference except a *quantitative* difference; and this is only conceivable with respect to individual existences. For the absolute Identity is *quantitative indifference* both of Object and Subject, and is only under this form. If we could behold all that is, and behold it in its totality, we should see a perfect quantitative equality. It is only in the scission of the Individual from the Infinite that quantitative difference takes place. This difference of Object and Subject is the ground of all finity: and, on the other hand, quantitative indifference of the two is Infinity.

That which determines any difference is a Power (*Potenz*), and the Absolute is the Identity of all Powers (*aller Potenzen*). All matter is originally liquid; *weight* is the power through which the Attractive and Expansive force, as the immanent ground of the reality of Matter, operates. Weight is the first *Potenz*. The second *Potenz* is Light—an inward intuition of Nature, as weight is the outward intuition. Identity with light is Transparency. Heat does not pertain to the nature of Light, but is simply a *modus existendi* of Light.

\* The reader must not complain if he do not understand what follows: intelligibility is not the characteristic of German speculation; and we are here only translating SCHELLING's words, without undertaking to enlighten their darkness.

Newton's speculations upon Light are treated with disdain, as a system built upon illogical conclusions, a system self-contradictory, and leading to infinite absurdities. Nevertheless this absurd system has led men to many discoveries: it is the basis of a gradually advancing science; while the views of Schelling lead to nothing except disputation. Thus with regard to his explanation of Electricity: let us suppose it exact, and we must still acknowledge it to be useless. It admits of no verification; admits of no application. It is utterly sterile.

There are indeed general ideas in his *Natur-Philosophie*, which not only approach the conceptions of positive science, but have given a powerful stimulus to many scientific intellects. The general law of polarity, for example, which he makes \* the law of universal nature, is seen illustrated in physics and chemistry; although the presumed relation between heat and oxygen, which he makes the basis of all atomic changes, no chemist will nowadays accept. When, in the second part of this treatise, he theorises on organic life, the result is similar, namely some general ideas which seem luminous are enforced by particular ideas certainly false. He maintains that vegetation and life are the products of chemical action: the first consisting in a continual deoxidation, the second in a continual oxidation; as soon as this chemical action ceases, death supervenes, for living beings exist only in the moment of *becoming*.† He only expresses the universally accepted idea of life when he makes it depend on the incessant disturbance and re-establishment of an equilibrium,‡ or, as De Blainville defines it, 'a continual movement of decomposition and recomposition.'

All the functions of Life are but the individualisations of one common principle; and all the series of living beings are but the individualisations of one common Life: this is the *Weltseele*, or *anima mundi*. The same idea had been expressed by Goethe, and has since been presented under various forms

\* *Von der Weltseele*, 25 sq.

† *Ibid.* p. 181.

‡ *Ibid.* p. 284.



by Oken and many German naturalists. The idea of a dynamic progression in Nature, is also the fundamental idea in Hegel's philosophy.

Schelling in his *Jahrbücher der Medicin*, says that Science is only valuable in as far as it is *speculative*; and by speculation he means the contemplation of God as He exists. Reason, inasmuch as it affirms God, cannot affirm anything else, and annihilates itself at the same time as an *individual* existence, as anything *out of* God. Thought (*das Denken*) is not my Thought; and Being is not my Being; for everything belongs to God or the All. There is no such thing as a Reason which *we have*; but only a Reason that *has us*. If nothing exists out of God, then must the knowledge of God be only the infinite knowledge which God has of himself in the eternal Self-affirmation. God is not the highest, but the only One. He is not to be viewed as the summit or the end, but as the centre, as the All in All. Consequently there is no such thing as a being lifted up to the knowledge of God; but the knowledge is *immediate* recognition.

If we divest Schelling's speculations of their dialectical forms, we shall arrive at the following results:—

Idealism is one-sided. Beside the Subject there must exist an Object: the two are identical in a third, which is the Absolute. The Absolute is neither Ideal nor Real—neither Mind nor Nature—but both. This Absolute is God. He is the All in All; the eternal source of all existence. He realises himself under one form as an objectivity; and under a second form as a subjectivity. He becomes conscious of himself in man: and this man, under the highest form of his existence, manifests Reason, and by this Reason God knows himself. Such are the conclusions to which Schelling's philosophy leads us. And now, we ask, in what does this philosophy differ from Spinozism?

The Absolute, which Schelling assumes as the indifference-point of Subject and Object, is, but the *πρώτον ἀγαθόν* and primal Nothing which forms the first Hypostasis of the

**Alexandrian Trinity.** The Absolute, as the Identity of Subject and Object, being neither and yet both, is but the Substance of Spinoza, whose attributes are Extension and Thought.

With Spinoza also he agreed in giving only a phenomenal reality to the Object and Subject. With Spinoza he agreed in admitting but one existence—the Absolute.

But, although agreeing with Spinoza in his fundamental positions, he differed with him in Method, and in the applications of those positions. In both differences the superiority, as it seems to me, is incontestably due to Spinoza.

Spinoza deduced his system very logically from one fundamental assumption, viz. that whatever was true of ideas was true of objects. This assumption itself was not altogether arbitrary. It was grounded upon the principle of certitude, which Descartes had brought forward as the only principle which was irrefragable. Whatever was found to be distinct and *a priori* in Consciousness, was irresistibly true. Philosophy was therefore deductive; and Spinoza deduced his system from the principles laid down by Descartes.

Schelling's Method was very different. Aware that human knowledge was necessarily finite, he could not accept Spinoza's Method, because that would have given him only a knowledge of the finite, the conditioned; and such knowledge, it was admitted, led to scepticism. He was forced to assume another faculty of knowing the truth, and this was the Intellectual Intuition. Reason which could know the Absolute was only possible by transcending Consciousness and sinking into the Absolute. As Knowledge and Being were identical, to know the Infinite, we must *be* the Infinite, *i.e.* must lose our individuality in the universal.

Consciousness, then, which had for so long formed the basis of all Philosophy, was thrown over by Schelling, as incompetent to solve any of its problems. Consciousness was no ground of certitude. Reason was the organ of Philosophy, and Reason was *impersonal*. The Identity of Being

and Knowing took the place of Consciousness, and became the basis of all speculation. We shall see to what it led in Hegel.

Our notice of Schelling has necessarily been brief, not because he merited no greater space, but because to have entered into details with any satisfaction, would have carried us far beyond our limits. His works are not only numerous, but differ considerably in their views. All we have endeavoured to represent is the ideas which he produced as developments of Fichte, and which served Hegel as a basis.\*

\* A French translation of SCHELLING's most important work, under the title of *Système de l'Idéalisme transcendantal*, by P. GRIMBLAT, the translator of FICHTE, has appeared; also a version of Bruno; ou, *Les Principes des Choses*. Nothing in English.

## CHAPTER III.

## HEGEL.

## § I. LIFE OF HEGEL.

GEORGE FREDERICK WILLIAM HEGEL was born at Stuttgart, the 27th of August, 1770. He received that classical education which distinguished the Würtemberg students beyond all others; and in his eighteenth year he went to Tübingen, to pursue his theological and philosophical studies. He was there a fellow-student with Schelling, for whom he contracted great esteem. The two young thinkers communicated to each other their thoughts, and discussed their favourite systems. In after-life, when opposition had rendered these ties, Hegel never spoke of this part of their connection without emotion, though both in his private letters and published works he more than once spoke contemptuously of Schelling. In his twentieth year he had to give up all plans for a professorship, and was content (hunger compelling) to accept the place of private tutor, first in Switzerland, and subsequently in Frankfort.

Early in 1801 his father died; and the small property he inherited enabled him to relinquish his tutorship and to move to Jena, where he published his dissertation *De Orbitis Cometarum*. This work was directed against the Newtonian system of Astronomy. It was an application of Schelling's philosophy of Nature; and in it Newton was treated with the scorn which Hegel never failed to heap upon empirics, those who trusted more to experience than to metaphysics.

In the same year he published his *Difference between Fichte and Schelling*, in which he sided with the doctrines of his friend, whom he joined in editing the *Critical Journal of*

*Philosophy.* It is in the second volume of this Journal that we meet with his celebrated essay *Glauben und Wissen* (Faith and Knowledge), in which Kant, Jacobi, and Fichte are criticised.

At Jena he enjoyed the society of Goethe and Schiller. The former, with his usual sagacity, detected the philosophical genius which as yet lay undeveloped in Hegel; of which more may be read in Goethe and Schiller's *Correspondence*. Hegel, on the other hand, was to the last one of Goethe's staunchest admirers; and many a gleam of lustre is shed over the pages of the philosopher by his frequent quotation of the poet.

At the University of Jena, Hegel then held the post of *Privatdocent*; but his lectures had only four listeners. These four however were all remarkable men: Gabler, Troxler, Lachmann, and Zellmann. On Schelling's quitting Jena, Hegel filled his chair; but filled it only for one year. Here he published his *Phänomenologie des Geistes*. He finished writing this work on the night of the ever-memorable battle of Jena. While the artillery was roaring, the philosopher was deep in his work, unconscious of all that was going on. He continued writing, as Archimedes at the siege of Syracuse continued his scientific researches. The next morning, manuscript in hand, he steps into the streets, proceeding to his publisher's, firmly convinced that the interests of mankind are bound up with that mass of writing which he hugs so tenderly. The course of his reverie is somewhat violently interrupted; bearded and gesticulating French soldiers arrest the philosopher, and significantly enough inform him that, for the present, the interests of men lie elsewhere than in manuscripts. In spite of French soldiers, however, the work in due time saw the light, and was welcomed by the philosophical world as a new system—or rather as a new modification of Schelling's system. The editorship of the Bamberg newspaper was then offered him, and he quitted Jena. He did not long remain at Bamberg; for in the autumn of 1808 we find him Rector of the Gymnasium College at Nürnberg. He shortly after married Fräulein

von Tucher, with whom he passed a happy life: she bore him two sons. In 1816 he was called to the chair of Heidelberg, and published in 1817 his *Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*, which contains an outline of his system. This work so exalted his reputation, that in 1818 he was called to the chair of Berlin, then the most important in Germany. He there lectured for thirteen years, and formed a school, of which it is sufficient to name its members, Gans, Rosenkranz, Michelet, Werder, Marheinecke, and Hotho.

Hegel was seized with the cholera in 1831, and after a short illness expired, in the sixty-second year of his age, on the 24th of November, the anniversary of the death of Leibnitz.

## § II. HEGEL'S METHOD.

Schelling's doctrines were never systematically co-ordinated. He was subtle, ardent, and audacious; but he disregarded precision; and stood in striking contradiction to his predecessors Kant and Fichte in his disregard of logical forms.

The effect of his teaching was felt more in the department of the philosophy of Nature than elsewhere. Crowds of disciples, some of them, as Oken and Steffens, illustrious disciples, attempted the application of his principles; and after a vast quantity of ingenious but sterile generalisation, it was found that these principles led to no satisfactory conclusion.

Schelling's ideas were however very generally accepted in the philosophical world at the time Hegel appeared. These ideas were thought to be genuine intuitions of the truth; the only drawback was their want of systematic co-ordination. They were inspirations of the truth; but the demonstrations were needed. The position Hegel was to occupy became therefore very clear: he had to systematise and co-ordinate the principles of Schelling and Kant. He complained, and justly, that Schelling's Absolute rested upon no grounds of logical proof, but was 'as if shot out of a pistol.'\* He undertook the logical genesis. Rejecting the conception of the Absolute as the indifference of Ideal and Real, he substituted for

\* *Phänomenologie des Geistes*. Vorrede, p. 40.

it the conception of an unfolding reality of the Idea. According to this view, the Absolute is a process, a dialectic movement. Hence the necessity of a demonstration that the Absolute contains within itself by the very necessity of its nature a principle of evolution from difference to difference, which differences are its *moments*. To effect this all-important position a Method was requisite, and this constitutes Hegel's glory. The nature of his contribution to philosophy, which has placed him on so high a pedestal of renown, is nothing less than the invention of a new Method.\*

The principle of this Method is the identity of two contradictories. Every conception contains within it its own negation; it is one-sided, and topples over into a second, which, not less one-sided, must sink with its opposite into a third; there both attain unity. But this synthesis of thesis and antithesis once effected, the position thus affirmed, is in turn negatived, and through negation passes onwards to a higher unity. Thus there is perpetual flux, nothing is ever fixed, definite, all is but the passing *moments* of the immanent movement. 'The universal which is the only ground of everything particular is such only in this way, that it (the universal) as such is only something one-sided, and is of itself impelled into negation of its abstract universality by means of concreter particularity (definiteness). The absolute is not a simple one something, but a system of notions which owe their origin to this self-negation of the original universal. This system of notions is then collectively in itself again an *abstractum*, that is impelled forward into negation of its merely notional (ideal) being, into reality, into the real self-subsistence of the differences (nature).'†

The first remark to be made on this famous Method is that whatever merit may be assigned to it should be passed to the credit of Fichte, as a glance at our exposition of Fichte

\* This is the claim put up by his disciple MICHELET, *Gesch. der letzten System der Philos.* ii. 604-5; who declares HEGEL's method to be all that can properly be called his own. Comp. HEGEL's *Vermischte Schriften*, ii. 479.

† SCHWEGLER: *Handbook of the History of Philosophy*. Translated by J. H. STIRLING, 1867, p. 317.

560) will show. Hegel's improvement on it can hardly be said to have done more than to render the process objective as well as subjective; and this was effected by Bardili.\* The second remark is that it needlessly departs from the common logic; and perplexes by its paradoxes.

Two contradictories are commonly supposed to exclude each other reciprocally: Being excludes Non-Being. This position Hegel pronounces to be false. Everything is contradictory in itself; contradiction forms its essence: its identity consists in being the union of two contradictories. Thus Being (*Sein*) considered absolutely—considered as unconditioned—that is to say Being in the abstract, apart from any individual thing—is the same as Nothing. Being is therefore identical with its negation. But to conclude that there is not Being, would be false: for the abstract Nothing (*Nichts*) is at the same time the abstract Being. We must therefore unite these two contraries, and in so doing we arrive at a middle term—the realisation † of the two in one, and this is *conditioned* Existence—it is the world.

Here is another example: in pure light,—that is, light without colour or shadow,—we should be totally unable to see anything. Absolute clearness is therefore identical with absolute obscurity—with its negation, in fact; but neither clearness nor obscurity are complete alone: by uniting them we have clearness mingled with obscurity; that is to say, we have Light properly so called.

Hegel thus, instead of allowing himself to be worsted by the arguments derived from the contradictions to which the identity of Being and Knowing was exposed, at once met the difficulty by declaring that the identity of contradictories is the very condition of all Being; without a contrary nothing could come into being. This logical audacity has stounded many, who proclaim this feat worthy of immortal

\* See BARDILI und REINHOLD: *Briefwechsel über das Wesen der Philosophie*, p. 51 sq.

† The original word is *Werden*—the *becoming*. It is much used in German speculation to express the transition from Non-being to Being.



glory. A new light seemed to be thrown upon the world: a new aspect was given to all existences. Being was at the same time Non-Being. Light was also Darkness, and Darkness was also Light.

Hegel is perfectly aware of the paradox, and foresees the amazement and the ridicule it will excite in Common Sense, which he says is nothing but Understanding organised into abstractions and the superstition of abstractions; whereas Philosophy deals with quite other conditions.\* Common Sense, not aware that its logical forms are products of the mind (by means of which the mind fashions sensations into objects), detaches these forms from their source, regards them as not only objective but extra-mental. Being is thus held to be something wholly outside Thought, to which Thought has to conform; whereas Speculative Insight recognises Being as the other side of Thought—the work of Reason in objectifying sensation. Common Sense detaches the object from the thought, as two separate entities; whereas it is the business of Philosophy, according to Hegel, to show that all things and all thoughts are stages in one continuous evolution. Thus, pushing aside the objection of Common Sense, he passes on, scornful and self-reliant. In the words of his disciple Mr. Stirling: ‘There is in the brain of Hegel a dominant metaphor. This metaphor relates to a peculiar evolution which is characterised thus: It begins, of course, with a first; but this first is presently seen to imply its opposite, which opposite, developed in its turn, coalesces with the former to the production of a third, a new form, constituted by and containing, but only *impliciter*, the two former as moments. This third, this new form, develops *itself* now up to the full of *its* unity, and is presently seen to imply *its* opposite—with the same results. Now, we have to conceive this process repeated again and again till an end is reached;

\* ‘In dieser Wissenschaft ganz andere Bestimmungen vorkommen als im gewöhnlichen Bewusstseyn und im sogenannten gemeinen Menschenverstande, der nicht der gesunde, sondern auch der zu Abstraktionen und zu dem Glauben oder vielmehr Aberglauben an Abstraktionen heraufgebildete Verstand ist.’—*Logik*, i. p. 76. (The edition I quote from is that of 1841.)

which end, we have further to conceive, passes back into the first, and thus the whole movement constitutes a simple circle. Each link in this circular chain, too, is seen to be a kind of triple unity. Ever, indeed, there seems somehow a flight of three, the last of which is always a return to the first, but changed, as if it were richer, heavier, more complete—more completely developed, in fact. Each of the three terms concerned must be conceived to begin, to fill, to reach its full; and when full, to show, as it were, the germ of its opposite, which rising up into its full, seeks union and coalescence with its former to a new production. This is the one metaphor of the thought of Hegel; and even here we can see that we have never moved from the spot; for this metaphor is but another way of expressing the one movement or principle already characterised in so many ways as *δύναμις*, *ἔλη*, *ἐντελέχεια*; Begriff, Urtheil, Schluss; Universality, Particularity, Singularity; Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis; Being, Essence, Notion, &c., &c. Wherever we are, in Hegel indeed we have ever the same triplet before us in one or other of its innumerable forms. Always there are the two opposites or reciprocals which coalesce like acid and alkali to a base—a base in which they still implicitly are, but only as moments. This base, again, if the result of its moments, is really their base, their ground, their foundation, their *Grundlage*. If they found it, it founds them. It is the mother-liquor into which they have passed: it is a living base out of which they can arise and show themselves, and into which they can again disappearingly return. This is the Hegelian metaphor: a ground, a base, from which arise members, which again withdraw themselves—a differentiated *Common* or *One*. And what is this but the disjunctive or reciprocal whole of Kant, suggested to him by the disjunctive judgment, and discussed by him at so much length, and with such fresh, new, and creative vigour? A sphere of reciprocity; this is the whole. This is the Hegelian *Idée-Monad*. The reciprocity still must be understood as notional reciprocity—the triple reciprocity of universal, particular,

and singular, each of which, as reciprocal of the others, holds the others in its own way, and is in fact the others. It is Identity gone into its differences indeed, but still even in these identical with itself. Differentiated identity, or identified difference, constitutes the one reciprocal sphere of Hegel—a sphere which is the whole universe—a sphere which is each and every atom in the universe—a sphere which, as self-consciousness, or rather as *the Notion* (self-consciousness in its simplest statement), is the one soul, the one spirit—which is life, vitality itself—and the only life, the only vitality. Thus it is—which is so curiously characteristic of the Hegelian philosophy—that every attempt to understand or explain any the least considerable of its terms becomes a flight into the system itself. So, for particular example, is it that the third is always the base and the truth of the first and second. We see this corroborated by fact; for it is simply the progress of thought to give itself the new as the reason or explanation or ground of the old, or of what preceded it.' And elsewhere he exclaims, 'Now this is the whole secret of Hegel, and this is his ultimate secret. These are the steps: *An sich, Für sich, An und für sich.*'

'The Ego is, firstly, the Universal; it is Identity, it is Immediacy, it is *An sich*. The Ego, secondly, *surveys itself*; that is, it *gives itself* or becomes to itself the *Particular*, the Difference, the Dis-cernment, the Reflexion: it is *Für sich* (and *Anders-seyn* and *Seyn-für-Anderes* are evidently just identical with *Für sich*, the moment the Ego is the All). The Ego, thirdly, returns from survey of itself with *increase of knowledge*; that is, returning into itself (the universal) from or with the particular, it does not just reassume its old identity, but is now the Singular, which is Identity in Diversity, Immediacy in Reflexion, the Universal in the Particular, or it is *An und für sich.*'

We may, by way of anticipation, observe that Hegel's notion of God becoming conscious of Himself in Philosophy, and thereby attaining his highest development, is founded on the above process. God as pure Being can only pass into

reality through a negation; in Philosophy he *negatives this negation*, and thus becomes a *positive* affirmation.

### § III. ABSOLUTE IDEALISM.

Everything contains within itself a contradiction, and this, as identity of the thesis and antithesis, constitutes its essence. Schelling's conception of the identity of Subject and Object was not exact. He assumed the reality of both of these *poles* of the magnet; and the identity he called the point of indifference between them. These two extremities were always separate, though identified. Hegel declared that the essence of all relation—that which is true and positive in every relation—is not the *two terms related*, but the *relation itself*. This is the basis of Absolute Idealism.

It may be thus illustrated: I see a tree. Certain psychologists tell me that there are three things implied in this one fact of vision, viz. a tree, an image of that tree, and a mind which apprehends that image. Fichte tells me that it is I alone who exist: the tree and the image of the tree are but one thing, and that is a modification of my mind. This is *Subjective Idealism*. Schelling tells me that both the tree and my Ego are existences equally real or ideal, but they are nothing less than manifestations of the Absolute. This is *Objective Idealism*. But, according to Hegel, all these explanations are false. The only thing really existing (in this one fact of vision) is the Idea—the *relation*. The Ego and the Tree are but two terms of the relation, and owe their reality to it. This is *Absolute Idealism*.

What does this Absolute Idealism bring us to? It brings us to a world of mere 'relations.' The Spinozistic notion of 'Substance' was too gross. To speak of Substance, was to speak only of *one* term of a relation. The Universe is but the Universe of Ideas, which are at once both objective and subjective, their essence consisting in the relation they bear to each other,—in the identity of their contradiction. 'Spinoza said God is Substance. I say that God is more than Sub-

stance; he is the Notion (*Begriff*); a definition which, in my judgment, suffices to re-establish the Freewill of man.'

Remark also that this Absolute Idealism is Hume's Scepticism, in a dogmatical form. Hume denied the existence of Mind and Matter, and said there was nothing but Ideas. Hegel in effect denies the existence of both Object and Subject, since the only reality of either depends on its relation to the other. He blames Kant for having spoken of Things as if they were only appearances to us (*Erscheinungen für uns*), while their real nature (*Ansich*) was inaccessible. The real relation, he says, is this: that the Things we know are not only appearances to us, but are in themselves mere appearances (*sondern an sich blosse Erscheinungen*) having their ground not in themselves but in the Absolute. The real objectivity is this: that our Thoughts are not only Thoughts, but at the same time are the reality of Things.\* For what we in ordinary language call Things are the acts of Thought, by which the subjective modifications of sensory organs are projected as objects. Being and knowing are one, or two aspects of one reality, two terms of one relation. Being is the simple relation of object and subject viewed from the objective aspect; knowing is the same relation viewed from the subjective aspect.

This is *the* Philosophy—not *a* Philosophy, remember—not a system which may take its place amongst other systems. No, it is the Philosophy *par excellence*.† True it is, that some of the young Hegelians, when reproached with the constant changes they introduce, reply that it belongs to the nature of Philosophy to change. But these are inconsiderate, rash young men. Mature and sober thinkers (of Hegel's school) declare that, although some improvements are possible in detail, yet on the whole Hegel has given *the* Philosophy to the world.

\* 'Dass die Gedanken nicht bloss unsere Gedanken, sondern zugleich das Ansich der Dinge und des Gegenständlichen überhaupt sind.'—*Encyklopädie*, § 41, p. 89; see also p. 97.

† *Gesch. der Philos.* iii. 690.

And this Philosophy is not simply a system of doctrines whereby man is to guide himself. It is something far greater. It is the contemplation of the self-development of the Absolute. Hegel congratulates mankind upon the fact of a new epoch having dawned. 'It appears,' says he, 'that the World-Spirit (*Weltgeist*) has at last succeeded in freeing himself from all encumbrances, and is able to *conceive himself as Absolute Intelligence* (*sich als absoluten Geist zu erfassen*). . . . For he is this only in as far as he knows himself to be the Absolute intelligence: *and this he knows only in Science; and this knowledge alone constitutes his true existence.*' \*

As for the system itself, we may leave to all readers to decide whether it be worthy of attention, except as an illustration of the devious errors of Speculation. A system which begins with assuming that Being and Non-Being are the same, because Being in the abstract must be conceived as the Unconditioned, and so must Non-Being, therefore both, as unconditioned, are the same; a system which proceeds upon the identity of contradictories as the method of Philosophy; a system in which the only real positive existence is that of simple Relation, the two terms of which are Mind and Matter; this system, were it wholly true, leaves all the questions for which Science is useful just as much in the dark as ever, and is therefore unworthy the attention of earnest men working for the benefit of mankind.

The futility may be estimated by a glance at the solutions of soluble problems which it offers. Nothing can exceed the ingenuity of nonsense exhibited by Hegel when he treats of questions which, as coming within the range of Verification, should, if his system were true, present the most convincing evidence of its truth. Newton (whom he calls a barbarian in thought †) and the empirical school (which he despises as 'trivial') he might ridicule to his heart's content, did he not exhibit the spectacle of his own hopeless failure to solve the problems approximately solved by Newton and the empirics.

\* *Gesch. der Philos.* iii. 689.

† *Ibid.* iii. 447.

A friend, to whose revision this chapter is much indebted, urges, in defence of Hegel, 'that it is not the business of Philosophy to discover particular empirical facts, but to investigate the general relation between the Cosmos and the thinking mind. Hegel's philosophy is a kind of Darwinian attempt to show *how* the objective world and the relation of the subject to it gradually grows up.' This defence would be final if the general relation were itself an algebraic expression of the particulars from which it was abstracted—in other words if the general included the particulars, and was not at variance with them. Unless natural selection were a fact, Darwin's hypothesis would have a merely speculative interest. It is because Hegel's dialectical process is at variance with some of the best established conclusions of science, that it is neglected.

Surely a system which has disclosed the highest truths, ought to have some illumination for the lower truths? A man who has sounded the depths of Being, ought to be able to state some of the simple laws of Phenomena? A man who can follow the development of the Cosmos, ought to have some insight into cosmical laws? But what is the fact in Hegel's case? He has not only failed to discover a single law, or to establish a single induction in the region of natural phenomena, but has vehemently opposed some of the best established inductions of previous thinkers. In Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, Biology, Psychology—though all these subjects have been treated by him—his system is utterly useless.

Not only is it useless; it is worse, it is pernicious. The facility with which men can throw all questions into systematic obscurity by the aid of Metaphysics, has long been the bane of Germany. In England and France we have been saved from perpetuating the frivolous discussions of the Schoolmen mainly because we have retained their nomenclature and terminology, and are warned by these from orthodox scholastic ground; but the Germans, having invented a new philosophical language, do not perceive that the new term

disguise old errors: they fail to recognise in *Irrlicht* the familiar face of *Ignis fatuus*.

Even a disciple admits that, with respect to the explanation of Nature, 'it is dangerous to read here if one would preserve one's respect for Hegel . . . all the essential greatness of the man has disappeared for the time, as it were, behind a dwarf.' 'Indeed, the instrument he has in hand brings with it its own temptations to merely arbitrary products, and the bare show of a consistent and continuous rationale.' Again: 'Strange how such a tough, shrewd, worldly man should have so egregiously deceived himself! Because he could new-classify and new-name, he actually thinks that he new-knows and new-understands! . . . In regard to Hegel, satisfaction and dissatisfaction are seldom far from each other, but the latter predominates. If for a moment the words light up, and a view be granted, as it were, into the inner mysteries, they presently quench themselves again in the appearance of mere arbitrary classification and artificial nomenclature.'\* A truer criticism was never written. Beside it may be placed these sarcasms Hegel directed against Schelling, sarcasms quite as applicable to his own formalism: 'The dodge (*der Pfiff*) of such wisdom is quickly acquired and is easy to put in practice; once known, its repetition is as intolerable as the repetition of an exposed jugglery. It is as if a painter had but two colours, red and green, with the former to depict historical subjects, with the latter landscapes. This method of labelling everything in the heavens above and on the earth beneath with names from the general schema, and so arranging the Cosmos, resembles the ticketing of skeletons, or closed cases in an old curiosity shop.'† Or, as Mr. Stirling in one of his wild outbursts exclaims: 'The fact is, it is all maundering, but with the most audacious usurpation of authoritative speech on the mysteries that must ever remain mysteries.'

\* STIRLING: *Secret of Hegel*, ii. pp. 523, 522, 66. Mr. STIRLING's admiration for Hegel's philosophy by no means blinds him to many of Hegel's defects.

† HEGEL: *Phänomenologie des Geistes*. Vorrede, p. 40.



When Hegel is dealing with History or with Nature, the worthlessness of his Method, and palpable failure of its application, are manifest. No better illustration can be named than his treatment of Newton, whose device, 'Physics beware of Metaphysics,' he says may be translated, 'Science beware of Thought;' which 'precept the followers of Newton have faithfully followed.'\* Was there ever a more audacious misrepresentation? Newton and his followers dispensing with Thought, because they tried to keep within the limits of verification! Hegel further adds that, so far from Newton's optical theory being 'a model of observation and reasoning, it is a model of what observation and reasoning should *not* be.' Let a sample or two of Hegel's own industry be placed beside that of Newton, and the reader may draw his own conclusion.

I. The position of our planet in the Cosmos renders it peculiarly fitted to be the cradle of Mind; but in order that this should be, the planet had to give up its pristine form, and suffer many cataclysms. In these catastrophes it was the unborn spirit of Humanity which unconsciously worked in the bowels of the Earth, preparing its future domain.

This is assuredly not Newtonian; but it has a curious and instructive affinity with a speculation of Auguste Comte's, when that great thinker had lapsed into the Subjective Method, from which his earlier speculations were so happily free. In his latest work we read: 'Il est permis de supposer que notre planète, et les autres astres habitables, furent doués d'intelligence avant que le développement social y devint possible. Alors la terre vouait ses forces à préparer le séjour de l'Humanité.'†

II. Physicists have speculated much about Heat; this is Hegel's explanation: 'Heat is the restoration of heavy

\* HEGEL: *Geschichte der Phil.* iii. 447.

† AUGUSTE COMTE: *Synthèse subjective*, 1856, p. 10. In a very interesting and erudite work, *Time and Space*, by Mr. SHADWORTH HODGSON, 1865, p. 400, there is a notice of several coincidences in the speculations of Hegel and Comte, which, however, are mainly formal; the real resemblance lies in their subjective procedure.

latter to its formlessness, its fluidity; the triumph of homogeneous Matter over the specific determination of its out-of-selfness; its abstract Continuity as Negation of Negation (the Form) determined; i.e. thrown into activity.'

III. In the development of Humanity we are told by Hegel that the races are moments. The Negro race is the natural Mind in itself (*der natürliche Geist als solcher*); the Mongolian shows the Mind conscious of its opposition to its natural form, and tending to rise above it; the Caucasian is the Free Mind: Mind returned to the absolute unity in itself.

IV. Passing over many drolleries of deduction respecting organic phenomena, we may pause at the explanation of the infant's first cry: 'While animals are born dumb, or only express their pain through moans, the child expresses the feeling of his wants through cries. Through this ideal activity the child from the first manifests himself as penetrated by the conviction that he has a right to demand from the outward world the satisfaction of his wants—that the independence of the outward world is a nullity in regard to Humanity.'\*

V. One more sample is all that I can find space for; it shall be drawn from Art. Music has for its material, tone. What is tone? The inner trembling of a sonorous body; consequently, the world of Sense is forsaken by Music, and the world of inner Emotion is exclusively acted on by it. This is why Music is the most subjective of all the Arts.

Is it needful to ask the reader whether Newton and the followers of Newton were justified in neglecting Thought which had such products as these? But Mr. Stirling, who is not blind to the absurdities in Hegel's explanation of the external world—who has, indeed, truly said: 'Hegel is always dogmatic-like; with him naming is explaining'—nevertheless remains a devout disciple, and after admitting the failure of the Philosophy of Nature, says, 'that one glance at the Science of Logic or the Philosophy of Spirit restores

\* HEGEL: *Encyklopädie*, § 396, p. 93. The previous examples are culled from the same work. There is much more *ejusdem farinae*.

the balance, and forces a recognition of Hegel as the absolute master of Thought.' We must not therefore leave these efforts unnoticed.

#### § IV. HEGEL'S LOGIC.

Philosophy being the contemplation of the self-development of the Absolute, or, as Hegel sometimes calls it, the representation of the Idea (*Darstellung der Idee*), it first must be settled in what directions this development takes place.

The process is this. Everything must be first considered *per se* (*an sich*); next in its negation, as some *other* thing (*Anders-seyn*). These are the two terms—the contradictories; but they must be identified in some third, or they cannot exist; this third is the Relation of the two (the *Anundfür-sich-seyn*). This is the affirmation which is founded on the negation of a negation: it is therefore positive, real.

The Absolute, which is both Thought and Being, must be considered in this triple order, and Philosophy falls into three parts:—

- I. LOGIC, the science of the *Idee* \* *an und für sich*.
- II. NATURE-PHILOSOPHY, as the science of the *Idee* in its *Anders-seyn* or externality.
- III. PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLIGENCE, as the *Idee* which has returned from its otherness to itself.

Logic, in this system, has a very different meaning from that usually given to the word. It is, indeed, equally with the common logic, an examination of the forms of Thought; but it is more:—it is an examination of Things no less than of Thoughts. Its object may thus be formulated: 'The exposition of God in his eternal essence previous to the creation of Nature and a finite Mind.'† It is 'the diamond

\* The *Idee* is but another term for the Absolute, 'the adequate Notion, the objectively True, or the True as such.' (*Logik*, iii. 236.) We shall use it, rather than *Idea*, because the English word cannot be employed without creating unnecessary confusion.

† *Logik*, i. 33.

net in which the Universe is woven.' As Object and Subject are declared identical, and whatever is true of the Thought is equally true of the Thing, since the Thought is the thing, Logic, while taking the place of the ancient Logic, is at the same time Metaphysics. It exhibits the genesis of all abstract ideas. Consequently it contains the whole system of Science, whose parts are but the application of this Logic.

Hegel's *Logic* is contained in three volumes of dry abstractions. It is a representation of the *Idee*, in its process of pure thought, free from all contact with objects. It is wholly abstract. It begins with pure Being. This pure Being, in virtue of its purity, is *unconditioned*; but that which has no conditions has no existence: it is a pure abstraction. Now a pure abstraction is also the *Nothing* (*das Nichts*): it also has no conditions; its unconditionalness makes its nothingness. The first proposition in Logic is, therefore, 'Being and Non-Being are the same.'

Hegel admits the proposition to be somewhat paradoxical; but he is not a man to be scared by a paradox, to be shaken by a sarcasm. He is aware that stupid Common-Sense will ask, 'whether it is the same if my house, my property, the air I breathe, this town, sun, the law, mind, or God, exist or not.' Certainly, a very pertinent question: how does he answer it? 'In such examples,' he says, 'particular ends—utility, for instance—are understood, and then it is asked if it is indifferent to me whether these useful things exist or not? But, in truth, Philosophy is precisely the doctrine which is to free man from innumerable finite aims and ends, and to make him so indifferent to them that it is really all the same whether such things exist or not.' Not only does Philosophy thus waive aside the objection as irrelevant, it also points out that the objection is illogical, since it applies to concrete and determinate Being the proposition which is enounced respecting abstract and indeterminate Being. He thus meets the objection in a passage which Mr. Stirling translates as follows:—

'It were vain to seek to meet on all sides the perplexities

into which ordinary consciousness, in the case of such a logical proposition, misleads itself, for they are inexhaustible. It is possible only to notice a few of them. One source of such perplexity, among others, is that consciousness brings with it to the consideration of such abstract logical position, conceptions (representations) of a concrete *Something*, and forgets that there is no question of any such here, but only of the pure abstractions of Being and Nothing, and that it is these alone which are to be held fast.

'Being and Non-being are the same thing ; it is, *therefore*, the same thing whether I am or am not, whether this house is or is not, whether these hundred dollars are or are not in my possession. Such inference or such application of the proposition alters its sense completely. The proposition contains the pure abstractions of Being and Nothing; the application, on the other hand, makes of these a determinate Being and determinate Nothing. But, as has been said, the question here is not of determinate Being. A determinate, a finite Being, is such as refers itself to others ; it is a complex which stands in the relation of necessity with many other such, with the whole world. As regards the reciprocating system of the whole, Metaphysic might advance the—at bottom tautological—allegation, that were a single dust-atom destroyed, the whole universe would collapse. In the instances opposed to the position in question, something appears as not indifferent, whether it is or is not, not for the sake of Being or Non-being, but for the sake of its Import, which Import connects it with other such. If a determinate complex, any determinate There-being, be presupposed, this There-being, because it is determinate, is in manifold relation to other complexes ; it is not indifferent to it, then, whether a certain other complex with which it stands in relation, is or is not ; for only through such relation is it essentially that which it is. The same thing is the case with conception (Non-being being taken in the more determinate sense of conception as against actuality), in the context of which the Being or Non-being of an Import, which is conceived as

determinately in relation with something other, is not indifferently different.'

To Hegel's own explanation let us now add Mr. Stirling's:—

'Pure Being and Pure Nothing are absolutely identical—they are absolutely indistinguishable. It is useless to say Nothing is Nothing, but Being is Something: Being is not more Something than Nothing is. We admit Nothing to exist; Nothing is an intelligible distinction; we talk of thinking Nothing and of perceiving Nothing: in other words, Nothing is the abstraction from every discrimen or particularity. But an abstraction from every discrimen, does not involve the destruction of every or any discrimen: all discrimina still exist; in Nothing we have simply withdrawn into indefiniteness. This Nothing, then, of ours still implies the formed or definite world. Precisely this is the value of Pure Being: when we have realised the notion Pure Being, we have simply retired into the abstraction from all discrimina, but these—for all our abstraction and retirement—still are. Pure Being and Pure Nothing, then, point each to the absolutely same abstraction, the absolutely same retirement. In both, in fact, Thought, for the nonce, has turned its back on all its own discrimina; for Thought is all that is, and all discrimina are but its own. In fact, both Being and Nothing are abstractions, void abstractions, and the voidest of all abstractions, for they are just the ultimate abstractions. Neither is a concrete; neither is, if we may say so, a *reale*. *What, then, is*—What *actu* is—in point of fact is—is neither the one nor the other; but everything that is, is a *σύνολον*, a composite, of both. This is remarkable—that the formed world should hang between the hooks of two invisible abstractions, and, at the same time, that every item of the formed world should be but a *σύνολον* of these two invisible abstractions. We cannot handle Being here and Nothing here, as we might this stone or that wood; yet both stone and wood are composites of Being and Nothing: they both *are* and are *not*—and this in more senses than one. They *are*—that is, they participate in Being. They are distinguish-

able, they involve difference; difference implies negation: that is, they participate in Non-being. The stone is *not* the wood, the wood is *not* the stone: each, therefore, if it *is*, also is *not*.'

Need we insist on the violation of the dialectical Method which is implied in these arguments? If the process of negation is true of the abstract indeterminate, it must be equally true of the concrete determinate. If Pure Being is the same as Pure Nothing, then is particular Being the same as particular Nothing, unless there is a breach of continuity in the passage from abstract to concrete.\*

I may remark, however, that many minds startled by the paradox of Being and Non-Being, and especially puzzled to conceive the existence of Non-Being, nevertheless cherish an analogous conception. They are astonished at Hegel's saying, 'Non-Being *exists*, for it is a Thought.' Yet they are quite comfortable in the assurance of an existing Space which is assuredly only a Thought, and one having all the characters (or characterlessness) of Non-Being. Besides Matter, they presuppose an empty Space, *in* which Matter exists and moves. It is true they do not conceive this Space to be the *same* as Matter; yet, if they hold fast to the logical position, that to know what a thing is we must also know what it is not, *omnis determinatio est negatio*, the Hegelian deduction ought not to surprise them. Again: the popular conception of Inertia as a property of Matter, is the personification of a negation; Inertia being the incapacity of a body's changing its state, this simple negative becomes transformed into a positive; and men speak of 'quantity of Inertia,' 'force of Inertia,' 'overcoming Inertia,' and so on. More examples might be adduced; but these will suffice to

\* The friend before referred to urges: 'The abstract relation Being=Nothing ceases to be true when we get even as far as the category of Something; for Something does not=Nothing, but Another thing, *i.e.* a more concrete negation. A something is determinate by being of a particular kind, by being what it is as distinguished from every other something; but it is only so determinate as the expression of every other something, to the whole universe of somethings to which it is related, and its relation to which makes it to be of a peculiar character.'

how that if Hegel is paradoxical in regarding Negation as one of the moments of the Infinite Process, analogous absurdities are current in the popular Metaphysics.

To return, however. The first proposition has given us the two contradictories; there must be an identity—a relation—to give them positive reality. As pure Being, and as pure Non-Being, they are sheer abstractions which have no reality; they are mere potentialities. Unite them, and you have the *Becoming* (*Werden*), and that is reality. Analyse this idea of *Becoming*, and you will find that it contains precisely these two elements,—a Non-Being from which it is evolving, and a Being which is evolved.

Now these two elements, which reciprocally contradict each other, which incessantly tend to absorb each other, are only maintained in their reality by means of the relation in which they are to each other;—that is the point of the magnet which keeps the poles asunder, and by keeping them asunder prevents their annihilating each other. The *Becoming* is the first concrete Thought we can have, the first conception: Being and Non-Being are pure abstractions. As abstractions, they are distinguishable in Thought, although not separable in reality. They are so related as to be at once the same and different. The difference is negation. Being is the *Ansichseyn* or Selfness; it must pass into its opposite, *Andersseyn* or Otherness (*Asunderness*), and in the passage it becomes Reality, *An und für sich seyn*, or In-and-for-its-selfness.

This return of Itself into Itself through its Otherself, is one of the logical sleights most difficult to follow. Two cardinal objections may be made to it: First, that it is absolutely unthinkable, cannot be construed to the understanding, however it may be phrased. Secondly, the passage from Abstraction to Reality is only intelligible by the aid of such conceptions as Time, Space, Movement, &c.

I. It is absolutely unthinkable. Try to follow in thought the movement of a point *out of itself* into another, and back again into itself enriched by that other. That A may pass



into B, there to be united with B, resolved into it, and form another unity, C, is conceivable; the acid combines with its opposite, or base, and forms a salt, which is the synthesis of two opposites. But this is seen to be possible because the opposites are real; were the base an acid, or the acid an alkali, no such synthesis would be possible, the union would give no salt, but simply an addition. In the Hegelian process no synthesis is possible, because no real opposition is presupposed. The abstraction, Being, is the same as Non-Being. These are two moments, the two termini of an oscillating pendulum, the convex and concave surfaces of one curve. But the one moment, the one terminus, the one surface, cannot pass out of itself into the other. The 'out-of-itselfness' is a metaphor destitute of conceivable import. When negated, Being is not out of itself, still less is it another; for it is not at all. But, even if we overlook this insuperable obstacle, we cannot render conceivable the assumed result of the process; we cannot conceive any enrichment of Being when it returns into itself—unless in the course of the passage it has incorporated some foreign positive elements. 'Existences are the concretions of the Abstract.' With all my heart! Only do not pretend that in the simple process of concretion—a formal change—there has been any material addition. The dirty water which you have condensed from your fog, existed already as dirty vapour of water. 'The Beginning,' says Hegel, 'is not the pure Nothing, but a Nothing from which Something is to be evolved: Being is thus from the first included in the Beginning. The Beginning thus includes both Being and Nothing; it is the unity of the two—or is Non-Being which is at the same time Being, and Being which is at the same time Non-Being.'\*

The passage of a thing out of itself into another, without loss of self, is simply inconceivable. Hegelian logic reconciles the contradiction by adopting it. The 'other' is with him the 'same.' Something (*Etwas*) and Another (*in*

\* *Logik*, i. p. 63.

*Aders*) are both, he says,\* in the first place Something existing (*Daseyende oder Etwas*): secondly, each is equally another. If we call one existence A, and the other B, then is in the first place determined as the Other. But A is usually the Other of B. Both are in the same way Others. To fix the difference, and the affirmative Something, there is the word *This*. But *this* simply says that the distinction and coming out of a Something is subjective, and is outside the something itself. *This* includes no difference; all and every something are just as well *this*.

When a man manipulates language in this way he can reconcile any incongruity; but neither by this, nor by any other means, can we construe in thought the movement of A to not-A, and its return again as A completed and enriched still less the movement of one empty Abstraction towards another empty Abstraction, and the consequent evolution of all concrete. In his exposition of the Becoming, he declares the Becoming of Essence, its reflected Movement, is the movement of Nothing to Nothing, and, therethrough, back again to itself. The passage, or Becoming, suppresses itself in the passage; the Other, which becomes in this passage, is not the Non-Being of a Being, but the Nothing of a Nothing; and this negation of a Nothing constitutes Being.† If it be said that the concrete Existence is implied in the abstract Being and Non-Being—that we must by the laws of thought conceive this—the answer is that in such a case Existence is not evolved from the two, but is presupposed in them. Now it is Hegel's pretension to have evolved Existence from the Law of Contradiction; whereas the Contradiction of not-A does not give C; the oscillation of Being and Non-Being remains an alternation of Being and Non-Being, it does not give Existence.

So far from the necessary laws of Thought forcing us to Hegel's conclusion, his conclusion directly violates those laws. His Nothing is an unthinkable beginning. It is so

\* *Logik*, i. p. 115.

† *Ibid.* ii. p. 15.

on his own principles : for he says that Thought is Specification, and if Nothing is to be thought, it must be specified (*bestimmt*), and thus be something. As Feuerbach epigrammatically puts it : *Wer Nichts denkt, denkt eben nicht*.<sup>\*</sup> If Logic has any voice in the matter, it proclaims that Hegel's *Nichts* is unthinkable, since he presents it as a Nothing out of which Something is to issue. The same Logic protests against his *Seyn*, or unconditioned Being, as a beginning; for if it is, as he says, a pure abstract in which there is nothing to be intuited, nothing to be thought, how can we make this *unanschaulbaren* and *undenkbaren* abstract a conceivable *prius*? If Being is unconditioned, and Non-Being is unconditioned, whence the conditions? If the beginning is a couple of contradictory abstracts, where is the origin of their concretes?

II. This leads me to the second cardinal objection, namely, that Hegel presupposes the very elements he pretends to evolve; and while declaring that he starts from pure abstracts which in the dialectical process will become concretes, he does in fact quietly introduce the elements of Experience, and invokes the Categories. Thus, unless to the pure Being and pure Nothing we add other elements, the dialectical process itself is unthinkable. A will remain immovably A, and B will remain B. One addition Hegel implies, namely, that of Development, *Werden*. The contradictory couple is resumed in the unity of realisation. Let us grant him this third factor. No sooner is it granted than we discover that in it Movement must be presupposed, and Movement presupposes Space and Time. These cannot be set aside as subjective merely; they are not so regarded by Hegel, for in his system they and all other subjective categories are objective likewise, and he regards Space and Time as Forms of Being. Trendelenburg† has pointed out the necessity of

<sup>\*</sup> FEUERBACH : *Kritik der Hegel'schen Philosophie*; in his *Philos. Kritiken und Grundsätze*. Werke, ii. 224.

† TRENDLENBURG : *Logische Untersuchungen*, 1862, i. 38. 'Das reine Seyn, sich selbst gleich, ist Ruhe; das Nichts—das sich selbst Gleich—is ebenfalls

ovement, and Hegel's entire neglect of any attempt to reduce it. One may remark, indeed, the significant disregard of this all-important category throughout the exposition. Perhaps Hegel considered that it was involved in the dialectical process. But this process itself is an assumption not otherwise warranted. The only passage I can recall in which there is a pretence of a deduction, is that in which he makes movement the product of Negation. Speaking of the old atomic conception that the Void is the source (*Quelle*) of Motion, he remarks that 'this has not the unimportant meaning that a thing can only move in a Void, and not in space already occupied; in this sense the Void would only be the assumption or condition of Motion, not its *ground* or *reason*. The view that the Void is the ground of Motion includes the deeper thought that in Negation generally lies the ground of Becoming, the unrest of self-movement. The Void is the ground of Motion only as the negative relation of the One to its negative, that is to say, of the One to itself, which nevertheless affirmed as There-Being (*als Daseyendes gesetzt* &c.).' \* Elsewhere, when treating directly of Motion, he defines it as 'the affirmation of the identity of Space and Time in place.' † But in no passage that I remember has he escaped the charge of having throughout presupposed Movement as equally indispensable with Being and Non-Being in the production of Existence. So that instead of the two contradictories, the two moments, three are necessary, the third bringing with it two others, Space and Time, thus making five *principia* in lieu of one *principium*.

Hegel admits that the transition from Ideality to Reality, from the Abstract to Concrete Existence, from Space and Time to their appearance as Matter, is inconceivable to the understanding, *für den Verstand unbegreiflich*. ‡ But it may be said to be equally inconceivable to the speculative Reason

the. Wie kommt aus der Einheit zweier ruhenden Vorstellungen das bewegte herden heraus?' Comp. also SHADWORTH HODGSON: *Space and Time*, p. 374. HELLING was the first to make this objection.

\* *Logik*, i. 178.

† *Encyklopädie*, § 261.

‡ *Loc. cit.*

upon any principles admitted by him ; it is simply asserted, not deduced.\*

Nor does the objection end here. 'Development,' he says, 'is not only the unity of Being and Nothing, but is *unrest* in itself.' The unrest will only be a movement of Being to Being—a formal change—it cannot be a movement from One to Another, unless an *otherness* be presupposed, and difference already exist ; still less is it conceivable as a movement from Being to Nothing. Hegel might say that the *otherness* was indissolubly involved in the ground of contradiction, Development having for its *moments* Birth and Death. Yet according to any conceivable process Birth is a metamorphosis of Being, a new form ; and Death is the resolution of that into other forms ; in each case the passage is from Being to Being, not from Nothing to Being and from Being to Nothing.

Let us, however, no longer pause in the exposition ; we shall have to criticise the system when its outlines are before us. Enough has been said respecting the basis, we may now glance at the superstructure.

In the dialectical process *quality* is the first negation : it is the reality of a thing. That which constitutes Quality is the negation which is the condition of its Being. Blue, for example, is blue only because it is the negation of red, green, purple, &c. ; a meadow is a meadow only because it is not a vineyard, a park, a ploughed field, &c.

Being, having suffered a Negation, is determined as Quality—it is Something, and no longer an Abstraction. But this something is limited by its very condition ; and this limit,

\* My friend objects that my argument ' involves the identification of Becoming with physical development [as indeed it does], which of course takes time and requires space. So you may say does thinking. It does in one sense. It takes some people ten years or a lifetime to pass from the premises to the conclusion ; but the premises lead to the conclusion immediately *as a mere relation between ideas*, and the process no more requires time or space than it requires time or space for twice two to make four. [Surely time is required to think even this relation, and there is movement of thought from one term to the other !] If this is so, and it be admitted that Hegel is dealing with ideas and relations between them [but he means these relations to be physical no less than mental] and only of "movement" in this sense, your objection that he begins with five principles falls to the ground.'

this negation, is external to it: hence Something implies Some-other-thing. There is a *This* and a *That*. Now the Something and the Some-other-thing, the *This* and the *That*, are the *same* thing. *This* is a tree; *That* is a house. If I go to the house, it will then be the *This*, and the tree will be *That*. Let the tree be the Something, and the house the Some-other-thing, and the same change of terms may take place. This proves that the two are identical. The Something carries its opposite (other-thing) within itself; it is constantly becoming the other-thing. Clearly showing that the only positive reality is the *Relation* which always subsists throughout the changes of the terms.

He tells us that perception gives us the ideas of Now, Here, This, &c. And what is the Now? At noon I say, '*Now* it is day.' Twelve hours afterwards I say, '*Now* it is night.' My first affirmation is therefore false as to the second, my second false as to the first: which proves that the *Now* is a general idea; and as such a real existence independent of all particular *Nows*.\*

The reader who envies the brain-whirl of a spinning Dervish may seek this enjoyment in the work now under notice. Such a succession of logical puzzles and juggling solutions has never been presented since the days of Aquinas. It is true that every now and then we meet with a suggestive remark, a penetrating analysis, a drastic refutation of some absurdity current in the schools. But these irradiations of the nebula only make its unsubstantial quality more apparent. In the discussion of Phenomena and the *Ding-an-sich*, there is masterly superiority. It would, however, call for more space than is at my disposal, to exhibit it intelligibly. Let us merely note the declaration that the 'Thing in itself is the empty abstraction from all conditions, and just because it is thus removed from all conditions it is removed from all knowledge.' But instead of remaining within the *critical* circle, and declaring knowledge of Things impossible, Hegel argues that the true *an*

\* *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, p. 86.

sich of Things is their Essence and this is precisely that which is knowable, the phenomenon being not the unsubstantial phantom of an unknowable but the actual manifestation, the reality of the essence.\*

Recommending the greater part of this second Book to metaphysical students, I pass on to glance at the third, which sets forth the nature of the Notion, Concept (*Begriff*).

The Notion (*Begriff*) is the *truth*, or union, of Being (*Seyn*) and Essence (*Wesen*), which are expounded in the two first books. Its evolution is the construction of the universe, namely, the world of Truth and Reason, that which really is. And here may profitably be placed the view which Hegel entertains of Truth. In the *Encyklopädie* he rejects the common confusion of Truth with Accuracy, declaring that men commonly speak of a judgment as true, when it is only correct. A correct judgment expresses only the formal agreement of our ideas with their content, let that content be what it may. 'On the other hand Truth consists in the agreement of the object with itself, that is to say, with its Notion. It may be *correct* to say that some one is ill, or has stolen something; but such a meaning (*Inhalt*) is not *true*, because a diseased body is not in accordance with the Notion of Life, nor is theft an action which accords with the Notion of human activity.'† In contrast to the old Logic, which regarded Truth as the agreement of notions with objects,

\* 'Dem Dinge ohne seine Eigenschaften bleibt deswegen nichts als das abstrakte An-sich-seyn, ein unwesentlicher Umfang und äusserliches Zusammenfassen. Das wahrhafte Ansichseyn ist das Ansichseyn in seinem Gesetzseyn; dieses ist die Eigenschaft. Damit ist die Dingheit in die Eigenschaft übergegangen.' *Logik*, ii. 133. To understand the real thought of Hegel here the student should meditate the section on Definition (*Logik*, iii. 280 sq.). If the exposition is not clear to him, he may with profit read TAINÉ: *De l'Intelligence*, 1870, vol. ii. livre iii.

† *Encyklopädie*, § 172, p. 334. Compare also *Logik: Einleitung*, p. 26. It is repeated by his disciple ERDMANN: *Psychologische Briefe*, 3<sup>re</sup> Aufl. 1863, p. 63. This strange conception of truth is not original with HEGEL; it had been announced by BARDILLI. His maxim 'whatever contains no contradiction within itself must exist,' seemed to be opposed by the fact that immoral actions, which were contradictions of morality, did exist; in answer to this objection, he declared that 'such actions only contradict what the immoral man *wills to be*, imagines he can be, not what he *is*; the *true* man cannot be immoral.' BARDILLI und REINHOLD, *op. cit.* p. 65.

the modern Logic, he says, starts from the position that only that which Thought presents respecting Things is the truly true.\* And with an etymological reference, familiar to him, he remarks that *thing* and *think* are closely allied.

This position becomes intelligible, and explains his famous paradox, 'whatever is real is rational, and whatever is rational is real,' when we learn that he adopted the realistic view of Universals—Platonic Ideas†—and he is consistent in maintaining that 'a thing has only reality in its Notion; in as far as it is different from its Notion it ceases to be real, and is a nothingness; this nothingness is its palpable and sensuously external side—*die Seite der Handgreiflichkeit, und des sinnlichen Ausersichseyns gehört dieser nichtigen Seite an.*‡ Things, the transitory and perishable individuals, are not real, or only real in as far as they are universals. The oak is real as such, namely, that which is universal in oaks, beeches, limes, leanders, &c., in other words its notion. Only by means of its universality can a thing enter mind which is universal.§ When we say that we have the notion of a thing, what is meant? That its qualities or properties|| have entered our minds through the senses. But although we intend to designate it as a 'thing,' we unconsciously declare that we have received from it a general 'notion;' and our notion of it constitutes its essence. For although in the act of perception our senses are directed to it individually, we are unable to seize it except through *general* notions. In saying 'this house,' I may intend to designate an individual thing, but I cannot at the same time help designating the general notion 'house,' while 'this' again is another general notion.¶

\* 'Jene legte nämlich zu Grunde, dass das, was durchs Denken von und an den Dingen erkannt werde, das allein an ihnen wahrhaft Wahre sey; somit nicht sie an ihrer Unmittelbarkeit, sondern sie erst in die Form des Denkens erhoben, als Gedachte.' *Logik*, i. 27.

† *Logik*, i. 12.

‡ *Ibid.* i. 34.

§ 'Das Begreifen eines Gegenstandes besteht in der That in nichts Anderem, als dass Ich denselben sich zu *eigen* macht, ihn durchdringt, und ihn in *seine eigene Form*, d. i. in die Allgemeinheit welche unmittelbar *Bestimmtheit*, oder Bestimmtheit, welche unmittelbar Allgemeinheit ist, bringt.' *Logik*, iii. 15.

|| On properties, comp. *Logik*, i. 113, and ii. 124.

¶ 'Die empirische Welt denken heisst vielmehr wesentlich ihre empirische



Notions are either general or particular, and as such exist in every individual thing. They are neither *abstract* nor *distinct* from the things in which they exist. The notion is primarily general, but its dialectic impulse forcing it to set limits to itself, it becomes particular by the negation of itself; and this particularisation, which is indeed only the negation of the general, comes into existence in each individual.\*

Now let us trace the genesis of the Notion, or rather its affirmation as the Truth of Being and Non-Being. The *beginning*, ἀρχή, gave us Being in general (the Notion in general), cleared from every particularity, away from every determination. But this Notion, by its own dialectic impulse, was forced to deny itself, and pass over (*übergehen*) to its opposite, Non-Being, equally free from every form or particularity. Returning to itself thus enriched, it affirmed itself as Essence (*Wesen*) on the one side, and as Truth on the other.

In the *Philosophy of History* we read that speculative cognition has *proved* Reason to be Substance as well as Infinite Power, 'its own *Infinite Material* underlying all the natural and spiritual life which it originates, as also the *Infinite Form*,—that which sets this Material in motion. On the one hand, Reason is the *substance* of the Universe; viz. that by which and in which all reality has its being and subsistence. On the other hand, it is the *Infinite Energy* of the Universe; since Reason is not so powerless as to be incapable of producing anything but a mere ideal, a mere intention having its place outside reality, nobody knows where; something separate and abstract, in the heads of certain human beings. It is *the infinite complex of things*, their entire Essence and Truth. It is its own material which

Form umändern und sie in ein Allgemeines verwandeln; das Denken übt zugleich eine *negative* Thätigkeit auf jene Grundlage aus; der wahrgenommene Stoff, wenn er durch Allgemeinheit bestimmt wird, *bleibt nicht* in seiner ersten empirischen Gestalt. Es wird der innere *Gehalt* des Wahrgenommenen mit Entfernung und *Negation* der Schale herausgehoben.' *Encyklopädie*, § 50, p. 108.

\* Comp. *Phänomenologie*, the early sections, and *Logik*, iii. *Vom Begriff im Allgemeinen*.

it commits to its own Active Energy to work up; not needing, as finite action does, the conditions of an external material of given means from which it may obtain its support, and the objects of its activity. It supplies its own nourishment, and is the object of its own operations.'

The movements of the planets take place according to unchangeable laws. 'These laws are *Reason implicit in the phenomena in question*. But neither the sun nor the planets which revolve around it can be said to have any consciousness of them.'

Elsewhere we read:—

'The simple Infinity or the absolute Notion is the simple essence of Life, the soul of the world, the universal blood, which, everywhere present, is rendered turbid and discontinuous by no difference, rather is itself all differences and their suppression, thus pulsating in itself without moving itself, trembles in itself without unrest. It is the self-equal, for the differences are tautologous, they are differences which are none. This self-equal essence has therefore only relation to itself. *To itself*: this implies another to which the relation refers, and the *relation to itself* is rather the separation in two (*das Entzweien*), or in other words, that self-equality is an inner difference.\* He thus stumbles upon the question which he says has vexed Philosophy: How can *difference* come from pure essence? He answers it in the same way as he answers the question, How can the Infinite become Finite? Namely, by restating the question—by declaring that the Infinite is at the same time the Finite.† The difference is included in the self-equality. 'The Unity, from which we are told that Difference cannot issue, is in fact only the one moment of the Duplicity (*Entzweiung*); it is the abstraction of Simplicity which is opposed to Difference. But inasmuch as it is an abstraction, only one of opposites, it is the Duplicity.'

This looks like logical legerdemain, but it has its ground in the very principle of his system, the identity of Object and

\* *Phänomenologie*, p. 126.

† *Logik*, i. 161.

Subject, which we shall have hereafter to notice more fully. Here is a passage which throws strong light on what has just been read: 'I distinguish myself from myself, and it is therein immediate for me, that this distinguished is not distinguished.'\*

Let us continue our exposition without involving ourselves in debates that would be interminable. What has already been stated may be summed up in the assertion that Development is the process of the universe, Dialectics the subjective aspect of the process. The Notion which develops itself externally into Nature, develops itself through Self-consciousness into God. Or, to phrase it with Schelling: 'Nature is only the visible organism of our understanding.'

How does this take place? Mr. Stirling shall answer:—

'Self-consciousness is the universal, the all-common (as in German), or the Common whole that is: *but it thinks itself*; and *itself thought* is to itself *its object*, its negative, its particular, which so is just the particular of the universal. But so long as itself is to itself in the form of object, or other, which it considers, it has not completed the act of thought: that act is completed when it returns, as knowledge, to itself as singular, that is, from the particular back into the universal. This is the single secret of Hegel; and his obscurest writing is but an abstract, and so almost mystifying description of all this.'

And in further elucidation of this identity of self-consciousness and the universe, read this passage:—

'Hegel coolly accepts the new position—demands no proof, supplies no proof—only sets to work new-arranging and new-labelling. All is ideal, and all is substance, but all must have the schema of subject. Nature is but the *other* of Spirit, and the Logical Idea unites them both. This is parallel to the scheme of Spinoza, Extension, Thought, and Substance. The general schema is to be considered applicable also as particular, or as method. All are ideas: they must be classified, then—thrown into spheres, objective, subjective,

\* *Phänomenologie*, p. 129.

d so on. The logical are the common categories—the secret machinery of the whole—the latent, internal, invisible skeleton.

Say a pool of water reflects the world above. Now, let there be no above, but let the pool still reflect as before. The pool, then, becomes in itself reflector and reflexion, subject and object—Man. Restore now again the *above* which we withdrew, the above that was reflected in the pool the mighty blue gulf of the universe; and call that the reflexion of a mightier—to us invisible—pool, which is thus also reflector and reflexion, subject and object, but, as pool above all pools, God. This is an image of Hegel's world. He will have no *Jenseits*, no Yonder and Again; all shall be *hier*, a perpetual Here and Now. God shall be no mystery; he will know God. He will apply the predicates and name the subject. The logical formulæ are the real predicates of God. God is that real and concrete—not that ideal and abstract, not that nonentity and nowhere that is understood as *le dieu français*, the Dieu of the Philosophes, the Gallic God, the infidel God. Being and Non-being are the ultimate secrets of the universe, the ultimate and essential predicates of God.'

#### § V. PANLOGISM.

By Erdmann, Hegel's system is happily characterised as panlogism rather than Pantheism, since instead of presenting the universe as the evolution of God, he presents it, and God also, as the evolution of the Logos, the concretion of the abstract Idea. God only comes into existence when the notion develops into Self-consciousness.

We have glanced at the Process and its evolutions in Logic; let us now glance at its evolutions in Nature and History. In the former we had only to deal with abstractions; and it was no difficult matter for Hegel to exhibit the genesis of ideas—the dependence of one formula upon another. Verbal distinctions were sufficient there. But

verbal distinctions avail nothing in attacking the problems presented by Nature; in endeavouring to give scientific solutions, Nature is not to be coerced. Aware of the difficulties—seeing instinctively that the varieties of Nature could not be reduced to the same simplicity as the varieties of the *Idee*—as Thought had been reduced in his *Logic*—Hegel asserted that the determinations of the *Idee* in its *exteriority* could not follow the same march as the determinations of the *Idee* as Thought. Instead of generating each other reciprocally, as in the *Logic*, these determinations in Nature have no other connection than that of co-existence; sometimes indeed they appear isolated.

When we look abroad upon Nature, we observe an endless variety of transformations. At first these seem without order; on looking deeper, we find that there is a regular series of development from the lowest to the highest. These transformations are the struggles of the *Idee* to manifest itself *objectively*. Nature is a dumb Intelligence striving to articulate. At first she mumbles; with succeeding efforts she articulates; at last she speaks.

Every modification which the *Idee* undergoes in the sphere of pure Thought it endeavours to express in the sphere of Nature. And thus an object is elevated in the scale of creation in so far as it resumes within itself a greater number of qualities: inorganic matter is succeeded by organic, and amongst organised beings there is a graduated scale from the plant up to man. In man the *Idee* assumes its highest grade. In Reason it becomes conscious of itself, and thereby attains real and positive existence—the highest point of development. Nature is divine in principle (*an sich*), but we must not suppose it divine *as it exists*. By the Pantheists Nature is made one with God, and God one with Nature. In truth, Nature is but the exteriority (*Aeusserlichkeit*) of God: it is the passage of the *Idee* through imperfection (*Abfall der Idee*). Observe, moreover, that Nature is not only external in relation to the *Idee*, and to the subjective existence of the *Idee*, namely, Intelligence; but

exteriority constitutes the condition in virtue of which Nature is Nature (*sondern die Aeusserlichkeit macht die Bestimmung aus, in welcher sie als Natur ist*).

The Philosophy of Nature is divided into three sections—Mechanics, Physics, and Organics. Into the details, we are happy to say, our plan forbids us to enter; or we should have many striking illustrations of the futility of that Method which pretends to construct the scheme of the world *a priori*. Although he asserts that Nature is only there in order to be known,\* he is forced to admit that much is unknown; but this is because Nature is too impotent (*ohnmächtig*) to obey Reason everywhere; she exhibits much that is mere chancework and insignificant. Experimental philosophers—Newton especially—are treated with consistent contempt. Hegel is not a timid speculator; he recoils from no consequence; he bows down to no name; he is impressed by no fact, however great. That Newton's speculations should be no better than drivel, and his 'discoveries' no better than illusions, were natural consequences if Hegel's theories were true. That all Europe had been steadily persevering in applying Newton's principles, and extending his discoveries,—that Science was making gigantic strides, hourly improving man's mastery over Nature, hourly improving the condition of mankind,—this fact, however great it might appear to others, when coupled with the other fact, that upon the ontological Method no discoveries had yet been made, and none seemed likely to be made—appeared to Hegel as unworthy of a philosopher's notice. The interests of mankind were vulgar considerations, for which there would always be abundant vulgar minds. The philosopher had other objects. 'Philosophy dwells in the region of self-produced ideas, without reference to actuality.'

What then was Philosophy, in his view? It was the substitution of Thoughts (Categories, or more precisely

\* So also God only exists in as far as He is known: 'Ein Gott, der sich nicht dem Menschen zu erkennen gäbe, wäre gar kein Gott.' FRANZ und HILLERT: *Hegel's Philosophie in wörtlichen Auszügen*: Einleitung, p. xviii.

Notions), in place of particular ideas (*Vorstellungen*)—it was the movement of pure Thought *as* thought, abstracted from all content; it was therefore not amenable to canons of Experience, which dealt only with the concrete perishable phenomena. And hence, if Philosophy is in his hands found flagrantly at variance with Science, that may cause distress to the followers of Empiricism, but will in no wise disturb him. To all the contradictions presented by Experience, he will answer, Contradiction is the essence of Philosophy.

The third and last part of Hegel's system is the Philosophy of Intelligence. Therein the *Idee* returns from Nature to itself, and returns through a consciousness of itself.

Subjectively, the *Idee* first manifests itself as a Soul; it then returns upon itself, and becomes Consciousness; and finally affirms itself as an Object to itself, when it is Reason. By this it preserves itself.

'For Thought is that *Universal*—that *Species* which is immortal, which preserves identity with itself. The particular form of Spirit not merely passes away in the world by natural causes in Time, but is annulled in the automatic self-mirroring activity of consciousness. Because this annulling is an activity of Thought, it is at the same time conservative and elevating in its operation. While, then, on the one side, Spirit annuls the reality, the permanence of that which it *is*, it gains on the other side, the essence, the Thought, the Universal element of that which *it only was* [its transient conditions]. Its principle is no longer that immediate import and aim which it was previously, but the *essence* of that import and aim.

'The result of this process is then that Spirit, in rendering itself objective and making this its being an object of thought on the one hand destroys the determinate form of its being, on the other hand gains a comprehension of the universal element which it involves, and thereby gives a new form to its inherent principle.'

Objectively the *Idee* manifests itself as Will, and realises itself in History and in Law.

The Subjective and Objective manifestations being thus marked out, we have now to see in what manner the identity of the two will manifest itself. The identity of the Objective and Subjective is the *Idee*, as Intelligence, having consciousness of itself in individuals, and realising itself as Art, as Religion, and as Philosophy.

The 'Lectures on the Philosophy of History'\* is of all his works perhaps the most interesting to the general reader; and is the only one that has been translated into English. The following ideas will be sufficient to give an indication of the method.

History is the development of the *Idee* objectively—the process by which it attains to a consciousness of itself by explaining itself.† The condition of Intelligence is to know itself; but it can know itself only after having passed through the three phases of the method, namely, affirmation, negation, and negation of negation, as the return to consciousness endowed with reality. It is owing to these phases that the human race is perfectible.

States, Nations, and Individuals represent the determinate moments of this development. Each of these moments manifests itself in the constitution, in the manners, in the needs, in the whole social state of any one nation. For this reason it is we call the spirit of the age: it is the only possible truth, and by its light all things are seen. But with reference to the absolute *Idee*, all these particular manifestations are nothing but *moments* of transition—instruments by which the transition to another higher moment is prepared. Great men are the incarnations of the spirit of the age.

\* *Werke*, ix.

† History is a sort of Theodicea; the merit of originality, however, which HEGEL claims (*Einleitung*, p. 20), is due to Vico, from whom he has largely borrowed; Vico expressly calls his New Science a *Civil Theology of Divine Providence*. See *Principi di una Scienza Nuova*, translated by MICHELET: *La Science nouvelle*.



It is not every nation that constitutes itself into a state: to do that, it must pass from a family to a horde, from a horde to a tribe, and from a tribe to a state. This is the formal realisation of the *Idee*.

But the *Idee* must have a theatre on which to develop itself. The Earth is that theatre; and the Earth as the geographical basis of History, has three great divisions:—1. The mountainous regions. 2. The plains and valleys. 3. The coasts and mouths of rivers. The first represents the primitive conditions of mankind; the second the more advanced condition, when society begins to be formed; the third, when, by means of river-communication, the activity of the human race is allowed free development in all directions, particularly of commerce. This is another of the ideas of Vico,\* and is in contradiction to all history.

The great *moments* of History are four. 1. In the *East* we have the predominance of substantiality: the *Idee* does not know its freedom. The rights of men are unknown because the East knows only that *one* is free. This is the *childhood* of the World. 2. In Greece we have the predominance of individuality. The *Idee* knows that it is free, but only under certain forms, that is to say, only *some* are free. Mind is still mixed with Matter and finds its expression therein; this expression is Beauty. This is the *youthhood* of the World. 3. In Rome we have opposition between the Objective and Subjective: the political universality and individual freedom both developed, yet not united. This is the *manhood* of the world. 4. In the Teutonic Nations we have the unity of the contradiction—the *Idee* knowing itself; and instead of supposing like Greece and Rome that *some* are only free, it knows that *all* men are free. This is the *old-age* of the world; but although the old-age of body is weakness, the old-age of Mind is ripeness. The first form of government

\* *La Science nouvelle*, livre i. ch. ii. § 97.

we see in History is Despotism; the second is Demond Aristocracy; the third is Monarchy.\*

reading this meagre analysis, the ingenious speculation of the original will scarcely be recognised. Such is with which Hegel clothes his ideas in the garb of philosophy, that we, though aware that he is writing fiction, history, and giving us perversions of notorious facts as signs of historical development;—telling us that the Spirit World manifests himself under such and such phases, it is apparent to all that, granting the theory of this spirit's development, the phases were *not* such as he declares them to have been;—although we are aware of this, yet is the book so ingenious that it seems almost to reduce it to such a *caput mortuum* as our analysis. Heless the principles of his philosophy of History are the same we have given above. The application of those principles to the explication of the various events of History is very ingenious.

Hegel's *Philosophy of Religion* has in the last few years been the subject of bitter disputes. The schisms of the young men—the doctrine of Strauss, Feuerbach, Bruno Bauer, and others—being all deduced, or pretended to be deduced, from Hegel's system, much angry discussion has taken place about the real significance of that system. We leave the matter to the theologians; and for the present only notice Hegel's mental ideas.

It is often a matter of wonder to see how Hegel's Method is applied to all subjects, and how his theory of life can be used to explain every product of life. This is doubtless a great merit; and it inspires disciples with boundless confidence.

Few, however, we suspect, have approached the Philosophy of Religion without some misgivings as to the applicability of the Method to explain it. Probably the triumph comes when the applicability is shown to be as perfect here as elsewhere. Of this our readers shall judge.

Hegel of course accepts the Trinity; his whole system is

\* *Philosophie der Geschichte*, p. 128.

Trinitarian. God the Father is the eternal *Idee an und für sich*: that is to say, the *Idee* as an *unconditioned* Abstraction. God the Son, *engendered* by the Father, is the *Idee* as *Anders-seyn*: that is to say, as a *conditioned* Reality. The *separation* has taken place which, by means of a *negation*, gives the Abstraction real existence. God the Holy Ghost is the Identity of the two; the *negation of the negation* and perfect totality of existence. He is the Consciousness of himself as Spirit: this is the condition of his existence.

God the Father was before the World, and created it. That is to say, he existed *an sich*, as the pure *Idee*, before he assumed any reality. He created the World, because it is the essence of his being to create (*es gehört zu seinem Seyn, Wesen, Schöpfer zu seyn*). Did he not create, then would his own existence be incomplete.

The vulgar notion of theologians is that God created the world by an act; but Hegel says that the creation is not an act, but an eternal moment,—not a thing *done*, but a thing perpetually *doing*;—God did not *create* the world, he is eternally *creating* it. Attached also to this vulgar notion, is another less precisely but more commonly entertained; namely, that God, having created the world by an act of his will, lets it develop itself with no interference of his; as Goethe somewhere ridicules it, he ‘sits aloft seeing the world go.’ This was not the doctrine of St. Paul, whose pregnant words are, ‘*In him* we live, and move, and have our being.’ We live *in* God, not out of him, not simply by him. And this is what Hegel means when he denies that the creation was a single act. Creation was, and is, and ever will be. Creation is the reality of God: it is God passing into activity, but neither suspended nor exhausted in the act.

This is all that we can here give of his *Philosophy of Religion*; were we to venture further, we should only get ourselves entangled in the thorny labyrinth of theological problems. Let us pass therefore to his *History of Philosophy*, which, according to him, is the history of the development of the *Idee* as intelligence. This development of thought is nothing

more than the various transitions which constitute the *moments* of the absolute Method. All these *moments* are represented in history; so that the *History of Philosophy* is the reproduction of the *Logic* under the forms of intelligence. The succession of these moments gives to each period a particular philosophy; but these various philosophies are, in truth, only parts of the one philosophy. This looks like the Eclecticism of Victor Cousin; and indeed Cousin's system is but an awkward imitation of Hegel: the Frenchman has either misunderstood, or has modified, the views of his master.

Historically speaking, there have been, according to Hegel, but two philosophies—that of Greece and that of Germany. The Greeks conceived Thought under the form of the *Idee*; the moderns have conceived it under the form of *Spirit*. The Greeks of Alexandria arrived at unity; but then unity was only ideal, it existed objectively in thought. The subjective aspect was wanting: the totality knew itself not as subjective and objective. This is the triumph of modern philosophy.

The *moments* have been briefly these:—1. With Thales and the Eleatics, the *Idee* was conceived as pure Being: the One. 2. With Plato it was conceived as Universal, Essence, Thought. 3. With Aristotle as Notion (*Begriff*). 4. With the Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, as subjective Notion. 5. With the Alexandrians as the totality of Thought. 6. With Descartes as the Self-Consciousness. 7. With Fichte as the Absolute, or *Ego*. 8. With Schelling as the Identity of Subject and Object.

#### § VI. CRITICISM OF HEGEL.

Of all celebrated thinkers Hegel is the most difficult to be understood. His very disciples and commentators are ready to deny each other's interpretations; and according to a current epigram, which though probably mythical has nevertheless the truth of a myth, Hegel himself declared that only one of his disciples had understood him—adding with a sigh

'and he misunderstood me.' No greater condemnation of a system could be uttered.

The first difficulty is Hegel's style. It is a serious one. Not that he writes the shameless, slovenly, confused style of Kant; far from it; his sentences are well constructed, the expression sometimes eloquent and powerfully epigrammatic.\* But he has a repulsive terminology, and a habit of always preferring the abstract expression to the concrete, which after a while gives the reader a sense of being raised above our mother earth into an atmosphere extremely rarefied and slightly mephitic.† This, however, is by no means the worst. With due patience, the terminology may be mastered, and the abstractions may be translated into intelligible concretes. The real exasperation begins with our detection of his slipperiness and ambiguity: 'The sense is often multiform, like a gypsy's prophecy or the scrolls of the alchemists.' This felicitous description is by an ardent disciple,‡ who elsewhere confesses§ that 'Hegel often uses words in their directly derivative sense, that this sense and the usual sense as it were coquet with each other into a third sense.' Is not this indeed the application of his dialectical Method to language?

In his *Logic* he makes it a special merit of the German language that more than all other modern languages it permits of this ambiguity, many of its words containing not only different but directly opposed meanings 'so that a speculative spirit in the language is not to be overlooked.'|| He takes occasion to comment in a special section on the

\* What can be finer than his retort upon the vulgar phrase 'no man is a hero to his valet'—not because the hero is not a hero but because the valet is a valet! Again a few lines further on he says that Thersites is a standing figure for all times: if he does not always get beaten, as in Homer, his envy and egotism rankle in his flesh, and the undying serpent that gnaws him is the pang of seeing his suggestions and vituperations wholly without influence on the course of events. *Philos. der Geschichte*, p. 40.

† On this point compare what he says *Encyklopädie*, § 3, p. 7.

‡ STIRLING: *Secret of Hegel*, i. 67.

§ *Ibid.* 254.

|| HEGEL: *Logik*. Vorrede zur zweiten Ausgabe. Comp. also p. 27.

*ufheben*, which, having the contradictory meanings of press and to preserve, plays an immense part in his . 'It is striking to find language,' he says, 'using the word for two contradictory predicables. To speculative t, it is gratifying to find words which have a speculative g in their own selves. The German language has a rable number of them.' \*

is fond of revealing philosophic principles involved in y terms, and his derivations are often as ingenious r are etymologically incorrect. If we were to derive ' from 'Do Evil,' in defiance of philology which proves e derived from *Diabolus*, we should pursue his plan ie derives Judgment, *Urtheil*, from *Ur Theil*, as 'the ve separation of the Notion,' † in defiance of philology proves *urtheilen* to be the old German *ordalen* 'to whence *ordalie* 'narrative,' and our English 'tale.' of many others.

cult as the style is, there is a greater difficulty in ; ourselves at Hegel's point of view, seeing the argu- s it is seen by him. This indeed is the main difficulty systems which have a different basis from our own . We incessantly introduce our own point of view; en this introduction produces, as often it must pro- manifest disturbance, we are but too ready to assign crepancy to the system we oppose, and thus credit it ie contradiction we have created. This is inevitably ie in our study of Hegel, unless we are vigilant. He n insults common sense, and so flagrantly disregards nclusions established by experience and science, that sperated reader judging him from these standing points ted to turn away in disgust; or lets the book fall from ads in the weariness of perpetual want of sympathy. even those who have been most perplexed and wearied

z, i. 110. The translation in the text is by Mr. STIRLING, *op. cit.* i. 356. . iii. 63, 65. This, however, is not original with HEGEL; I find it in 's *Grundriss der ersten Logik*, 67, where *Urtheil* is the direction of : towards an object, *quasi divisio primaria objecti*.

will admit that Hegel was neither a fool nor a lunatic, it is clear that if he disregards the objections of Common Sense and Empiricism, it must be because he refuses to recognise their claims to be heard at all in questions of Philosophy.\* And so it is. Two things excite his measureless contempt: 1. The psychological investigation of the necessary limitations of Knowledge—that is to say inquiries into the *genesis* of ideas—and 2, the attempt to gain insight into philosophical problems by using Experience as a platform. Inductive Psychology, and Empirical Inductions, except when confined to the vulgarest purposes of Science, he doffs aside; and justly, since if their claims be admitted, his system tumbles into ruin.

Taking his stand upon the identity of Being and Knowing; which was the undisputed platform of Philosophy in his country, he saw that since Nature was thus simply the externality of Mind,—if the order in phenomena is identical with the order in ideas,—a complete explanation would be given could the process of Thought be explained.

The laws of *Thought* would be the laws of *things thought*. The laws of Thought as Thought, constitute the science of Logic. But instead of accepting the ancient division of Logic and Metaphysics, or the laws of Thought and the laws of Things, we must, he said, absorb the two into one, and present a Logic which is also a Metaphysic. The categories will thus form the skeleton of the universe.

The process of Thought, its dialectical movement, is Thesis (Affirmation), Antithesis (Negation), and Synthesis (Unity); otherwise Premise, Judgment, and Conclusion. This also must be the process of objective evolution, namely, Being, Non-Being, and Becoming—Possibility, Actuality, Reality,—Generality, Particularity, Singularity. The dialectical movement is a concretion of the Abstract, a specification of the

\* He would have smiled at the epigram in which M. ORT expresses the feeling of ordinary readers, struck with the absurdity of the Method of Negation: 'Or la négation la plus claire en ceci, c'est la négation du sens commun, c'est le renversement de toute la logique humaine.' *Hegel et la Philosophie allemande*. Paris, 1844, p. 98.

meral, a differentiation of the One into the Many, and the turn again of the Many into the One—a birth, a development, and a death which is also new birth.

Just as physicists generalise all particular phenomena to their Laws, and then treat these as the eternal verities and immanent causes of change, so Hegel having seized the abstract and eternal categories or general laws of Thought, within them the immanent causes of all changes, inward and outward. Finding a process of incessant negation, or limitation, underlying all specification, he erected this principle of contradiction into the generating process.

It is thus I endeavour to rethink his thought. Whatever ultimate one may form of it, one must at least acknowledge rigid consistency very unlike the chaotic lunacy it presents from an outside view. The great problem before him was how to interpret the co-existence and succession of phenomena? which presented itself in this question, What is the relation of the subjective to the objective? His solution proceeds on the assumption, common to all metaphysical systems, that the *processes* of Creation are revealed in Thought. He carried this assumption further by affirming an *identity* where more timid speculators saw only a *mirroring*, or intuition. He remarks of Empiricism 'that instead of seeking the True in Thought itself, it endeavours to draw it from *experience* of the inward and outward present.'\* It seeks concretes, particulars, and raises them into general concepts, propositions, laws. 'But this, however, has only the meaning that such generalities—*e.g.* Force—have no further reach than such as is given in Perception, and only refers to the monstrable connexion of phenomena.' 'The rigorous logic of Empiricism, inasmuch as it limits itself to the Finite, together denies the Suprasensible, or at least the knowledge of it, and leaves to Thought only Abstraction and formal universality and Identity. The fundamental illusion of empiricism is this, that it employs the metaphysical cate-

\* *Encyklopädie*, § 37.



gories of Matter, Force, besides those of One, Many, Universality, Infinitude, &c., moreover by means of these concludes, thereby presupposing the forms of Conclusion, and in all this never suspects that it is metaphysical.' Empiricism has only Perception, and Perception is always of the singular and transitory; whereas knowledge refuses to remain standing still here, but seeks, in the singular and transitory, what is universal and permanent. This is Experience. Its instrument is analysis. But here it commits the error of supposing that when it has analysed objects it leaves them as it found them; whereas it has transformed the concrete into the abstract. Its differences are abstract specifications, *i.e.* Thoughts. 'Since then these thoughts represent what the Things are in themselves, we return to the old metaphysical assumption that the truth of Things lies in Thought.'\* In a word, Empiricism fails wholly to reveal Universality and Necessity.

'The critical philosophy of Kant in common with Empiricism accepts Experience as the only ground of knowledge, but this knowledge is only that of phenomena, not that of Truth.' But Kant drew Universality and Necessity from another source, the spontaneous or *à priori* determinations of Thought. These categories constitute the objectivity of Experience.† Wherein then does Hegel differ from Kant? In this, that Kant regarded the identity of object and subject as an identity limited to Consciousness—it was a truth of Experience; but transcendently it was no truth at all, for no such conceptions as those of object and subject could be transcendently applied. Hegel tearing down the barrier between Experiential and Transcendental—denying the existence of the assumed *Ding an sich*—made the identity in Consciousness an absolute identity. Thus while Kant affirms the categories to be applicable only to phenomena, to our subjective condition, and to have no application whatever to *things in themselves*, Hegel, utterly denying the dis-

\* *Op. cit.* § 38.

† *Op. cit.* §§ 40, 41.

inction between phenomena and noumena, declaring the *Ding an sich* to be a thought, obliterates the distinction between objective and subjective, uniting them in a higher category; and he is thus led to regard the categories as physicists regard laws.

Before proceeding to exhibit the point of intersection and the derivation of Hegel from Kant, it may be useful here to say a word on the distinction of Objective and Subjective. Hegel remarks an essential defect in Kant's view of the categories, that it does not consider them in themselves, but only whether they are objective or subjective. The ordinary sense of objective, is whatever is external, and only to be reached through perception. And since such categories as Causality have not this objectivity, not being given in perception, Kant declared them to be subjective, belonging to the spontaneity of Thought. But he also named what is *thought* (more particularly the Universal and Necessary) objective, and what is only *felt*, the subjective. The contradiction is only superficial. Sensations are subjective in as far as they are ours only—mine, not yours, or his—and thus incapable of being communicated. But thoughts are objective in as far as they are every one's,—they carry their own signatures, and are universally intelligible—they admit of demonstration, or being *shown* to others. Thoughts are objective, in the sense of being independent of every subject; \* and they are the permanent; whereas feelings are only of the transitory; thoughts are of the general, whereas feelings are only of the singular.

This distinction which Kant has brought out we also find in the language of culture. Thus in judging of a work of Art, we are required to take the objective not the subjective point of view, that is to say not the particular fancy and mood of the spectator, but the higher vision of Art in its nature and essence.†

\* A fallacy. Thoughts are not *independent of* but *common to* the subjects. Take away the *thinking subjects*, and the asserted independence vanishes.

† *Encyklopädie*, § 41, Zusatz 2.

But Hegel, rejecting the Kantian position that even this latter form of objectivity is after all only subjective, since the categories are only *our* forms, and are divided by an impassable chasm from things in themselves, declares 'the true objectivity of Thought to be this, that thoughts are not only our thoughts, but are at the same time the *in itselfness* of things and objects in general.' Although it is perfectly true that the categories are not immediately contained in sensations, but belong to Thought, it by no means follows that they are therefore only ours, and not also conditions of the objects.\*

From Hegel's point of view, namely that of Absolute Idealism, this is indisputable. The identity of object and subject being affirmed, whatever is true of the one must be equally true of the other. According to Kant, whatever we think is false (transcendentally) because it is our thought; according to Hegel, whatever we think is true, because we think it. He says: 'Kant pretends that the ideas or notions of things are conveyed to us by means of general forms called Categories; and he adds that by means of these, viz. Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality—we form a synthesis *à priori* without any co-operation on the part of our senses. But Kant, who in affirming this had entered on the path of truth, was not able to deduce from his principles all the consequences. In the remainder of his philosophy he has embraced that common error which affirms that ideas or notions of things are fortuitous abstractions made by the mind, and that things are absolutely impenetrable to us. Proceeding further on the course which Kant abandoned too soon I have arrived at a reconstruction of Logic.'†

It is here the point of intersection may be found. Hegel complains that Kant has not deduced his Categories, but simply taken those which the old books of Logic furnished.

\* *Encyklopädie*, § 42, Zusatz 3.

† *The Subjective Logic of Hegel*, translated by H. SLOMAN and J. WALLON, London, 1855, p. 19. This little work, not a translation but a digest of some portions of the Subjective Logic, can be recommended to the English reader about to commence the study of Hegel.

Whence does the Ego, which is simply the abstract unity of self-consciousness, derive its concrete determinations, or forms? This deduction is Hegel's special object. But without pausing here to examine its validity, let us ask, How does the Logical become Real, how are the Forms of Thought shown to be at the same time Forms of Things? The answer must be sought in the identification of the Notion with the Absolute. 'Being and Essence are but moments of its Becoming; it (the Notion) is, however, their ground or *fundamen*, their Truth, as the identity in which they have perished, and are contained. They are contained in it because it is their Result, but no longer as Being and Essence; they have these specifications only so far as they have not returned into Unity.\* Kant's Categories are functions of the understanding which have no content, being simply formal and deriving their material from Sense. But Hegel, dissolving the assumed opposition of Sense and Understanding, denied the asserted distinction of formal and material to be other than logical. He thus materialised the Categories.

Having thus, not without effort, tried to present the system as a coherent deduction, we have now to ask: Is the foundation solid? Can we accept this revelation of the process by which the universe is evolved? Can we accept the Logic as an organon of discovery?

I. *As an organon.* It claims to deduce the multiple phenomena of the universe as concretions of the Abstract Idea through its immanent dialectical movement. It holds the keys. Now the first remark to be made is that this Method is not in the least the deductive Method it pretends to be. It gives us a Rubric and pretends to give a Deduction. By Deduction we reach unsuspected truths, undisclosed particulars. A verbal generality discloses nothing but verbal applications;

\* 'Seyn und Wesen sind insofern die Momente seines Werdens; er aber ist ihre Grundlage und Wahrheit, als die Identität in welcher sie untergegangen und enthalten sind. Sie sind in ihm, weil er ihr Resultat ist, enthalten, aber nicht mehr als Seyn und als Wesen; diese Bestimmungen haben sie nur insofern sie noch nicht in diese ihre Einheit zurückgegangen sind.' *Logik*, iii. 5.

a generality gathered by induction from phenomena is seen to have wide-reaching applications and illuminations of obscure places. Once let the elements be given, and from them we can deduce the resultant, before that resultant has yet been manifest to sense:—the existence, and local position of a planet, with its orbit, can be deduced from the elements of perturbation in the movements of other planets. Hegel's Rubric has no such reach. It can but assign a place to discoveries already made. No single unexpected disclosure was ever made by it; many undeniable disclosures obstinately refuse to be included in it. It has excited awe and admiration by its universality of application; and there is something truly fascinating in this appearance of grasp.

Admitting that it is no Organon of discovery, we might still prize it highly as a vast Classification—were the Classification only valid, *natural*, serviceable, instead of being arbitrary and useless, useless because arbitrary. Its pervading vice is the metaphysical vice of dealing with abstracts in disregard of the concretes from which they have been, or ought to have been abstracted; consequently whenever we restore the discarded concretes we disclose the futility of the scheme.

The friend, already referred to, objects that in this passage I am 'arbitrarily assuming the point of view opposite to Hegel's, who conceives that Knowledge is abstract or void of definiteness before it is concrete or defined. He would say that it is a mistake to suppose that our first knowledge of a physical phenomenon is concrete, that the phenomenon is concrete to us when we first become aware of it. It only becomes so gradually as we compare it with other phenomena and relate it to all its conditions.' Unquestionably I am assuming the opposite point of view to Hegel's. I conceive that he altogether misrepresents the genesis of experience, and that he confounds a confused conception with an abstract conception, when he supposes that our sensible experiences are abstract before they are concrete. The *obliteration* of particulars, which is Hegel's plan, is a very different procedure from the *subsumption* of particulars

and their expression in a symbol, which is the Notation of Science. Take an example: when a man is killed by the fall of a tile from the house-top, he is not killed by the tile itself, says Hegel, 'since the effect is only produced by the acquired velocity—that is to say the man is killed by Time and Space—*der Mensch wird durch Raum und Zeit todgeschlagen!*'\* The absurdity here arises from disregarding the tile, its mass and cohesion, as factors in the result. Does he suppose that if a snowball acquired the velocity of a cannon-ball it would equally shatter a parapet? The physicist is at liberty to disregard all particulars, if he *subsumes* them in his notation, *e.g.* whether the projectile be of wood, iron, brick, or water is indifferent to him; all that his formula needs is a given density, mass, with a given velocity.

Another example: the instinct of Reason, Hegel says, necessarily seeks the purification of the Notion. When a Law first appears it is impure, shrouded in the particulars of Sense, and the Notion which constitutes its nature is sunk in Sense. Reason endeavours to free it, and thus raise it out of its imprisonment in the moments of conditioned Being. 'Thus the relation of Acid to Base and their movement towards each other make a Law, in which these opposites appear as bodies. But these separated things have no reality; the force which tears them asunder, cannot hinder them immediately from uniting again, for they exist only in this relation. They cannot remain for themselves, like a tooth or a claw, and so be shown. That their *essence* consists in passing over into a neutral product, makes their *being* an *in-itself-subsumption* (*Ansichaufgehobenem*—which may be paraphrased 'that whose essential character is its tendency to suppress itself')—or an Universal; and Acid and Base have only truth as *Universal*.'†

It is perfectly true that an Acid has only the significance of an *acid* in reference to a base, and *vice versa*. But the body which is acid in reference to a base, exists quite irrespective

\* *Phänomenologie*, p. 192.

† *Encyklopädie*, § 261.

of the base; and Hegel's assertion that it is non-existent in itself, becomes the more untenable when juxtaposed to the assertion that a tooth, or a claw, exists for itself. The tooth and claw are only *tooth* and *claw* in relation to the objects bitten and clawed, as an acid is only an *acid* in relation to the objects it oxidises.

But this arbitrary suppression of integral factors is systematic with Hegel; indeed he proclaims it to be the instinct of Reason. Thus, to take an illustration from another sphere, when he declares that 'Spinoza thinking Substance is nothing but the *Notion developing itself as substance*,' he is consistent with his assumption of the History of Philosophy being only the successive stages of the evolution of the *Idee*. He would say that in consequence of this necessary evolution, Spinoza's personal existence was needless, the successive stages would have gone on had there been no Spinoza. It is in this sense we so often hear that gravitation would have been discovered had Newton never lived. There is truth in the remark, but it suppresses an implied condition, namely, if not Spinoza and Newton, then some *other* mind or minds of equivalent force! Are we to suppose that Gravitation would *disclose itself*; or that Science in the abstract, floating away from scientific thinkers, would evolve the law?

Throughout his historical, no less than throughout his speculative labours, may be noticed this arbitrary suppression of concretes which do not fit into his scheme. This is seen in his *Phänomenologie* which pretends to expound the evolution of Consciousness through History. As Haym truly says: 'It is no presentation of how the Spirit of the World has evolved itself, but how it might have done so, and must have done so had it accommodated itself to the scheme of the abstract theory of Consciousness. The historic figures are thrown chaotically together. The selection is absolutely arbitrary. When the writer is familiar with some historical figure, or has recently met with it in his reading, he seizes on it as a symbol of a necessary and inevitable stage of developing Consciousness. Yet if the spirit of the French

Revolution is elevated to this dignity, one sees not why the characteristic spirit of Puritanism in its struggle against Charles I. was not worthy of a similar regard. If the transition from the classic to the Middle Ages is raised into typical significance, how comes it that the not less remarkable transition of the Renaissance is unnoticed?''\*

The source of the error here, as in so many other cases, is the fallacy which deals with an abstract in forgetfulness of its concretes; because Reason detaches the law from the particulars expressed by the law; this, which is at first only an artifice of Notation, becomes, in forgetfulness of its origin, a reliance on the law as self-subsistent, as 'freed from its imprisonment' in particulars; and thus freed, thus purified, the law seems to acquire a higher validity. Hegel believes that he has deduced the process of the world from the *Idee*; and it is no doubt true that he has explained how all the special notions we frame of the process, may be regarded as gradual evolutions of the Absolute Notion, how all concretes may be regarded as concretions of the Abstract. But inasmuch as it is equally easy to ascend from the special notions to the general notion, from concretes to their abstract, and thus reverse the scheme of evolution, we are called upon to decide between these two processes. Our decision cannot be doubtful when we perceive, as quickly we may perceive, that Hegel draws nothing out of his Absolute but what he had previously put into it; he can deduce no special notions except those which have already been supplied through special experience. His Rubric only embraces the already known. Had not experience furnished him with concepts of Motion, Quality, Quantity, Becoming, Reality, Space, Time, Thought, and the rest, he could not have exhibited them as evolutions of Being and Non-Being, pure and simple.

In one word, the truth of things is not to be attained by the *suppression* of particulars, but by their *comprehension* in a general concept. The Universal which is a negation of

\* HAYM : *Hegel und seine Zeit*, 1857, p. 242.



particulars, is a phantasm ; the Universal which is a notation of particulars, is a scientific artifice.

II. *As a revelation.* On a first acquaintance the system looks more like an old philosophical ragshop wherein the exploded fallacies of Antiquity and the Middle Ages—the frippery which was once the finery—are offered for sale. Those primitive errors, which one hoped to have been finally disposed of—Matter and Form—Universals—Virtual and Actual—the Logos—the Many and the One—the Nothing as existent—are reproduced as primary truths. We are for ever meeting with Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, and the Schoolmen, not under new lights, strengthened with firmer supports, wearing a more plausible aspect, but only restated with confident calmness.

Philosophy is regarded as an evolution ; not an epigenesis where one stage is supplanted by its successor, disappearing to give place to a more perfect form ; but an evolution like that conceived by the early embryologists, namely the gradual unfolding of what was from the first folded up in the embryo. Hegel indeed denies that his system resembles the *emboliment* theory, which taught that from the first the oak was contained in the acorn, the animal in the germ, and grew from this miniature into a life-size portrait. Let him be heard on the point.

‘The progress of the Notion is neither the passage nor the appearance in Another, but Development, inasmuch as the Differenced is immediately affirmed (*gesetzt*) as the Identical with Each and the Whole, the specification (*Bestimmtheit*) as a free Being of the whole Notion.’

This not very luminous paragraph is thus enlightened:—

‘The passage over into Another is the dialectical process in the sphere of Being and the appearance (*Scheinen*) in Another in the sphere of Essence. The movement of the Notion is on the contrary Development, through which only that is affirmed, posited, which is already present in itself (*durch welche nur dasjenige gesetzt wird, was an sich schon vorhanden ist*). In Nature it is in organic Life that we see

the stages of the Notion expressed. It is thus, for instance, that the Plant develops itself from its germ. This contains already the whole Plant in itself, but in idea; and we must not conceive its development as if the different parts of the Plant, its root, stem, leaves, &c., were already *really* in the germ, only in miniature. Such a conception is the so-called *emboîtement* hypothesis, the defect of which is that it considers as already existing what is only ideally existing. The correct side of this hypothesis is that in it the Notion remains the same during its process, and adds nothing new to its ingest (*Inhalt*) but only brings forward a change of form.\*

It is on the same ground that he vindicates the existence of Innate Ideas, and Plato's doctrine of Reminiscence. Ideas exist *virtually* though not *actually*. We have here the recurrence of his tendency to suppress integral factors, to disregard all the elements which are incorporated in the course of the evolution, as if *they* were insignificant. What he supposes to exist *ideally* is simply a reflection of what has *really* occurred; thus he confounds a resultant with an antecedent; and upon the same method we might prove that ten was a million, because it contained the million ideally, because by multiplication it would engender a million. The seed does not contain the plant; the plant is developed only by a successive incorporation of foreign elements into its substance; and the plant varies as these incorporations vary. But because we can ideally retrace these successive steps, and thus reach the seed, the fallacy emerges which assumes that the result was contained in the starting point, and we say the plant is 'potentially contained' in the seed.

I have argued this question of potentiality in *Prolegomena*, §§ 50-52, and again vol. i. pp. 317-19 and vol. ii. p. 281, and p. 525. The reader is requested to consider again what is there said, because the 'infirmity of thought' which it expounds, is one which pervades Hegel's system. It is this infirmity which dictates his position of the *Idee*: the

\* *Encyklopädie*, § 161, p. 317.

Thought, which on his own showing is the *last* stage of development, is erected into the *first*. The Universe which passes from unconsciousness to consciousness, and from consciousness to self-consciousness, is made to be an evolution of this self-consciousness, i.e. its last stage. Precisely analogous is his position that all sensation is thought—a far more illogical position than that of Condillac, who made all thought sensation. Both positions rest on the same mistake of obliterating differences.

If we regard the evolution of the universe as the self-movement of the *Idee*, we must declare that the final stage no less than all the intermediate stages were contained *really* in the first, as the *emboîtement* theory declares the plant to be really contained in the seed. And for this reason. If the *Inhalt* (ingest or content) be not enriched by the incorporation of foreign elements, but only undergo changes of form, the *reality* will never appear, the changes will continue restricted within the formal sphere. If, however, the incorporation take place, whence come the incorporated elements? In that case we assume an existent Matter independent of the Form; as for a real plant we require the existence of gases and salts independent of the Plant idea.\*

The same objection rises against his conception of Universal History, as the evolution of the *Idee*, 'the exhibition of Spirit (*Geist*), in the process of working out the knowledge of that which it is potentially. And as the germ bears in itself the whole nature of the tree, and the taste and form of its fruits, so do the first traces of spirit virtually contain the

\* SCHELLING puts his finger on this weak spot when he observes that HEGEL 'seems destined by Nature to introduce a new Wolfianism;' by this is meant that just as WOLF obliterated all that was positive in LEIBNITZ and DESCARTES to fashion a system in which nothing but abstract formalism remained, so HEGEL, obliterating the real and living element which SCHELLING had proposed, as the origin of movement, as 'the power of passing into its opposite and returning to itself,' substituted for it the Notion or *Idee*, 'à laquelle, par la fiction la plus arbitraire et la plus étrange, il attribuait une faculté semblable de mouvement propre.' SCHELLING also truly says that the empirical element which Hegel at first excludes from his system he is forced to readmit by the back entrance, for the transformations of the *Idee*. SCHELLING: Preface to the Translation of *Cousin's Fragments*; translated by PAUL GRIMBLOT.

whole of that History.' \* Pause here to remark that not only is the germ made to contain all the future elements which must build up the structure of the tree, but the psychological elements of 'taste' and 'form,' which may hereafter coalesce with it in a percipient. He admits in the following passages all we claim :—

'What we call *principle, aim, destiny*, or the nature and idea of Spirit, is something merely general and abstract. Principle—Plan of Existence—Law—is a hidden, undeveloped essence, which *as such*—however true in itself—is not completely real. Aims, principles, &c., have a place in our thoughts, in our subjective design only; but not yet in the sphere of reality. That which exists for itself only, is a possibility, a potentiality; but has not yet emerged into Existence. A *second* element must be introduced in order to produce actuality—viz., actuation, realisation; and whose motive power is the Will—the activity of man in the widest sense. It is only by this activity that that Idea as well as abstract characteristics generally, are realised, actualised; for of themselves they are powerless. The motive power that puts them in operation, and gives them determinate existence, is the need, instinct, inclination, and passion of man.

'The History of the World begins with its general aim—the realisation of the Idea of Spirit—only in an *implicit* form (*an sich*), that is, as Nature; a hidden, most profoundly hidden, unconscious instinct; and the whole process of History (as already observed), is directed to rendering this unconscious impulse a conscious one. Thus appearing in the form of merely natural existence, natural will—that which has been called the subjective side—physical craving, instinct, passion, private interest, as also opinion and subjective conception,—spontaneously present themselves at the very commencement. This vast congeries of volitions, interests and activities, constitute the instruments and means of the World-Spirit for attaining its object; bringing it to consciousness, and

\* *Philosophy of History*. Translated by J. SIBREE, M.A., 1857 (In Bohn's *Philosophical Library*), a translation of the rarest merit.

realising it. And this aim is none other than finding itself—coming to itself—and contemplating itself in concrete actuality.

‘In relation to this independently universal and substantial existence—all else is subordinate, subservient to it, and the means for its development.—The Union of Universal Abstract Existence generally with the Individual,—the Subjective—that this alone is Truth, belongs to the department of speculation, and is treated in this general form in Logic.—But in the process of the World’s History itself,—as still incomplete,—the abstract final aim of history is not yet made the distinct object of desire and interest. While these limited sentiments are still unconscious of the purpose they are fulfilling, the universal principle is implicit in them, and is realising itself through them. The question also assumes the form of the Union of *Freedom* and *Necessity*; the latent abstract process of Spirit being regarded as *Necessity*, while that which exhibits itself in the conscious will of men, as their interest, belongs to the domain of *Freedom*.’

But since these elements are all subjective, all spiritual, we may claim them as concretions of abstract Spirit; and he has a good illustration here.

‘The building of a house is, in the first instance, a subjective aim and design. On the other hand we have, as means, the several substances required for the work,—Iron, Wood, Stones. The elements are made use of in working up this material: fire to melt the iron, wind to blow the fire, water to set wheels in motion, in order to cut the wood, &c. The result is, that the wind, which has helped to build the house, is shut out by the house; so also are the violence of rains and floods, and the destructive powers of fire, so far as the house is made fire-proof. The stones and beams obey the law of gravity,—press downwards,—and so high walls are carried up. Thus the elements are made use of in accordance with their nature, and yet to co-operate for a product, by which their operation is limited. Thus the passions of men are gratified; they develop themselves and

their aims in accordance with their natural tendencies, and build up the edifice of human society; thus fortifying a position for Right and Order *against themselves*.'

To which we may add: Here the existence of the building materials is presupposed; *without* these there can be no house built, no society evolved, let there be never so architectural an Idea; *with* these the house and society may be built, the structures depending incessantly on them, every alteration in them having a corresponding alteration in the realised ideal. But this Hegel will not allow. He says:—

'Here we have only to indicate that Spirit begins with a germ of infinite possibility, but *only* possibility,—containing its substantial existence in an undeveloped form, as the object and goal which it reaches only in its resultant—full reality. In actual existence Progress appears as an advancing from the imperfect to the more perfect; but the former must not be understood abstractly as *only* the imperfect, but as something which involves the very opposite of itself—the so-called perfect—as a *germ* or impulse. So—reflectively, at least—*possibility* points to something destined to become actual; the Aristotelian *δύναμις* is also *potentia*, power and might. Thus the Imperfect, as involving its opposite, is a contradiction, which certainly exists, but which is continually annulled and solved; the instinctive movement, the inherent impulse in the life of the soul—to break through the rind of mere nature, sensuousness, and that which is alien to it, and to attain to the light of consciousness, *i.e.* to itself.'

Nor can this be gainsaid by any one who accepts the Aristotelian conception of virtual and actual. Which, however, must be rejected. The virtual is only a figment, which the actual may make a reality; until it is *made*, it does not *exist*. Hegel declares that 'Essence is a self-separation of Being' (*Das Wesen ist eine Selbstdirektion des Seyns*). But the proposition is unthinkable in its naked simplicity, and only thinkable when it involves the very elements it pretends to evolve. Abstract Being, in which

there is no difference, cannot be construed to Thought as 'separating itself from itself;' the difference must already be there before a separation can be thought as taking place; and if difference be already there, Being is no longer abstract, but contains Essence. In a word, Being and Essence are not real Categories, but logical distinctions.

Even German metaphysicians have resisted this proposition of pure Being splitting itself in two, and becoming Reality in the act. Schelling humorously suggests that the act itself was perhaps an escape from the ennui of a purely logical existence.\*

Rejecting thus, as we are forced to reject, Hegel's fundamental conception of evolution, we need not pause to point out the reasons for refusing to accept his explanation of special evolutions. There is a third question, however, which must still be answered.

III. *Is the foundation solid?* Hegel may have failed in explaining the process of the universe; the failure is visible in the sudden ruin of his school. On the death of Alexander the empire fell to pieces; but the independent empires into which it merged, severally asserted their vitality. Hegel left no system capable of subsisting, but he left disciples; and even now, though scattered and sadly diminished in number, there are disciples who stand by his Method, hoping to erect on it a permanent system. That method we have already declared incompetent; we must now examine its foundation.

The foundation is the hypothesis of the identity of Object and Subject, of Being and Knowing. There is a sense in which this is indisputable; within the sphere of Consciousness the Object must be the Object Known. But we must ask: Is the sphere of Consciousness *cocxtensive* with the sphere of Existence? Is Consciousness a sphere within the wider sphere, one form of existence; or the reflex of the

\* 'L'Idée, on ne sait pourquoi, peut-être pour faire diversion à l'ennui de son existence purement logique, s'avise de se décomposer en ses moments qui constituent, dit-on, la création.' Preface to Cousin.

ality of Existence? To present the question in an image:—An organism is identical with *its* external medium, it not with the whole external medium. The organism is identical with the medium only at the points of intersection, namely those elements of the medium which are assimilated by the organism, and drawn into the vital current. The organism exists through and in these; it flows by the identification of them with itself. They, without ceasing to be physical and chemical integers, nevertheless assume new values as vital integers. Meanwhile, all the *standing* physical and chemical elements pursue their physical and chemical movements quite irrespective of the organism, and we know how hopeless would be the attempt to explain these by the assumption of their being also vital: since vitality is a specialised phenomenon, and if we vitalise the Cosmos we obliterate this very speciality. Now the attempt to explain Physics and Chemistry by biological laws, is equivalent to the attempt to explain cosmical processes by psychological laws.

Of course this would be denied *ab initio* by those who accept Absolute Idealism, and regard the Object as only a reflection of the Subject. But we may in the first place remark that this position is hypothetical, it is not proved; and it is an hypothesis which has evidence so mighty against it, that very few minds can hold it. In the second place the hypothetical identity of Thought and Being is only held to be valid in the region of abstractions, wherein things are replaced by Universals, and it is only with Universals that Philosophy is supposed to be concerned. Hegel explicitly warns us against interpreting his position in the sense that such or such external object must respond to my personal, individual, conception of it; such thoughts mine can only be *just*; to be *true* they must be universal. It is not my Notion, but *the* Notion corresponds with the Object, the Object.

This gets rid of many a *prima facie* objection, and reconciles many a seeming contradiction, but it does not



furnish Philosophy with an available criterion. For observe the following dilemma:—There was once a time—nor is it very distant—when *all* men unhesitatingly conceived that the sun moved round the earth. This conception was not only general, it was universal; and it was not only universal, it was inevitable. Was it then true? did the objective fact correspond with the subjective conception? If it did correspond, the planetary movements must have suddenly changed at the period of Copernicus, changing to follow the change in scientific Thought. If it did not correspond, there was a serious breach of continuity between the outer and inner; and since there is no ground to assume this breach to be solitary, we must admit that Thought and Things are not always identical.

Nor indeed would Hegel claim such identity. He says indeed that 'Nothing is because it is a thought;' but as he would not admit that Hippogriffs, Gnomes, Fairies, and multitudes of thoughts have an objective existence, we must ask why the thought Nothing is endowed with reality; and we shall see that it is because Nothing is a *necessary* thought. So, I conclude, Hegel would answer the case of the sun's movement. It was not a necessary thought; it was not deduced from logical necessity, but inferred from sensible appearances.

The distinction may be accepted, and thereby the difficulty escaped; but what is not thereby escaped is the inapplicability of his principle as a criterion. If the identity of Subject and Object could be accepted in all important cases, that is, in cases which were important because they were general and not merely individual, because they were constant and not merely accidental, then indeed we might admit the criterion, as in science we admit Laws, and disregard particular cases. But if the identity fail in general and important cases, and can only be admitted in those rare cases wherein Thought is a *necessary* deduction, the contrary of which is not only unthinkable, but undeducible from any admitted premises, of what value can such a

principle be in explaining the phenomena of our universe? Failing in regard to individual opinions, failing in regard to general opinions, failing even in regard to universal opinions, it succeeds only with those opinions that are logically necessary. My thought is not true; only *the* thought is true. Here we are again thrown back on his definition of Truth (see page 614). To be consistent with such principles he should never apply them to phenomena; yet since philosophy does pretend to explain phenomena, some criterion is needed. Moreover, even within the restricted sphere to which he assigns it the principle fails; for, as we have seen (p. 607), his dialectic proceeds on absolutely unthinkable assumptions, the laws of thought (*Denkgesetze*) which he invokes, are violations of every intelligible principle.

Let us see how he treats the observation of Nature.\* Thoughtless Consciousness declares that Observation and Experience are the source of Truth. It confounds sensible description with essential specification. It is mere superficial description of particulars, whereas that which is *intelligised* (*erkannt*), is more important than all the sensible properties which Consciousness may disregard. Through the distinction of the *essential* from the *non-essential*, the Notion raises itself from out the sensuous dispersion, and therein declares its cognition in that here it is dealing essentially as much *with itself* as with things. By this twofold essentiality it falls into perplexity as to whether that which is essential and necessary for cognition is equally so for things. On the one side must the *marks* only serve cognition whereby things are distinguished among each other; on the other it is not the non-essentiality of things that is known, but that whereby they *detach* themselves from the universal continuity of Being, *separate* themselves from others, and are *for themselves*. The marks must not only have an essential relation to cognition, but also the essential specifications of things, and the ideal system correspond with the real system.'

\* *Phänomenologie*, pp. 184-6.

The reader is probably initiated far enough into Hegel's phraseology and mode of thought to enable him to detect the argument here; but the passage now to follow will clear up any difficulty: 'The distinguishing marks of animals are for example drawn from their teeth and claws; for, in fact, not only does cognition thereby distinguish one animal from another, but the animal separates itself thereby; by these weapons, it sustains itself separated from the Universal. The plant, on the contrary, does not arrive at the *For-itselfness*, but only touches the limit of individuality; at this limit, where it manifests the appearance of separation (*Entzweiung*) in sex, it is on this ground accepted and distinguished.' \*

On learning that the idea of a claw or a tooth is the subjective aspect of the objective fact, but that the idea of the sun's movement round the earth is *not* the subjective aspect of the objective fact—on learning further that inasmuch as the man is only what he has *done*, and that therefore 'his body is the self-produced expression of himself—*der von ihm hervorgebrachte Ausdruck seiner selbst*' †—and that in fact all external existence is but the reflex of internal thought—one feels the pressing need of some decisive criterion to decide which of our thoughts have correspondent existences, and which not. As far as I can see into this matter, Hegel would say that the criterion must be sought in the absolute identity—*whenever* the external movement corresponds with the dialectic movement, then, and then only have we the truth. It is not this phenomenon or that, not this *differentia* or that, not this opinion or that, which can be accepted as the objective-subjective, real-ideal. It is only the *differentia* which appears as a necessary moment in the dialectical process, that we can accept as a necessary moment in the creative process. But my objection remains: the identity is an hypothesis; and if it were granted, the criterion would remain barren and misleading, in all inquiries that have any significance for man.

Leibnitz conceived that inasmuch as the soul represented

\* *Loc. cit.* p. 187.

† *Op. cit.* p. 232.

the universe with perfect accuracy though with imperfect clearness, the series of ideas must correspond with the changes in the universe.\* Bayle objected that a dog who felt the pain from a blow on his back while eating, might easily pass from the sensation of pleasure to that of pain; but that he should equally pass from pleasure to pain, as the ordained series, whether struck or not, is inconceivable—hence the alleged parallelism between the series of ideas and the series of external facts fails. To this Leibnitz answered that such a case could not occur; if the series of ideas is preordained on the one side, the series of corresponding facts is equally preordained.† Nor can this answer be impugned; as an answer to Bayle it is conclusive. But how will it avail in the case previously urged respecting the earth's movement? The preordained series of ideas in every mind (up to the coming of Copernicus) was one representing a series of facts, which since Copernicus has been recognised as directly the reverse; the representation was of an universe in which the sun revolved round the earth; the facts are now proved to have been diametrically opposed to this representation. Are we to rescue the principle of parallelism by assuming that with the change in the series of ideas there came about a corresponding change in Nature? Are we still to maintain with Hegel that 'the activity of the subjective notion is on the one side only the development of that which is already in the object, because the object itself is nothing but the totality of the notion'?‡

Hegel rejected the 'pre-established harmony,' rejected also the obviously untenable position of a complete parallelism between the order of ideas and the order of things which would imply that whatever thought crossed the mind must

\* LEIBNITZ : *Système nouveau*, § 15. 'L'âme étant représentative de l'univers d'une manière très-exacte, quoique plus ou moins distincte, la suite des représentations que l'âme se produit répondra naturellement à la suite des changements de l'univers même.'

† LEIBNITZ : *Lettre à Basmage* : *Opera Philos.* ed. ERDMANN, p. 151.

‡ HEGEL : *Logik*, iii. 271. 'Weil das Object selbst nichts als die Totalität des Begriffes ist.'

have an external fact corresponding with it. He held with all other thinkers that some ideas corresponded with facts, others do not. But the grand desideratum, What shall be the criterion whereby to distinguish the true ideas from the false? Hegel failed to seize.

This necessarily imperfect account of a vast system of thought must here cease. It has touched only on a few cardinal points, but these will, I hope, suffice both to assign to the system its historical significance, and serve as an introduction to those who may desire a near acquaintance with Hegel. False, and pernicious because false, as the system seems to me, I cordially join in the admiration expressed by disciples when they speak of its comprehensive ingenuity and imposing coherence. Hegel was assuredly one of the greatest of metaphysical thinkers; and will probably for very many years be an object of curious study. That he has made an epoch, I cannot admit; that he has made any one valuable contribution to philosophical evolution—discovered one law or point of view by which all succeeding speculation must be determined, is, I think, extremely doubtful. But he has cleared up many obscurities, systematised metaphysical thought in a masterly manner, and thus will for some time be a quarry for speculative thinkers.\*

\* Of the works on Hegel the following deserve mention. WILM: *Histoire de la Philosophie allemande*, 4 vols. Paris, 1846-9, a careful and detailed analysis of the chief works; it seems very accurate as far as my superficial examination of it allows me to judge. OTT: *Hegel et la Philosophie allemande*, Paris, 1844, useful, but inferior to WILM, and often misrepresenting positions. VERA: *Introduction à la Philosophie de Hegel*; the same writer has translated the *Logique* with a commentary, the *Philosophie de la Nature*, and the *Philosophie de l'Esprit*. I have seen none of his labours, but hear them spoken of approvingly. For an Italian to translate Hegel into French, implies a marvellous flexibility of mind. STIRLING: *The Secret of Hegel*, 2 vols. 1865; this in every sense remarkable work, eloquent, grimly-humorous, iconoclastic, chaotic,—contains a translation of several sections of the *Objective Logic* with a commentary; and is, except the little tractate published by SLOMAN and WALLON in 1855 under the title of *The Subjective Logic of Hegel*, the only translation into English of the purely speculative treatises; while Mr. SIBREE's translation of the *Philosophy of History*, 1857 (*Bohn's Philosophical Library*), is the only translation of a complete work by Hegel. In the *Oxford Essays*, 1855, Mr. SANDARS has given an account of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*. In the *Fortnightly Review*, September 1870, Mr.

HENDERSON has treated of *Hegel as a politician*. All the German Histories of Philosophy published of late years, of course treat of Hegel. MICHELET : *Geschichte der letzten Systeme der Philosophie in Deutschland*, 2 vols. 1837, is the work of a disciple. SCHWEGLER : *Handbook of the History of Philosophy*. Translated and annotated by J. H. STIRLING, 1867, an excellent handbook, brief yet full. UEBERWEG : *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*, 3 vols. Berlin, 1868, a masterly work by an acute thinker. REICHLIN-MELDEGG : *Einführung in die Philosophie*, prefixed to his *System der Logik*, Wien, 1870.

Very valuable for students who can think out the conclusions without the aid of illustrations, is FRANZ and HILBERT : *Hegel's Philosophie in wörtlichen Auszügen*, Berlin, 1843. It is a systematic abridgment of the works in Hegel's own words ; and is not only valuable as a brief exposition of the system, but useful as a companion to the works.

## ELEVENTH EPOCH.

*Foundation of the Positive Philosophy.*

## CHAPTER I.

## AUGUSTE COMTE.\*

## § 1. HIS LIFE.

AUGUSTE COMTE was born at Montpellier on the 19th of January, 1798, in a modest house still to be seen facing the church of St. Eulalie. His father was treasurer of taxes for the department of Hérault. Both father and mother were strict Catholics and ardent royalists; but any influence they may have exercised over the direction of their son's thoughts was considerably neutralised by his own insurgent disposition on the one hand, and by his early education on the other. He was not docile to authority; though in after life he strenuously preached the virtue of docility. At the age of nine he became a boarder in the Montpellier Lycée; and there quickly distinguished himself by his ardour in study and by his resistance to discipline. Small and delicate in frame, loved by his comrades although he seldom joined in their sports, full of veneration for his professors, he was intractable, tiresome, and argumentative with his masters; those who could teach him found him docile;

\* The sources of this biographical sketch have been LITTRÉ: *Auguste Comte et la Philosophie positive*, 1863; ROBINET: *Notice sur l'Œuvre et sur la Vie d'Auguste Comte*, 1860; *Lettres d'Auguste Comte à M. Valat*, 1870; and personal knowledge.

those who had to restrain him found him rebellious. His professors praised, his masters punished him.

At the age of twelve he had learned all that the Lycée prescribed in the way of instruction, and the Director begged that he might be permitted to begin mathematics. Consent was given; and the result may be told in one significant sentence: in four years he had gained a first place at the École Polytechnique, although the rules of that institution did not then allow of his admission, because he was still under age. He had to wait a whole year before the doors were open to him; and in that year he displayed his acquirements by taking the place of his old professor (who was in failing health), and giving a course of mathematics to his former comrades, and some of his former masters.

At the age of seventeen he was admitted to the École Polytechnique, and there he was brought in contact with republican sentiments and scientific tendencies eminently suited to his rebellious and inquiring disposition. By the time he was fourteen he is supposed to have entirely disengaged himself from all royalist and all theological opinions; and he was occupied with the writings which in the eighteenth century discussed the fundamental axioms of social, ethical, and religious systems. He began seriously to meditate on the revolutions of modern history. His comrades respected and admired him. His professors recognised his eminent capacity. A brilliant career seemed certain, when it was arrested by a characteristic action of his own. One of the masters had insulted the younger students by his manners; the elder students took up the case, and after mature deliberation decided that the master was unworthy of continuing in his office. They drew up the following notification:—'*Monsieur, Quoiqu'il nous soit pénible de prendre une telle mesure envers un ancien élève de l'école, nous vous enjoignons de n'y plus remettre les pieds.*' This notification, drawn up by Comte, had his signature at the head of the list. The result was his expulsion. His official career was at an end. He was forced to return home; and



remained there some time under the surveillance of the police.

We do not learn, but we may imagine, what was his reception at home, and of what nature were the debates as to his possible future. He remained some months at Montpellier, pursuing his studies with passionate devotion, and attending the various lectures at the Faculty. But this could not last. Paris allured him. In vain were the remonstrances and threats of his troubled parents; in vain their refusal to give him a penny if he quitted his native city without an assured position; the desire for freedom and the manifold attractions of the great intellectual centre were all powerful; and he found himself lonely in the crowded capital, ready to begin that eternal struggle in which year after year so many noble intellects equipped with nothing but a little knowledge and an immense ambition, fight for bread and distinction, are wounded and worsted, are wounded and conquer. A greater intellect moved by a loftier ambition has rarely fought that noble fight.

He supplied his very modest wants by giving private lessons in mathematics. Two illustrious men of science befriended him—Poinsot, who had been his professor at the École Polytechnique, and knew his mathematical power; De Blainville, who early recognised his philosophical calibre. By their aid a few pupils were obtained; one of them was the Prince de Carignan.\* The bread was scanty, but he wanted little more than bread. He was not one of those who founder on the sunken rocks of Parisian life.†

A brief experience of a less independent position seems to have sufficed. He became private secretary to Casimir Périer; but quickly found that the paid servant was ex-

\* 'De cette manière je me fais une rente d'environ 200 francs par mois, et par conséquent tu vois que je puis subsister sans être obligé de demander rien à mes parents.' *Lettres à Valat*, p. 14.

† 'Je cherche à imiter le Socrate moderne (Franklin), non par ses talents mais par ses mœurs. Tu sais qu'à vingt-cinq ans il forma le projet de devenir parfaitement sage, et qu'il l'exécuta : moi, j'ai osé entreprendre la même chose, et je n'ai pas vingt ans.' *Ibid.* p. 19.

pected to be a blind admirer. Called upon to make some comments on the public labours of his master, 'elles ne furent pas goûtées;' and after a trial of three weeks the connection ceased. From Casimir Périer he passed over to the celebrated St.-Simon. This was in 1818. The young philosopher hoped that he might live in harmony with a philosopher; and for some years he did so. I cannot ascertain precisely the footing on which they stood together. M. Littré says that Comte was first secretary, then pupil, then collaborateur and friend. Dr. Robinet says that the secretaryship was practically an honorary one, for although three hundred francs a month were promised, only the first quarter's salary was ever paid.\* Whatever the nature of the relation, it subsisted for six years, beginning with great enthusiasm on Comte's part, continuing for some time with affectionate veneration, and ending in a violent rupture which was the culmination of a growing dissidence in opinion.

There have been angry accusations and angry recriminations from the disciples of St.-Simon and the disciples of Comte which render the task of an impartial biographer somewhat difficult. But whatever may have been the personal influence of St.-Simon, for good or evil, on the direction of Comte's aims, a superficial acquaintance with the Positive Philosophy will detect its essential independence of, and divergence from, St.-Simonianism. When, therefore, writers sarcastically or indignantly assert that Comte 'borrowed St.-Simon's ideas,' they disclose a complete misapprehension of all that characterises the Positive Philosophy. On the other hand it is unnecessary to assail St.-Simon, and accuse him of being an ignorant charlatan, in order to prove what his own language and the express declaration of his editor unequivocally establish, namely, that he not only disapproved, he failed even to understand, the doctrines of his young collaborateur.

As a point in the history of philosophical evolution it is

\* See *Lettres à Valat*, p. 36.

clear that Comte does not proceed from St.-Simon, but from the eighteenth century: he resumed its twofold movement towards destruction and reconstruction in one grand synthesis by means of a thorough application of the Methods of Science.\* Nevertheless, as a detail in the biographical evolution of Comte's own mind, it is, I think, undeniable that the influence of St.-Simon was decisive. By which I mean that through personal contact with this reformer his mind received the stimulus, if not the bias, which at that peculiar stage of his development was a determining one. At the age of twenty, familiar with all the inorganic sciences (Biology he had not then studied, and Sociology had not been conceived), well read in history, fervent in republicanism, and ambitious of mastering the great laws of social existence, this inheritor of the eighteenth century spirit, regarding Philosophy and Science as instruments for the dissolution of theological superstitions and feudal inequalities, came into affectionate and reverential contact with one whom some regard as a turbulent charlatan, and others as a prophetic thinker, but whom all must admit to have been impressed with the urgent need and possibility of replacing the critical and destructive tendency by a positive and constructive tendency; and the immediate consequence of this contact was, that Comte learned to look upon the revolutionary work as completed, and saw that the effort of the nineteenth century must be towards the reconstruction of society upon a new basis. The old faith was destroyed, a new faith was indispensable.

Probably most readers will agree with M. Littré, that so potent an intellect as Comte's might easily have passed from the revolutionary to the constructive attitude without any impulse from one so manifestly his inferior as St.-

\* This is confirmed by his letter to VALAT written after his quarrel with St.-SIMON, in which he speaks of a new work written away from the influence of that former master, 'influence du reste qui a puissamment servi à mon éducation philosophique' (p. 115). And compare p. 119: 'Je dois certainement beaucoup intellectuellement à St.-Simon, c'est-à-dire qu'il a puissamment contribué à me lancer dans la direction philosophique que je me suis créée aujourd'hui.'

Simon: but 'what might have been' is an idle hypothesis when we know what was; and in Biography, as elsewhere, we should guard against the tendency to substitute a possible evolution for an actual evolution. The simple biographical fact is, that in his youth Comte passed from the negative to the positive attitude while under the influence of a teacher whose special aim was constructive. He called himself a disciple of St.-Simon; and it is not clear what he could have learned from such a master, except the necessity of a constructive attitude.

An attitude, however, is not a doctrine: an aim is not a philosophy. The impulsion may have come from St.-Simon; the doctrine assuredly came from Comte, and from him only. It was probably owing to his keen perception of the irreconcilability of his ideas with the ideas of St.-Simon, and the pardonable exasperation he felt at ungenerous accusations, which made him in his later years speak of his old master with excessive bitterness. His tone was that of a man who feels himself to have been deeply injured. So far from acknowledging any intellectual debt, he, who was nobly scrupulous in acknowledgment of all such obligations, however trifling, always affirmed that St.-Simon's influence had been a serious retardation of his development. What the truth may be cannot now be ascertained. It is certain that his development was surprisingly rapid, and that four years after his first meeting with St.-Simon, namely in 1822, he laid the solid basis of the new philosophy, which he called 'positive,' because it was the generalisation of the method which each positive science had employed in particular. Like Bacon, he schemed in his youth what a laborious life was devoted to work out.

St.-Simon had vast aspirations, but he misconceived the fundamental conditions of social reorganisation. He was, moreover, altogether unprepared for a system based upon positive science, the more so because he was unacquainted with the methods of science; and accordingly, when Comte, in 1822, having discovered the laws of social evolution, drew

up his memorable *Plan des Travaux nécessaires pour réorganiser la Société*, it must have dawned upon St.-Simon that his young assistant had become his rival and superior. He published the essay, but even in publishing it disclaimed agreement in its peculiar views. Others thought more highly of it; among these were Humboldt and Guizot. In writing to a friend, the young philosopher could say, 'J'ai été agréablement affecté (je ne dis pas surpris) de l'effet que ce travail a produit sur M. Guizot; il m'en a témoigné par écrit une profonde et sincère satisfaction, et depuis j'ai pu voir par sa conversation que ces idées agissent sur lui.' He also mentions its effect on Flourens, adding, 'Je dois avoir avec lui un entretien important sur l'idée fondamentale de mon travail, l'application de la méthode positive à la science sociale.'

The open rupture with St.-Simon took place in 1824. The next year may be considered the year when the Positive Philosophy was constituted; for, as M. Littré reminds us, the Essay of 1822, republished in 1824, only sets forth the laws of social evolution, but does not give even an outline of the Positive Philosophy, which is for the first time expressly announced in the *Considérations philosophiques sur les Sciences et les Savants*\* (published in the *Producteur* in 1825). In the two pregnant essays which thus form, as it were, the inaugural thesis of the young philosopher, it is shown (1) that all phenomena, even those of politics, are subject to invariable laws; (2) that the human mind passes from initial theological conceptions to final positive conceptions through the transition of metaphysical conceptions; (3) that human activity, in like manner, passes through three phases, from the conquering military régime to the pacific industrial régime, through the transitional state of a defensive military régime; (4) that everywhere, and at all times, the state of opinions and manners determines the institutions, and that

\* This essay, with others, will be found appended to the fourth volume of the *Système de Politique positive*: they form an excellent introduction to the study of Positivism.

the nature of the general beliefs determines a corresponding political régime; (5) that philosophy (or general beliefs) in passing from the theological to the positive stage must bring about the substitution of the industrial for the military régime; and finally, that the spiritual reorganisation, which is the necessary condition of all social reorganisation, must repose upon the authority of demonstration, it must be based upon science, with a priesthood properly constituted out of the regenerated scientific classes. In other words, the spiritual authority must issue from a philosophy which can be demonstrated, not from a philosophy which is imagined.

The year 1825 is memorable on other grounds; it is the date of his marriage with Caroline Massin, bookseller, then (as I infer from a phrase in one of his letters to me) in her twenty-fourth year.\* There is no graver event in a man's life than marriage. It may prove an inestimable blessing, the subtle influences of which will permeate every hour of the day, strengthen every fibre of his moral being, and by its satisfying repose to the affections, give his intellect a calmer and more continuous sweep. It may also prove a desolating evil, numbing the sympathies, irritating and scattering the intellectual energies, distorting the life. In Comte's case the marriage was unhappy.† In spite of mutual admiration there was some essential cause of disunion, which led to much unhappiness and a final separation. Into the very delicate question of culpability I do not feel inclined to enter. The relations of man and wife are too complex and too obscure for a bystander to appreciate, even when he has

\* From his letter to VALAT it appears that she was only two-and-twenty, and had no other dowry except her 'bon cœur, ses grâces, son esprit d'une trempe peu commune, son aimabilité, son heureux caractère et ses bonnes habitudes,' p. 162.

† In less than a year after their marriage we find him writing thus: 'Tu me crois heureux; je le suis en effet, sous certains rapports, sous tous ceux qui dépendent essentiellement de mon organisation et de mes antécédents; mais sous d'autres je ne souhaite pas à mon plus cruel ennemi un pareil bonheur.' From a passage at p. 178, we may divine that Madame Comte was not sufficiently in love with her husband to suppress in its birth 'all vain desire of dominion.' Temper, here as in so many other cases, was the domestic fiend.

personal knowledge to aid him. I have no knowledge of Comte in his domestic relations; and MM. Robinet and Littré are so transparently in the position of partisans, one vehemently reviling Madame Comte, the other artfully pleading her cause, that little reliance should be placed on either. M. Littré is more measured in his judgments than Dr. Robinet, whose imputations cannot be sustained in presence of the documentary evidence of letters from De Blainville, Comte, and Madame Comte; but M. Littré, who has long been the intimate friend of Madame Comte, suppresses important facts, and uses others with insidious effect. In presence of such *ex-parte* versions we shall do well entirely to suspend judgment.

Enough for us here to know that Comte was initiated into domestic life at a time when there seemed very little prospect of his being able to earn more than a precarious subsistence. His family at first opposed the match, but finally gave a reluctant consent: though, to their grief, the religious ceremony was resolutely declined, and a civil marriage was all that Comte would accept. We shall hear more of this presently. Meanwhile we must think of the young couple as dependent entirely on the proceeds of lessons in mathematics. At the time of their marriage, Comte had but one pupil: that pupil was the 'Bayard of our day,' as his admirers style General Lamoricière. A modest lodging was furnished in the Rue de l'Oratoire. Here M. de Narbonne proposed to place his son as boarder and pupil. Other aristocratic families would, it was hoped, follow the example. To receive these pupils a more dignified apartment was taken in the Rue de l'Arcade, at the corner of the Rue St.-Lazare; and fresh furniture had to be bought. Their small stock of ready money was thus invested, but the pupils never came, and the apartment was a burden. In a few months the solitary boarder was sent back, and the young couple had to migrate to more modest lodgings in the Rue Montmartre (No. 13). Here Comte, although unwilling to divert his attention from the working out of the great

scheme which he was then meditating, was persuaded to earn a little money by publishing an occasional essay in the *Producteur*. To this we owe the *Considérations philosophiques sur les Sciences et les Savants*, and the *Considérations sur le Nouveau Pouvoir spirituel*.

By the month of April, 1826, the system was sufficiently matured in his mind for a dogmatic exposition, which he announced in a course of seventy-two lectures to be delivered in his private rooms. There is something imposing in the magnitude of the attempt. One hears with surprise of a young and obscure thinker proposing to expound the philosophy of all the sciences, aiming at the reconstruction of a Spiritual Power, and calling upon his auditors for a year's severe attention to his scheme. One is still more surprised to hear the names of the auditors who were prepared to give this attention: Humboldt, Poinso, De Blainville, Montebello, Carnot, d'Eichthal, Cerclet, Allier, and Mongéry. A scheme so gigantic might, indeed, have originated in a colossal vanity unimpeded in its pretensions by any definite knowledge of what the scheme implied; for the ignorant are often seduced by their ignorance into pretensions which a little knowledge would repress. It is as easy to write a check for ten millions as for ten pounds—when you have nothing at your bankers. But the presence of an audience such as I have named, and in such a place, proves that the pretensions were recognised by competent judges, and that the lecturer had inspired men of position with the conviction that he had something important to say.

It will be readily understood, by any one acquainted with the intense cerebral excitement which attends the elaboration of great conceptions in their systematic co-ordination, that the strain on Comte's mind, amid various vexations, and particularly in the agitation of vehement personal quarrels, proved too much for him. After the delivery of three or four lectures, an attack of insanity abruptly closed the course. For some weeks previously he had displayed an irritability and violence of temper which alarmed his wife.



She, not unnaturally, attributed to malignity what was due to disease. On Friday, April the 24th, he went out and did not return home. On Monday a letter came, dated from St. Denis, whither his wife hastened, but found him no longer there. Remembering that he was very fond of Montmorency, she went there on the chance of finding him; and found him in a pitiable condition. A physician was sent for, who confessed the case to be alarming, but dared not bleed the agitated patient.

The excitement subsided, and he expressed a wish to go out for a walk. She imprudently consented, and accompanied him. As they came to the edge of the lake of Enghien, he suddenly declared that although he could not swim he should not be drowned if he walked into the lake; and he began to drag his wife with him. She was young and strong; struggled, caught hold of a tree, and saved them both.

But now came the difficulty of getting him back to the inn. His excitement rapidly increased. The peasants refused all offers tempting them to act as guardians while his wife hurried to Paris to seek the assistance of De Blainville; and she was forced to leave him under the charge of two gendarmes. She returned from Paris to find him in a worse condition. In the morning De Blainville arrived followed by M. Cerclet. They contrived by stratagem to get him to Esquirol's establishment for the insane; and there his exaltation was so great, that it was regarded by Esquirol as a favourable prognostic of an early recovery. Unhappily the recovery was slow, and would probably have been impossible had he not quitted the madhouse, with its incessant irritations, for the soothing influences of domestic quiet. On hearing the melancholy news, Comte's mother at once came to Paris to attend on him; and she remained there till he quitted the asylum. De Blainville, after seeing summer and autumn pass away without sensible improvement, justly concluded that hatred of his keepers and the system of treatment perpetuated the excitement. Comte's father hereupon proposed that he should be removed to

Montpellier. But the wife wished to have her husband under her care, and her plan was adopted.

A grotesque and lugubrious farce was played on the day of his quitting the establishment. I have already mentioned the pain and indignation of his family at his refusal to give his marriage the religious sanction of a Church ceremony; and this refusal was now regarded by his parents as the origin of the calamity which had fallen on him. The confidence with which people see the 'finger of God' in human afflictions, and see their own anger confirmed by his 'judgments,' is too constantly exemplified for us to think harshly of the mistaken parents. But I cannot without pain hear of a man like Lamennais being mixed up with what followed, namely, the attempt to make peace with offended Heaven by inducing the insane heretic to submit himself to the dictates of the Church he detested, and ask for a religious ceremony to sanction his marriage. By what arts the consent was gained, is not said; but in a lonely chamber of Esquirol's madhouse this gloomy farce was played. The officiating priest was deficient in tact, and instead of shortening the ceremony, lengthened it by a prolix discourse which excited Comte; and the shocking spectacle was presented of a priest pouring forth pious exhortations, extremely unsuited to the mental condition of the maniac, who kept up a running commentary of anti-religious incoherencies! The state of his mind was exhibited when he came to affix his signature, —after his own name he added Brutus Bonaparte. But the ceremony was performed; the Church was satisfied; the tender consciences were at peace.

He left the establishment for ever. His nurses were now his mother and his wife. Iron bars were placed before the windows of his lodging, and Esquirol sent a keeper to help and protect them. But at the end of a week it was found necessary to do away with these precautions, which made the unhappy man still imagine himself in the establishment he hated. From that moment his recovery began. In three weeks' time he was left alone with his wife. His violence at

first caused serious anxiety. Twice a day, at meals, he would try to plant his knife in the table, in imitation, he said, of Sir Walter Scott's highlander; and he would call for a succulent pig, in imitation of Homeric heroes. More than once he threw his knife at Madame Comte—not, as she believes with any intention of injuring her, but merely to frighten her into compliance with his wishes.

At the end of six weeks all immediate danger was over. A new danger emerged in the profound melancholy which gradually overclouded him, as with returning health there came upon him the conviction that he could no longer live that life of intellect which had once been his. Life could in future be nothing but a weariness, now that his powers were gone. The idea of suicide arose. One day, during his wife's absence, he slipped out, hurried to the Seine, and threw himself into it from the bridge. A soldier plunged in and saved him. The shock seems to have roused his energies; perhaps by determining a different impulse to his circulation. He expressed great regret for his attempt, and the grief he had thereby caused his wife. From this time there was no relapse. In the month of July he was well enough to visit his parents at Montpellier.\*

It is not without a purpose that I have told this story of the severe cerebral attack in its painful details. The fact that he had been insane was openly avowed by himself, in anticipation of the ignoble pretext which he foresaw that it might furnish to his adversaries, who would more easily dismiss his philosophical ideas as the reveries of a madman than point out incoherencies and refute arguments. We are so ready to see the love of singularity, the distorted conceptions of eccentricity, or the illusions of a 'heat-oppressed brain,' in any departure from our own ways of thought, that when a man comes before us with opinions we do not understand, or understanding do not like, and that man is

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\* I have followed M. LITTRÉ in this narrative of the attack, because it is confirmed, to a great extent, by documentary evidence, though of course the story proceeds from Madame COMTE.

known to have been actually insane at one time, the temptation to charge his opinions on his insanity is very strong indeed. But although Comte was really out of his mind for the brief period, he was perfectly sane and sound when he first conceived, and when he finally executed, the scheme of his philosophy. Had the work been elaborated in a madhouse, or published while the author was insane, there would be an excuse for dismissing it unexamined; in such a case, however, examination would have disclosed something like a miracle which would have revolutionised all our ideas about sanity. Every one must see that a body of doctrine so compact and organically related in its parts, could only have been wrought out in the plenitude of mental power. Call that doctrine mischievous, erroneous—what you please—only not incoherent. The intense concentration it demanded may have been the predisposing cause of the insanity, but the insanity had nothing to do with the production of the philosophy. Nor will any one who is even superficially acquainted with the phenomena of mental disease, and who understands that all disease whatever is only a disturbance of equilibrium of the functions, suppose that when the disease has passed and the equilibrium is restored, the functions will not resume their normal activity, the insane man becoming perfectly sane, and capable of as accurately co-ordinating ideas as before. The fevered pulse becomes normal in its beats, the inflamed mucous membrane becomes normal in its power of secretion, and the over-stimulated brain becomes normal in its action, when once the disturbing causes are removed.

There is, therefore, nothing remarkable in the fact that Lucretius and Cowper wrote their immortal poems during lucid intervals of frequent cerebral attacks. The philosophy of Lucretius has indeed been often affiliated on his insanity; but the sweet piety, the delicate humour, and the sustained excellence of Cowper, have not been thus branded; and they show that the mind is lucid in its lucid intervals. The list of illustrious madmen is a long one. Lucretius, Mahomet, Oyola, Peter the Great, Haller, Newton, Tasso, Swift,

Cowper, Donizetti, spontaneously occur as the names of men whose occasional eclipse by no means darkens the splendour of their achievements. To these we must add the name of Auguste Comte, assured that if Newton once suffered a cerebral attack without thereby forfeiting our veneration for the *Principia* and the *Optics*, Comte may have likewise suffered without forfeiting his claims on our veneration for the *Philosophie positive*. But the best answer to this ignoble insinuation is the works themselves. If they are the products of madness, one could wish that madness were occasionally epidemic.\*

I return to the narrative of his life. In 1828 he recommenced that oral exposition of his system which we have seen so cruelly interrupted. This time it was in his lodgings, Rue Saint-Jacques, No. 159. The great geometrician Fourier, and the celebrated physician Broussais, with De Blainville, Poinso, and Mongéry, were among the small audience. He completed the course, and also gave a brief public exposition of his historical views at the Athénée. In 1830 he published the first volume of his Course; but the second volume, owing to the commercial crisis, did not appear till 1835; the sixth and last in 1842. I should add that in 1830 he began to give the gratuitous course of public lectures on Astronomy which was repeated for seven years, and afterwards (1844) published under the title of *Traité philosophique d'Astronomie populaire*.

These twelve years (1830-42), embracing the publication of the *Cours de Philosophie positive*, form what M. Littré justly calls 'the great epoch' in his life: 'Un labeur infini l'attendait; il se soumit sans réserve à cet infini labeur.

\* Let us hear him on this point:—'Après que la médecine m'eut enfin heureusement déclaré incurable, la puissance intrinsèque de non organisation, assistée d'affectueux soins domestiques, triompha naturellement, en quelques semaines, au commencement de l'hiver suivant, de la maladie, et surtout des remèdes. Ce succès essentiellement spontané se trouvait, dix-huit mois après, tellement consolidé que, en août 1828, appréciant dans un journal le célèbre ouvrage de Broussais sur L'Irritation et la Folie, j'utilisais déjà philosophiquement les lumières personnelles que cette triste expérience venait de me procurer si chèrement envers le grand sujet.'

Douze ans se passèrent pendant lesquels il ferma courageusement sa vie à tout ce qui aurait pu le distraire. Jamais le besoin d'une publicité prématurée ne fit invasion dans son âme. . . . Sévère, persévérant, sourd aux bruits du dehors, il concentra sur son œuvre tout ce qu'il avait de méditation. Dans l'histoire des hommes voués aux grandes pensées, je ne connais rien de plus beau que ces douze années.' It would be well that we should bear this in mind. Although the world is called upon to judge results, not efforts—to accept or reject works on their own pretensions, and not on any pretensions claimed for the disinterestedness and labour of the worker—it is but just that, in speaking of the worker, we should remember his claims. Whether it is a system or a sonnet, we agree with the Misanthrope of Molière—

'Monsieur, le temps ne fait rien à l'affaire ;'

but the serious worker is regarded with very different feelings from those which are excited by the vain and presumptuous socialist. Reject the Positive Philosophy if your mind refuses to accept it, but speak of Comte as one who gave a life to its elaboration ; as one who believing that he was commissioned to impart a new faith, accepted the burden with a severe courage, and thought and toiled, relinquishing all other aims, steeling himself against all other seductions, and with a noble disinterestedness devoting himself to the task which he well knew was certain to bring obloquy on him while living, to be followed by an immortal fame.

Shortly after 1830 he refused to join the National Guard. He was cited before the municipality, and was condemned to an imprisonment of three days. He thus proclaimed his reasons :—'The law declares that the National Guard is instituted to defend the government which France has given herself. If it were simply a question of maintaining order I should not refuse to bear my part ; but I refuse to share in political struggles. I shall never attack the government by force. But, being a republican in mind and heart, I cannot swear to defend, at the peril of my life and that of others, a

government which I should attack were I a man of action.' Such language as this would have led to a criminal indictment had not the authorities dreaded the publicity of such a defence. As it was, he remained unmolested.

In 1833 he obtained an office in the École Polytechnique, which with another that soon came to him, and a mathematical class in a private educational establishment, brought ease into his domestic circumstances, and enabled him to dispense with private pupils. From this time and for some years he enjoyed an income of 10,000 francs. Hitherto his sole relaxations had been long walks, and what he called his *flâneries philosophiques*. Now he was enabled to indulge his newly awakened passion for music, and every season had his stall at the Italian Opera.\* Although without musical culture, he was exquisitely sensitive to music; had a fine voice, and sang certain songs with great effect, particularly *La Marseillaise*, which he gave with vibrating revolutionary fervour.

He read absolutely nothing on Philosophy or Science: he abstained on system. In his early years he had read immensely, and his memory was of extraordinary tenacity. English, Italian, and Spanish he taught himself simply by taking a book and a dictionary of each language. Gifted with such a memory, his neglect of books was perhaps a greater advantage to the integrity of his philosophising than it would be in most cases. All his knowledge was organised; whatever he had once read was always available.

M. Littré describes his method of composition, which is truly remarkable. 'He meditated the subject without writing a word. From the general conception he passed to the great divisions, and from those to the details. When

\* 'J'esuis fort heureux,' he writes to VALAT, 'que ce goût se soit enfin développé chez moi, quoiqu'un peu tard, d'une manière aussi franche et aussi vive, qui m'inspire à cet égard toute l'ardeur d'un jeune novice. . . . Du reste ce goût esthétique n'est pas borné à la musique, quoique actuellement dominante; il s'étend aussi à la peinture, et surtout à la poésie, pour laquelle tu connais mon ancienne prédilection, qui, après m'avoir momentanément quitté, m'est depuis longtemps pleinement revenue.'

this elaboration, first of the whole and then of the parts, was finished, he considered that his volume was completed. And this was true, for on sitting down to write he recovered without loss every one of the ideas which formed the tissue of his work, and recovered them in their order and connection, although not a word had been committed to paper. In this way he composed the course of lectures which embraced the whole Positive Philosophy, and the catastrophe which followed (in 1826) proves that the method was as dangerous as it was puissant.' When once he began to write he was hurried along by the impetuous current of his thoughts; and the dates which he has given of the composition of various parts of his writings prove the almost incredible rapidity with which he wrote. The sheets were sent to press as fast as they were written; so that the printing of each volume was completed almost as soon as he laid down the pen.

The last of his private pupils, whose name has not transpired, has given an interesting glimpse of his illustrious teacher, in a paper which appeared in *Chambers's Journal* (June 19, 1858). After narrating how he found himself in this position, he adds:—'Daily as the clock struck eight on the *horloge* of the Luxembourg, while the ringing hammer on the bell was yet audible, the door of my room opened, and there entered a man, short, rather stout, almost what one might call sleek, freshly shaven, without vestige of whisker or moustache. He was invariably dressed in a suit of the most spotless black, as if going to a dinner party; his white neckcloth was fresh from the laundress's hands, and his hat shining like a racer's coat. He advanced to the arm-chair prepared for him in the centre of the writing-table, laid his hat on the left-hand corner, his snuff-box was deposited on the same side beside the quire of paper placed in readiness for his use, and dipping the pen twice into the ink-bottle, then bringing it to within an inch of his nose, to make sure it was properly filled, he broke silence: "We have said that the chord A B," &c. For three quarters of an hour he continued his demonstration, making short notes as he went on,



to guide the listener in repeating the problem alone; then, taking up another *cahier* which lay beside him, he went over the written repetition of the former lesson. He explained, corrected, or commented till the clock struck nine: then, with the little finger of the right hand brushing from his coat and waistcoat the shower of superfluous snuff which had fallen on them, he pocketed his snuff-box, and, resuming his hat, he as silently as when he came in made his exit by the door which I rushed to open for him. This man of few words was the Aristotle or Bacon of the nineteenth century.

‘Thus for a year I daily sat a listener, not always attentive, and to the last but dimly conscious of the value of lessons which I can never forget in their higher meaning, though the angles and curves which they explained have long since become to me more meaningless than hieroglyphics.

‘One would think that such a teacher, gliding in and out like a piece of clock-work, without an interchange of any of the gentle courtesies of life, would raise only a repulsive feeling in his pupil. It was in vain I tried to break through the coldness of our relations, to establish that little preliminary gossip in which I have found some teachers too ready to employ all the time of their lesson; he seemed to say that he had nerved himself to a disagreeable duty, and that nothing should turn him from it. Only twice did I even succeed in gaining proof that he had something mortal in his composition. I had been six weeks under his tuition, and still persisted, with more, perhaps, of malice than of ignorance, in using the most abominably ungrammatical French in my written repetitions of his lectures. One morning he lost patience at some solecism more excruciating than usual; and laying down his pen, he turned to me, and said: “Why do you persevere in writing such barbarisms?” “You know I am a foreigner,” said I: “how should I do better?” “You can at least do better than this: write as you speak;” and he resumed his pen, correcting every fault of language. From that day, there were few grammatical

blunders in my papers. Once again, and this time less wilfully, I encountered the same mild anger. I was at the time studying very hard, generally thirteen hours a day of book-work—a folly bitterly expiated and repented since—and I was seldom in bed till after midnight. One black wintry morning, after harder work than usual, I nodded over the lecture. With no straining of the ears, could I drink in the sense; with no forcing of the eyelids, keep them open. I dared not rise and take a few turns in the room, for this would have been a violation of our habits. So I sat till the humming of the voice, and the scraping of the pen, acted like a lullaby, and I was already three parts asleep, when suddenly a change of tone aroused me, and the words “But you sleep,” recalled me to myself, only to see my tutor stalking out of the room, while I vainly tried to catch and appease him. The next day, he resumed the lesson where he had left off on the one previous to my nap, but not a word of reproach was uttered, or of apology allowed, by the insulted sage.

‘From that day, I began to love him. Cold or abstracted as he seemed, the intellectual giant henceforth won almost imperceptibly on the youth. I could not feel, much less measure his greatness, but I acquired an interest in the dry science he taught me; and had I continued under his charge, I might have become a mathematician. I had been taught to fear, not to revere my masters; if I had a liking for any one, it had been in proportion to his laxness: and I now found myself half unconsciously, and quite unaccountably, gliding into a sort of affection for the most unapproachable, the most uncongenial of them all. I was then the most unreasonable of boy-mortals. I cannot, therefore, suppose that this feeling was due to the sway of pure reason over my mind; I can only think that it arose from an instinctive perception of the smothered kindness which entered so largely into his composition.

‘I returned to England to “keep halls,” and devote myself to a new range of studies—stigmatised, I believe, by my

masters and pastors as pure idleness, because not set down in their books; and it was two years before I was again in Paris. By that time I had become acquainted with what was published of the *Philosophie positive*. From its pages I had learned that my old tutor was a great man, though hardly yet a celebrated one. I had learned to contrast his earnestness with the *laissez-faire* of others; and a visit to him was one of the first pleasures which I promised myself in the capital most fertile in pleasure to youthful visitors. Mindful of the showers of snuff which had too often attacked my sternutatory muscles, I carried him a Cumnock snuff-box, with one of our Ayrshire pebbles in the lid, and was delighted to find it graciously accepted. He put it at once into a drawer of his writing-table, and then told me that he had given up the use of snuff. He said that he had withdrawn entirely from the world, to devote himself without distraction to the politics of his philosophy—that he no longer even read the newspapers, and had weaned himself from every superfluity.

‘It was not till 1851 that I again saw him. He was then the acknowledged chief of a school, and renowned, if not admired, among all thinkers. I had some little trouble in finding his abode, and it was with a beating heart that I pulled the bell-string. An old gentleman in a dressing-gown, with a black neckerchief strung round his throat, opened the door. I almost thought I had misunderstood the porter’s directions. “Monsieur Comte?” I inquiringly said.

“It is I, Sir,” was the answer.

‘The change in his appearance intimidated me, and I hesitatingly mentioned my name. At once he put out his hand, and drew me into his sitting-room. Here I was able to remark the wonderful change which had come over his expression since we had last met. He now reminded me of one of those mediæval pictures which represent St. Francis wedded to Poverty. There was a mildness in those attenuated features that might be called ideal rather than human; through the half-closed eyes there shone the very soul of

him who had doubted whether he had anything more than intellect. "I did not recognise you," he said, opening a drawer; "but I think of you almost daily. See, I still have your box, and I keep my seals in it, so that I am often reminded of you." He spoke unreservedly of the honourable poverty to which the last revolution, in depriving him of his modest competence, had reduced him, and he told me how the generous sacrifices of some of his disciples had relieved him of the cares of material existence.

'He indulged me with a long conversation, every word of which filled me with fresh wonder. He was no longer the rigid thinker, regular and passionless as mechanism; he seemed to have renewed his youth, to have added something to his former self, but how or what, I could not at the time imagine. In terms unintelligible to me, he referred to relations which had given impulse to his affections; he spoke with enthusiasm of the Italian poets, and of Shakspeare and Milton, whose works he had learned to read in the original; and—O surprise!—taking from his chimney-piece a well-thumbed copy of the *Imitation*, he said: "I read some pages of this book every morning."

'I already had had cause to suspect that under that frigid mask which he wore in earlier years, an impulsive nature and warm affections were concealed; I had heard at the time that the little keepsake I had brought had pleased him so much, that in speaking of it a few days afterwards his eyes glistened; I understood, therefore, that far within him was a loving soul; and I now learned, from a book which he gave me, the story of how he had found and lost the counterpart, the other half, which he had so long sought. The history of the platonic love to which he owed the late development of his affections is a strange one, and the story of its heroine one of the saddest in the history of crime.'

To return: the year 1842 is doubly memorable: it saw the termination of his great work and of his conjugal life. I have already said that into the domestic question I cannot

enter. Be the blame of the failure chiefly hers, or chiefly his, the failure sprang from conditions we cannot accurately appreciate. That the separation was her deed, and not his, seems indisputable; and in one of his letters to Madame de Vaux he writes:—‘An indispensable separation, all the more irrevocable on my side because I in no way provoked it, completely relieved me of an intolerable domestic oppression, now happily converted into a simple pecuniary charge which my character forbids my feeling in its true weight. In truth, the two first years of that new situation, during the interval between the close of my first great elaboration and the opening of the second, were passed in enjoyment of the negative happiness resulting from this un hoped-for calm succeeding the long and daily agitation.’ It is clear from many indications that they quarrelled frequently and violently; their views of life were different, and probably the worldly views of the one were a continual exasperation to the other; but it is also clear that he did not regard her as having done anything to forfeit his respect and admiration; in one of his letters he lays the principal stress on the fact of her having never loved him. He continued for some years to correspond with her on affectionate terms.

With the publication of the *Philosophie positive* he assured his place among the great thinkers of all ages, but drew upon himself the bitter hatred of rivals and insulted professors, which hatred, being aided by the indignation of theologians, metaphysicians, and journalists, who were irritated at his dangerous doctrines and sweeping scorn, ended in driving him from his official position. He was turned adrift once more to seek a laborious existence as a teacher of mathematics. The story is told by him in the preface to the sixth volume of the *Philosophie positive*, and in fuller detail by M. Littré.\* It need not be repeated here; the sad result is enough. To mitigate the blow, three Englishmen—Mr. Grote, Mr. Raikes Currie, and Sir W. Molesworth—through

\* To which may now be added the *Lettres à Valat*.

the intervention of Mr. Stuart Mill, offered to replace the official salary for one year, understanding that at the end of the year Comte would be reinstated, or would have resolved on some other career. The year passed, and his re-election was again refused. At first this troubled him but little. He had learned to regard the 'subsidy' of his admirers as his right. It was due from the rich to the philosopher; and the philosopher could more effectually use his powers if all material anxieties were taken from him. This, however, was no means the light in which the case was seen in England. Mr. Grote sent an additional 600 francs, but a renewal of the subsidy was declined. Comte was exasperated. I remember hearing him speak of the refusal, as if some unworthy treachery had been practised on him. I tried to explain as delicately as I could what I conceived to be the point of view of his friends who had never thought of becoming his bankers; but he had so entirely wrought himself into the persuasion that the refusal was a moral dereliction, and that no excuse could be offered for men who had wealth withholding a slight portion of it from thinkers whose lives were of importance to the world, that I saw explanation was useless. He had a fixed idea on the subject; and it may be seen expressed in haughty terms in his letter to Mr. Mill.\* If there is much to be said (and I think there is) in favour of his idea of the duty of the rich towards thinkers whose aims they approve, there is also not a little to be said on the other side, and not a little blame attributable to his manner of urging his claims. He chose to assume a 'haute magistrature morale' which others would not recognise. He professed to speak solely as a philosopher, but showed too much personal pre-occupation. It

\* And in a published work : ' Je somme tous les occidentaux capables de sentir, d'une manière quelconque, la vraie portée de mes travaux, de concourir loyalement, suivant leurs moyens respectifs, au digne protectorat institué pour moi. Si les positivistes incomplets persistaient à motiver leur *coupable indifférence* sur leurs divergences partielles envers l'ensemble de ma doctrine, je *dévoilerais aisément l'égoïsme mal caché* sous ce vain prétexte.'—*Système de Politique positive*, iii. Préface, p. xxv.

is sad to hear that the result of this was a coolness on the part of Mr. Mill, and the cessation of a correspondence which he had valued, and to which Comte himself attached great value (as appears in one of his letters to me, inquiring into the cause of the silence, and showing anxiety on the subject).

This idea of a subsidy replacing the 'infamous spoliation,' became, as I said, a fixed idea, and he now boldly relinquished all efforts at providing an income, and made a public appeal to his admirers for one. The appeal was responded to during the rest of his life.\*

Meanwhile he was to learn the unspeakable influences of a deep affection. We have seen St.-Simon giving the bias to his intellect which determined the creation of the *Philosophie positive*; we have now to see the bias given to his thoughts by a passionate love, which carried him to sentimental and mystical conceptions little foreseen by his early adherents.

It was in the year 1845 that he first met Madame Clotilde de Vaux. There was a strange similarity in their widowed conditions. She was irrevocably separated from her husband by a crime which had condemned him to the galleys for life; yet although morally free, she was legally bound to the man whose disgrace overshadowed her. Comte also was irrevocably separated from his wife by her voluntary departure; and although morally free was legally bound. Marriage being thus unhappily impossible, they had only the imperfect, yet inestimable, consolation of a pure and passionate friendship. He was fond of applying to her the lines of his favourite Dante—

'Quella che imparadisa la mia mente  
Ogni basso pensier dal cor m' avulse.'

Every one who knew him during this brief period of happiness will recall the mystic enthusiasm with which he spoke of her, and the irrepressible overflowing of his emotion which

\* The circulars which he yearly sent forth are printed in the prefaces to his *Système de Politique positive*.

led him to speak of her at all times and to all listeners. It was in the early days of this attachment that I first saw him; and in the course of our very first interview he spoke of her with an expansiveness which was very interesting. When I next saw him he was as expansive in his grief at her irreparable loss; and the tears rolled down his cheeks as he detailed her many perfections. His happiness had lasted but one year.

Her death made no change in his devotion. She underwent a transfiguration. Her subjective immortality became a real presence to his mystical affection. During life she had been a benign influence irradiating his moral nature, and for the first time giving satisfaction to the immense tenderness which slumbered there; she thus initiated him into those secrets of emotional life which were indispensable to his philosophy in its subsequent elaboration. Her death rather intensified than altered this influence, by purifying it from all personal and objective elements.

In one of his letters to her we read:—'*Le charmant bonjour auquel je n'ai pu répondre avant hier me laissera le souvenir permanent d'une affectueuse expression caractéristique dont j'éprouve le besoin de vous remercier spécialement, quand vous y avez daigné mentionner votre bonheur de m'acquiescer. En effet, c'est bien là, ma Clotilde, le mot qui nous convient mutuellement, pour désigner à chacun de nous sa meilleure propriété. Plus notre intimité se développe et se consolide, mieux je sens journellement que cette chaste union est devenue chez moi la principale condition d'un bonheur que j'avais toujours ardemment rêvé, mais sans pouvoir, hélas! l'éprouver jamais avant d'avoir subi votre bienfaisant empire.*'

The remainder of his life was a perpetual hymn to her memory. Every week he visited her tomb. Every day he prayed to her and invoked her continual assistance. His published invocations and eulogies may call forth mockery from frivolous contemporaries—intense convictions and disinterested passions easily lending themselves to ridicule—but



posterity will read in them a grave lesson, and will see that this modern Beatrice played a considerable part in the evolution of the Religion of Humanity. Philosophic students will admit that to act powerfully on the sentiments of others the philosopher must have first participated in them himself; and that the elaboration of a system in its emotional relations could only be accomplished by a thinker who had been profoundly moved. This initiation Comte gained through Madame de Vaux. In one of his letters to her he says:—  
*‘ Mon organisation a reçu d’une très-tendre mère certaines cordes intimes, éminemment féminines, qui n’ont pu assez vibrer faute d’avoir été convenablement ébranlées. L’époque est enfin venue d’en développer l’activité, qui, peu sensible directement dans le premier volume, essentiellement logique, de mon prochain ouvrage, caractérisera fortement le tome suivant, et encore plus le quatrième ou dernier. C’est de votre salutare influence que j’attends, ma Clotilde, cette inestimable amélioration, qui doit dignement écarter les reproches de certains critiques sur le prétendu défaut d’onction propre à mon talent, où quelques âmes privilégiées ont seules reconnu déjà une profonde sentimentalité implicite, en m’avouant avoir pleuré à certains passages philosophiques, ceux-là même que j’avais, en effet, écrits tout en larmes. ’*

It may be useful here to remark that Comte is frequently written against by those who know him only at second hand, as offensively dry, hard, materialistic, and irreligious; while by those who have more or less acquainted themselves with his writings, he is frequently condemned as a mystical, sentimental, and despotically moral pontiff. One class objects to him because he allows no place to the emotions; another because he makes philosophy too emotional. One class fulminates against his denial of religion; another class is more disposed to echo the apostrophe of Billaud Varennes to Robespierre, *‘ Avec ton Être suprême, tu commences à m’embêter ! ’* He is called an atheist; and no one was ever more contemptuous towards atheism. He is called a

materialist; and no great thinker was ever less amenable to the objections which that term connotes.

The contradictory charges are grounded upon a misapprehension of the scope and spirit of his philosophy, in the first place; and in the second upon the fact that there is a very wide divergence in Method and results between his early and later works. Up to 1842 he placed himself in the direct line of historical filiation, and subordinated his researches to the Objective Method; he resumed and systematised the efforts of his scientific predecessors in one vast and compact body of doctrine, creating a Philosophy out of the various sciences by giving unity to their scattered generalities. But after 1842 a radical change took place; the philosopher began to assume the position of a pontiff. He changed his Method (and was forced to change it), and coincident with this theoretical transformation, was the emotional transformation initiated by a profound affection and a profound sorrow.

Before setting himself to the composition of his second great work, Comte is supposed to have had another cerebral attack, though but a slight one, and of brief duration; and it will not be without indignation that impartial readers will observe how M. Littré, apparently to explain his rejection of the doctrines, insinuates that they were vitiated in their origin by that (hypothetical) cerebral attack. From unthinking and reckless adversaries such an accusation might be anticipated. From one who avows himself a disciple it could only escape reproof by being at least plausibly founded. Now on what grounds can M. Littré pretend that the cerebral attack, the very existence of which is a supposition of his own, and the duration of which must have been slight, vitiated the *Politique*, when he refuses to admit that the avowed, long continued, and violent attack which preceded the composition of the *Philosophie* in any respect vitiated that work? The contradiction is glaring. To suppose that a man issues from an attack of insanity lasting many months and characterised by extreme violence, without injury to his

philosophical integrity, and many years afterwards suffers a radical metamorphosis through a very trivial attack, so trivial as to be only suspected from a passing phrase in a letter, is not indeed a supposition beyond the reach of psychological inference, and if supported by evidence would find little resistance; but for a disciple of the *Philosophie* to insinuate that the *Politique* has the taint of insanity, is a contradiction I am forced to point out. The weaknesses and extravagances which strike M. Littré in the second work cannot be adduced in proof, because those who reject the first work might on equal grounds detect insanity in the ideas which to them appear weak and extravagant. Moreover, M. Littré, as a student of Comte, ought not to have overlooked the very obvious germs of these extravagances which are in the *Philosophie*—the tendencies towards despotic systematisation and arbitrary fictions, which in the *Politique* have all the more freedom because unrestrained by established truths. As a student of history he ought not to have overlooked the fact that the unbridled employment of the deductive method was *inevitable* on a topic which was destitute of the requisite inductions; that is to say inevitable in the case of all who are not content to await the slow results of inductive investigation. Finally, and conclusively, M. Littré should not have failed to recognise in the *Politique* the same intellectual force, the same sustained power of conception and co-ordination, although with less successful result, as had commanded his veneration in the *Philosophie*. To reject the work may be permissible; to see in it the work of an intellect distorted by disease is an extravagance greater than any to be found in its pages. The reach of intellect and profoundly moral tone displayed in every chapter, can only be misconceived by those who estimate the force of a thinker according to the immediately available truths he offers them—an estimate which would make sad havoc with the pretensions of a Plato, a Descartes, a Spinoza, or a Hegel.

I am not pleading for the later system. On the contrary, my dissent from it is open and direct. All the later positivists

regard me as a heretic. But I am a reverent heretic nevertheless: in other words, I profoundly admire the greatness and sincerity of the thinker, whom I believe to have attempted a task for which the materials were not ready. If men will approach the work with minds sufficiently open to receive instruction from teachers whom on the whole they refuse to follow, capable of setting aside differences, to seize upon and profit by agreements, they will carry away from the *Politique* many luminous suggestions, and that ennobling influence which always rays out from a moral conviction. They must be prepared to find passages to marvel at, passages to laugh at, and passages to fling hard words at. But they will detect even in these the presence of a magisterial intellect, carried by the deductive impetus beyond the limits of common prudence; they will detect nothing of the incoherence of insanity. Even the startling suggestion which he propounds on the basis of what he himself calls a daring hypothesis—*i.e.* that of the *Vierge Mère*—is a legitimate deduction from what many regard as established data; it happens to be absurd because the data are profoundly erroneous, although they have been, and still are, accepted by many scientific men as truths. Had the data been true, the deduction would have been as admirable as it is now laughable: it would have been a genuine scientific hypothesis.

Antagonism to the Method and certain conclusions of the *Politique positive* led me for many years to regard that work as a deviation from the Positive Philosophy in every way unfortunate. My attitude has changed now that I have learned (from the remark of one very dear to me) to regard it as an Utopia, presenting hypotheses rather than doctrines, suggestions for future inquirers rather than dogmas for adepts—hypotheses carrying more or less of truth, and serviceable as a provisional mode of colligating facts, to be confirmed or contradicted by experience. Grave students think it no misuse of time to study the *Republic* and the *Laws* of Plato. Let them approach the *Système de Politique positive* in a similar spirit; they will find there an intellect

greater than Plato's, a morality higher and purer, and an amount of available suggestion incomparably greater.

Although no importance is to be attached to the slight cerebral attack (if attack there were) which preceded the composition of this work, there is intense biographical and psychological significance in the indications of the mental modifications which accompanied what may be called the development of the pontifical spirit in Comte. The germs are visible in his earliest years. No one can study the *Philosophie* without recognising the irrepressible tendency to domination, to a systematising circumscription of our aims with a view to unity (without, as Mr. Mill justly remarks, any demonstration of the necessity of such unity), and to reliance on deductive reasoning irrespective of objective verification. We see only the germs, because the soil of positive science was ill-suited to their development. Obligated to employ the Objective Method throughout, he was forced to restrain these tendencies, under penalty of failure. As he grew older, and lived more and more alone, absorbed in meditation, less and less occupied with what had been effected by others, his intense self-confidence became enormously exaggerated, and the disposition to take his own feelings as sufficient guarantee and proof, grew more and more disastrous. The very vividness of his conceptions, rising up during long and lonely meditation, rendered it difficult for him to doubt their reality; while the deductive impatience natural to a systematic intellect prevented his verifying their reality. He first struck out an hypothesis; he then overleaped the next condition of testing its conformity with fact: it became a truth in his mind, and he proceeded to deduce from it as from a verified truth. The awakening of an intense emotional life, and the welcome homage of a few ardent disciples, contributed their share. The conviction of an apostolic mission grew apace. The transformation of the systematic theorist into the pontiff was rapid. Those who were subjugated by his personal influence, or are fascinated by the seeming truth of his doctrines, will see a logical develop-

ment in this; whereas we who stand aloof can see in it nothing but the unfortunate fatality which seems attached to deep convictions in certain powerful and arrogant natures. Those who consider Mahomet an impostor, and Loyola a malignant despot, may brand Comte with similar epithets of scorn or hatred. But if with a deeper sympathy and wider knowledge we mark the line between infirmity and strength, recognising that where the lights are brightest there the shadows are darkest, we shall be careful not to confound a common infirmity with an uncommon greatness. Hundreds of men have been as vain, as arrogant, as despotic in their tempers; but how many have been as severely ascetic, as profoundly moral, as devoted to high thoughts, and as magnificently endowed? We need not follow the errors of a great mind because of his greatness; but ought we to forget the greatness when we reject the errors?

After the publication of the *Politique* there is little of biographical importance to be added. In 1852 he had published the *Catechisme positiviste*, a little work which, I think, has done more to retard the acceptance of his views than all the attacks of antagonists. It contains many profound and noble passages, and to thorough disciples is doubtless a precious work; but it should have been an esoteric work, at least for many years. Catechisms are for the converted. The objections to this one, apart from the ideas which, to all but believers, must appear without adequate foundation, are, first, that being brief and popular in form it is seized on by those who wish to 'know something about Comte' and are unwilling to take the requisite labour of reading the more serious works; secondly, that he was incapable of conducting a popular exposition in a dramatic form, hence a perpetual sense of the ridiculous vexes the reader, preventing his giving serious attention to the matter; thirdly, that in an unpromising and unconvincing form it puts forth ideas which could only escape ridicule and indignation by a very earnest, logical, and persuasive exposition. If my voice can have the slightest weight with

the reader, I beg him not to open the Catechism until he has carefully studied the two great works by which Comte will live in history.

The *Synthèse subjective* he did not live to finish. It contains some precious thoughts, and much that is startling and extravagant. I am given to understand that some eminent mathematicians think highly of the mathematical philosophy it propounds.

Dr. Robinet has sketched the routine of Comte's daily life in these later years. The picture should be meditated by those whose irritation has led them to throw hard words at this 'materialist and scoffer.' He rose at five in the morning, prayed, meditated, and wrote until seven in the evening, with brief intervals for his two meals. Every day he read a chapter from the *Imitation of Christ* and a canto of Dante. Homer also was frequently re-read. Poetry was his sole relaxation now that he could not longer indulge his passion for the opera. From seven to nine (and on Sundays in the afternoon) he received visits, especially from working men, among whom he found disciples. On Wednesday afternoons he visited the tomb of Madame de Vaux. At ten he again prayed and went to bed. The hour of prayer was to him an hour of mystic and exquisite expansion. Nothing could be simpler than his meals: breakfast consisted only of milk; dinner was more substantial, but rigorously limited. At the close of dinner he daily replaced dessert by a piece of dry bread, which he ate slowly, meditating on the numerous poor who were unable to procure even that means of nourishment in return for their work.

He died September 5, 1857, at the age of sixty, leaving behind him an immortal name, and an almost canonised position in the memory of a select few, who still carry out, with admirable energy, the efforts to establish and spread the Religion of Humanity, undismayed by the ridicule and social persecution which await every religious movement at its outset.

The increasing notoriety of the name of Auguste Comte is

significant of a spreading sympathy and a spreading dread. In grave treatises and in periodical works his opinions are silently adopted, openly alluded to, and discussed with respect; but much oftener they furnish a flippant sentence to some jaunty journalist, or pander to the austere dishonesty of some polemical theologian. Indignation, scorn, and ridicule are poured forth with all the greater freedom because usually unhampered by any first-hand knowledge. It is with him as it used to be with Kant, who not many years ago was a standing butt: many who had never opened the *Kritik*, and more who would have understood nothing of it had they read it, laughed at the 'dreamer' and his 'transcendental nonsense,' without any misgiving that they were making themselves ridiculous in the eyes of those who knew something about Kant. They are now respectful or silent. Surely it is wise to be entirely silent about that of which we know ourselves to be ignorant? As if our natural liability to error were not frequently misleading us, even in our most painstaking inquiries, we must add to it by what Mr. Mill somewhere calls 'the abuse of the privilege of speaking confidently about writers whom we have never read.' Few reflect that the exercise of this privilege is foolish; still fewer that it is dishonest. There is always peril in pretence. Silence cannot commit us. And if many delusively imagine that they do know enough of Comte to form a general estimate of him, let them ask themselves whether this knowledge is anything more than the echo of what others have said, those others being for the most part antagonists? Such a question would silence the candid; nothing will silence the garrulous and ignorant.

Nor is it only from the garrulous and ignorant that foolish and unworthy criticisms proceed. There is the fatal habit of many minds to take up a celebrated writer under the bias of a foregone conclusion; and a Darwin, or a Comte, is read, not with the serious desire to understand a doctrine, but to find contradictions and absurdities which may justify the savage satisfaction of contempt. But no polemics that are



founded on a misconception of the adversaries' strength can seriously affect the ultimate triumph of a doctrine. The disciples of the Positive Philosophy may therefore disregard all attacks which do not expose its weak position ; and should endeavour to fortify the system where its weakness is made evident. Comte himself wisely abstained from all polemics. 'Si mes principes sont bons et opportuns,' he wrote to Valat, 'ils se défendront par leur propre poids et par la supériorité de leur application continue.'

There is but one point I shall notice, and this only because it is one which has a specious air, such as may impose on readers unacquainted with Science, or modestly underrating their judgment in such matters when opposed by scientific authorities. It is this : Comte founds his Philosophy on the Sciences ; and we are triumphantly told that many men of science absolutely refuse to admit his competence ; whence the conclusion suggested is that his Philosophy is unworthy of attention.

This conclusion is unacceptable, firstly, because the fact that many men of science speak contemptuously of Comte's pretensions is neutralised by the fact that some men, and these among the most eminent, speak admiringly ; secondly, by the fact that the estimates formed by men of science are often determined by prejudices of an extra scientific order. Thus if a mathematician like Arago could express his opinion that Comte had no claim whatever to the mathematical proficiency which would entitle him to be elected a professor at the École Normale, we have no need to inquire into the personal motives which dictated such an opinion, it is enough to cite the far weightier testimony of Poinso, the greatest mathematician of his age, who warmly supported Comte's candidature for the chair. If a biologist like Professor Huxley can speak with hasty contempt of Comte's scientific pretensions, a biologist like De Blainville adopts Comte's views, and expounds them in his lectures ; and a biologist like Charles Robin, who is learned in the history of his science, can declare that in no other writer has he found views

so luminous and just respecting the philosophy of Biology, and has therefore been forced to follow Comte step by step.\* I might mention several other eminent names, but these suffice; and even they are superfluous, because in the case of a doctrine so offensive to theological and metaphysical doctrines, and to the *amour-propre* of scientific specialists, it requires but slight acquaintance with history to appreciate this opposition at its true worth. Have we not seen Darwin proclaimed a 'mere amateur,' and as such excluded from the Académie des Sciences? And was not this contemptuous epithet applied to the biologist whose name will be immortal, the expression of M. Émile Blanchard, a specialist of European renown? If Darwin can be styled an amateur, Comte may be styled a smatterer; but who is damaged by such epithets?

## § II. THE POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY.

Philosophy, as we have seen in the various phases of its history, has always had one aim, that of furnishing an Explanation of the World, of Man, and of Society; but it has sought this aim by various routes. To solve the problems of existence, and to supply a rule of life, have constituted its purpose more or less avowed. Steady in this purpose, it has been vacillating in its means: now borrowing and now rejecting the principles and conclusions of its rival, Theology; now claiming and now violating the methods of Science; unwilling to follow either, incapable of advancing alone. We have seen it endeavouring to embrace all inquiry; and seen it in despair restricting itself to Psychology, in spite of the manifest incompetence of Psychology, even were it

\* 'J'ai vainement cherché ailleurs que dans Auguste Comte, des vues d'ensemble plus profondément justes et lumineuses, concernant tout ce qui tient à l'objet et au but de la biologie, à ses relations avec les autres sciences, à la nature et à l'étendue de ses recherches essentielles, aux moyens d'investigation qui lui sont propres et aux parties de la logique en particulier de la philosophie en général, qu'elle développe et affermit. Aussi ai-je été forcé de suivre pas à pas ce philosophe dans cette partie de mon travail.'—CHARLES ROBIN: *De la Biologie*; first printed in the *Revue de la Philosophie positive*, p. 81, July 1867.

perfected, to furnish cosmical and social theories : an incompetence more or less recognised by metaphysicians, who refused to restrict their wide-sweeping inquiries to the mere investigation of human faculties, and the conditions of thought.

With the creation of the Positive Philosophy this vacillation ceases. A new era has dawned. For the first time in history an Explanation of the World, Society, and Man, is presented which is thoroughly homogeneous, and at the same time thoroughly in accordance with accurate knowledge: having the reach of an all-embracing System, it condenses human knowledge into a Doctrine, and co-ordinates all the methods by which that knowledge has been reached, and will in future be extended. Its aim is the renovation of Society. Its basis is Science—the positive knowledge we have attained, and may attain, of all phenomena whatever. Its method is the Objective Method which has justified its supremacy by its results. Its superstructure is the hierarchy of the sciences—*i.e.* that distribution and co-ordination of general truths which transforms the scattered and independent sciences into an organic whole wherein each part depends on all that precede, and determines all that succeed.

The cardinal distinctions of this system may be said to arise naturally from the one aim of making all speculations homogeneous. Hitherto Theology while claiming certain topics as exclusively its own (even within the domain of knowledge) left vast fields of thought untraversed. It reserved to itself Ethics and History with occasional incursions into Psychology; but it left all cosmical problems to be settled by Science, and many psychological and biological problems to be settled by metaphysics. On the other hand Science claiming absolute dominion over all cosmical and biological problems, left Morals and Politics to metaphysicians and theologians, with only an occasional and incidental effort to bring these also under its sway. Thus while it is clear that society needs one Faith, one Doctrine, which shall satisfy the whole intellectual needs; on the other

hand it is clear that such a Doctrine is impossible so long as three antagonistic lines of thought and three antagonistic modes of investigation are adopted. Such is, and has long been, the condition of Europe. A glance suffices to see that there is no one Doctrine *general* enough to embrace *all* knowledge, and sufficiently warranted by experience to carry irresistible conviction.

Look at the state of Theology:—Catholicism and Protestantism make one great division; but within the sphere of each we see numerous subdivisions; the variety of sects is daily increasing. Each sect has remarkable men amongst its members; but each refuses to admit the doctrines of the others. There is, in fact, no one general doctrine capable of uniting Catholics, Protestants, and their subdivisions. Look also at the state of Philosophy. There is no one system universally accepted: there are as many philosophies as there are speculative centres, almost as many as there are professors. The systems of Germany are held in England and Scotland as the dreams of alchemists; the Psychology of Scotland is laughed at in Germany, and neglected in England and France. Besides this general dissidence, we see, in France and Germany at least, great opposition between Theology and Philosophy openly pronounced. This opposition is inevitable: it lies in the very nature of Philosophy: and although, now as heretofore, many professors eagerly argue that the two are perfectly compatible and accordant, the discordance is, and always must be, apparent.

With respect to general doctrines, then, we find the state of Europe to be this: Theologies opposed to Theologies; Philosophies opposed to Philosophies; and Theology and Philosophy at war with each other. Such is the anarchy in the higher regions.

In the sciences there is less dissidence, but there is the same absence of any general doctrine; each science is on a firm basis, and rapidly improves; but a Philosophy of Science was nowhere to be found when Auguste Comte came forward

with the express purpose of supplying the deficiency. The *speciality* of most scientific men, and their incapacity of either producing or accepting general ideas, has long been a matter of complaint; and this has been one great cause of the continuance of Metaphysics; for men of speculative ability saw clearly enough that however exact each science might be in itself, it could only form a part of Philosophy. Moreover the evil of speciality is not confined to neglecting the whole for the sake of the parts; it affects the very highest condition of Science, namely, its capability of instructing and directing Society.

In the early ages of speculation, general views were eagerly sought and easily obtained. As Science became rich and complex in materials, various divisions took place; and one man cultivated one science, another man another. Even then general views were not absent. But as the tide rolled on, discovery succeeding discovery, and new tracts of inquiry leading to vast wildernesses of undiscovered truth, it became necessary for one man to devote himself only to a small fraction of a science, which he pursued, leaving to others the task of bringing his researches under their general head. Such a minute division of labour was necessary for the successful prosecution of minute and laborious researches; but it ended in making men of science regard *only* the individual parts of science; the construction of general doctrines was left to philosophers. A fatal error: for such doctrines could only be truly constructed out of the materials of Science and upon the Method of Science.

In the present state of things the speculative domain is composed of two very different portions,—general ideas and positive sciences. The general ideas are powerless because they are not positive: the positive sciences are powerless because they are not general. The new Philosophy is destined to put an end to this anarchy, by presenting a Doctrine which is *positive*, because elaborated from the sciences, and yet possessing all the desired *generality* of metaphysical doc-

trines, without possessing their vagueness, instability, and inapplicability.

How is this to be effected? Obviously by taking Science as the basis. The teaching of history is clear. Everywhere, Science with its all-conquering Methods is seen steadily advancing, drawing more and more subjects under its rule, yielding answers to more and more problems while Theology and Metaphysics remain impotent to furnish satisfactory answers, and are constantly found in flagrant contradiction with the certainties of experience. There are but three modes of explaining phenomena, and of these the scientific mode daily gains strength, the other two daily lose their hold upon men. If the present anarchy is due to the simultaneous employment of three radically incompatible modes of thought, obviously the cessation of that anarchy must follow on the general adoption of only one of these modes of thought. The question is, which are we to select? When Theology was supreme there was unity in doctrine and unity in life. All men accepted the theological explanation of the world, man and society. But in proportion as knowledge advanced, this explanation was discovered to be incessantly in contradiction with experience. If, therefore, we are to select the theological mode of thought as our guide, and the theological explanation of the Cosmos and Society as our doctrine, we must ignore all experience, sweep away all science, and appeal to the Pope or to the Archbishop of Canterbury for answers to the questions in Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, Biology, and Sociology, which our pressing needs or speculative curiosity may force upon us. Is Europe prepared for this? Is any one nation prepared for it? Is any cultivated mind prepared for it?

The incompetence of Metaphysics has been clearly exhibited in this History. Nothing, therefore, but Science remains. Nevertheless, Science itself only furnishes the basis. It must be transformed into a Philosophy before it can satisfy the higher needs. Even the encyclopædic knowledge of a Humboldt was powerless, because it was scientific

knowledge, not Philosophy; and because, moreover, even as scientific knowledge it had the fatal defect of incompleteness—it embraced cosmical, but excluded sociological speculations. Supposing Humboldt to have mastered, what he was far from conceiving, the philosophy of the cosmical sciences, he would still have left the great problem untouched, he would have failed to propound a homogeneous doctrine, since he would have left the vast and important field of moral speculation to theologians or metaphysicians. The completion of the scientific encyclopædia was therefore a necessary preliminary; and this was effected by the creation of Sociology, as a science ranking with the cosmical sciences. This task was reserved for the genius of Auguste Comte. Having done this, he held in his hand the complete materials for an universal Philosophy. All human knowledge was now capable of being treated as a homogeneous and organic whole, one spirit, one method, and one aim presiding over each department.

But this was only the first step, though a step of immense importance. Having before him the materials of a Philosophy, materials furnished by the efforts of all preceding generations, he had next to organise them. The several sciences had to furnish their philosophies, and to yield a Philosophy which embraced the whole. The philosophy of each science is the co-ordination of its fundamental truths and special methods; consequently the co-ordination of these philosophies—the proper distribution of these truths and methods in a dependent series—will yield the philosophy of Science.

We shall have to consider this organisation of the sciences more in detail hereafter; for the present it is enough to point out the position it occupies in the evolution of the new doctrine. When we add thereto the Law of Development, through the theological, metaphysical, and positive stages (of which also more anon), we have completed an indication of the great legacy Comte has left. These are his contributions, his titles to immortal fame. They have been

and will be disputed, as other men's titles have been and will be. Some deny that they are his; others deny that they are of value. I shall not discuss these questions. But although I consider discussions respecting originality to be commonly interminable and idle, there is one point which may profitably be noticed, and that is the confusion between the positive spirit and method, and the Positive Philosophy; a confusion which once cleared up may prevent much idle dissertation.

What is called the positive or scientific spirit is coeval with Science; indeed, only in that spirit is Science possible; and from the time of Galileo, Bacon, and Descartes, it dates its recognition as a distinct power. In this sense, therefore, we may truly say that positive thinkers have never been wanting, and that the whole course of tradition has set steadily in the direction of the new doctrine. Even the untutored savage so far employed the Objective Method that in certain very familiar and accessible phenomena he was content with the visible and tangible properties, and never sought outlying agencies to account for them. As knowledge advanced men withdrew more and more phenomena from the regency of outlying agencies, and placed them under the regency of immanent properties: deities and entities were replaced by laws.

But the method was only partially applied. In all cases not sufficiently explored, men continued—and the majority still continues—to place unhesitating reliance on the action of outlying agencies, simply because they had not discovered the immanent properties. Hence the continuous spectacle of minds completely dominated by the Scientific Method in Astronomy, Physics, and Chemistry, unwilling to extend their principles to Biology, disdainful of the proposal to apply them to Psychology, and regarding it as both foolish and wicked to apply them to History, Politics, and Morals.

If, however, the Positive Method is in germ as old as Science, and if with gradual and ever-accelerated velocity it has encroached upon and absorbed each department of



inquiry, so that we now see its final adoption to be inevitable,\* this does not in any way lessen Comte's originality, does not diminish the need for a Positive Philosophy, as the offspring of that Method. Positive thinkers may be counted by thousands, but no one before Comte had a glimpse of the Positive Philosophy. Thousands had cultivated Science, and with splendid success; not one had conceived the Philosophy which the sciences when organised would naturally evolve. A few had seen the necessity of extending the scientific Method to *all* inquiries, but no one had seen how this was to be effected; and the proof of this is exhibited in the vague and fragmentary nature of all previous attempts, and in the absence of all vision of it as a renovating and harmonising principle which could transform Science into a Philosophy and thus furnish a homogeneous Doctrine. In this, as in most other parts of the system, we see how Comte gathered together in one luminous focus the scattered rays which issued from various sides. So long as the rays were scattered men could read but little by their light.

The Positive Philosophy is novel *as* a Philosophy, not as a collection of truths never before suspected. Its novelty is the organisation of existing elements. Its very principle implies the absorption of all that great thinkers had achieved; while incorporating their results it extended their methods. To assert, therefore, that Comte only placed himself in the ranks of the advancing column, filling a place which would have otherwise been filled by others, is, I conceive, an immense mistake; and I regret to find Mr. Herbert Spencer

\* 'Pour terminer radicalement ce désordre, la seule manière est de le détruire dans son principe, en ramenant le système intellectuel à l'unité. Or cela ne peut se faire que de deux manières : ou bien en rendant à la philosophie théologique (car il est inutile de parler ici de la métaphysique, qui ne serait jamais qu'une transition) toute l'influence qu'elle a perdue ; ou bien en complétant la philosophie positive de façon à la rendre capable de remplacer définitivement la théologie. Si donc on regarde comme démontrée l'impossibilité de rétablir la théologie dans toute l'étendue de son ancien empire, il n'y a pas d'autre solution admissible que la formation définitive de la philosophie positive.'—*Politique positive*, iv. *Appendice*, p. 160.

countenancing it; though his avowedly superficial acquaintance with the system renders the error excusable. He says, 'M. Comte designated by the term "Positive Philosophy" all that definitely-established knowledge which men of science have been gradually organising into a coherent body of doctrine.'\* Not so: the 'coherent body of doctrine' is precisely that which no one has ever attempted since Science emerged from a metaphysical condition. And Mr. Mill, following in the same track, says, 'the philosophy called Positive is not a recent invention of M. Comte, but a *simple adherence to the traditions* of all the great scientific minds whose discoveries have made the human race what it is. M. Comte has never presented it in any other light (!). But he has made the doctrine his own by his manner of treating it.'† M. Littré, with just astonishment, exclaims, 'The great scientific minds? This term implies what seems to me a confusion. Does it mean the philosophers? Why, the philosophers, one and all, have belonged to theology or metaphysics, and it is not their tradition which M. Comte has followed. Does it mean those who have illustrated particular sciences? Well, since they have not philosophised, M. Comte cannot have received his philosophy from them. That which is recent in the positive philosophy, that which is M. Comte's invention, is the conception and construction of a philosophy, by drawing from particular sciences, and from the teaching of great scientific minds, such groups of truths as could be co-ordinated on the positive method.'‡

On reconsideration Mr. Mill may perhaps admit that the light which flashed upon his own mind when first he became acquainted with Comte's work was something essentially unlike what would have issued from a simple adherence to tradition. He had little to learn on the score of what great thinkers had taught, and must have known but too well

\* SPENCER : *The Classification of the Sciences*, 1864, p. 28.

† MILL : *Auguste Comte and Positivism*, 1865, p. 9.

‡ *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 15 août 1866.

that they had no coherent body of doctrine to teach. Further, he will admit that Comte, who was keenly alive to the debt he owed his predecessors,\* and nobly generous in his recognition of even a suggestion, would have been astonished to hear that what he regarded as his great achievement—the organisation of the results of research into a doctrine—was no more than an adherence to tradition. What tradition brought was the results; what Comte brought was the *organisation* of those results. He always claimed to be the founder of the Positive Philosophy. That he had every right to such a title is demonstrable to all who distinguish between the positive sciences and the Philosophy which co-ordinated the truths and methods of those sciences into a doctrine. The achievement was great and novel; but its very perfection, which arises from its intimate harmony with all the great results of scientific research, prevents the feeling of strangeness which usually accompanies novelty.

Having thus defined the position of the new Philosophy in History, and Comte's relation to it, we may look a little closer into its nature. The creation of Sociology, by which the series of the sciences was completed, will perhaps best be appreciated after an exposition of his classification of the sciences. This indisputably was entirely his own, and so far from being simply an ingenious arrangement without capital importance, as many critics have supposed, it is nothing less

\* 'Nous avons ainsi systématiquement réalisé une évolution individuelle radicalement conforme à l'évolution nécessaire de l'humanité, que l'on peut maintenant se borner à considérer ici à partir de l'impulsion décisive déterminée par la double action philosophique et scientifique émanée de Bacon et de Descartes conjointement avec Kepler et Galilée. . . . En outre, l'homogénéité continue de ces diverses déterminations partielles nous a spontanément manifesté leur convergence croissante vers une même philosophie finale. Pour caractériser convenablement cette philosophie il ne nous reste donc plus qu'à indiquer la co-ordination définitive de ces différentes conceptions essentielles, d'abord logiques puis scientifiques, d'après un principe d'unité réellement susceptible d'une telle efficacité, afin de pouvoir signaler la véritable activité normale réservée au système qui doit devenir la base usuelle du régime spirituel de l'humanité.'—*Philosophie positive*, vi. pp. 645-6; compare the passage in the Appendix to the *Politique positive*, iv. p. 91.

than the organisation of the sciences into a Philosophy. For let us understand the problem:—Given human knowledge in its multiplicity of details and vast extent, how on this basis, and with these materials, to raise a general Doctrine? All must be included or the Doctrine will be incomplete; no established truths must be contradicted, or the Doctrine will be imperfect. There was no great difficulty in constructing a Philosophy by the aid of one or more of the sciences, selecting such truths as suited the construction, and neglecting such as were adverse to it. That had been done by hundreds. But nothing could be gained by that. The old difficulty remained. To construct a Doctrine which should harmonise all results and embrace all methods, was the labour imposed upon Philosophy. In the presence of the vast accumulations of modern Science the task seemed hopeless. How was any one mind to master all the sciences, and, having mastered them, reduce them to an intelligible system! What lifetime could extend far enough even to traverse these fields, and roads, and byeways? Obviously the first step to be taken was to reduce the chaos to order, to make such a general disposition of the various groups as would enable the mind to see their main bearings—in a word to classify the groups, as each group itself had classified the phenomena it studied. If the reader is unacquainted with Comte's classification he will be in the true condition for appreciating the immensity of the effort. Let him ask himself how he would proceed if in presence of the vast multiplicity of sciences already established he had to introduce such an order as would of itself constitute a Philosophy because it would represent the serial dependence of all natural phenomena?

The first luminous conception which enabled Comte to discover this order was the fundamental distribution of all sciences into Abstract and Concrete. The abstract sciences are those which treat of the elementary laws, or general facts, on which all the particular facts depend; they are called abstract because in them the mind fixing itself solely

on some elementary fact which it discovers under a great variety of phenomena or complicated with other elementary facts, abstracts this from all its surroundings, purifies it from all its variations, and considers it in itself. Thus all bodies whatever present the elementary facts of Number, Form, and Movement; they present other facts besides these, but these can be considered apart, and from them arise Algebra, Geometry, and Mechanics. Besides Number, Form, and Movement, bodies present facts of Weight, Temperature, Luminousness, &c., which likewise can be considered apart, and Physics is the abstract science of these facts. Further we find bodies presenting facts of combination and decomposition, and Chemistry results. Finally we find certain bodies presenting facts of growth, reproduction, and sensation, and these facts we abstract in Biology.

Whether there are elementary facts capable of, being abstracted from social phenomena and yielding a Sociology may, for the present, be left in abeyance: the groups just indicated are groups admitted by every thinker. An attentive consideration of them discloses that they embrace all the elementary facts we have hitherto been able to abstract from cosmical phenomena; and all of these we have been able to consider apart, as pure relations without reference to any special occasion, or any variations in the manifestation of the phenomena. Thus the physical phenomena of falling bodies are variable and complicated, but the physical law is invariable and simple: the circumstances may vary, the heights may differ, but the relation of the height fallen through to the time of falling remains invariable.

Not only do these groups comprise the whole of the elementary cosmical facts, but implicitly in these facts are comprised all the multiple and complex phenomena ranged under the concrete sciences, which treat of objects as actually presented to us under the conditions of time and space. Geology is a concrete science; so is Mineralogy; so is Botany. Each deals with objects, not with abstract relations. Each considers existences as determined by complex con-

ditions. The rock, the mineral, or the flower is considered as an object involving more or less of the elementary facts of Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, and Biology; and only through the knowledge of these elementary facts can the objects be known except empirically.

D'Alembert has noticed the paradox that 'les notions les plus abstraites, celles que le commun des hommes regarde comme les plus inaccessibles, sont souvent celles qui portent avec elles une plus grande lumière; l'obscurité s'empare de nos idées à mesure que nous examinons dans un objet plus de propriétés sensibles.'\* But the paradox disappears when we reflect that these abstract ideas express the elementary and constant relations of the complex and variable phenomena. It is true that the discovery of these simple relations is a laborious task. At first man is observant only of particular phenomena in their isolation: he then begins to perceive their connections; and finally decomposes them into their constant relations—this is the birth of Science, which only occupies itself with relations of succession and coexistence.

Abstract Science then is the knowledge of the elementary facts, or Laws of phenomena; Concrete Science is the knowledge of objects as actual combinations of these elements. The one investigates existence, the other individuals. The abstract sciences necessarily precede the concrete sciences in dogmatic value; and they suffice to furnish a Philosophy, since they comprise the elements of all speculative knowledge in comprising the elementary facts of Universal existence.

What is a law? what is an elementary fact of existence? It is the invariable relation between two distinct phenomena, according to which one depends on the other; the relation being invariable, the only variation which is possible is in the *intensity* of the phenomena or their *direction*. Here therefore we have two distinct aspects of Nature: one which is inaccessible to human intervention, uncontrollable by human skill, a Fatality which must be accepted; and another

\* D'ALEMBERT : *Discours préliminaire de l'Encyclopédie*.

which is accessible to human intervention, a Modifiability which enables us to convert the Fatality into a power for our benefit. The Laws of Nature are immutable. But owing to this, the resultant phenomena are so far modifiable that their directions may be adapted to our service. We cannot create or destroy a particle of Matter, or a moment of Force; but we can so arrange Matter that the Force shall be our servant.\* It is the very unchangeableness of the Laws which renders their results modifiable. Because the course is unswerving, it can be accurately measured, accurately foreseen, accurately directed. The phenomena are but combinations of elementary laws. Each law preserving its value under all circumstances, never varying one iota, we know precisely what will be its value in combination with other laws. The simplest illustration of this is the composition of forces in Mechanics; among the more striking illustrations are the triumphs of discovery on the one side, and of mechanical inventions on the other. Owing to this unchangeableness, a mathematician working with symbols in his study can tell the astronomer to point his telescope in a particular direction, and there for the first time will be seen a planet which has a revolution of 164 years 6 days, and which is twenty-five times as large as our earth; and the astronomer, confident in the previsions of Science, discovers what he is told will be discovered. The formula 'under similar circumstances similar phenomena will appear' carries with it the consequence that when the phenomena are different it is owing to some difference in the circumstances. Not only so, but when the phenomena differ owing to an alteration in the circumstances, there still exist the same fixed relations between them; thus proving that the variations have been variations in the combination of elementary Laws leaving these Laws unaltered. In other words, the Universe is governed by immutable Laws, general

\* 'En considérant que chaque groupe de phénomènes ne peut jamais être entièrement fixe, on reconnaît que l'immuabilité des lois naturelles ne saurait convenir aux événements composés, et reste toujours bornée à leurs éléments irréductibles.' — *Synthèse subjective*, p. 7.

facts which determine all particular facts; and the Abstract Sciences are the registration of these general facts, as the Concrete Sciences are of the particular facts.

Although the division into Abstract and Concrete Sciences, the latter depending on the former, was of absolute importance as a first step, there still remained the need of a classification of the Abstract Sciences themselves, if they were to yield a Doctrine; and the execution of this difficult task displays the genius of Auguste Comte. But the operation seems so easy now it is accomplished, especially to those who have not long meditated on the nature of the problem, that he rarely gains the credit which is his due. Any vulgar mariner can reach America after Columbus.

The classification differs from all previous classifications, as that of Jussieu, in Botany, differed from those of Linnæus and Tournefort, namely, in grounding its divisions on the natural distinctions presented by the phenomena, not on any conception of symmetry or convenience. It is an objective grouping, not a subjective grouping. The principle adopted is that which permeates the Positive Philosophy, namely, the principle of dependence. The Concrete Sciences are separated from the Abstract Sciences because they exhibit particular cases of the general laws, and depend upon them. In like manner the Abstract Sciences themselves are ranged in a serial order constituted by their gradations of dependence; one succeeds the other according to the principle of decreasing generality and increasing complexity, that which has phenomena the most general and least complex (Mathematics) standing first, and that which has phenomena the least general and most complex (Sociology) standing last. Between these terms the sciences are so distributed that each serves as a necessary introduction to the comprehension of its successors, and each becomes an instrument of exploration taken up by the mind in traversing the field of philosophic investigation. Not only so, but because the series represents the natural order it cannot anywhere be inverted. Each science, after the first, embraces phenomena which



can only be explained by the laws of the science preceding it in addition to laws peculiarly its own. Thus the truths of Number are the most general truths of all; they are true of all things whatever; all things depend on them, but they depend on no prior conditions. A science of Number, *i.e.* Arithmetic and Algebra, may thus be studied without reference to any other science. Next in order of generality and simplicity stand the truths of Form; Geometry presupposes the laws of Number, and must therefore be studied with reference to them, but requires no other aids. Then come the truths of Motion, which furnish the science of Mechanics: here we find the operation of the laws of Number and Form necessarily determining the laws of Motion; so that while it is quite feasible to study Algebra and Geometry in ignorance of Mechanics, it is impossible even to state the laws of Equilibrium and Motion without involving the laws of Number and Form. The movement of a body oscillating round a fixed point is determined by the form of that body; but its form is independent of this movement. In Astronomy we have phenomena which depend on these preceding laws of Number, Form, and Motion, and besides these on the law of Gravitation, which law in no way affects the laws of Mathematics. Physics succeeds, and presents us with phenomena which depend on mathematical laws and—inasmuch as all terrestrial phenomena are affected by influences derived from the heavenly bodies—on astronomical laws. Chemistry presents us with phenomena of a peculiar kind, but these are all seen to be influenced by the laws of Physics, Astronomy, and Mathematics, though they cannot in turn be said to influence these laws. Biology presents us with phenomena of Life, obviously dependent on laws of Chemistry, Physics, Astronomy, and Mathematics, and obviously not influencing these. Finally we have the laws of social existence, embracing the phenomena of human society (Sociology), and these clearly depend on the laws of organic life, and through them on the laws of inorganic nature, on the vital and

physical conditions which alone permit society to exist and be developed. But just as it is impossible to deduce social phenomena from biological and physical laws alone, without the aid of laws peculiar to social existence, so is it impossible to deduce vital phenomena from chemical and physical laws, impossible to deduce chemical phenomena from physical and mathematical laws, and impossible to deduce physical phenomena from mathematical laws alone: \* thus each science adds its own peculiar group of laws to all those which precede it in the series, and each gathers up into its grasp the methods and results of all that have gone before it, serving in turn as a stepping-stone to that which comes after it.

Thus does the series embrace all human knowledge † as regards the elementary laws of the World, Man, and Society. It represents both the objective dependence of the phenomena, and the subjective dependence of our means of knowing them. It constructs a series which makes all the separate sciences organic parts of one Science; and it enables the several philosophies to yield a Doctrine which is, what no other Doctrine has ever been, coextensive with human knowledge, and homogeneous throughout its whole extent: that is to say, while theological and metaphysical systems have necessarily been constructed out of heterogeneous materials, and have either omitted scientific questions, or else have been forced with them to admit the scientific Method on which answers could be gained, this Doctrine treats all knowledge in one spirit, and views the whole Cosmos in one light.

Exactly eight-and-twenty years have passed since I first became acquainted with this serial arrangement of the sciences, and, during the interval, its value has been re-

\* Impossible at present, and likely to remain so for some generations, although a prophetic view discerns in the distant future a reduction of all cosmical phenomena to Mechanics; the doctrine of vibrations will then be the Abstract Science of which all cosmical sciences will be the Concrete.

† In his latter speculations, COMTE added a seventh science under the name of Morals, separating its subject-matter from Biology and Sociology. This does not affect the classification, however.

peatedly tested in the course of my researches both in Science and in the History of Science. Great as that value has been to me, I have several times felt my confidence in it falter in the presence of facts: these hesitations, however, successively subsided, and left behind them an increased conviction of the importance of the classification. This personal experience is not cited as an argument in favour of the series, but simply of an intimation to the earnest student that he may expect to find doubts arising, and should be slow to condemn the classification directly it seems imperfect. Only a long application of it will enable him thoroughly to appreciate its value, and to set aside certain superficial objections. As to the adverse criticisms of it which have been published, those at least which have fallen in my way, I cannot confess that any of my hesitations came from them. The critics have not taken the trouble to master the principles of the classification; not one of them seems to have considered what the object was, nor how such an object constituted an integral part of the Positive Philosophy. Usually they speak of it as if it were a more or less ingenious arrangement, of no great moment in itself, and easily replaced by some other ingenious scheme. Of its vital importance in the study of Science, and History, no suspicion is felt. I except, in some degree, Mr. Herbert Spencer, though he also seems to have misapprehended the spirit and aim of the classification, which he has attacked with his usual vigour and acumen, in a remarkable essay on the Genesis of Science,\* not, I think, with success; and his ill-success appears in stronger relief in the classification which he proposes as a substitute.† M. Littré has examined and satisfactorily refuted his criticisms,‡ and Mr. Mill remarks that ‘after giving to his animadversions the respectful attention due to all that comes from Mr. Spencer, we cannot find that he has made out any case. It is always easy to find

\* SPENCER : *Essays, First Series*, 1858.

† *The Classification of the Sciences*, 1864.

‡ *Auguste Comte et la Philosophie positive*, chap. vi.

fault with a classification. There are a hundred possible ways of arranging any set of objects, and something may almost always be said against the best, and in favour of the worst of them. But the merits of a classification depend on the purposes to which it is instrumental. We have shown the purposes for which M. Comte's classification is intended. Mr. Spencer has not shown that it is ill-adapted to those purposes; and we cannot perceive that his own answers any ends equally important. His chief objection is that if the more special sciences need the truths of the more general ones, the latter also need some of those of the former, and have at times been stopped in their progress by the imperfect state of the sciences which follow long after them in M. Comte's scale; so that the dependence being mutual, there is a *consensus*, but not an ascending scale or hierarchy of the sciences. That the earlier sciences derive help from the later is undoubtedly true; it is part of M. Comte's theory, and amply exemplified in the details of his work.\* When he affirms that one science historically precedes another, he does not mean that the perfection of the first precedes the humblest commencement of those which follow. Mr. Spencer does not distinguish between the empirical stage for the cultivation of a branch of knowledge, and the scientific stage.'

Neither M. Littré nor Mr. Mill has noticed the initial principle of Mr. Spencer's criticism, which is that of the rejection of all distribution of the sciences into a series. 'Did

\* Mr. MILL might here have quoted the explicit language of COMTE in introducing his classification: 'En effet non-seulement les diverses parties de chaque science qu'on est conduit à séparer dans l'ordre *dogmatique* se sont, en réalité, développées simultanément et sous l'influence les unes des autres, ce qui tendrait à faire préférer l'ordre *historique*; mais en considérant, dans son ensemble, le développement effectif de l'esprit humain, on voit de plus que les différentes sciences ont été dans le fait perfectionnées en même temps et mutuellement; on voit même que le progrès des sciences et ceux des arts ont dépendu les uns des autres, par d'innombrables influences réciproques, et enfin tous ont été étroitement liés au développement général de la société humaine.' *Philosophie positive*, i. 81; and a little farther on he adds that no classification can be rigorously conformable with the historical development. 'Il faut tâcher seulement qu'un tel inconvénient n'ait lieu relativement aux conceptions caractéristiques de chaque science.' Comp. *Politique positive*, iii. 41.

we believe a serial arrangement possible,' he says, 'that of M. Comte would certainly be the one we should adopt.' But he dissents from the conception. 'There is no one *rational* order among a host of possible systems. There is no true *filiation* of the sciences. The whole hypothesis is fundamentally false: indeed, it needs but a glance at its origin to see at once how baseless it is. Why a *series*? What reason can we have to suppose that the sciences admit of a *linear* arrangement? Where is our warrant for assuming that there is some *succession* in which they can be placed? There is no reason; no warrant.'\*

No reason? The best of reasons! No warrant? The strongest warrant! The reason for supposing that the sciences admit of a linear arrangement is the fact that the corresponding phenomena admit of it; the dependence of physical laws on the mathematical, and of chemical laws on the physical, and of biological laws on the chemical, is not a figment of Comte's, but an observed fact. As Bichât says of his own classification of the tissues, 'c'est la nature, et non la science, qui a tiré une ligne de démarcation entre eux.' And the warrant for assuming that there is some succession in which the sciences can be placed, is that the effective study of these sciences demand such a succession as the one corresponding to the successive complexity of the phenomena. It is quite true, and no one was more alive to it than Comte, that all the sciences are interwoven, and that the highest seeks aid in the lowest; but because of this are we to reject the immense speculative assistance of a serial arrangement? Mr. Spencer asks, why is a series necessary? It is necessary on grounds similar to those which require that the various truths constituting a science should be systematically co-ordinated, although in nature the phenomena are intermingled. That classification of ideas which transforms Common Knowledge into Science, arranging the phenomena in the order of their dependence, and bringing the particular

\* SPENCER : *Essays*, pp. 171-183.

under the general relations,—which makes the heterogeneous parts assume a homogeneous unity,—must also be performed for the several sciences. And this operation Comte has effected. No one else has done it.

Because the hierarchy of the sciences is an integral part of the Positive Philosophy, it has claimed this somewhat lengthy notice, which is still, however, too brief except as a general indication. We must now pass to another integral part of the doctrine, namely, the creation of a new science, Sociology, which was rendered possible by Comte's discovery of the Law of Evolution.

The necessity of reducing social phenomena to scientific Method had long been felt. The daily increasing disregard for theological and metaphysical habits of thought, and the growing conviction that the Method which had been proved so brilliantly successful in explaining cosmical phenomena ought also to be applied to social phenomena, received a further impulse when the idea became general that social phenomena were in reality subject to Law, and consequently were as capable of scientific investigation as all other phenomena, only far more complicated and difficult. But it is one thing to conceive generally that social science is possible, another thing to create the science. Mr. Mill holds that Comte first made the creation of this science possible, but denies that he created it. As I shall presently have to urge Comte's claim, I will borrow his critic's exposition of what he accepts:—

'The Method proper to the Science of Society must be, in substance, the same as in all other sciences; the interrogation and interpretation of experience, by the twofold process of Induction and Deduction. But its mode of practising these operations has features of peculiarity. In general, Induction furnishes to science the laws of the elementary facts, from which, when known, those of the complex combinations are thought out deductively: specific observation of complex phenomena yields no general laws, or only empirical ones; its scientific function is to verify the laws obtained by

deduction. This mode of philosophising is not adequate to the exigencies of sociological investigation. In social phenomena the elementary facts are feelings and actions, and the laws of these are the laws of human nature, social facts being the results of human acts and situations. Since, then, the phenomena of man in society result from this nature as an individual being, it might be thought that the proper mode of constructing a positive Social Science must be by deducing it from the general laws of human nature, using the facts of history merely for verification. Such, accordingly, has been the conception of social science by many of those who have endeavoured to render it positive, particularly by the school of Bentham. M. Comte considers this as an error. We may, he says, draw from the universal laws of human nature some conclusions (though even these, we think, rather precarious) concerning the very earliest stages of human progress, of which there are either no, or very imperfect, historical records. But as society proceeds in its development, its phenomena are determined, more and more, not by the simple tendencies of universal human nature, but by the accumulated influence of past generations over the present. The human beings themselves, on the laws of whose nature the facts of history depend, are not abstract or universal but historical human beings, already shaped, and made what they are, by human society. This being the case, no powers of deduction could enable any one, starting from the mere conception of the Being Man, placed in a world such as the earth may have been before the commencement of human agency, to predict and calculate the phenomena of his development such as they have in fact proved. If the facts of history, empirically considered, had not given rise to any generalisations, a deductive study of history could never have reached higher than more or less plausible conjecture. By good fortune (for the case might easily have been otherwise), the history of our species, looked at as a comprehensive whole, does exhibit a determinate course, a certain order of development: though history alone

cannot prove this to be a necessary law, as distinguished from a temporary accident. Here, therefore, begins the office of Biology (or, as we should say, of Psychology) in the social science. The universal laws of human nature are part of the data of sociology, but in using them we must reverse the method of the deductive physical sciences: for while, in these, specific experience commonly serves to verify laws arrived at by deduction, in sociology it is specific experience which suggests the laws, and deduction which verifies them. If a sociological theory, collected from historical evidence, contradicts the established general laws of human nature; if (to use M. Comte's instances) it implies, in the mass of mankind, any very decided natural bent, either in a good or in a bad direction; if it supposes that the reason, in average human beings, predominates over the desires, or the disinterested desires over the personal; we may know that history has been misinterpreted, and that the theory is false. On the other hand, if laws of social phenomena, empirically generalised from history, can when once suggested be affiliated to the known laws of human nature; if the direction actually taken by the developments and changes of human society, can be seen to be such as the properties of man and of his dwelling-place made antecedently probable, the empirical generalisations are raised into positive laws, and Sociology becomes a science.

'Much has been said and written for centuries past, by the practical or empirical school of politicians, in condemnation of theories founded on principles of human nature, without an historical basis; and the theorists, in their turn, have successfully retaliated on the practicalists. But we know not any thinker who, before M. Comte, had penetrated to the philosophy of the matter, and placed the necessity of historical studies as the foundation of sociological speculation on the true footing. From this time any political thinker who fancies himself able to dispense with a connected view of the great facts of history, as a chain of causes and effects, must be regarded as below the level of the age; while the vulgar



mode of using history, by looking in it for parallel cases, as if any cases were parallel, or as if a single instance, or even many instances not compared and analysed, could reveal a law, will be more than ever, and irrevocably, discredited.

‘The inversion of the ordinary relation between Deduction and Induction is not the only point in which, according to M. Comte, the Method proper to Sociology differs from that of the sciences of inorganic nature. The common order of science proceeds from the details to the whole. The method of Sociology should proceed from the whole to the details. There is no universal principle for the order of study but that of proceeding from the known to the unknown; finding our way to the facts at whatever point is most open to our observation. In the phenomena of the social state, the collective phenomenon is more accessible to us than the parts of which it is composed. This is already, in a great degree, true of the mere animal body. It is essential to the idea of an organism, and it is even more true of the social organism than of the individual. The state of every part of the social whole at any time is intimately connected with the contemporaneous state of all the others. Religious belief, philosophy, science, the fine arts, the industrial arts, commerce, navigation, government, all are in close mutual dependence on one another, insomuch that when any considerable change takes place in one, we may know that a parallel change in all the others has preceded or will follow it. The progress of society from one general state to another is not an aggregate of partial changes, but the product of a single impulse, acting through all the partial agencies, and can therefore be most easily traced by studying them together. Could it even be detected in them separately, its true nature could not be understood except by examining them in the *ensemble*. In constructing, therefore, a theory of society, all the different aspects of the social organisation must be taken into consideration at once.’

There is one more point in the general philosophy of

sociology requiring notice. Social phenomena, like all others, present two aspects, the statical, and the dynamical; the phenomena of equilibrium, and those of motion. The statical aspect is that of the laws of social existence, considered abstractedly from progress, and confined to what is common to the progressive and the stationary state. The dynamical aspect is that of social progress. The statics of society is the study of the conditions of existence and permanence of the social state. The dynamics studies the laws of its evolution. The first is the theory of the *consensus*, or interdependence of social phenomena. The second is the theory of their filiation.

‘The first division M. Comte, in his great work, treats in a much more summary manner than the second; and it forms, to our thinking, the weakest part of the treatise. He can hardly have seemed even to himself to have originated, in the statics of society, anything new,\* unless his revival of the Catholic idea of a Spiritual Power may be so considered. The remainder, with the exception of detached thoughts, in which even his feeblest productions are always rich, is trite, while in our judgment far from being always true.’

Passing from the consideration of Social Statics to Social Dynamics, Mr. Mill continues:

‘Two questions meet us at the outset: Is there a natural evolution in human affairs? and is that evolution an improvement? M. Comte resolves them both in the affirmative by the same answer. The natural progress of society consists in the growth of our human attributes, comparatively to our animal and our purely organic ones: the progress of our humanity towards an ascendancy over our animality, ever

\* ‘Indeed his claim to be the creator of Sociology does not extend to this branch of the science; on the contrary, he, in a subsequent work, expressly declares that the real founder of it was Aristotle, by whom the theory of the conditions of social existence was carried as far towards perfection as was possible in the absence of any theory of Progress. Without going quite this length, we think it hardly possible to appreciate too highly the merit of those early efforts, beyond which little progress had been made, until a very recent period, either in ethical or in political science.’

more nearly approached though incapable of being completely realised. This is the character and tendency of human development, or of what is called civilisation; and the obligation of seconding this movement—of working in the direction of it—is the nearest approach which M. Comte makes in this treatise to a general principle or standard of morality.

‘But as our more eminent, and peculiarly human, faculties are of various orders, moral, intellectual, and æsthetic, the question presents itself, Is there any one of these whose development is the predominant agency in the evolution of our species? According to M. Comte, the main agent in the progress of mankind is their intellectual development. Not because the intellectual is the most powerful part of our nature, for, limited to its inherent strength, it is one of the weakest: but because it is the guiding part, and acts not with its own strength alone, but with the united force of all parts of our nature which it can draw after it. In a social state the feelings and propensities cannot act with their full power, in a determinate direction, unless the speculative intellect places itself at their head. The passions are, in the individual man, a more energetic power than a mere intellectual conviction; but the passions tend to divide, not to unite, mankind: it is only by a common belief that passions are brought to work together, and become a collective force instead of forces neutralising one another. Our intelligence is first awakened by the stimulus of our animal wants and of our stronger and coarser desires; and these for a long time almost exclusively determine the direction in which our intelligence shall work: but once roused to activity, it assumes more and more the management of the operations of which stronger impulses are the prompters, and constrains them to follow its lead, not by its own strength, but because, in the play of antagonistic forces, the path it points out is (in scientific phraseology) the direction of least resistance. Personal interests and feelings, in the social state, can only obtain the maximum of satisfaction by means of co-operation, and the necessary condition of co-operation is a common

belief. All human society, consequently, is grounded on a system of fundamental opinions, which only the speculative faculty can provide, and which, when provided, directs our other impulses in their mode of seeking their gratification. And hence the history of opinions, and of the speculative faculty, has always been the leading element in the history of mankind.'

Here we come upon the famous *loi des trois états* which has been received with great opposition from theologians and metaphysicians, whose modes of thought it sets aside as unfit for modern use; nor has it received an open welcome from men of science, whom, at first sight, it would seem most to flatter. The opposition of all the teachers now living, though it would retard, could not ultimately prevent, the reception of a law. If, therefore, Comte has really discovered a law—as many of us firmly believe—its acceptance is only a question of time. I merely note two general sources of the opposition of scientific men, both of them evils of our present condition to which Comte has frequently called attention: first, the *speciality* of most men of science, combined with the absence of large philosophical or general views; secondly, the patchwork of opinion commonly held is formed of loose floating notions of metaphysics side by side with theological dogmas and inductive generalisations, so that many a mind which has discarded theological and metaphysical explanations of physical and even biological phenomena, readmits them into Psychology or Sociology. To these causes of opposition must also be added the license men permit themselves of pronouncing confidently on questions they have not taken the preliminary trouble of understanding. Two-thirds of the objections urged against this law of the three stages are based on a radical misapprehension of it; and there is something quite comic in the gravity with which these misconceptions are advanced.

The law does not assert that at distinct historical periods men were successively in each of the three stages, that there was a time when a nation or even a tribe was exclusively

theological, exclusively metaphysical, or exclusively positive; it asserts that the chief conceptions man frames respecting the world, himself, and society, must pass through three stages, with varying velocity under various social conditions, but in unvarying order. Any one individual mind, inheriting the results of preceding generations, may indeed commence its thinking on some special topic, without being forced to pass through the stages which its predecessors have passed through; but every class of conceptions must pass through the stages, and every individual mind must more or less rapidly, in the course of its evolution from infancy to maturity, pass through them. These necessary stages Comte names the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive. Mr. Mill suggests, as less ambiguous, the terms volitional, abstractional, and experiential. The first is the spontaneous and primitive condition of thought; the second is a transition to the third, which is final.

All men are agreed, in these days, that real knowledge must be founded on observation. But no science could have its origin in simple observation alone; for if, on the one hand, all theories must be founded on observation, on the other, it is equally necessary to have some sort of theory before we address ourselves to the task of steady observation. If, in contemplating phenomena, we do not connect them by some principle, it would not only be impossible for us to combine our isolated observations, and consequently to draw any benefit from them; but we should also be unable even to retain them, and most frequently the important facts would remain unperceived. We are consequently forced to theorise. A theory is necessary to observation, and a correct theory to correct observation.

This double necessity imposed upon the mind—of observation for the formation of a theory, and of a theory for the practice of observation—would have caused it to move in a circle if nature had not fortunately provided an outlet in the spontaneous activity of the mind. Owing to this activity, it begins by assuming a cause, which it seeks outside

the phenomena, *i.e.* a *supernatural* cause. As man is conscious that he acts according as he wills, so he naturally concludes that everything acts in accordance with some will.

The spontaneous tendency is to animate the external world, because, since knowledge can only proceed from what is already known, the analogies suggested by consciousness are inevitably the first explanations of cosmical phenomena. This is the state of Fetichism: a state still to be noticed among children and savages. It passes by insensible degrees into Polytheism; and that again by a supreme effort of abstraction is replaced by Monotheism.

The second, or metaphysical, stage was a transition from this primitive stage to the final stage of positivism. It replaced the supernatural agent of the theological conception by a natural agent inherent in the objects themselves. It replaced the variable action of a *will*, for the invariable action of an *essential cause*. In lieu of deities, it imagined entities.

Criticism subsequently discovered that these entities were simply personified abstractions. They then fell into such discredit that nowadays there may be some difficulty in comprehending how men of keen and meditative intellects could ever have mistaken abstractions for real existences capable of causing all the changes observed; yet nothing is more certain, and this History has exhibited abundant examples of the mistake. Not only so, but many moderns who find it difficult to conceive that the great minds of the past could so far confound the names they gave to certain classes of facts with the essential causes of the facts themselves—could rely on an explanation which was in truth only a restatement of the facts to be explained—could passionately maintain that over and above the existing animals, which they saw, there existed an universal Animal, which they did not see, and that this Animal was the reality of which the individual animals were the passing shadows—many moderns who find this difficult to conceive are themselves so wedded to similar abstractions (that of a

Vital Principle, for example) that they despise you as 'shallow,' or declaim against you as 'materialistic,' if you think otherwise.

In the final, or positive, stage, the mind relinquishes attempts to penetrate into the essence of things, to transcend the sphere of Experience, and pass into that of causes, first or final. Its aim is to explain the *how*, and leave unexplored the *why*. It desires to establish by observation and induction the Laws, or constant relations, and resigns itself to ignorance of the Agents.

One illustration must suffice here.\* Men formerly believed, according to Oersted, that Basilisks lived in cellars which had long been shut up; they were invisible, and whomsoever they looked upon died. This is a typical specimen of the theological mode of explanation. I am not aware what metaphysical one replaced it, but in the spirit of that method I will suggest the following: *Cellarity*, when long pent up, is inimical to Life. The positive explanation, seeking in the known properties of things, discovers a deleterious gas, whose weight causes it to accumulate in low places unless driven away by supplies of fresh air, and this gas is a poison to any one who breathes it.

The theological system arrived at the highest perfection of which it is capable when it substituted the providential action of a single Being for the varied operations of the numerous divinities which had been before imagined. In the same way, in the last stage of the metaphysical system, men substitute one great Entity (Nature) as the cause of all phenomena instead of the multitude of Entities at first supposed. In the same way, again, the ultimate perfection of the positive system would be to represent all phenomena as particular aspects of a single general fact—and to this the molecular theory seems now rapidly tending.

After this brief indication of the law, we may resume Mr. Mill's exposition:—

\* In my work on *Aristotle*, pp. 26-34, the law of the three stages is variously illustrated.

'The passage of mankind through these stages, including the successive modifications of the theological conception by the rising influence of the other two, is, to M. Comte's mind, the most decisive fact in the evolution of humanity. Simultaneously, however, there has been going on throughout history a parallel movement in the purely temporal department of things, consisting of the gradual decline of the military mode of life (originally the chief occupation of all freemen) and its replacement by the industrial. M. Comte maintains that there is a necessary connection and interdependence between this historical sequence and the other; and he easily shows that the progress of industry and that of positive science are correlative; man's power to modify the facts of nature evidently depending on the knowledge he has acquired of their laws. We do not think him equally successful in showing a natural connection between the theological mode of thought and the military system of society: but since they both belong to the same age of the world—since each is, in itself, natural and inevitable, and they are together modified and together undermined by the same cause, the progress of science and industry, M. Comte is justified in considering them as linked together, and the movement by which mankind emerge from them as a single evolution.

'These propositions having been laid down as the first principles of social dynamics, M. Comte proceeds to verify and apply them by a connected view of universal history. This survey nearly fills two large volumes, above a third of the work, in all of which there is scarcely a sentence that does not add an idea. We regard it as by far his greatest achievement, except his review of the sciences, and in some respects more striking even than that. We wish it were practicable in the compass of an essay like the present to give even a faint conception of the extraordinary merits of this historical analysis. It must be read to be appreciated. Whoever disbelieves that the philosophy of history can be made a science should suspend his judgment until he has



read these volumes of M. Comte. We do not affirm that they would certainly change his opinion; but we would strongly advise him to give them a chance.'

It is now needful to consider whether Comte may rightfully be claimed as having created Social Science, or only, as Mr. Mill thinks, having rendered such a creation possible. To do this, we must first settle what is meant by the creation of a science. There is, I believe, only a difference in terms between Mr. Mill's position and my own; he would say that the defects in Comte's construction prevent it from being accepted as a science, though the route is opened for future investigators, and much of the country is mapped out. Admitting the defects to be as great as he supposes, though I think on some points a good defence may be made, I should only look on these *as* defects. No science is perfect, and the last and most complex of them all is, of course, the most defective of them all. What we have to consider is whether it is a science, and whether it is in such condition that, like all other sciences, it may indefinitely advance. We have seen that in the absence of Sociology the creation of the Positive Philosophy would have been impossible, since, then, *all* phenomena would not have been embraced; we have seen, further, that it was not only necessary that social phenomena should be included with cosmical phenomena in the Doctrine, but that these social phenomena should disclose their elementary laws: in other words, that Sociology should not only be a science but an Abstract Science. I will now endeavour to show that Comte transformed what before was Common Knowledge into Science, separated its elements from those of other sciences, and presented the Abstract Science of social existence claiming its place in the hierarchy.

Others before Comte, as Mr. Mill remarks, had a full conviction that social phenomena conform to invariable laws, and by discarding all theological and metaphysical explanations had adopted the positive attitude. Granted; but the positive attitude is not enough for Science; and no one will

venture to assert that Montesquieu, Macchiavelli, Adam Smith, Bentham, or the political economists, had discovered the fundamental laws which constitute the science. They had not even distinctly conceived how the science itself should be distributed into statical and dynamical laws, the statical derived from Biology, the dynamical from History. They made several empirical generalisations, valuable as such, but made no attempt to organise these into a science.

The universal mistake of social speculators was an attempt to deduce the phenomena from the laws of 'human nature,' i.e. to make collective phenomena the simple consequences of laws of the individual. Setting aside the metaphysical conceptions which were thus made a basis of deduction, and assuming that the true biological laws had been discovered and applied, we should still perceive that failure was inevitable, because social laws are not directly reducible to Biology. As Comte in one of his earliest publications remarks on this very point:—

'Sans doute, les phénomènes collectifs de l'espèce humaine reconnaissent pour dernière cause, comme ses phénomènes individuels, la nature spéciale de son organisation. Mais l'état de la civilisation humaine à chaque génération ne dépend immédiatement que de celui de la génération précédente, et ne produit immédiatement que celui de la suivante. Il est possible de suivre, avec toute la précision suffisante, cet enchaînement à partir de l'origine, en ne liant d'une manière directe chaque terme qu'au précédent et au suivant. Il serait, au contraire, absolument au-dessus des forces de notre esprit de rattacher un terme quelconque de la série au point de départ primitif, en supprimant toutes les relations intermédiaires.\* The error is as great as that of a physiologist who should attempt to deduce the state of manhood from that of infancy, without taking the state of puberty into account.

Not only did Comte see how social phenomena were to be

\* COMTE : *Politique positive*, tome iv. *Appendice*, p. 126 ; comp. also the passages pp. 98 and 130, 131.

distributed and studied in order to form a science ; he saw the decisive point of separation between these and other phenomena which rendered the constitution of a separate science necessary. Precisely as Physics must be separated from Mathematics, because no extension of mathematical laws alone will suffice to explain physical phenomena ; precisely as Chemistry must be separated from Physics, because in chemical phenomena there is, over and above the physical laws, the additional laws of molecular affinity ; precisely as Biology must be separated from Chemistry and Physics, because by no extension of physical and chemical laws can we deduce the special laws of organic life : so in like manner must Sociology be separated from Biology, because, over and above the phenomena of human nature, exhibited in the species, there is the important series of phenomena due to the collective activities of the race. History modifies the race.

By this conception Sociology was rendered possible, but not by this alone was the science constituted. Had Comte done no more than this, he would have held an analogous position to that of a biologist before Bichât, whom we will imagine to have conceived that Biology could be rescued from Theology and Metaphysics, and constituted as a science, if Life were reduced to the elementary properties inherent in organic tissues. Obviously this would only have been one step towards the solution of the problem ; the next step would have presented immense difficulties ; it would have been to determine specifically what those properties were which the several tissues specially manifested. In like manner, Comte, having conceived that the collective phenomena of History must be separated from the individual phenomena of Biology, and having withdrawn them from the *regency of volition*, to place them under the *regency of law*, showing that they depended on conditions inherent in the successive stages of society, and not on providential interventions, first made a science of History possible, and next constituted it by discovering the fundamental law of evolution.

In order that the science should be constituted, the particular phenomena had to disclose their laws; and in order that it should be an Abstract Science, it was necessary that they should disclose their elementary laws. Otherwise we might have had a History of some particular people, but not a science of universal History, an Abstract Science, the Laws of which would be rigorously applicable to all nations and all times, just as the laws of Biology are applicable in all climates and in all branches of the organic series.

Mr. Mill's statement of what constitutes a science is all that Comte's disciples require, namely, 'discovering or proving and pursuing to their consequences those of its truths which are fit to form the connecting links among the rest; truths which are to it what the law of gravitation is to astronomy, and what the elementary properties of tissues are to physiology.' And this we believe the law of the three stages is to Sociology. Mr. Mill accepts that law; and therefore it is that I venture to intimate that his doubts respecting Comte's claim may be mainly a question of terms. Those—and they are the majority—who refuse to accept the law may consistently reject the claim. I cannot here afford the space for a discussion of their objections, but content myself with saying that it is a law of History, and must be verified in History; it cannot even be comprehended, much less refuted, through Psychology. Whoever will take the trouble to understand its meaning, and follow Comte's exemplification of it throughout History, will see how the superficial objections to it all disappear; as objections disappear before the law of gravitation, which likewise needed an extensive and persistent verification before its truth became irresistible.

Having thus characterised the general aspects of the New Philosophy founded by Comte, I must refrain from any attempt to follow in detail what Mr. Mill justly calls 'that wonderful systematisation of the philosophy of all the sciences, from mathematics to physiology, which, if he had done nothing else, would have stamped him in all minds competent to

appreciate it, as one of the principal thinkers of the age.' There are portions, of course, which the advance of Science has rendered antiquated, and portions it has rendered unacceptable; but we shall seek in vain through the writings of his predecessors, even in special departments, for anything comparable to the solid and luminous exposition of the philosophy of each subject, and its position in human evolution. The student is advised to master and patiently meditate the successive chapters in which the philosophy of Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, Biology, and Sociology, is expounded; and, thus fortified, he will be prepared to meet the objections which assail the Doctrine from various quarters.

Meanwhile two points imperatively demand our attention, because they are urged by a positive thinker of the highest eminence, and because they assail the integrity of the Doctrine: these are, 1st, the absence of Psychology from the hierarchy of the sciences; 2ndly, the absence of a method of Proof. Without saying where he would admit these sciences, so as to reconstruct the hierarchy, Mr. Mill insists on their omission as a defect. I am the less inclined to undervalue the force of these objections because at one time I fully accepted the first, and still waver respecting the second.

When Mr. Mill says that Comte rejected psychological observation, properly so called, as an invalid process at least in regard to intellectual operations, and that 'he gives no place in his series to the science of Psychology, and always speaks of it with contempt,' there is both truth and error in the criticism. It is true that Comte did regard internal observation as an illusory process. This is a question of Method, on which I agree with Mr. Mill in thinking Comte greatly mistaken, owing to his contempt for the only psychological investigations he was acquainted with, and to his justifiable disregard of the pretended 'œil interne.' But it is not true that Comte discarded psychological observation; he only disclaimed for it a double organ, external with regard to one class of facts, and internal with regard to

another. However, it must be admitted that his ideas on this subject were not perhaps very clear, and that he had paid but little attention to the results of psychological analysis. Considering how very far professed psychologists are even yet from any definite and consistent Method, this is not a serious charge against him.

But when it is said that he gives no place to Psychology in his series, a question of Doctrine is raised, namely, whether he was or was not justified in refusing to Psychology the position of an abstract and independent science? On this question I retract the adhesion which many years ago I gave to Mr. Mill's point of view, and pass over to that of Comte. It then seemed to me that on the principles of positive classification Psychology ought to be separated from Biology, just as Biology was separated from Chemistry; in each case the separation was necessitated by the *speciality* of the phenomena treated. I now see the erroneous appreciation which misled me. The confusion in my mind (let me not include others in the reproach) was the confusion of the subsidiary question of Method with the dominant question of Doctrine, and, as a consequence, an imperfect appreciation of biological phenomena. Thus because Comte was wrong respecting one of the means of psychological research (subjective analysis) and spoke with indiscriminating contempt of Psychology (meaning really nothing but the unscientific farrago about *le Moi*), and because I saw that Psychology was a possible science of great value, having a special instrument in Consciousness, I was led to dissent from him, and agree with Mr. Mill in claiming for it an independent position. Further meditation, however, disclosed that it is one thing to recognise Psychology as a science, another thing to assign it a place in the hierarchy of Abstract Sciences. It may be a Concrete Science, as Physiology and Botany are; but it is derived from the Abstract Science of Biology, and can only be consistently separated from it by those who hold that psychical phenomena are in essence distinct from vital phenomena. What I had hastily classed as special

in psychical phenomena was a conventional speciality, arising from the conventional restriction of biological phenomena, and the unphilosophic practice of biologists, who had left all the higher functions to be treated by metaphysicians. That this was a serious error a moment's consideration will disclose. Biology is the science of Life; among the manifestations of living organisms we distinguish, for our convenience, the vegetal from the animal functions, what are called vital from what are called psychical phenomena; but no positive biologist supposes that this distinction is real, that an animal organism has two independent vitalities, or that the psychical functions are not part and parcel of the organic activities, determined by the structure and condition of the organs; above all no biologist supposes that his science would be complete if from the circle of vital phenomena all the sensitive, emotive, instinctive, volitional, and intellectual phenomena were excluded. The parallel between Chemistry and Biology entirely fails. Chemistry deals with the phenomena of molecular combination; the phenomena of Life are superadded to these, and this superaddition constitutes a new science. The laws of Chemistry would remain precisely what they are if all organisms were destroyed: neither more nor less. But psychological phenomena are no superaddition to the phenomena of Life, they are themselves vital; and although we may conceive a Biology restricted to Plants, and comprising only vegetal functions, this withdrawal of animal organisms would profoundly affect the constitution of Biology, by robbing it of a class of important laws. In other words, since every general science of Life necessarily includes *sensitive* no less than *nutritive* functions, any conception of Biology which excluded the sensations, instincts, and intellections would be monstrously truncated.

Comte was therefore fully justified in refusing to truncate Biology by removing from it one important class of vital phenomena; he would have erred against his own principles had he erected the concrete, derivative science of Psychology into an Abstract Science holding its place in the hierarchy.

We may cheerfully give up his views as to how Psychology should be studied, without giving up an essential element in the Positive Philosophy—without creating a place for Psychology independent of, and equivalent to, Biology. We cannot forget that all psychical phenomena are phenomena of Sensibility, and are reducible to neural processes, actions of the organism.

There is, indeed, a Philosophy which takes a very different view, teaching that sensation, emotion, ideation, are not directly functions of an organism, but are the activities of an entity living within the organism, a life within a life, having, with the organism it inhabits, only points of contact, none of community. I will not here discuss the pretensions of this Philosophy; I only say it is not the Positive Philosophy. The answer to Mr. Mill may therefore be summed up thus: either psychical phenomena are biological phenomena, in which case Psychology is a branch of Biology; or psychical phenomena are essentially different from biological phenomena—the special actions of a special agent or combination of agents—in which case Psychology claims a separate place among fundamental sciences.

Dr. Bridges,\* in his letter to Mr. Mill, after noticing the restricted sense in which Comte spoke of Psychology, adds, 'If by Psychology be meant the study, by every means that are available, of the moral and intellectual functions of man, it is very certain that Comte was a psychologist, though he naturally avoided a word which connected him with a contemporary school of metaphysicians. With regard to the impossibility of studying the purely intellectual functions by the method of self-observation, Comte adopted, it is true, the opinion of Broussais so vigorously stated in his treatise *sur l'Irritation et la Folie*. It is possible that these thinkers may have rejected the method too absolutely. But it must be shown to be far more fruitful in results than it has yet proved, before it can rank very high as an instrument for

\* *The Unity of Comte's Life and Doctrine: A Reply to Strictures on Comte's later Writings, addressed to J. S. Mill, Esq., M.P.* By J. H. BRIDGES, M.D. 1866.



the discovery of truth. The study of the intellectual and moral functions was prosecuted by Comte throughout his life, and that on methods not, I imagine, materially different from those which you would adopt.'

M. Littré grapples more directly with Mr. Mill's objection. He begins with an important distinction between the study of the faculties and the study of the products of those faculties. 'According to Comte there is no Psychology beyond the domain of Biology; according to Mr. Mill, Psychology forms an *ensemble* of notions which cannot be explained by Biology. What shall I say to this, when at the outset I remark a confusion, which I must clear up before pronouncing? The confusion is that the word Psychology sometimes comprehends the cerebral faculties and sometimes the products of those faculties. If the question is of the faculties, I side with M. Comte; if the question is of the products, I side with Mr. Mill.' He proceeds to show that whatever relates to the faculties, either as to their analysis or to their classification, everything which relates to the functions or the modifications impressed on them by external influences, belongs of right to Biology; and as such it is treated by Comte. The fact that there is a Psychology of animals decisively refutes the notion of the independence of this study, of the faculties; the intelligence, affections, and instincts of animals being clearly biological questions.

'These explanations,' he adds, 'show that M. Comte committed no error in placing under Biology the study of Psychology, if by the latter we understand the intellectual and affective faculties; but if we also understand by it Ideology, and even Logic, then the reproach has quite another aspect.' M. Littré selects as an illustration of the distinction between faculties and products, the case of Language. Recent researches, he says, have given almost a demonstration of the existence of such a faculty in one of the anterior convolutions of the cerebrum. 'That is a decisive case of cerebral physiology—a definite function assigned to a definite organ; but if the faculty of Language

belongs to Biology, this cannot be said of Grammar, which is a product of the faculty.' Other examples might have been added. The faculty, or faculties, of Music belong to Biology, but Counterpoint has no such place. Ideology, Logic, Ethics, Æsthetics, are products, and, as products, have no place in the series of Abstract Sciences which constitute the positive hierarchy, though one and all of them may be very important special sciences. '*Leur théorie générale n'est pas plus partie intégrante de la philosophie positive que ne le serait la théorie générale du langage et de la grammaire; et vraiment pourquoi ne pas réclamer en faveur de celle-ci, fort considérable assurément, si l'on réclame en faveur de celles-là ?*'

We will now turn to the second objection. 'The philosophy of a science,' says Mr. Mill, 'consists of two principal parts; the methods of investigation and the requisites of proof.' I pause here to remark that although he is at perfect liberty to construct his own definitions, and conform to them, he is not at liberty to make them the standard for Comte, and to object to the Positive Philosophy because it does not conform to such a standard. As a critic of a system, he is bound to accept its definitions, not to apply his own. In the present instance, a positivist would say that Mr. Mill's definition is one which describes the logic, not the philosophy, of a science. I do not remember any express definition proposed by Comte, but the following is the one I should construct from his exposition: 'The philosophy of a science is constituted by the co-ordination of the fundamental Laws of the phenomena within the domain of the science—the Methods by which those Laws are discovered,—and the relation which the science bears to the one which precedes and the one which succeeds it in the encyclopædic hierarchy; in other words, its position and degree of influence in human development.'\*

\* M. LITTRÉ proposes the following :—'*La philosophie d'une science est la conception de cette science par co-ordination des faits généraux ou vérités fonda-*

This difference of definition being indicated, we may consider what force there is in the objection urged by Mr. Mill. He sees two requisites:—‘The one,’ he continues, ‘points out the road by which the human intellect arrives at conclusions; the other, the mode of testing their evidence. The former, if complete, would be an *Organon of Discovery*; the latter, of *Proof*. It is to the first of these that M. Comte principally confines himself, and he treats it with a degree of perfection hitherto unrivalled. Nowhere is there anything comparable in its kind to his survey of the resources which the mind has at its disposal for investigating the laws of phenomena; the circumstances which render each of the fundamental modes of exploration suitable or unsuitable to each class of phenomena; the extensions and transformations which the process of investigation has to undergo in adapting itself to each new province of the field of study; and the especial gifts with which every one of the fundamental sciences enriches the method of positive inquiry, each science, in its turn being the best fitted to bring to perfection one process or another. These and many other cognate subjects, such as the theory of Classification and the proper use of scientific Hypotheses, M. Comte has treated with a completeness of insight which leaves little to be desired.’

The praise is emphatic enough, and authoritative enough, to satisfy even disciples; but it is succeeded by the statement of a grave defect: ‘We are taught the right way of searching for results, but when a result has been reached, how shall we know that it is true? How assure ourselves that the process has been performed correctly, and that our premises, whether consisting of generalities or of particular facts, really prove the conclusion we have grounded on them? On this question M. Comte throws no light; he supplies no test of proof. As regards deduction, he neither recognises the syllogistic system of Aristotle and his successors—the insufficiency of which is as evident as its utility is real—nor proposes any other in lieu

mentales qui y appartiennent.’—*Revue des Deux Mondes*. (This article has since been reprinted as a pamphlet: *Auguste Comte et Stuart Mill*.)

of it; and of inductions he has no canons whatever. He does not seem to admit the possibility of any general criterion, by which to decide whether a given inductive inference is correct or not. He maintains that no hypothesis is legitimate, unless it is susceptible of verification, and that none ought to be accepted as true, unless it can be shown not only that it accords with the facts, but that its falsehood would be inconsistent with them. He, therefore, needs a test of inductive proof; and, in assigning none, he seems to give up as impracticable the main problem of Logic, properly so called.'

The objection is formidable; if admitted, it would be fatal, —a system which was without a criterion would have the radical vice which dissolves every metaphysical construction. Happily this is not the case with the Positive Philosophy. A deficiency, I admit, exists, but it is not one having the reach assigned to it by Mr. Mill. A system of Philosophy must somewhere have a place for Logic, and Comte has not indicated the place it should occupy. But the omission does not deprive the system of a criterion; it only deprives us of a ready mode of exhibiting the criterion. *Logic is the codification of the rules which the various sciences have employed and must employ.* It is the grammar of science. The author of incomparably the best work on Logic is naturally alive to the importance of this codification; and we who have profited so largely by his work, are not likely to underrate it. Nevertheless, when the integrity of Positivism is in question there is doubt permissible whether the plan followed by Comte does not, as M. Littré suggests, furnish an equivalent to the legal sanction of Logic. Mr. Mill thinks not; but that may be because he misapprehends the plan:—He says, 'Method, according to M. Comte, is learnt only by seeing it in operation, and the logic of a science can only be usefully taught through the science itself.' The plan is wider: it is the combination of the hierarchy of the sciences with their methods, so that each science in turn furnishes its own criterion; thus the logic of each science is serially exhibited, and all that is

wanting is the codification of the whole, an abstract science of Proof.

If Logic is the codification of the rules of experience, its utility as codification may be admitted. But the code does not introduce any new validity. It shows what the rules are; it does not furnish a test deeper than the rules themselves. Comte was not imperatively called upon to supply a test of truth more valid than experience; nor could Logic have supplied such a test. Mr. Mill declares that the final test is the universality of the law of causation. But no one has shown more conclusively that the law of causation is itself a generalisation of experience. M. Littré, therefore, asks, 'How do we know that a general proposition in science is true? By showing that in every case experience confirms it. If exceptions arise, we either sacrifice it or modify it. Our most assured inductions are only accepted under the control of constant verification, and no sanction which Logic can give them removes this relative character or adds anything to their certainty.'

Although Comte neglected to codify the rules of Proof (a neglect which has been amply remedied by Mr. Mill), he did not by any means or in any department neglect Proof. He gave the rules in giving the Methods of Research; and in this portion of the philosophy of each science he elaborated the logic peculiar to that science. As he says, 'Le vrai régime positif ne sépare jamais la logique de la science. Car en n'étudiant chaque partie de la méthode inductive qu'avec *les doctrines qui l'ont spécialement suscitée*, on sent aussitôt que son usage doit toujours être conforme aux notions fondamentales que cette science reçoit de la précédente.' \*

While defending Comte, I have also to add that although Logic is to Science what Grammar is to Language, and both should be taught *pari passu* with their examples, there is still a need for a general Logic or Methodology, as for an Universal Grammar or Philosophy of Language; and this need Comte sometimes seems to have felt. 'Puisqu'il est toujours

\* *Politique positive*, i. 518.

absurde,' he says, 'd'enseigner la méthode séparément de la doctrine, il faut utiliser toutes les occasions où l'on peut tirer de l'exercice scientifique une saine instruction logique.'\* But where this Methodology should be placed, whether as an Abstract Science at the close of the series, or as a division of Anthropology, he has left for others to determine.

This, then, is the Positive Philosophy: the extension to *all* investigations of those methods which have been proved successful in the physical sciences—the transformation of Science into Philosophy—the condensation of all knowledge into a homogeneous body of Doctrine, capable of supplying a Faith and consequently a Polity.

The positive mode of thought is that which must rule the future. This is an induction from all History, which shows that only three modes have existed, and that they have everywhere exhibited the same law of mutation, the theological once dominant being gradually supplanted by the metaphysical, and the metaphysical in turn gradually giving way to the positive. One by one the various groups of phenomena have fallen under the positive rule, and as each group received its scientific character it freed itself more and more from the influence of Theology or Metaphysics, the perfection of each science being accurately measured by the completeness with which these influences have been eliminated.

But although the course of History unequivocally consecrates the Positive Philosophy, and although we see in the ever accelerated advances of Science the accumulative preparation for the new Doctrine, we must not confound the general spirit with the special result. We may accept the positive spirit, and all the positive sciences, without accepting the Philosophy which Comte has evolved from them. I myself accept that Philosophy, and I do not know of any other general Doctrine which is to be placed beside it. But there are many

\* *Politique positive*, ii. 443.

positive thinkers who either do not feel the need of a Doctrine, or do not see how at present it is to be constructed ; men who think that the several sciences are enough, without a general Philosophy to knit them together ; and men who are dissatisfied with Comte's synthesis, though unable to propose a better. Thus it is that there is still a vast mass of unorganised positivism which the future will have to organise. What may be said at once of the Philosophy is that it is a systematisation, more or less perfect, of actual knowledge, a general doctrine capable of embracing all knowledge. This is its distinctive character. 'Tant qu'Auguste Comte n'a pas paru,' says M. Littré, 'le champ de la spéculation générale appartient à la théologie ou à la métaphysique, et celui de la spéculation particulière à la science. Quand il a paru, les positions sont interverties ; la spéculation scientifique devient générale, et la théologie et la métaphysique deviennent particulières, c'est-à-dire, qu'elles ne se montrent que comme des étages de l'histoire de l'esprit humain.'\*

More than once the phrase 'systematisation of all knowledge' has been used, and used designedly ; for the province of Positivism is strictly limited to what can be known ; and it is this very circumscription which has provoked the deepest antagonism. Affirming that since we cannot *know* the origins and ends of things—first and final causes being, from the constitution of our faculties, inaccessible to us—we ought stringently to exclude them from our Philosophy, which is concerned solely with what can be known, Positivism by no means denies the existence of such causes, it simply denies that by invoking the mere existence we can gain any insight into the laws of phenomena. Neither affirming nor denying their existence, it contents itself with asserting that these causes have not been made cognisable to our minds ; and although it is permissible to every man to indulge in any phantasies he pleases, it is not permissible to introduce these into Philosophy. It is no use asking for better bread than

\* LITTRÉ : *Auguste Comte*, p. 99.

can be made of wheat. The limitations of human knowledge may be irksome to some impatient spirits—and are usually so to those who have not had patience enough to master much of what is known—but Philosophy pretending to no wider sweep than that of human faculty, and contented with the certainties of experience, declares the search after first and final causes to be a profitless pursuit.

### § III. TRANSFORMATION OF PHILOSOPHY INTO RELIGION.

It is neither consistent with the plan of this History, nor with the few pages still at my disposal, to give an exposition of the speculations which Comte produced during his second period. That his Philosophy rapidly became transformed into Religion, has already been noticed; also that the transformation caused a schism among his disciples, one party affirming that he had forsaken the positive Method, and was untrue to his own teaching; the other party affirming that the later developments were perfectly consistent with the earlier speculations, and that his whole life had been the one work of founding a Polity on the basis of a demonstrated Faith.\*

The later works, namely, the *Politique*, the *Catechisme*, and the *Synthèse subjective*, form a group by themselves, which, whether they are, or are not, necessary developments of the Philosophy, in nowise affect the integrity of that system of thought; a system that may be accepted by those who do not feel the need of the Religion, and by those who do not think that Comte has succeeded in the transformation. There are thus two separable doctrines associated with his name; the fervent adherents of the one being sometimes only partial adherents of the other, and sometimes even its open antagonists.

Such questions must be debated elsewhere. For myself I will only say that in spite of my veneration for Comte, and

\* Contrast LITTRÉ's work on Comte, and Dr. BRIDGES' *Letter to J. S. Mill*.



my growing sympathy with his views, I have never been able to accept the later works as more than magnificent efforts to construct an Utopia, which differs from all previous Utopias in having the past life of Humanity as its warrant. I think his attempt at systematisation was premature: failure was inevitable, because politics must grow, they cannot be made—and by him the laws of growth were disregarded. It was not thus in his early days; indeed, when writing to Valat he declares that the object of his philosophy is to reform the whole system of Education, and that until the Doctrine is completely established, every attempt to change the existing form of government should be carefully avoided. But in his later days this was forgotten. The Method he employed is one which the Positive Philosophy emphatically condemns; and his large use of subjective fiction, though permissible in an Utopia, is disastrous elsewhere. He painfully illustrates his own Law of the Three Stages, according to which the same mind may be in the positive stage when handling some topics, and in the metaphysical stage when handling others. No metaphysician ever constructed a scheme of the Cosmos with more arbitrary conceptions, and a greater disregard of experience than Comte employs in the construction of his Polity. Not only does he perpetually disregard experience, and verifiable data, but he is sometimes flagrantly at variance with them, and propounds hypotheses that are as wild as the fictions of poets. On these grounds of Method and premature systematisation, I am forced to separate myself from him, to question some doctrines and reject others, which, if they were put forth merely as suggestions, might be fertile in influence. Generally it may be said of these later works that had they been avowed as Utopian—as the visions and suggestions of a meditative mind anxious to impart to others the thoughts which rose in it—their immediate operation would have been incomparably greater, because their profoundly moral and ennobling spirit, and their reach of suggestion, would have gained the sympathy of many who are roused to

antagonism by what they consider the arrogance of a claim to finality, and the danger of an attempt at practical enforcement of ideas not rationally sifted. It is one thing to listen to a philosophic proposal, to carry it in our thoughts and see how far it will clear up difficulties, how far it is or is not compatible with experience; another thing to listen to a preacher who propounds his visions as laws. As a great teacher, Comte's simple indications would have been received with the respect which was their due. As a pontiff, he forced us to scrutinise severely the validity of every proposition he put forth. We could all admit the deep importance of his efforts to exalt every demonstrated truth into an element of Religion, making all studies religious by disclosing their higher aim, so that even Mathematics might become a part of Morality; we could see that he was thus calling on us to do consciously what from the first mankind has been doing unconsciously, namely, to make every insight into the truth of things a rule of conduct. But the very principle here in operation teaches a cautious reserve. We must be thoroughly convinced of a truth before we erect it into a rule of conduct. Now it is certain that many of Comte's ideas, even on fundamental questions, are very far from having the evidence requisite for conviction; and however grateful we may be to him for his suggestions, we are by no means ready to regard them as laws.

Thus much it was needful to say respecting the attitude of many who on the whole regard Comte's later speculations with sympathy, as the efforts of an individual to anticipate the work of future generations. The history of his ideas he has narrated in the preface to the first volume of the *Politique*; and although it may be somewhat coloured by the after glow, its substantial truth will be recognised by all who read his early essays, or meditate the first and final chapters of the *Philosophie*. Nothing can be more evident than that from the first his aim was to construct a Polity on the basis of Science. This Polity did not at first wear the aspect of a Religion, but the transition was inevitable. A

Doctrine which furnished an explanation of the World, of Man, and of Society, which renovated education, and organised social relations, above all which established a Spiritual Power, was in all its chief functions identical with a Religion. 'Les positivistes sont aujourd'hui,' he said, 'les seuls qui, plaçant le problème spirituel avant la recherche temporelle, fondent la réorganisation industrielle sur la rénovation intellectuelle et morale. Tous les autres réformateurs s'accordent au contraire à régler immédiatement la société matérielle sans avoir aucunement discipliné les opinions et les mœurs.' The discipline of opinion is to be effected by the Philosophy which furnishes a common Faith, in furnishing a homogeneous explanation of the external order of existences; the discipline of conduct is to be effected by a religious conception of our duties. This conception of our duties naturally emerges from a consideration of the laws of social evolution, since 'l'avenir que nous voulons préparer résulte essentiellement d'un passé que nous ne pouvons changer.'

The Positive Religion claims to resume and complete all previous Religions, just as the Positive Philosophy resumes and completes all previous Philosophies. It resembles them in purpose, it differs from them in having a basis of demonstrated truth. Widely as the various creeds may be separated, they are essentially combined by Positivism, which considers each in reference to its local and temporary destination, as the expression of one stage of human evolution. 'Il n'existe au fond qu'une seule religion à la fois universelle et définitive, vers laquelle tendirent de plus en plus les synthèses partielles et provisoires, autant que le comportaient les situations correspondantes.' No sooner was the religion of Humanity distinctly conceived than the history of Religion seemed suddenly illuminated, as the story of one aim becoming more and more definite: everywhere the same tendency was observable: everywhere the ideal of *human* nature usurping more and more of the province primitively assigned to supernatural powers: the gods, always exaggerations of human powers and passions, became more and more personifications of

what was most admirable and loveable in human nature, till, in Christianity, there emerged the avowed Ideal Man.

It is therefore an ungenerous and misplaced reproach so often sneeringly cast upon Comte that he has enriched his religion by incorporating largely the elements of Christianity. It is because Christianity was the highest and latest development of religious thought, and because it brought into pre-eminence the human element contained in all religions, that it was the effectual preparation for a religion of Humanity. Comte therefore, whose aim it was to extricate from the whole past experience of the race whatever was in harmony with the development of our higher nature, could not but largely incorporate Christian teaching in his own synthesis. And thus it is that apart from certain metaphysical doctrines—very lightly held by most minds—there is little in the conceptions of the most enlightened Christian which is not identical with Positivism; or, conversely, there is little in Positivism which Christians do not or cannot cordially accept in all that relates to this life. The main distinction lies in this, that Positivism leaves less influence to the avowedly selfish motives.

Unhappily Comte did not confine himself to preaching a noble moral doctrine, but irritated his antagonists and perplexed his admirers by a variety of particular prescriptions, which gratified his love of systematisation. These are regarded as absurd or worse; and the public, ever ready to fasten upon details and to neglect essentials, quarrel over these particular prescriptions, declaim against them, and laugh at them, as if the Religion of Humanity meant nothing more. It is the spectacle constantly before our eyes when in the squabbles about Ritualism, men forget that they are Christians.

Two things every Religion must do if it is to endure: it must satisfy the intellect, and regulate the feelings. To satisfy the intellect, it must furnish an explanation of the World and Society such as enables us to understand, and by understanding to modify, the External Order to which

our existence is subordinate. To regulate the feelings, it must furnish an explanation of Man, such as enables us to understand, and, by understanding, adapt ourselves to the Internal Order which constitutes the moral life. How far Positivism at present answers to such demands is a matter for debate. That it claims to answer them is enough to arrest serious attention. So much is clear: that whenever the present intellectual anarchy is replaced by a common Faith, whenever men have a system of beliefs respecting the universe and their relation to it, which resting on demonstration admits of no dispute, then—alas! the prospect seems far distant—will arise a Polity which also will admit of no dissent. Then will Philosophy be transformed into Religion.

Meanwhile anarchy continues, and the Faith is slow in spreading.

## THE PRESENT CONDITION OF PHILOSOPHY.

**H**ITHERTO the History of Philosophy has been that of a long period of preparation. A new era dawns with the transformation of Science into Philosophy. Henceforward History will record development, not revolution—convergence of effort, not conflict. Each science has had its period of preparation, during which knowledge was accumulated, but no presiding conceptions gave unity to researches, no fixed methods enabled all men to assist in building one temple. Then came the change: each science was ‘constituted,’ separated from Common Knowledge, and the efforts of all labourers were convergent, the development was continuous. The constitution of the Positive Philosophy closes the period of preparation, and opens the period of evolution. This system is distinguished from all philosophical systems hitherto propounded in that it accepts from the special sciences the Methods they have employed and the Results they have attained, thus presenting an expression and summary of the whole of human effort: instead of following the old plan of constructing a system and then applying its Method and Results to the special inquiries of the sciences. It is far, very far from complete as a Doctrine. It will have to undergo many enlargements and modifications, advancing with the progress of discovery, and adapting itself flexibly to all the changes of scientific knowledge. But while it will thus need and will absorb the labours of future generations, it will continue in the same path, undisturbed by conflicts of principles.

This prophecy is not made in forgetfulness of the fact that at present the Doctrine has no very extensive acceptance, and

that even positive thinkers are not always willing to accept it. Hipparchus and Bichât found lukewarm adherents among the astronomers and biologists of their day, and fierce antagonists among the philosophers; but the rolling years brought light into men's minds; and the Positive Philosophy will force its way to empire, in spite of sceptics and opponents. It must do so, because its only rivals are Theological Philosophy and Metaphysical Philosophy, and these, after a long reign, have irretrievably lost their supremacy in every department where they have been confronted with Science. No sooner was victorious Science transformed into a Philosophy than the rivalry was virtually at an end. Thus, although Comte may come to be as antiquated as Hipparchus, and as far behind the knowledge of the day as Bichât now is, the Positive Philosophy will henceforth reign undisturbed.

In the story which these pages have told, there has been something like a demonstration of the incompetence of the Method upon which all metaphysical inquiries proceed. The urgent need of the Positive Philosophy was thus made apparent. If the Past points to the necessity for a homogeneous and all-embracing Doctrine, what indications are there in the Present of a speedy realisation of that aim? To answer this question, a volume might profitably be employed. In the few pages still at command, I can only briefly touch on it.

In France, at first sight, the signs seem unfavourable, since what little speculative activity exists there (out of Science) is markedly opposed to the positive spirit. The reaction against the 18th century still continues, and 'Materialism' is still the bugbear erected to warn men away from positive tendencies. In Germany, on the other hand, the old spiritualism is daily falling into discredit, and what are called materialistic opinions are rising into popularity. Nay, even in England there is no mistaking the strong current towards positive ideas, in spite of our theological impatience of whatever can be stigmatised as Materialism.

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Materialism is an ugly word, which *connotes* certain opinions of very questionable validity held by some writers, and opinions both silly and immoral which are wantonly *attributed* to these writers by rash and reckless polemicists. Be their opinions, however, what they may, the materialists have at least this important advantage, that they strive to get rid of all metaphysical entities, and seek an explanation of phenomena in the laws of phenomena. Their doctrine may be, as I think it is, truncated and imperfect; words and vague generalities are too often made to supply the place of distinct conceptions; but the opinions should be refuted as false, not denounced as dangerous. Research is arduous enough without our obstructing the path with bugbears. If materialistic opinions are erroneous, they are dangerous to the extent of their erroneousness; whereas most men declare these opinions to be erroneous because they believe them to be dangerous. Against this mode of warfare philosophers are bound to protest. It is an effective mode, and therefore should be condemned. Men may, unhappily, be frightened from the truth and cajoled into error;\* and in France the cajolery has been openly avowed, Victor Cousin frankly appealing to the 'patriotism' of his audience in favour of 'nos belles doctrines.'

The reaction against the Philosophy of the Eighteenth Century was less a reaction against a doctrine proved to be incompetent than against a doctrine believed to be the source of frightful immorality. The reaction was vigorous, because it was animated by the horror which agitated Europe at the excesses of the French Revolution. Associated in men's

\* M. TAINÉ, in one of his vivacious sallies, notices the small importance the public attaches to pure reasoning: 'Attaquez une psychologie par une psychologie; vous convaincrez quatre ou cinq esprits solitaires, mais la foule vous échappera. Au contraire, proclamez bien haut que si l'on continue à croire vos adversaires, Dieu, la vérité, la morale publique sont en danger; aussitôt l'auditoire dressera les oreilles: les propriétaires s'inquiéteront pour leur bien, les fonctionnaires pour leur place; on regardera les philosophes dénoncés avec défiance; par provision on ôtera leur livre des mains des enfants; le père de famille ne laissera plus manier à son fils un poison probable.'—*Les Philosophes français du XIX<sup>ème</sup> Siècle*, p. 5.



minds with the saturnalia of the Terror, the philosophical opinions of Condillac, Diderot, and Cabanis were held responsible for the crimes of the Convention; and what might be true in those opinions was flung aside with what was false, without discrimination, without analysis, in fierce impetuous disgust. Every opinion which had what was called 'a taint of materialism,' or seemed to point in that direction, was denounced as an opinion necessarily leading to the destruction of all Religion, Morality, and Government. Every opinion which seemed to point in the direction of spiritualism was eagerly welcomed, promulgated, and lauded; not because it was demonstrably true, but because it was supposed capable of preserving social order. And indeed when, looking back upon those times, we contemplate the misery and anarchy which disgraced what was an inevitable movement, and dimmed what was really noble in the movement, we can understand how many generous hearts and minds, fluctuating in perplexity, did instinctively revolt not only against the Revolution, but against all the principles which were ever invoked by the revolutionists. Looking at the matter from this distance we can see clearly enough that 'Materialism' had really no more to do with the Revolution than Christianity had to do with the hideous scenes in which the Anabaptists were actors; but we can understand how indelible was the association of Revolution with Materialism in the minds of that generation.

So profoundly influential has this association been, that a celebrated surgeon of our own day perilled his position by advocating the opinion, now almost universally accepted, but then generally shuddered at, that the brain is the 'organ' of the mind. He had to retract that opinion, which the pious Hartley and many others had advanced without offence. He had to retract it, not because it was scientifically untenable, but because it was declared to be morally dangerous.

The history of the reaction in France is very instructive, but it would require more space than can here be given

adequately to narrate the story.\* Four streams of influence converged into one, all starting from the same source, namely, horror at the Revolutionary excesses. The Catholics, with the great Joseph de Maistre and M. de Bonald at their head, appealed to the religious sentiments; the Royalists, with Chateaubriand and Madame de Staël, appealed to the monarchical and literary sentiments; the metaphysicians, with Laromiguière and Maine de Biran, and the moralists with Royer-Collard, one and all attacked the weak points of Sensationalism, and prepared the way for the enthusiastic reception of the Scotch and German philosophies. A glance at almost any of these writers will suffice to convince the student that their main purpose is to defend morality and order, which they believe to be necessarily imperilled by the philosophy they attack. The appeals to the prejudices and sentiments are incessant. Eloquence is made to supply the deficiencies of argument; emotion takes the place of demonstration. The hearer is charmed, roused, dazzled. He learns to associate all the nobler sentiments with spiritualistic doctrines, and all grovelling ideas with materialistic doctrines; till the one school becomes inseparably linked in his mind with emotions of reverence for whatever is lofty, profound, and noble, and the other with emotions of contempt for whatever is shallow and unworthy. The leaders of the reaction were men of splendid talents, and their work was eminently successful. But now that the heats of controversy have cooled, and all these debates have become historical, we who look at them from a distance can find in them no philosophical progress, no new elements added which could assist the evolution of Philosophy, and form a broader basis for future monuments. In political and literary history these attempts would claim a conspicuous position; in the History of Philosophy they deserve mention only as having

\* The reader may consult on this topic DAMIRON, *Essai sur l'Histoire de la Philosophie en France au XIXième Siècle*; TAINÉ, *Les Philosophes français du XIXième Siècle*; and RAVAISSON, *Rapport sur la Philosophie en France au XIXième Siècle*.

made mankind aware of the limited nature of the eighteenth-century philosophy, and its extraordinary *lacunæ*. Their office was critical, and has been fulfilled.

One doctrine, and one alone, emerged from these attempts, and held for some time the position of a School. It made a noise in its day, but even the echoes have now become almost inaudible. A feebler doctrine scarcely ever obtained acquiescence; we must nevertheless bestow a few sentences on it to make our story complete. Eclecticism is dead, but it produced some good results, if only by the impetus it gave to historical research, and by the confirmation it gave, in its very weakness, to the conclusion that an *à priori* solution of transcendental problems is impossible. For Eclecticism was the last product of philosophical speculation, the gathering together of all that philosophers had achieved, and the evolution from these separate achievements of one final doctrine,—which final doctrine is itself rejected.

Victor Cousin and Thomas Jouffroy are the chiefs of this School: one a brilliant rhetorician utterly destitute of originality, the other a sincere thinker, whose merits have been thrown into the shade by his brilliant colleague. As a man of letters, M. Cousin deserves the respect which attends his name, if we except the more than questionable use which he has made of the labours of pupils and assistants without acknowledgment. However, our business is not with Cousin, but with Eclecticism. Royer-Collard introduced the principles of the Scotch school, to combat with them the principles of Sensationalism. Reid and Stewart were translated by Jouffroy, explained and developed by Royer-Collard, Jouffroy, and Cousin. The talents of these professors, aided by the tendency towards any reaction, made the Scotch philosophy dominant in France. But Victor Cousin's restless activity led him to the study of Kant:—and certain doctrines of the 'Königsberg sage' were preached by him with the same ardour as that which he had formerly devoted to the Scotch. As soon as the Parisians began to know something of Kant, M. Cousin started off to Alexandria for a

doctrine: he found one in Proclus. He edited Proclus; lectured on him; borrowed some of his ideas, and would have set him on the throne of philosophy, had the public been willing. A trip to Germany made him acquainted with the modern Proclus—Hegel. On his return to Paris he presented the public with as much of Hegel's doctrines as he could understand. His celebrated Eclecticism is nothing but a misconception of Hegel's *History of Philosophy*, fenced round with several plausible arguments.

Gifted with great oratorical power, flattering the prejudices and passion of the majority, tempted as most orators are to sacrifice everything to effect, and incapable, from native incapacity or from defective training, of gaining any clear insight, Victor Cousin by his qualities and defects rose to an eminence which was regrettable, because it overshadowed the efforts of nobler minds. He was the source of philosophical patronage, and he filled the chairs of France with professors who were his adherents, or who dared not openly expose his weakness. The consequence was, that, being crassly ignorant of Science, he kept Philosophy aloof from all scientific influences. The progress of centuries was ignored, and the methods of Scholasticism were once more brought into vogue. A painful cant of 'question begging' eloquence supplied the place of research. The clear, precise genius of France was for a time ashamed of its clearness, and in sheer terror of being thought superficial and immoral rejected the aid of Science, and went maundering on about *le Moi, l'Œil interne, l'Infini, le Vrai, le Beau, et le Bien* in a pitiable manner.

Among the productions of late years which deserve serious attention, may be named the two works of M. Cournot, the Logic of M. Delbœuf, and the Essays of M. Renouvier.\* The most remarkable of all the recent productions, is undoubtedly the work of M. Taine,† wherein he has resumed with French

\* COURNOT: *Essai sur les fondements de nos Connaissances*, 2 vols. 1851; and *Traité de l'enchaînement des Idées fondamentales dans les sciences et dans l'histoire*, 2 vols. 1861; DELBŒUF: *Essai de Logique scientifique*, 1865; RENOUVIER: *Essais de Critique générale*, 1854.

† TAINE: *De l'Intelligence*, 2 vols. 1870.

clearness and his own felicity of style, some of the best established results of psychological research in England and Germany, uniting Mill, Bain, and Spencer, with Herbart, Helmholtz, and Wundt. It is indeed a matter of surprise to see how, after following these leaders through the greater part of his work, he endeavours at the close to adopt Hegel's principles, and present them as a basis for a future Metaphysic. But whether the reader agree or disagree with the views M. Taine puts forth, he will be interested throughout, and always stimulated to re-investigation of the problems.

In Italy the philosophic activity is almost exclusively metaphysical, and mainly directed by Theology. There is a centre of Hegelianism at Naples, of which M. Vera is the leader; and a small section of reactionists against all Theology, of which Signor Franchi may be regarded as the type.\* But I only know one philosophic work that has any positive tendency, and that is the very remarkable treatise by the Padre Secchi of Rome,† which no one interested in the modern doctrine of the correlation of the Physical Forces should neglect. A sketch of the present state of philosophy has been given by Signor Ferrari,‡ but I cannot speak as to its value.

In Germany, so long the home of Metaphysics, the movement has for some time past been decidedly towards positivism. 'The fall of Hegelianism,' says Haym, 'is connected with the sense of deadness generally in philosophy.'§ How could it be otherwise? So great a failure of such exulting hopes, necessarily led to a despair of speculation. The majority turned impatiently away from researches which landed every one in Scepticism or Absurdity, and gave their attention to Science, which promised less, but fulfilled so much more. There was, and is still, a small minority unwilling to relinquish Speculation. Nor can they be blamed.

\* FRANCHI: *La Filosofia delle Scuole Italiane*. 1863.

† SECCHI: *L'Unità delle Forze fisiche; saggio di filosofia naturale*. 1864.

‡ FERRARI: *Essai sur l'Histoire de la Phil. en Italie au XIXième Siècle*, 2 vols. 1869.

§ HAYM: *Hegel und seine Zeit*, p. 5.

If Speculation manifestly failed, the causes of its failure have not been adequately revealed; and hence there are still ardent soldiers ready again and again to join the forlorn hope. Not seeing that the method of Metaphysics is one on which no certainty can be reached, the seekers continue on the old path instead of trying a new path; they retrace the steps of their predecessors to discover, if possible, some bye-path that had been overlooked. This explains the revival of interest in Kant, Herbart, Schopenhauer, and Leibnitz. Unlike Science, which never returns upon a refuted error, never reoccupies abandoned positions, Metaphysic naturally returns to its forsaken idols, burning fresh incense on their altars. Not being verifiable, Metaphysic is not refutable. Observe, moreover, that whereas Science is cosmopolitan, Metaphysic is national. It would be ridiculous to speak of English Astronomy, German Physiology, Italian Physics, or French Chemistry, except as illustrating the state of these cosmopolitan sciences in the several countries; and a work on one of these sciences that was not intelligible in all countries, an experiment that was only valid in France, and not in England, Germany, and Italy, would be at once put out of court. Not so with Metaphysical Philosophy. The Germans boast that they, and they alone, possess a philosophy; and it is true that we can speak of *German* Philosophy, as we speak of Chinese Religion, the dogmas and rites of which are to other nations unintelligible or absurd. Only by dint of patient preparation can the most philosophical Englishman, Frenchman, or Italian, understand German philosophy; its terminology, its maxims, its assumptions, its proofs, lie remote from the sphere of his thoughts. On the other hand, the German regards with undisguised contempt the efforts of all other nations. He considers that he has a Calculus where others have only a Multiplication Table.

Nevertheless it is as I said; Germany is awakening to the conviction that Science must displace Metaphysic. Ontology finds few cultivators, and Psychology calls itself

a *Naturwissenschaft*, and very strenuously seeks to discover the organic mechanism of thought.\* The break up of the Hegelian school was coincident with the popularity of the Herbartian, or what may be called the school of mathematical metaphysicians; and the disciples have mainly distinguished themselves by their assaults on the *à priori* Method, the destruction of which is the necessary prelude to Positivism. Fichte the younger tells us that 'since the systems which aimed at the attainment of absolute knowledge have died out, and the Kantian maxim *that we can only comprehend truth as it stands in relation to human nature* has been reintroduced, it has become evident that all philosophical problems must be placed under the control of psychology. This is the essential character of that German speculation which has sprung up since the time of Schelling and Hegel. . . . We do not mean that any particular psychological doctrine (whether that of Kant, Fries, or Herbart) has been *finally* established, but simply that the science of the human mind and the laws of its intelligence must be made the universal starting point of philosophy.' †

If we examine the psychological writings of the day, we shall be struck with the change which has come over German Philosophy, since even the writers who are still hampered by metaphysical trammels are surprisingly eager to borrow all the aid they can from Science, while one and all see the absolute necessity of detecting in mental phenomena the determining physiological processes. And this tendency is still more visible in the outburst of Materialism which

\* Among the most remarkable works are WAITZ: *Lehrbuch der Psychologie als Naturwissenschaft*, 1849; LOTZE: *Medicinische Psychologie*, 1852; FECHNER: *Elemente der Psychophysik*, 1860; WUNDT: *Vorlesungen über die Menschen und Thierseele*, 1863; WUNDT: *Beiträge zur Theorie der Sinneswahrnehmung*, 1862; and the researches of HELMHOLTZ: *Handbuch der physiologischen Optik*, 2nd edit. 1867. Some of the results of German psychological investigations will be found lucidly presented in J. D. MORELL'S *Introduction to Mental Philosophy on the Inductive Method*, 1862.

† J. H. FICHTE: *Contributions to Mental Philosophy*. Translated by J. D. MORELL, 1860, p. 88.

took place some eighteen years ago, recalling the old days of theological controversy.

In 1852, Moleschott, the physiologist, published a remarkable book, *Der Kreislauf des Lebens*, mainly directed against Liebig's physiological errors. It describes in graphic and popular style the 'circle of matter' from the mineral world to the vegetal world, and from the vegetal world to the animal, and from the animal to the psychical world. The psychical? Even so. Moleschott is a frank materialist, admitting no realities but Matter and Force, two inseparable ideas. All the phenomena of Life and Mind he relegates to the changes of Matter. In his chapter on Force, he attacks the old metaphysical conception of Force (*Kraft*) as an independent Entity, reducing it simply to the properties of Matter. As we know Matter only through its properties, and never know the properties in the absence of Matter, the conclusion is 'kein Stoff ohne Kraft, keine Kraft ohne Stoff: no Matter without Force, no Force without Matter.'

The book created an uproar. In the same year, Karl Vogt, the celebrated naturalist, published his *Bilder aus dem Thierleben*. Many who forgave Vogt's red republicanism in consideration of his researches in Embryology, especially of the salmon tribe, were startled out of their tolerance when they found him, in an essay on the souls of animals, declaring that men are only animals, and that 'thought stands in the same relation to the brain as the bile to the liver.' Of course he meant nothing so extravagant as the words imply; and he afterwards declared that his meaning simply was the meaning generally accepted respecting thought as a function of the brain. But like Proudhon's famous pistol shot—*la propriété c'est le vol*—the noise of this formula startled the world. The essay was unhappily one unworthy of such a man as Vogt: flippant and fragmentary, it could only serve to exasperate, not to convince. Nevertheless, so ready were men's minds to be stirred on this subject, that even this slight concussion hastened the general outbreak, and Rudolph Wagner (May 1853) wrote a letter to the



newspapers, confessing that he discontinued the publication of his *Physiologische Briefe* because of the 'uproar and disgust' excited by his denunciation of Materialism, and by his unpopular views on the relations of Faith and Knowledge.

The uproar continued, and in 1854 Wagner declared his intention of discussing the question of a 'special soul substance' at the Göttingen Congress of physiologists. The challenge was gladly accepted by Ludwig; and Congress was alive with expectation. But Wagner was either too unwell to attend, or, as opponents aver, shrank from the discussion. At any rate it was quite clear that he would have found small support: 'The reader may form a conception of the intellectual tendencies of men of science on this question when he reflects on the fact that among five hundred persons present, not one single voice was raised in favour of the spiritualistic philosophy.'\*

In the same year Wagner appealed to the wide public in an essay on Faith and Knowledge (*Glauben und Wissen*), in which he declared that in matters of Faith he thought with the poorest charcoal-burner, but in matters of Knowledge he adopted all the results of science. Vogt was roused. He replied in a terrible pamphlet: 'The Creed of a Charcoal-burner versus Science' (*Köhlerglaube und Wissenschaft*, 1855). This was succeeded by Büchner's famous 'Matter and Force' (*Kraft und Stoff*), which rapidly ran through seven or eight editions, and was for a time the 'best abused' book in Europe. Soon afterwards came Czolbe's *Neue Darstellung des Sensualismus*, which may be called the *Système de la Nature* of the nineteenth century. I cannot here enumerate the books and pamphlets which appeared on this subject; much less give any exposition of their views. It is enough to note the fact of the conflict, because even the most considerable opponents of Materialism, such as Wagner, Lotze, and Fichte, were quite willing to discuss the question on purely scientific

\* *Deutsches Museum*, edited by PRUTZ, 1854, No. 47.

grounds: and if they oppose the materialist school, it was because they saw, and I think justly saw, the failure of that school to give a satisfactory solution either of cosmical or psychical problems.

The intellectual ferment was beneficial. The materialists claimed and received a wide-spread sympathy in their efforts to root out the lingering Scholasticism, which obstructed Science, and prevented the elaboration of a true Philosophy. They were applauded also for their resistance to official orthodoxy and compromise. They pointed to the vanity of ontological systems, and called upon men to enter fearlessly on the path of objective inquiry. They popularised many of the results of Science. It was a great gain to the majority, even of scientific men, and still more of philosophers, to learn, as they learned from Dubois-Reymond \* and Moleschott, that Force was not an Entity which ruled passive Matter, but that 'both were abstractions from things, each completing the other, each presupposing the other.' Force being the dynamical aspect of Matter, as Matter is the statical aspect of Force.

But while the public, impatient of Metaphysics, sympathised with this spirit, and applauded its revolutionary fervour, cautious, circumspect men of science could not but object to a rough-and-ready mode of settling intricate questions, which left all the essential difficulties untouched. They felt that only a first step had been taken in getting rid of the metaphysical entities; and that not much advantage was gained when these were replaced by mere phrases.

It is the sense of unexplained difficulties which keeps many scientific men from adopting Materialism, even when they sympathise with the leading purpose of the materialists. We need but a more thorough application of the biological Method to disclose that the materialist view is quite as imperfect as the spiritualist view. If the hypothesis of a spirit is merely the introduction of a misleading phrase, which

\* DUBOIS-REYMOND: *Untersuchungen über thierische Electricität*, 1848, i. 38.  
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pretends to explain the phenomena by naming them, not less unphilosophical is the introduction of the famous formula respecting the brain as the organ of the mind, unaccompanied by any clear statement of what an 'organ' is, or what is included under the complex term 'mind.' If 'mind' is the collective name for a large group of functions, sensitive, emotive, intellective, and active, Biology must reject altogether the exclusive assignment of these functions to the brain, and must declare that to call the brain 'the organ of the mind' is about as legitimate as to call the heart 'the organ of life.'

If the brain is regarded simply as one of the factors in mental manifestations, the most important it may be, then Biology demands that the mechanism be displayed, and that the cerebral processes on which mental actions depend be exhibited in some such orderly connection as that which displays the part played by the intestinal canal in digestion, or the osseous and muscular structures in locomotion. Has any one done this? No one has attempted it. Materialism is powerful in as far as it invokes the Methods of Science, and proclaims the old scholastic habits of thought unsuited to our age. The sympathy it has excited, in spite of its narrowness, is a sign of the times; and when we couple with it the visible decay of all metaphysical systems, and the visible extension of Science, we cannot doubt that in Germany also the Positive Philosophy must ere long prevail, being as it is the only system which can embrace all tendencies and furnish a homogeneous doctrine of the World, Society, and Man.

Nor are the signs less hopeful in England. An impatience of Metaphysics has long existed—an impatience not always, indeed, grounded on a clear recognition of the reasons which justify it, but sustained by the observation of repeated failure on the part of Metaphysics, and of increasing success on the part of Positive Science. A painful degree of insincerity, and an uneasy alacrity in catching at any compromise which may for the nonce 'accommodate' the radically incompatible con-

clusions of Theology and Science, have always been, and continue to be, exhibited. Men wish to think, or wish the world to believe they think, that both Theology and Science may be true; meanwhile they steadily refuse to give up Science, and thus, at whatever cost to consistency, the tendency towards a thorough adoption of the positive point of view is manifestly growing. Metaphysic is out of court. Neither word nor thing finds favour. Ferrier's *Institutes of Metaphysics*, one of the most remarkable books of our time, is like a lonely obelisk on the broad flat plain: there are not even cairns beside it. The one great metaphysician who has formed a school, Sir William Hamilton, energetically disclaimed all the pretensions of Ontology, and devoted himself to the explanation of the conditions of knowledge. His influence, aided by that of Mr. Mansel and others, has been purely destructive. If these distinguished writers are indisposed to adopt the positive point of view, they have at least effectively prepared for its future adoption by their demonstration of the futility of metaphysical speculation.

Turning from the Hamiltonian school to the thinker who has exercised the deepest and widest influence on our generation, Mr. Stuart Mill, we see an unmistakable illustration of the tendency of English thought to set aside theological and metaphysical explanations as no longer in harmony with present knowledge. Mr. Mill is a declared adherent of the Positive Philosophy: though not regarding that Philosophy as by any means perfect, nor disposed to accept every conclusion put forward by Comte, he has recognised the truth of the leading principles, and has largely contributed to their diffusion. It is characteristic of our condition that to the vast body of cultivated Englishmen his *Logic* has sufficed for all their instruction in Philosophy. The very celebrity of that work absolves me from further notice of it in this rapid sketch. Nor is it necessary to do more than mention his very remarkable *Examination of the Philosophy of Sir W. Hamilton*, which in many ways must help the education of our countrymen. The republication of his father's *Analysis*

of the *Human Mind*, with abundant annotations by himself, Professor Bain, Mr. Grote, and Mr. Findlater (1869), has been a real service to Psychology. The clear and penetrating intellect of James Mill is shown to great advantage in this work; while many shortcomings and errors of the *Analysis* are rectified in the annotations, so as to make the book a good representative of the Association School of Psychology.

Another eminent thinker of the positive school is Professor Bain, who has restricted himself to Psychology, but whose writings display a thorough mastery of scientific Method, and a familiarity with all the sciences. In *The Senses and the Intellect* (3rd edit., 1865), in *The Emotions and the Will* (3rd edit., 1868), and in the *Logic: Inductive and Deductive* (1870), he has availed himself of much that has been discovered respecting the nervous mechanism, and has interpreted it by the light of patient psychological analysis. His pages are rich in information and suggestion. No one has more successfully exhibited the evolution of intellect even in the earliest phenomena of sensation: in Sensibility he discloses the germ of Discrimination, and in Discrimination the germ of all Cognition. Nor has any one thrown such steady light upon the nature of voluntary movements, and the physiological process on which they depend.

It is a matter of regret to me that my space will not admit a fuller account of these works, which assuredly will mark our epoch; but I may point to one general conclusion bearing on my present argument, and it is this: The one department of inquiry still in favour which belonged of old to Metaphysics is the department of Psychology, and in this the only cultivators who have a large following are positive thinkers, namely, Professor Bain and Mr. Herbert Spencer.

The last-named writer is one daily rising into wider influence. In spite of the internecine warfare between his principles and the theological and metaphysical principles officially admitted, even antagonists are compelled to admit:


the force and clearness of his genius, the extent and profundity of his scientific knowledge. It is questionable whether any thinker of finer calibre has appeared in our country; although the future alone can determine the position he is to assume in History. At present he is too close to us for an accurate estimate; and, moreover, to this end his system should be before us in its entirety, whereas only two parts—*First Principles* (1862) and *The Principles of Biology* (1864–7) and the first volume of the *Principles of Psychology*—have as yet appeared.\* He alone of British thinkers has organised a System of Philosophy. Seeing that he adopts the positive Method, is thoroughly imbued with the positive spirit, and constructs his system solely out of the positive sciences, one cannot but raise the question, What is his relation to the Positive Philosophy? This question becomes the more pertinent because Mr. Spencer has on several occasions expressed his dissent from Comte's views, sometimes indeed exaggerating the amount of difference in vindicating his unquestionable originality, and implying an antagonism which does not exist. Even if I thought Mr. Spencer always in the right where he opposes Comte (and I am very far from thinking so), I should still claim him as a puissant ally of the Positive Philosophy, which is something greater than Comte—being the product of all History. This Philosophy will undergo many and important modifications; the whole tendency of Molecular Physics as now cultivated is one which must finally introduce such modifications. Mr. Spencer may impress on its details important changes, but he will nevertheless no more disturb the integrity of the Positive Philosophy than Schwann by his cell-theory, or Dubois-Reymond by his discovery of the muscular currents, disturbed the integrity of Biology. Comte was the first to create that Philosophy, as Bichât created Biology: successors may gradually displace many of the provisional ideas out of

\* Mr. SPENCER's other works are *Social Statics* (1851), *Principles of Psychology* (1855), two volumes of *Essays*, a small volume on *Education*, and a pamphlet on *The Classification of the Sciences*.

which these creations were formed, but the Method and the general structure will remain unalterable.

Mr. Spencer is unequivocally a positive philosopher, however he may repudiate being considered a disciple of Comte. His object is that of the Positive Philosophy—namely, the organisation into a harmonious Doctrine of all the highest generalities of Science by the application of the positive Method, and the complete displacement of Theology and Metaphysics. The peculiar character he impresses on it by his thorough working out in detail of the Law of Evolution, a law which Schelling said was the peculiar creation of Modern Thought, and which the Germans have worked out with great success in almost every direction, constitutes a real claim to our admiration; but the Positive Philosophy will absorb all his discoveries, as it will absorb all future discoveries made on its Method and in its spirit; rejecting certain *a priori* and teleological tendencies which he sometimes manifests, and disregarding his failures as it disregards the failures of Comte and every other seeker.

Am I claiming too much for the Positive Philosophy in claiming for it whatever the future may produce? To claim it for Comte would indeed be preposterous; but to claim it for that Philosophy which it is Comte's immortal glory to have extricated from the products of all the past, is only to claim it for HUMANITY.



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

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